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A B S T R A CT
A key question in the central-local relationship is ‘what is the most appropriate 
performance framework to deliver service improvements?’ The role of Policy 
Agreements in this regard had not previously been explored. Also, when 
considered with studies on similar organisational pay-for-performance 
schemes in England, the research could provide evidence as to the drivers of 
service improvement in different contexts and help maximise the benefits of 
devolution whilst guarding against the forces of isolationism.
Governments have assumed PRP can be transferred from the individual to 
the organisational level without any understanding of the implications or 
knowledge of actual impact. In addition, evidence relating to the effectiveness 
of individual schemes is inconclusive. Finally, this is an under-researched 
area and understanding of organisational schemes could be enhanced by 
considering knowledge relating to individual PRP.
Policy evaluation literature suggests the impact of policies should be 
considered in relation to their final outcome and by developing a detailed 
understanding of the implementation process, as the outcome may not have 
been achieved in the way in which it was conceptualised. An evaluation 
model was therefore developed based on a review of literature relating to 
target setting in the public sector, evaluations of similar English schemes and 
theory and practice relating to individual PRP, in particular its use in the public 
sector. This unique lens was used to design the research instruments, a 
postal questionnaire and structured interviews.
The analysis identified that some objectives of Policy Agreements were 
partially met and some were not met at all, resulting in several lessons for 
practice. Implications for theory were identified relating to central-local 
relations and organisational performance management schemes in the public 
sector. It was concluded that the governmental assumption of the 
transferability of PRP from the individual to the organisational level is 
questionable in terms of both robustness and appropriateness.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
In the United Kingdom, successive national governments of different political 
persuasions have wrestled with the dilemma of central-local relations. The 
paradigm of central control has arguably fuelled local government policies 
including; ‘nationalisation’ of the business rate, compulsory competitive 
tendering, the right to buy, strict controls over finances such as capping of 
council tax and hypothecation of funding, a plethora of targets, increased 
levels of inspection and regulation and Best Value. All have been intended to 
ensure that local authorities deliver national policies either by direct control or 
by reducing local power bases and discretion. Whilst the ‘localism’ paradigm 
argues this undermines local democracy and saps energy into compliance 
which could be better employed in improving service delivery.
The key question is, therefore, how does one organisation, in this case central 
or devolved government, exert the appropriate kind of influence over another, 
local authorities, to improve performance and ensure its own objectives are 
delivered, whilst still creating an environment where local democracy can 
exercise sufficient discretion and, generate creativity and energy for service 
improvement beyond any impetus which comes with a compliance culture? 
Wilson (2001) frames this as achieving a balance between diversity and 
uniformity.
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Local Government Modernisation
When the Labour Government came to power in 1997, it began a programme 
of ‘modernising’ local government. This was branded as a new dawn for 
central-local relations -  what matters is what works (Benington, 2000). The 
agenda had three main pillars: revitalising local democracy by means of a 
series of reforms to the democratic structures of local authorities; 
championing community leadership; and, the introduction of ‘Best Value’, a 
regime to drive the continuous improvement of local authority services (DETR, 
1998 and Welsh Office, 1998). This was accompanied by an increased focus 
on inspection and regulation (Boyne, 2000).
Devolved Government in Wales
In Wales, the local government modernisation agenda was set against the 
context of devolution. The establishment of the National Assembly in 1999 
marked perhaps the greatest ever change in the governance of the country 
(Patchett, 2000; Laffin and Thomas, 2000). The creation of devolved 
government meant the nature of the central-local relationship changed, 
becoming closer and more mutual (Laffin, 2004; Jeffery, 2006). It is perceived 
as the key relationship in the governance of Wales with an important inter­
dependency. The Assembly Government is dependent on local authorities for 
the delivery of many of its key national policy objectives, whilst local 
authorities are dependent on the Assembly Government to determine their 
policy, funding, governance and performance frameworks (Essex, 1998; 
Andrews and Martin, 2007).
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Performance Improvement in Local Government in Wales
The framework which establishes the parameters of the performance 
management system has two main facets: the Wales Programme for 
Improvement (W PI) and Policy Agreements. The Best Value regime and the 
Wales Programme for Improvement had no financial incentives but, in 2000 
the UK Government announced the development of Local Public Service 
Agreements (LPSAs). The first round included a reward element of up to 
2.5% of the local authority’s revenue budget for hitting 12 targets negotiated 
with central government. This was followed by the development of Policy 
Agreements in Wales which had a reward of £40 million to be distributed 
amongst the 22 Welsh authorities. Both were regimes of participation in 
target setting with a financial reward.
Policy Agreements set out agreed baselines and service improvement targets 
to be met at the end of a three-year period. Each of the 22 local authorities 
had its own Agreement reflecting different baselines. The incentive/reward 
took the form of Performance Improvement Grant (PIG) to be awarded on the 
basis of an evaluation protocol collectively agreed by the local authorities. In 
theory, PIG could have been withheld if performance was not satisfactory.
This performance framework raises the question - ‘what is the role of Policy 
Agreements in the relationship between the Welsh Assembly Government 
and local authorities?’ One of the aims was to improve service delivery but, 
others have been identified such as culture change, both centrally and locally 
and, a more coordinated and improved relationship between the Assembly
3
and local authorities (National Assembly for Wales/Welsh Local Government 
Association, 2000).
Policy Evaluation
Policy evaluation theory stresses the importance of learning not only from 
what was done but how it was done (Lewis, 2001; Davies, 1999; Blalock, 
1999; Chelimsky, 1997, Drakeford, 2006; and Jeffery, 2006). A gap in 
learning and understanding in relation to this period therefore exists, as no 
formal evaluation of the effectiveness of Policy Agreements in achieving the 
desired performance impacts and process outcomes, including their 
contribution to central-local relations, has ever been commissioned by the 
Welsh Assembly Government or other stakeholders. The last substantial 
piece of research in the area was conducted in 2002 (Laffin, Taylor and 
Thomas, 2002) which did not explore Policy Agreements in depth but, 
recognised their potential contribution to changing the nature of the central- 
local relationship. This means that valuable lessons and insights have not 
been captured and disseminated.
Again with a focus on the ‘how’, Martin and Andrews (2009) suggest that it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to compare service performance across 
devolved administrations because of differences in performance frameworks 
but, qualitative data could provide evidence to examine the extent and causes 
of regional variation. Likewise, Downe et al (2007) suggest that contextual 
research looking for the contingent factors leading to the success or otherwise 
of performance regimes in different parts of the UK will be important in
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establishing an assessment of the differential impact of the different regimes. 
Laffin (2009) notes that central-local relations in England have been a 
neglected topic for research in recent years and sets out a future research 
agenda. Studies which enable comparison with other UK administrations 
could therefore provide important insight and help mitigate the potentially 
negative effects of devolution, such as isolationism, identified by Hockridge 
(2006). He suggests that whilst devolution has led to substantial policy 
innovation, it could also lead to insularity; studies which look across regimes 
can therefore provide valuable insight for policy makers across the UK and 
beyond.
The Principles of Improving Performance
The tension in any performance regime, whether one aimed at improving 
individual or organisational performance, is that evidence suggests targets are 
unlikely to be achieved if they are imposed on organisations by superior 
bodies or imposed on staff by senior executives (Latham and Yukl, 1975; 
Locke and Latham, 2002; Boyne and Chen, 2006). In contrast, targets are 
more likely to be achieved if those responsible for doing so are motivated to 
apply energy and innovation in the right direction (Klein et al, 1999).
Boyne and Chen (2006) suggest there are two main ways of securing 
motivation: participation in setting targets and financial incentives for 
achieving them. They continue by identifying that no direct tests of whether 
participation moderates the relationship between targets and the performance 
of public organisations has been conducted and, that the role of financial
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incentives has not been explored directly in empirical studies of the impacts of 
targets upon public service performance. In respect of the latter, they suggest 
that evidence of the effect of financial rewards is provided by studies of 
employee performance related pay schemes in the private sector, where the 
effect seems to be positive but, caveat this by identifying that evidence in the 
public sector is more mixed.
Reiter et al (2006) suggest that pay-for-performance schemes are traditionally 
used as a means of directing the efforts of individuals and the effects of such 
schemes on organisational behaviour is an under-researched area. The 
concept of taking a system ‘designed’ for individuals and applying it at an 
organisational level is not new, as Hood (2007) suggests that Taylor’s work on 
scientific management in relation to individuals was adopted by Lenin and 
became central to soviet management and economics.
However, Reiter et al (2006) note that performance related pay schemes are 
being used at an organisational level by governments without any real 
understanding of whether they will elicit the same behaviours as they do or 
are intended to do at an individual level. They argue that in many cases the 
‘reward’ may never reach those responsible for delivering the performance 
and, therefore the effect may not be as strong. The development of such 
schemes in relation to local government in England (Local Public Service 
Agreements, Local Area Agreements), Scotland (Single Outcome 
Agreements) and Wales (Policy Agreements, Improvement Agreements) and
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in relation to health in England (CIPFA, 2008) means a potentially serious gap 
in knowledge and understanding is emerging.
As suggested by Boyne and Chen (2006), looking at inter-governmental 
performance systems through a lens based on theory and evidence in 
developing and implementing individual systems may provide new insight. 
For example, Sullivan (2008) states that the language of policy ‘levers’ and 
‘drivers’ implies an ability to engineer change through their application, but 
governance systems rely on human interaction, therefore lessons from the 
ways in which individuals relate to similar drivers and levers may provide 
valuable insight. Lapsley (2008) also notes the impact of human ‘frailties’ 
upon policy implementation. In addition, the ‘human’ aspects of the 
governance system may be of particular relevance to smaller countries such 
as Wales where the relationship between the centre and local is more 
‘personal’ and founded on face to face relationships between politicians and 
officers (Andrews and Martin, 2007).
Boyne and Chen (2006) suggest that literature on employee based PRP 
schemes could provide evidence for evaluating the impact of organisational 
financial incentives on performance. Reiter et al (2006) make a similar 
comparison between organisational and individual performance related pay 
schemes. However, all note this does not seem to have been tested either 
empirically or explored by means of any qualitative study. Therefore, an 
opportunity exists to explore whether the parameters of individual schemes 
operate in the same way at the organisational level. In addition, policy
7
evaluation theory suggests that it is important to identify a ‘theory of change’ 
in order to help establish why an intervention is expected to have the 
anticipated effects (Lewis, 2001; Connell and Kubisch, 1998).
Performance Related Pay and Performance Management
To undertake such a study it is necessary to develop an understanding of the 
theory and evidence relating to individual motivation, performance 
management and performance related pay. In light of the literature noted 
above, these have been identified as the potentially relevant areas to consider 
the effectiveness or otherwise of organisationally based pay-for-performance 
schemes such as Policy Agreements which include the negotiation of a 
performance contract with ‘agreed’ targets and the attachment of a financial 
reward.
Thesis Aims
The thesis aims to provide new, original insight and evidence in relation to the 
following;
• The effectiveness of the first round of Policy Agreements in relation to 
improving the performance of local authority services and delivering 
desired process outcomes;
• What worked and what did not in relation to the policy implementation 
of the first round of Policy Agreements;
• The contribution of the first round of Policy Agreements to the 
development of central-local relations in Wales during the period 2001- 
02 to 2003-04;
• Whether using a lens which includes the principles relating to 
performance management/PRP schemes for individuals, provides new 
insight into considering inter-governmental ‘pay-for-performance’ 
schemes and contributes to the development of theory in this regard, 
including whether the governmental assumption of transferability is 
robust and appropriate.
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These aims, if achieved, will enable the resulting implications for 
organisational performance management in the public sector theory and 
literature to be developed. This will also enable lessons for policy making in 
Wales to be identified and, provide evidence for comparison with other 
regimes in the UK thus enabling the benefits of devolution to be maximised 
whilst at the same time acting as a counterforce to isolationism. The former is 
becoming especially critical in Wales as the focus in the current stage of 
devolution is upon service improvement (Andrews and Martin, 2007).
Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 explores the pre-devolution nature of central-local relations (Hood, 
1991; Stewart, 2000; Walker 2000a and 2000b; Wilson, 2001; Jacobs, 1998; 
Kirkpatrick et al, 2005) and the local government modernisation agenda 
(Martin, 1999 and 2000; Benington, 2000; Boyne 1998 and 1999), in particular 
the development of performance regimes to drive change in the delivery of 
public services (Haubrich and McClean, 2006; Courty and Marschuke, 2007; 
Boyne and Law, 2005; Hood, 2007; Lapsley, 2008). This puts devolution in 
context.
The remainder of the chapter considers the nature of the relationship between 
central and local government in post-devolution Wales (Laffin and Thomas, 
2001; Hanlon, 2000; Griffiths, 1996; Essex, 1998) and identifies there has 
been a divergence both in the nature of the central-local relationship and 
policy with England (Laffin, 2004; Jeffery, 2006; Bradbury and Mitchell, 2005; 
Laffin et al, 2002; Drakeford, 2006; Martin and Webb, 2008). In particular
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there has been less reliance in Wales on ‘hard’ levers such as league tables 
to drive service improvement (Andrews and Martin, 2007).
It is identified that despite this divergence there has been no formal published 
evaluation of either the modernisation agenda as a whole or Policy 
Agreements. It is also identified that this limits the scope for learning both 
within Wales and between administrations in the UK and could lead to 
insularity (Downe et al, 2007; Hockridge, 2006; Andrews and Martin, 2009). 
In addition it is noted that policy evaluation and other literature (Lewis, 2001; 
Wilson, 2001) highlight the importance of governments learning from and 
understanding the policy implementation process. In Wales this is given new 
impetus by the focus of devolution shifting to the delivery of better services 
(Andrews and Martin, 2007).
Finally, the chapter provides a brief overview of the Welsh local government 
performance management system, highlighting the potential differences with 
England (Andrews et al, 2002). The chapter concludes by identifying that 
public pressure on central governments to be ‘seen to be doing something’ 
(Lapsley, 2008) means that despite criticisms and concerns, performance 
management and the use of targets as a means of driving service 
improvement in the public sector remain high on the agenda. The evidence 
from the use of these systems is then drawn together as a pre-cursor to the 
literature reviews in Chapters 3 and 4.
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Chapter 3 considers the development of inter-governmental performance 
management systems in England and Wales; Local Public Service 
Agreements (Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005; Boyne and Law, 2005; Young, 
2005) and Local Area Agreements (Gillanders and Ahmad, 2007; Brand, 
2008) in England and Policy Agreements in Wales (Laffin et al, 2002; Laffin, 
2004; Jeffery, 2006). There are no comprehensive, published evaluative 
studies of the first round of Policy Agreements in Wales, there are however, 
studies relating to the English system. The detail of the Welsh system was 
pieced together by review of relevant documentation and observation of key 
meetings by the researcher. The English studies identified a number of issues 
such as multiple objectives, differing perceptions amongst stakeholders, the 
importance of communication and trust and, a focus on outcomes which were 
also identified as present and/or desirable in the Welsh system. It was noted 
that this provides the opportunity to consider the impact of these in different 
contexts.
It was also noted that the English studies consider the impact of the financial 
incentive/reward on different local participants but again this has not been 
considered in different contexts or using a lens partially constructed from 
evidence relating to individual PRP schemes, neither has the robustness and 
appropriateness of the schemes been questioned (Boyne and Chen, 2006; 
Reiter et al, 2006). It is noted that this is an under-researched area and that 
governments are assuming the principles can be transferred from individual to 
organisational level without any real understanding or evidence as to their 
impact (Reiter et al, 2006).
l i
Chapter 4 therefore reviews the literature on individual performance 
management and PRP schemes, including motivation theories such as 
Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964) and Goal Setting Theory (Locke, 1968). In 
particular, it considers research surrounding the performance management of 
individuals using performance related pay (McNabb and Whitfield, 2007; 
Hendry et al, 2000; McCausland et al, 2008; Hammond, 2000). Much of this 
research is private sector based but, the chapter homes in on research which 
has been undertaken in the public sector (Waine, 2000; Reilly, 2003) so that 
factors such as the public sector ethos (Pratchett and Wingfield, 1996) and 
the role of public sector professions (Mahoney et al, 2004) can be considered.
The Chapter identifies that many of the schemes have objectives of cultural 
change as well as performance improvement (Clarke, 1995; Procter and 
Currie, 2004). The evidence as to the effectiveness of PRP schemes in 
motivating individuals and, whether PRP schemes result in improved 
organisational performance (however this might be defined) is inconclusive 
(Oliver, 1996; Purcell et al, 2000; Huselid, 1998). It also emerges that PRP 
schemes may have a ‘darker’ side which, from the employees’ perspective, 
may result in work intensification and increased levels of employee stress 
(Legge, 1998, 2005; Marchington and Grugulis, 2000).
Many common themes emerge with the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 
3. For example, driving culture change, the importance of communication and 
participation, the requirement to focus on the delivery of a few key outcomes 
which are set firmly not only within a coherent system of performance
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management but also within a coherent vision/set of strategies which the 
organisation is aiming to achieve, the creation of a shared vision and the 
search for mutuality of goals. Also important is consideration of the nature of 
the targets themselves, those which are too ambitious may have a 
demotivating effect and/or result in gaming and perverse incentives elsewhere 
in the ‘system’. The construct of the targets in terms of measuring the right 
things is also a common theme as is ensuring the cost/benefit of the scheme 
is in proportion. Finally, there is a shared theme relating to ‘supportive’ 
management, set in an environment of trust, being more likely to generate the 
desired results. Also, by comparing and contrasting the schemes at a 
principle level, it is further confirmed that the linking of performance to 
rewards is an under-researched area within the literature on organisational 
performance schemes in the public sector
The main difference is that whilst the use of targets and performance 
management considered in Chapter 2 mostly relies on the targets themselves 
to drive performance, individual (and by governmental assumption 
organisational, Reiter et al, 2006) PRP schemes attach a financial reward to 
further incentivise the achievement of purpose. PRP schemes are premised 
on Expectancy Theory which relies on strong links between effort and 
performance and, performance and rewards. These links may be difficult to 
establish at an individual level and, thus it may be extrapolated, the difficulties 
are potentially exacerbated at an organisational level in the public service 
where multiple individuals will be involved in the pursuit of the targets, other 
organisations may also be involved and, as noted in Chapter 2, the complexity
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of the environment makes the measurement of outcomes challenging. 
Consideration of the effectiveness of these links adds a new dimension to the 
evaluation of organisational ‘pay-for-performance’ schemes in the public 
sector.
Chapter 5 sets out the methodology and method applied in this thesis. It 
notes how evidence in respect of both the process and effects of Policy 
Agreements will provide an original contribution to knowledge and, that both 
deductive and inductive methods are used to establish this evidence and 
support each other. The deductive method is a postal questionnaire based on 
theory and lessons from practice identified from the review of literature in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The inductive method uses semi-structured interviews to 
provide ‘rich’ evidence on the process, to build evidence on the 
appropriateness and robustness of the governmental assumption of 
transferability of the principles of individual PRP schemes to organisational 
ones, and to triangulate and ameliorate deficiencies in the deductive method, 
such as response rates and the timing of the questionnaire distribution to 
enable evidence of the impact of Policy Agreements to be collected. To 
achieve the aims of the thesis the research question is defined as:
1Have Policy Agreements contributed to culture change and improved 
performance in the public sector in Wales?’
Evidence from Chapter 3 suggests the objectives of Policy Agreements were
multi-faceted. Performance impacts were desirable but, considering the
review of experience with LPSAs and LAAs in England, the development of
the Agreements themselves and literature on employee performance
agreements, process outcomes such as cultural change, alignment of local
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and national planning and priorities and, better relationships between central 
(devolved) and local government were also desirable. Six ‘sub’ questions 
were therefore developed.
RQi Have Policy Agreements helped to create a culture of ‘self-improvement’ 
in local authorities?
RQ2 Have Policy Agreements helped to change culture in the Welsh 
Assembly Government?
RQ3 Has the Policy Agreement process ‘added value’ to the relationship 
between the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities?
RQ4 Have Policy Agreements contributed to ‘cohesive’ strategic planning at 
national and local levels?
RQs Have Policy Agreements contributed to improved service performance in 
local authorities?
RQe Have Policy Agreements provided ‘value for money’?
Chapter 6 provides an overview of the postal questionnaire responses 
including; an analysis of basic descriptive statistics and identification of any 
statistically significant differences between respondent groups. The chapter 
also considers the qualitative evidence from respondents, in the form of 
comments returned with the questionnaires, as part of the analysis. The 
chapter identifies some areas for further exploration in Chapter 7 and 
highlights an emerging confusion amongst respondents as to the role of 
funding in the process.
The analysis of the interview data in Chapter 7 is framed in the context of the 
literature reviews in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and the analysis of the responses to 
the postal questionnaire in Chapter 6. It uses the interview data to undertake 
a preliminary assessment of whether or not the objectives of the Agreements 
were met, not met or partially met and identifies some key themes to be 
developed in the Chapter 9.
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Chapter 8 provides further evidence relating to the performance impacts of 
Policy Agreements by exploring the final performance of those services 
included in the Agreements. This is based on an analysis of the data 
collected from National Assembly for Wales Performance Indicators. It 
identifies that performance has improved, both in those services included in 
the Policy Agreements and those which are not. Performance has increased 
to a greater extent in those services included in the Agreements but, the 
improvement in service performance is ‘patchy’ across Wales. This analysis 
contains a number of caveats and limitations as to the robustness of any 
conclusions which might be drawn from a review of this data.
The Chapter also builds a multiple regression model using actual performance 
as the dependent variable and baseline performance and, the critical success 
factors, identified as statistically significant in multiple regression models used 
to ‘sift’ the critical success factors, as the independent variables. The 
limitations of the construction of the model and the interpretation of results are 
acknowledged. A number of factors were highlighted as significant in the 
models - the baseline performance, the role of the Assembly Government in 
constructively helping local authorities to improve performance (both positive) 
and, adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement process as a whole 
when reviewing targets and baselines (negative). In this model based on 
questionnaire responses from service managers variables relating to funding 
were not found to be significant. These findings provide some limited 
empirical evidence to support similar qualitative findings in the English 
context.
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Chapter 9 draws together the building of the evaluation model and identifies 
the limitations inherent in the research. The Chapter concludes that none of 
the objectives of Policy Agreements were met in their entirety. Some 
objectives were partially met while others were not met at all. Performance 
against the Policy Agreement baselines did improve but, it is noted it is not 
possible to conclude whether this was solely as a result of the Policy 
Agreement intervention as there was no control group and other interventions 
such as hypothecated grants were in operation during the period. In addition, 
the implementation process had several limitations which resulted in a shallow 
impact on process outcomes such as culture change and cohesive strategic 
planning between local and national government.
This means that the contribution of the Agreements to culture change and 
improved performance in the public sector in Wales was severely limited and 
the Agreements did not realise the potential identified for them by Laffin et al 
(2002). In respect of theory and practice relating to organisational 
performance schemes in the public sector, it was identified that the concept of 
allocating reward funding based on differential performance seemed 
incompatible with the prevailing context of the Welsh central-local relationship 
at that time. This caused a change to be effected in the allocation of the 
reward funding which further compounded the implementation failures and 
tainted the Agreement process.
However, this lack of rationality and politicisation of the process was also 
evidenced in the English system, as was the lack of significance of the
funding as a motivator and its undesirable impacts and inherent tensions. 
This applicability of the findings beyond Wales and the Policy Agreement 
initiative contributes to the development of theory relating to organisational 
pay-for-performance schemes by identifying the dangers of assuming 
rationality, the potential for politicisation of the process and the limited 
potential impact and undesirable effects of reward funding. Previous studies 
have not considered these issues in relation to organisational pay-for- 
performance schemes in the public sector.
In terms of practice, senior officers and politicians need to be involved in the 
process, both locally and nationally, otherwise it will become marginalised and 
key decisions are taken by junior and middle level officers in corporate 
centres. The operationalisation and design issues identified with Policy 
Agreements meant their contribution to the development of central-local 
relations in Wales was one- rather than multi-dimensional. Relationships did 
improve between junior and middle level officers in corporate centres but the 
improvement did not extend beyond this.
Several further implications for theory relating to organisational pay-for- 
performance schemes were identified relating to the role of the funding and 
the process itself, for example; the adage from individual PRP schemes that 
the reward element becomes ‘normalised’ seems to hold true for 
organisational schemes; the marginal valance of the reward -  small amounts 
of funding have the potential to elicit small amounts of effort and thus have a 
limited impact on improving performance or changing culture; recognising that
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the depersonalisation of a performance management system to an 
organisational level does not remove the importance of the quality and 
effectiveness of the human interactions within the system and, whilst the 
importance of participation in target setting holds true at both an individual 
and an organisational level, the importance of choice of targets is amplified in 
the models relating to central-local relations as this is perceived as a means 
of mitigating any differences between local and national priorities. Again, 
these findings were evidenced in the English system and the conclusions are 
therefore felt to have applicability beyond Wales and Policy Agreements.
It was noted that national level central-local relations in Wales were 
categorised as ‘good’ in the literature in Chapter 2 but evidence from 
Chapters 6 and 7 suggests this did not hold true for all levels and all parts of 
Wales. Policy Agreements were therefore a missed opportunity to develop 
these relationships. This has implications for theory relating to central-local 
relations and it is suggested that this theory should recognise a ‘good’ 
national relationship is not likely to be sufficient to mitigate design and 
operationalisation flaws, and may indeed compound them. Likewise, it was 
identified that the complexity of the system in England may have been a 
manifestation of a lack of trust and the ‘poor’ central-local relationship 
identified in Chapter 2 which is also a facet of individual PRP systems 
identified in Chapter 4.
The evaluation model has therefore provided new insight, in particular using a 
lens including evidence and principles relating to individual PRP schemes
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enabled greater understanding of the impact and operation of the rewards 
linked to outcome element of the scheme to be drawn out and provided more 
explanation than previous studies of the impact of the reward, for example the 
role of the public service ethos and budget maximisation. It also enabled the 
robustness and appropriateness of the governmental assumption of 
transference of individual PRP schemes to an organisational level to be 
questioned.
It is concluded therefore that the thesis aims have been met and the evidence 
generated provides an original contribution to theory relating to both 
organisational performance schemes, especially those with a ‘pay-for- 
performance’ element in the public sector and central-local relations. It also 
provides important evidence for practice in terms of what worked and what did 
not. This latter point is currently of magnified importance for Wales as 
attention turns in the current phase of devolution to improved service delivery.
Finally, the contribution to relevant theory, literature, policy and practice has 
the potential to be magnified when used, as in this thesis, in conjunction with 
studies relating to other administrations in the UK to enable understanding to 
develop as to the drivers of service improvement in different contexts and, 
enable the benefits of devolution to be maximised and the potential for 
isolationism to be minimised.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WELSH ASSEMBLY GOVERNMENT 
AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Introduction
Firstly, this chapter explores the pre-devolution nature of central-local 
relations and the local government modernisation agenda, in particular the 
development of performance management regimes to drive change in the 
delivery of public services. This puts devolution in context. The remainder of 
the chapter then considers the nature of the devolution settlement, its impact 
on central-local relations in Wales and how this provided the context for the 
development of the Welsh local authority performance system. Finally, the 
conclusions identify the key lessons for the development of local authority 
performance frameworks and how these might be considered in the Welsh 
context.
The Nature of Central-Local Relations
One of the main tensions in the relationship is the debate between central 
command/uniformity versus local delivery/subsidiarity (Walker, 2000a and 
2000b; Wilson, 2001). Stewart (2000) suggests that the relationship is 
multifaceted:
“The reality is that no simple metaphor can describe the relationship, 
‘partner’, ‘agency’, ‘networks’, ‘hierarchy’, ‘the dual state’ and the ‘dual 
polity’ all capture aspects of the relationship which can gain greater or 
lesser prominence at different points in time. Sometimes and in some 
places, the relationship can be one of ‘conflict’ or one of ‘co-operation’.” 
(Stewart, 2000, p.90)
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Stewart (2000) describes how local government is subject to both forces for 
uniformity and diversity. Pressures for uniformity include legislation, a shared 
culture between authorities of what local authorities should do, pressure for 
uniformity of service delivery and member/officer professional groups, while 
forces for diversity include the local social, economic, political and 
demographic situations. He also suggests that whilst legislation and 
regulations are a force for uniformity, the way in which they are implemented 
will vary from authority to authority. It is possible to speculate that not only the 
method of implementation might vary but also the level of enthusiasm.
Finally, he outlines how the structure of local authorities causes issues in 
terms of a rule bound bureaucracy and departmentalism which lead to 
problems of co-ordination. Research conducted by the University of 
Birmingham (1999) and the University of the West of England (1999) supports 
this analysis but identified different types of local authority cultures including 
compliance, survival, ‘can do’ activism and strategic implementation.
Wilson (2003) identifies that central government does not have a ‘single’ 
viewpoint when it comes to relations with local government. The attitude and 
levels of trust vary from department to department and may be different with 
different local authorities. From the perspective of local government, central 
government is not ‘joined-up’. This is also evidenced by ODPM research 
relating to LPSAs (ODPM, 2005a). Further to this, Jones and Travers (1996) 
highlight that one assumption of centralism is that the calibre of members and
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officers is low, arguably this leads to a ‘mothering’ approach from central 
government in the form of detailed legislation, control and regulation.
New Public Management
The concept of central government regulation over local government is not a 
new one (Walker, 2000b), although arguably, it was not until the election of 
1979 that the relationship between central and local government began to 
alter radically. The reforms introduced by the Conservatives in their 18 years 
of power included; the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering, the 
creation of the Audit Commission, the ‘right to buy’ for council tenants, the 
‘opting out’ of schools from local authority control and, the abolition of the 
Greater London Council and other large metropolitan authorities. These were 
all aimed at what had previously been seen as sacrosanct in the local 
authority world. The principles behind these reforms (see Table 2.1) were 
termed ‘new public management’ or NPM (Hood, 1991).
Public Sector Ethos
Jacobs (1998) argues that during the 1980s and 1990s ‘public sector ethos’ 
was evoked as something of a criticism of local authority management. 
Critics saw it as something used to defend the outmoded working practices of 
local authorities which were hindering effective decision making. It was seen 
as the binding factor in rigid bureaucracies which obstructed innovation and 
creativity.
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However, Jacobs continues by arguing that the opposite is true, for many 
professionals the ‘public sector ethos’ is seen as the bulwark of local 
democracy, without which it could not function. The evidence is that local 
government professionals are not motivated by profit but by wider altruistic 
objectives such as commitment to community, democracy and personal 
integrity.
This is supported by Kirkpatrick et al (2005) who cite lack of consultation with 
public sector professionals and, the strength of their attachment to the public 
sector ethos as major barriers to central government’s managerialist reforms 
taking route in many parts of the public sector. They argue that it is not the 
pressure to induce change which will ensure its effectiveness but, the 
acceptability of the change to professionals. Also, they highlight the sense of 
vocation that once sustained the delivery of good quality public services at 
relatively low cost, is slowly being eroded.
Arguably, therefore CCT, markets and managerialism did not lead to 
improved services but to poor employee morale, the erosion of intrinsic public 
sector values and, poorly specified contracts and costings (Robinson, 2000).
The Third Way
New Labour’s Third W ay’ aimed to recognise this by attempting to reconcile 
more business-orientated government with the community leadership role. 
Martin (1999) identifies that the Third Way’ and the resulting local 
government modernisation agenda (discussed further below) drew on the
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themes of ‘Reinventing Government’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and 
Benington (2000) highlights how Tony Blair presented these reforms as 
pragmatic and non-ideological ‘what matters is what works’. Hirst (2002) 
writes,
“Unlike the widely reviled CCT regime - with its Thatcherite assumptions 
about private sector good, public sector bad - Best Value was meant to 
be value neutral. Who cared whether a private firm or in-house staff 
emptied the bins or provided the home help? What mattered was what 
worked.” (Hirst, 2002, p. 18)
Table 2.1 is based on Jones and Stewart (1999) and presents the 
development of the central-local relationship. It has been adapted to include 
New Labour’s Third W ay’ (Miliband, 1999).
New Localism
The context of central-local relations in England has shifted over time to a 
rhetoric of ‘new localism’ (Stoker, 2001; Corry and Stoker, 2002; Stoker, 
2004). This calls for a strategic approach to devolution based on local 
authorities and communities involving themselves in the decisions affecting 
their social, economic and environmental well-being. New localism is 
underpinned by participation and networked local community governance. 
This perhaps reflects the ever present tension of central control versus local 
autonomy in the relationship.
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First Way- 1920’s-1970’s- OLD PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION
Second Way- 1980’s and most of 
1990’s- THATCHERISM AND NPM’
Third Way-1997 to date- 
MODERNISATION
• Government was not expected to be 
run like a business.
• Making government run like a 
business.
• Government may run like a business 
but it is not one.
• Governing was routed in and driven by 
political processes, which in this 
country is representative democracy.
• Privatising public functions. • There should be no dogma, whether 
public or private delivery what counts 
is ‘what works’.
• Civil servants and local officials served 
their duly elected governments, 
implementing and advising on policy in 
a professional and non-partisan 
manner.
• Making functions that had to stay in 
the public sector the responsibility of 
bodies acting like business, testing 
their activities against competitors and 
operating as if subject to market 
disciplines.
• Focus on outcomes, not just efficiency 
and effectiveness. The third way is 
based on partnership and 
collaboration.
• The methods and techniques of the 
public sector were different from those 
of the private sector.
• Civil servants and local officials to 
copy the methods, techniques, 
organisation, language and culture of 
business.
• Public sector does now not just 
unquestioningly adopt private sector 
techniques; thought is given to 
applicability and adaptation.
• The public and private sectors were 
kept at arms’ length to avoid distorting 
the public interest with private sectoral 
interests.
• The public and private sectors were 
closely intertwined in collaborative 
activities.
• The collaboration will continue but the 
basis of the relationship is different.
TABLE 2.1: CENTRAL - LOCAL RELATIONS
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The Continuous Search for ‘Balance’
Walker (2000b) suggests that the relationship is likely to remain unresolved. 
He suggests that successive Conservative and Labour Governments and 
local authorities have preferred to live with this ambiguity. Local authorities 
like to be neither free from limitation nor entirely bound. Their identity is mixed 
up with this ambiguity and they are content to live with contradiction and 
confusion. This is supported by Laffin et al (2002).
Likewise Rhodes (1986) suggests that “it is in the nature of the system that 
there is no right balance between local and national interests, only a perpetual 
search to achieve a balance which is unlikely to be permanent” (p.289). 
Rhodes also suggests that ambiguity is a necessary part of trying to make the 
system work. ODPM (2005a) suggests that the relationship is constantly 
being made and remade.
In this complex relationship amending or replacing established ‘rules and 
norms’ is difficult and Lowndes (1999) suggests that often old and new will co­
exist and potentially compete. This may explain the seemingly competing 
emphasis between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ in the relationship but, may 
also mean that policies which challenge the apparent ‘top-down norm’ such as 
LPSAs may be fighting against the tide as Stewart (1985, p.33) puts it, “there 
is inevitably greater awareness of the restraints upon action than upon the 
ability to act.”
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This suggests that research into a policy which sits at the heart of the central- 
local relationship, such as LPSAs or Policy Agreements will need to be alive 
to this complexity and ambiguity and, to the competing perceptions not just 
between central and local, but also between central and central and local and 
local.
The Modernisation Agenda
‘Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People’ (DETR, 1998) and the 
Welsh Office equivalent ‘Local Voices: Modernising Local Government in 
Wales’ (Welsh Office, 1998) set out the vision of the Third Way as it applied to 
local government. The Local Government Acts 1999 and 2000 provided the 
legal basis for the three ‘strands’ of the modernisation agenda: community 
leadership (including the power to promote economic, social and 
environmental well-being); the new duty for local authorities ‘to secure 
continuous improvement in exercising all of their functions with due regard to 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ (or the ‘Best Value’ regime); and, 
democratic renewal in the form of new local authority structures and ethical 
standards.
Benington (2000), Stewart (2000) and Martin (1999) all suggest that like its 
predecessor, NPM, the New Labour Third W ay’ approach to modernising 
government was aimed at driving significant improvement in the delivery of 
public services. However, Baggini (1999) highlights that there were many 
tensions in the agenda and argues that the UK Government was only paying 
lip-service to its devolutionist tendencies whilst taking a centralist approach.
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Brooks (2000) explains the contradictions in terms of Labour’s principles of 
territorial equity and universalism in service delivery being incompatible with 
variation in service performance. While Martin (1999) identifies how many 
Conservative policies were continued under Labour - from CCT to Best Value, 
PFI continues, from the Citizen’s Charter to citizen centred government and 
Best Value consultations, the continuation and expansion of the ‘Audit 
Society’ to include the Best Value and Housing Inspectorates and the creation 
of more statutory performance indicators. He continues that all of the ‘gloss’ 
does not conceal the deep-seated tension in the modernisation agenda 
between the delivery of national priorities and the creation of local autonomy. 
This is supported by Brooks (2000), Wilson (2003) and Stewart (2000).
Wilson (2001) suggests a challenge for the new Labour Government in 1997 
was that the evidence from the Conservative era suggested change imposed 
from the centre, without involving or consulting local authorities, was prone to 
implementation failure and likely to produce unintended consequences. The 
result was that the ‘top-down/bottom-up’ tension remained at the heart of New 
Labour’s ‘modernisation’ programme.
Jones and Stewart (2001) suggest the UK Government’s understanding of 
change management was naive. They argue that effective change is more 
likely to be achieved by working with councils rather than against them. They 
suggest that this arises from failure on the part of the Government to consider 
implementation; as a result it gets frustrated, and takes matters into its own 
hands by issuing detailed, prescriptive guidance and over inspecting. This is
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a ‘Catch 22’ for authorities; to be trusted they need to perform and they need 
to be trusted to be able to perform.
Walker (2000a) supports this by suggesting that the Labour Government was 
falling into the same trap as the previous one by forcing councils to accept its 
values or run the risk of being by-passed and supplanted. He concludes 
(2000b) that the basis of the new compact between central and local 
government was if local government was reinvented on the basis of a 
centrally designed modernisation agenda then, possibly new autonomies may 
follow. This was reflected in the concept of ‘earned autonomy’.
Benington (2000) identified an important critical success factor as the need to 
manage continuity and change, ‘routine as well as reform’. He suggested that 
the UK Government’s modernisation programme was in danger of faltering 
because of an inadequate theory and strategy of change. The lack of focus on 
the ‘big picture’ may be seen as a failure of all parties to manage high level 
organisational and cultural change by putting too much focus on procedural 
change.
Walker (1998), Sanderson (1999, 2001), Boyne (1998, 1999), Martin (1999, 
2000) and Hirst (2002) argue the ‘Best Value’ approach was too consumerist 
and detail/process focused. Likewise Boyne et al (2001) argue that while the 
policies imply a rejection of the dogma of market forces, they are still 
prescriptive as they promote only one model. Boyne (2001) expands this 
argument, suggesting that the renewed emphasis which Labour placed upon
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rational planning, including the introduction of Best Value, in the public sector 
assumes that this approach to decision making will lead to improvements in 
performance.
Performance Management and Targets 
Overview
Rational planning requires the development of systems to manage and 
measure performance. It requires adding targets to indicators to convert 
‘performance monitoring’ to ‘performance management’ by providing a clear 
objective to be achieved in a specific time (Behn, 2003).
Gore (1993) and Osbourne and Gaebler (1992) believe developing and 
implementing performance management systems can improve accountability 
and management. Davies (1999) and Lapsley (2008) identify the use of 
performance measurement and incentives as being at the heart of new public 
management (NPM) since the expression was first coined by Hood (1991). 
Indeed, Hood (1991) places quantification ‘centre stage’ of NPM because the 
shift of emphasis within it, from bureaucratic to managerial, in which results 
are paramount, means that performance measurement of public services has 
been accentuated.
Hood (2007) suggests that the use of performance indicators as targets to 
improve performance is not a new phenomenon in public service 
management. Quantitative target systems were used during the war to 
manage munitions and other war production and have been used to manage
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welfare and job placement bureaucracies for at least half a century. Their use, 
either now or in the past, is not confined to the UK, for example Soviet Russia 
(Hood, 2007), Australia, New Zealand, Sweden (Davies, 1999) and the US 
(Courty and Marschuke, 2007).
Target Setting
In terms of effective target setting, Boyne and Chen (2006) draw on the 
extensive literature in human resource management (Latham and Yukl, 1975 
and Locke and Latham, 2002) to conclude that targets are unlikely to be 
achieved if they are imposed on staff by senior executives or on organisations 
by superior bodies. Also drawing on literature relating to individual 
performance management, motivation and PRP schemes (Klein et al 1999), 
they identify that targets are most likely to be met if those responsible for 
achieving them are highly motivated to apply ingenuity in the right direction. 
Also, the literature on individual motivation suggests that difficult targets lead 
to greater effort and achievement (Locke and Latham, 2002; Wright, 2004) but 
that targets which are too difficult become counter-productive (Bandura and 
Locke, 2003).
Boyne and Gould-Williams (2003) conclude there is a negative relationship 
between the number of quantified targets in the plans of Welsh local 
authorities and responsiveness to service needs and service quality and 
efficiency. This study is limited in that it is based on the perceptions of local 
authority officers.
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Boyne and Law (2005) state it is crucial that outcomes are properly defined 
and indicators used are ‘appropriate’. They suggest that the principles of 
robust performance indicators are always important but, even more so when 
there are large financial rewards attached for achieving outcome targets. 
They cite criteria developed by the Audit Commission (2000):
• conceptually valid i.e. measures the objective which is trying to be 
achieved;
•  attributable to the efforts of the authority;
• well defined so that progress can be assessed;
• verifiable, with clear documentation;
• timely so that progress can be tracked at appropriate intervals;
• free from perverse incentives i.e. does not encourage unwanted or 
wasteful behaviour;
• reliable so that an indicator constantly represents what it should;
• unambiguous; and,
• statistically valid - a PI based on a small number of cases may show 
substantial variations.
They continue by suggesting that as outcomes are difficult to measure (Courty 
and Marschuke, 2007), measures in reward based systems must be carefully 
justified and it is essential to provide evidence that proxy measures of 
performance link to the desired outcomes. Unless these prerequisites are met 
then outcome-based reward systems such as LPSAs will not operate 
effectively. They suggest that using more than one indicator may help to avoid 
perverse incentives and a basket of indicators may help where an outcome is 
beyond the control of an organisation operating in isolation.
Lapsley (2008) also identifies that the availability of robust measures can 
seriously inhibit managers realising any potential benefits from sophisticated 
performance management systems and Martin (1999) identified that there
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was a lack of performance management skills and systems within local 
authorities when Best Value was first implemented.
A further issue is that most indicators are tin openers rather than dials (Carter 
et al, 1995). In other words they do not provide answers but prompt 
investigation and inquiry -  the numbers on their own present an incomplete 
picture.
Undesirable Effects
Hood (2007) suggests that the use of targets may be appropriate in a 
circumstance where the aim is to increase performance over a limited number 
of standards. However, even here governments need to be alert to potential 
down sides such as ratchet and threshold effects. He suggests that trying to 
avoid ratchet effects will create threshold effects and vice versa, and that 
these effects will become more serious as time progresses. Boyne and Law
(2005) also identify the possibility of perverse incentives if the indicators do 
not accurately capture what is trying to be achieved.
Bevan and Hood (2006a and 2006b) identify that management by targets in 
the NHS in England may have improved performance in those areas targeted 
but, the effect on services excluded from the star ratings is unclear. Some 
perverse effects were also identified such as a target that all patients should 
be able to get an appointment with their GP within two days meant that some 
practices refused to book more than two days ahead.
34
Bevan and Hood also identified instances of gaming and data manipulation 
and suggested that systems needed to be put into place to minimise these 
effects and ensure that targets did not result in unwanted effects elsewhere. A 
further consequence of gaming being uncovered is potential loss of public 
confidence in government statistics and systems. Ordonez et al (2009) are 
also critical and suggest that management by targets has led to unethical 
behaviour. Caulkin (2009) suggests that the approach has resulted in a loss 
of focus on service users as the stressed lines of accountability are to 
Ministers through a ‘ballooning of bureaucracy’ which means systems become 
expensive, fragmented and impersonal.
Courty and Marschuke (2007) also identify evidence of gaming in the target 
based performance management system in the US Federal job training 
programme. They suggest a gaming cycle develops where the federal 
government sets targets, the local managers learn how to game them, and 
the federal government identifies this and then re-sets the targets. They 
suggest that gaming is in part a function of information asymmetry as the 
designers of performance measures cannot anticipate all behavioural 
responses ex ante.
Caulkin (2009) suggests that where targets are followed ‘religiously’ they 
distort judgement and cause organisations to become ‘institutionally witless’. 
Davies (1999) terms this ‘goal displacement’ where efforts are directed 
towards achieving the targets to the detriment of achieving the programme’s
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overall objectives and raison d’etre. This tends to be exacerbated when 
insufficient attention is paid to the implementation process.
Ordonez et al (2009) conclude that the beneficial effects of goal setting have 
been overstated while the systematic harm caused has been largely ignored. 
However, this work has been criticised by Locke and Latham (2009) as being 
largely based on anecdotal evidence.
Inherent Tensions
Lapsley (2008) suggests that on-going pressure on governments to be 
effective and efficient will mean they continue to turn to NPM with its 
emphasis on performance measurement and targets for solutions to public 
service delivery. This may explain why, despite continual criticism and even 
ridicule of performance measurement as counterproductive, there has been a 
proliferation of performance indicators and the emergence of a performance 
indicator industry (Johnsen, 2005; Lawton, McKevitt and Miller, 2000; Caulkin, 
2009 and Elliston, 2000).
Boyne and Law (2005) identify the issue of working in partnership as a 
tension, working with outcomes almost inevitably means working with other 
partners such as the police and health and as this joint working increases so 
the control which the local authority has over the attainment of the target 
decreases.
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Outcomes tend to be associated with the longer-term whilst performance 
management systems tend to measure the more immediate. Courty and 
Marschuke (2007) identify this as the trade off between timely and accurate 
performance measures. Their evidence suggests that measures based on 
short-term performance are not only unlikely to capture long-term effects but 
are also especially vulnerable to manipulation.
Another difficulty associated with management by targets identified by Bevan 
and Hood (2006a and 2006b) and by Davies (1999) is that regulation by 
targets assumes that the required priority can be targeted, that the part which 
is measured can stand for the whole and that what is omitted does not matter. 
Davies calls this ‘the assumption of causality’. He continues by also identifying 
that performance management systems can suffer from ‘poor construct 
validity’ - they are implemented quickly, under pressure, can result in the 
‘difficult to measure’ being ignored and are implemented without sufficient 
consideration.
Trust, Fairness and Communication
Davies (1999) notes that top-down implementation of performance 
management processes that are not supported by genuine stakeholder ‘buy- 
in’ are likely to be detrimental to relevant performance. Credibility of the 
system and trust between those involved is vital. Davies suggests that this 
comes from communication and giving due attention to the implementation of 
the system by agreeing parameters, definitions, setting up an agreed process 
for review, participation and transparency of process.
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Role of Financial Incentives
Boyne and Chen (2006) suggest that including financial rewards for achieving 
the target is intended to encourage organisations to focus on and deliver 
outcomes. This is sometimes termed ‘managing for results’ in the public 
management literature. Two main methods of securing motivation: 
participation in the target setting process and financial incentives for achieving 
them are identified. They suggest that both of these areas are under-explored 
in the public management literature, in particular the role of financial 
incentives in improving public service performance has not been explored 
empirically. This could be explored by considering the evidence on the 
moderating effects of individual performance related pay in the private and 
public sectors. They acknowledge that evidence in the public sector on PRP 
is mixed, also that bureaucrats can be motivated by budget maximisation 
(Niskanen, 1971) and this should be taken into account.
This is supported by Reiter et al (2006) who explore the types of behavioural 
changes made by not-for profit hospitals in Michigan in response to a pay-for- 
performance system. They use agency theory as a framework for this 
exploration, the principal (the insurer acting on behalf of patients and society) 
desires to align the efforts of the agent, the provider, with the goal of 
improving healthcare quality.
Reiter et al suggest the assumption behind the pay-for-performance scheme 
incentive payments is that the payments will stimulate increases in quality 
related effort on the part of the providers, leading to improved health
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outcomes for patients. It is noted that the policy is proceeding rapidly without 
any evidence to support this underlying assumption, that these schemes have 
traditionally been used to direct the efforts of individuals, particularly 
physicians and that, by contrast, hospitals are complex organisations, 
dependent on individuals to execute the necessary improvements.
Hospitals also have multiple accountabilities and stakeholders, therefore 
incentive payments to hospitals may not elicit the same result as if the 
payments were provided to individuals. Furthermore, the funding may never 
reach the individuals from whom the extra effort is needed to achieve the 
targets. Their study explored the behavioural changes at multiple levels 
within hospitals and found that “like individuals, hospitals generally respond to 
incentive pay” (p. 132). Reiter et al suggest there is a consistent set of 
organisational characteristics that appear to facilitate increased effort 
including: structural changes, more involvement by the board of trustees, and, 
process changes which impacted upon physician behaviour i.e. to align 
behaviour with the goal of the principal.
They conclude that organisational PRP schemes may be a promising tool for 
enhancing quality but, the effects may not be universal and, may be 
dependent upon the organisational characteristics and the nature of the 
hospital’s market. Reiter et al also conclude that this is a seriously under 
researched area with only two, limited previous studies, as they had 
considered the impact of the schemes, rather than how and why that impact 
had been achieved. In addition, the conclusions of Reiter et al (2006) do not
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consider the appropriateness of the approach, whether any perverse 
incentives arose or whether ‘gaming’ took place.
Cost Benefit
Courty and Marschuke (2007) conclude that designing a performance 
management system for government is not a one-time challenge and that it is 
costly both initially and in the longer-term, so much so that it may not be cost 
effective in some situations. A positive conclusion is that workers in public 
services do respond to targets, the down-side of this is that both the local 
gaming and system redesign tend to consume resources which could have 
been deployed on delivering the programme. While Haubrich and McClean 
(2006) suggest top-down performance management has reached 
“unprecedented levels of sophistication, complexity, formal structure, and 
prescription” (p.271).
Performance and Culture Change
Boyne and Chen (2006) considered whether there is a relationship between 
target setting and service improvement by studying Local Public Service 
Agreements. The study is limited, because as the authors themselves identify, 
it does not explore issues such as equity, value for money, cost-benefit, 
working in partnership, or the effect on those areas not included in the LPSA, 
i.e. perverse effects on the performance in other areas may have arisen.
They conclude there is preliminary evidence to suggest that when policy 
making is participatory and financial incentives provided, targets appear to be
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a promising mechanism for achieving public service improvement and that the 
target setting approach seems to work best, i.e. leads to improved
performance, when the number of targets is small.
Performance improvement may be a desired objective for performance
management systems but Laffin et al (2002) identify a further possible
objective in that some local authority officers saw the potential to use Policy 
Agreements (see later and Chapter 3 for more detailed explanation) as a 
performance management system to drive change and establish a
‘performance culture’. However, arguably, the more sophisticated the system 
the more the potential exists for it to become relegated to the leagues of 
performance specialists, the less elected members will be engaged and the 
potential for such a system driving culture change and systemic improvement 
becomes severely limited.
Boyne and Law (2005) identify that focussing on outcomes is intended to 
create culture change by providing incentive to those involved to seek new 
and creative ways to improve public welfare. This is supported by Courty and 
Marschuke (2007).
Regulation and Inspection
A further strand to the modernisation agenda is regulation and inspection. It is 
part of the performance management system and is intended to provide 
another ‘driver’ for continuous improvement. However, Cope and Goodship 
(1999) argue that the plethora of regulatory agencies may serve to exacerbate
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rather than ameliorate the creation of joined-up government. They suggest 
that the development of policy networks (Kicked et al, 1997) and focusing on 
steering rather than rowing (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) has meant that 
Government has focused its ‘managerial surveillance’ on the rowing agencies, 
including local government.
The financial cost of this managerial surveillance is substantial (Hood et at 
1998; Haubrich and McClean, 2006) both in terms of the costs of the 
regulators themselves and, the compliance costs for the ‘regulated’ 
organisations. Cope and Goodship (1999) add there are human as well as 
financial costs in that the Chief Executives they interviewed felt overwhelmed 
by regulation. They conclude that high levels of regulation undermines joined- 
up government, fragments governance, means the regulators themselves are 
not joined-up and its existence suggests non-collaboration and a lack of trust.
Walker (2002) questions the overall value added by inspection and regulation 
and Andrews et al (2008) identify that an inspection event is inevitably 
disruptive and destablises the link between organisational strategy and 
performance. However, this is not to say that inspection and regulation per se 
is a ‘bad thing’, Andrews et al conclude that regulation which is viewed as 
supportive by service managers is likely to reinforce the effectiveness of a 
successful strategy and to shift a neutral strategy into a positive position. “In 
other words if the regulatory regime is seen as helpful, then the impact of local 
strategies for service improvement is enhanced” (p. 198).
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Farrell and Morris (1999) suggest that close regulation of professionals has 
adverse effects. This is because external regulation of professionals, whilst 
adding cost, may not be effective if they are not consulted and involved in its 
development. They argue that the success of policy reform is dependent on 
the attitudes of those involved in the process. This is supported by Lapsley 
(2008), Boyne and Chen (2006) and Caulkin (2009) who suggest that explicit 
targets may undermine the autonomy of professional staff who expect to use 
their own discretion to set goals for public service organisations. This may 
result in their disenfranchisement and a corrosion of intrinsic motivation 
(Ordonez et al, 2009).
Power (1997) in The Audit Society’ also identifies a potential problem with the 
increased use of audit and inspection. He terms this the ‘cost assurance 
function’- the additional assurance gained from increasing investment in audit 
and inspection is far from clear. Hood et al (1998) also point out that there is a 
lack of oversight of the regulators themselves, arguing that there is no single 
unit in government with any overall responsibility for or capacity to review the 
regulatory ‘industry’.
Martin (2000) suggests part of achieving continuous improvement is 
innovation and to achieve this not only does the national framework of 
regulation need to be relaxed but, the framework needs to actively encourage, 
resource and reward those councils that are prepared to take risks and be 
innovative and develop new models of service delivery. This is supported by 
Hale (2000), University of Birmingham (1999), University of West of England
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(1999) and Brooks (2000). Martin continues by highlighting that a commitment 
to innovation and learning requires a high level of trust, a culture of openness 
and, a more supportive and less punitive framework.
Boyne (2000) sums up these arguments between external regulation and 
systems of self-improvement by writing “regulation can only be justified if it 
delivers better service standards above and beyond those that the local 
authorities would have achieved anyway” (p. 12).
Capacity and Culture
Martin (1999) noted the capacity of local government to deliver the 
modernisation reforms was likely to be a significant factor, and that there was 
a need for a fundamental restructuring of both central and local government. 
He argued that ‘success’ would be dependent not only on new ways of 
working for local authorities themselves, but also on new ways of working for 
central government and a new kind of relationship. This is supported by 
Benington (2000).
Brooks (2000) and Keenan (2000) identify that commitment and the way in 
which the improvement process is implemented would be crucial to success. 
Evidence from Hirst (2002) supports the conclusion that a lack of cultural 
change has been an important contributory factor in the apparent inability of 
Best Value up to that point to deliver continuous improvement. This is 
supported by Martin (1999) who also identified communication as a crucial 
factor.
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Devolution in Wales
The design of the National Assembly was an experiment in government on a 
scale not previously seen in the UK (Patchett, 2000; Laffin and Thomas, 2000 
and 2001). Funding flows from Westminster and is determined by the Barnett 
formula. However, once funding reaches Wales the Assembly has complete 
discretion over how the Welsh block is spent (Laffin et al 2000).
Unlike Scotland, Wales has never enjoyed a separate legal system and, as
Bogdanor (2001) points out, Wales does not have the same crucial memory of
independent statehood. He states:
‘Wales, having lost the opportunity of establishing an all-Wales body in 
the 1960’s would have to wait thirty years for the establishment of an 
assembly; and when it came, it did so with a narrow and half-hearted 
mandate given by a bare majority of the 50% of Welsh electors who had 
taken the trouble to vote.’ (Bogdanor, 2001, p. 165)
Bradbury (2003) and Andrews and Martin (2007) suggest the case for 
devolution was made, not on the basis of national identity, but on the need to 
develop distinctive Welsh policies which reflected the social, economic and 
political context of the country -  ‘the democratic deficit’.
Laffin (2001) suggests that the initial fragile support created a continuing crisis 
of identity for the Assembly. Politicians were therefore driven by the need to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of the Assembly and, civil servants were driven by 
their professional pride, both were determined that the Assembly should 
‘work’. (Laffin and Thomas, 2001; Laffin et al, 2002; National Assembly for 
Wales, 2001 and Betts, 2000). As a result, Laffin and Thomas (2001), Laffin 
et al (2002) and Drakeford (2006) describe a ‘policy-making deficit’ and, that it
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was arguably a key factor in the relationships which the Assembly formed with 
other players in the governance of Wales such as local authorities.
The early days of the Assembly were politically turbulent; Labour did not gain 
an overall majority in the first Assembly and ‘lost’ its first leader in the form of 
Alun Michael. Bradbury (2003) suggests that the Assembly was seen as 
‘overworked’ and ‘unloved’ and, it was not until Rhodri Morgan’s Lib-Lab 
coalition that a medium term strategy was established which underlined the 
now famous ‘Devolution is a process. It is not an event’ (Davies 1999, p. 15).
Politically it suited Welsh Labour to distance itself from Whitehall and this has 
reinforced both the demand and the desire to create distinctive Welsh 
policies. The ‘clear red water’ (Morgan, 2002) has manifested itself in the 
abolition of major QUANGOS, including the Welsh Development Agency, the 
Wales Tourist Board and Education and Learning Wales, distinctive policies in 
health and education that have stressed public as opposed to private sector 
provision, reorganising the health service along different principles to England 
and abolishing the internal market, free eye tests for the under 25s, free NHS 
prescriptions, not introducing specialist comprehensive schools, the ending of 
league tables, free student tuition fees, the introduction of children’s and older 
people’s commissioners, free bus travel for the over 60s, free school 
breakfasts and the abolition of hospital car parking charges. The guiding 
principles of public service reform in Wales are ‘voice’ not ‘choice’ and 
‘collaboration’ not ‘competition’. Finally, there is a different performance 
framework for local government based on a more consensual rather than a
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top-down approach and less hypothecation of local authority funding. 
(Bradbury and Mitchell, 2005; Laffin et al, 2002; Laffin, 2004; Jeffery, 2006; 
CIPFA, 2008; Drakeford, 2006; Martin, 2008; Martin and Webb, 2009; Martin 
and Andrews, 2009 and Brand, 2007).
Andrews and Martin (2007) identify that the latest debate relating to the 
extension of powers to the National Assembly, as outlined in the report of the 
Richard Commission (2005), moved on from distinctive policy and was made 
on the basis that it would produce practical benefits such as better services 
and more effective governance. This suggests that effective systems to 
deliver improvement in local authority services will become ever more crucial.
Central-Local Relations in Wales
In 1996 local government was reorganised into 22 unitary local authorities. 
They range in nature; urban, rural, south Wales valleys, Welsh speaking, 
some are very small with populations of less than 100,000, and wards on 
average of less than 1,500. The relationship between local authorities and 
the Assembly was seen as the key one in the governance of Wales (Essex, 
1998). This is reflected in the Government of Wales Acts which place a 
statutory duty on the Welsh Assembly Government ‘to promote local 
government’ and create a Partnership Council to act as a forum for joint 
development of policy and a voice for local government in the Assembly. 
However, Essex (1998) suggests this ‘partnership’ is not automatic as one 
partner holds the purse strings, but the Assembly will be dependent upon 
local government delivering at ground level.
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When the Assembly was created in 1999 local authorities were concerned 
about two issues; money and discretion (Laffin et al, 2002). There were stark 
warnings that any centralist tendencies would be strongly resisted by local 
government and if this were to be the case support for the Assembly would 
rapidly dissipate (Griffiths, 1996).
The early days of the relationship were difficult. Hanlon (2000) reported that 
the WLGA conference had discussed how the relationship between the Welsh 
Assembly and local government was ‘light years away from working as an 
effective system of government.’ Meanwhile, Laffin et al (2002) identified a 
key question on the creation of the Assembly was whether it would lead to a 
more crowded governance system resulting in reduced local government 
discretion. Their study for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation concluded that at 
that time it had not but, as noted above, the question was symptomatic of 
fears and suspicions circulating in local government at that time.
Laffin et al (2002) identify that the ‘policy deficit’ enabled others, in particular 
local government through the WLGA, to input and influence the very early 
stages of policy making. They note that this was in striking contrast to central- 
local relations in England at that time, where local government was more 
remote from the centre and Labour Ministers did not see local government as 
an important constituency. This is supported by Laffin (2004) and Jeffery
(2006). Laffin (2004) also concludes that ‘regional-centralism’ is not inevitable 
and that the Welsh Assembly allows local authorities considerable policy
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influence whilst exercising looser direct control than Whitehall departments, 
thus resulting in a different style of central-local relations emerging in Wales.
Early Assembly documents such as ‘A Plan for Wales’ (National Assembly for 
Wales, 2001a) recognise the major role which local government has to play in 
the delivery of Assembly Government policies and, one of its first actions was 
to initiate a review of Standard Spending Assessments (SSAs). This was 
aimed at ameliorating local authority concerns over money (Laffin et al, 2002) 
and supports the premise that funding is a crucial part of the relationship and 
could be a potentially powerful lever if used as an incentive or reward.
Laffin et al (2002) state that local authorities felt the Assembly was a great 
improvement on the old Welsh Office in terms of accessibility, openness and 
susceptibility of influence. But, Laffin and Thomas (2001) identify that there 
were tensions between the delivery of local and Assembly priorities. Local 
government felt overburdened by new initiatives, consultations and the 
process of Best Value and, it was felt that both sides should take more risks 
(Glamorgan Conference, 2001).
Laffin (2004) suggests that Welsh Ministers have placed considerable trust in 
Welsh local authorities’ ability to improve themselves but central to this was 
the relationship between Edwina Hart AM (then Minister for Local 
Government) and Sir Harry Jones (then leader of the WLGA). Laffin continues 
by suggesting that this relationship reflects both the scale of Wales and the
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different power dependency of the Assembly-local government relationship 
compared to Whitehall.
Wilson (2003) also notes that post devolution central-local relations in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are less polarised than in England. 
Jeffery (2006) suggests that local authorities in Wales and Scotland have 
realised a close relationship with devolved government and, that this 
relationship is an improvement on the previous one with Whitehall.
Local Government Policy in Wales
‘Freedom and Responsibility in Local Government’ (Welsh Assembly 
Government, 2002) was the first paper to set out the Assembly Government’s 
vision for local government. It was developed in a way reflective of a new 
consensual working relationship with the WLGA (Jeffery, 2006) and, also 
encapsulated diverging policy on Best Value, re-branded as the Wales 
Programme for Improvement (WPI), itself a product of this new working 
relationship (Laffin et al, 2002; Martin and Andrews, 2009). It suggested that 
the Assembly-local government relationship should be ‘one of mutual trust 
and respect.’ (Welsh Assembly Government, 2002, pp.25-26)
‘Freedom and Responsibility’ pre-dated published thinking on public service 
reform in Wales but ‘Making the Connections’ (Welsh Assembly Government, 
2004, 2005) set out an approach based on citizen-focused services, delivered 
through collaboration not competition and ‘voice’ not ‘choice’ as the driver for 
improvement. Also, unlike England, the efficiency agenda came under this
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umbrella, as did workforce development and planning (Downe et al, 2007; 
Martin and Webb, 2009; Martin, 2008). The role of local government in Wales 
was then set against the wider canvas of the principles of public service 
reform and its contribution to this agenda.
In Wales, ‘new localism’ does not seem to have entered the public service 
vocabulary. The latest policy statement on local government ‘A Shared 
Responsibility’ (Welsh Assembly Government, 2007) does not have a rhetoric 
based in new localism. It develops the role of local government as community 
leader, in the context of public service collaboration, to deliver the ‘Beyond 
Boundaries’ vision set out in the Beecham report (Beecham et al, 2006). In 
Wales, it seems that whilst the relationship has its tensions the principle of 
localism has never been so much in doubt that it needs to be resurrected.
Despite this policy divergence, there were no formal policy evaluations 
commissioned by the Welsh Assembly Government, either of the public 
service reform agenda as a whole or of the Welsh approach to local 
government performance and reward management. In addition, most of the 
recent academic literature on the nature of British local government is Anglo 
centric, for example Stoker and Wilson (2006) includes no reference to Wales.
This limits the possibilities for learning between administrations in the UK and 
could lead to insularity (Downe et al, 2007; Hockridge, 2006; Laffin, 2009 and 
Martin and Andrews, 2009). In addition, policy evaluation literature stresses 
the importance of learning from the ‘how’ as well as the ‘what’ (Lewis, 2001;
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Davies, 1999; Blalock, 1999; Chelimsky, 1997; Drakeford, 2006 and Jeffery, 
2006). Likewise, Wilson (2001) and Jones and Stewart (2001) highlighted the 
importance of Government understanding the implementation process as part 
of taking forward its modernisation agenda. There seems, therefore, to be a 
gap in knowledge of the impact of Welsh policy at this time, which given the 
new emphasis in the devolution settlement on delivery of better services 
(Andrews and Martin, 2007), could be potentially important in understanding 
and developing future performance management systems for local 
government in Wales.
Performance Management in Wales
Haubrich and McClean (2006) suggest that since devolution Wales has 
embarked on a different route to the improvement of local authority services, 
and, this route is much less prescriptive, less intrusive, more reliant on self- 
assessment and more based on the fact that the country is small enough for 
all senior managers to know one another. Andrews and Martin (2007) agree, 
stating that Welsh policy makers have turned their backs on many of the tools 
used by their English counterparts - league tables and earned autonomy do 
not feature in the Welsh model. They argue that the small policy space 
means Ministers in Wales can have meaningful relationships with public 
service leaders and, therefore, do not need the same levers, suggesting that 
informal pressure can be as effective in a country the size of Wales. This is 
supported by Laffin et al (2002).
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Neither ‘Freedom and Responsibility’ nor ‘A Shared Responsibility’ had any
categorisation of authorities and awarding of stars or earned autonomy. Laffin
et al (2002) suggested that both the then Minister for Local Government and
the WLGA accepted there was substantial scope for improvement in local
authority performance, but a ‘naming and shaming’ approach would not work
in Wales and an approach based on improvement being ‘owned’ by local
authorities was preferable and more likely to succeed. This is supported by
Andrews and Martin (2007 and 2009). In her speech at the launch of
‘Freedom and Responsibility’ Edwina Hart AM stated:
“Underlying it all is the need to work together to deliver the quality public 
services which the people of Wales need and deserve...In England the 
relationship between central and local government is between half a 
dozen Whitehall departments and over 400 local authorities. The 
approach to improvement being developed in England probably fits the 
scale of England. As I understand it, Ministers in England rely on 
auditors and inspectors to provide a classification of authorities into the 
good, the bad and the indifferent, and are prepared to provide incentives 
for improvement to those which are successful according to the 
evidence.
If I tried this approach in Wales, I should fail. The closeness of our 
relationship is such that if I discriminated between authorities in such a 
systematic way, all the effort that should go into improving public 
services would go into recriminations. Authorities would go to war with 
each other to an even greater extent than they would go to war with me - 
the public and the Assembly and local authorities would suffer.
My approach is to use the small scale of Wales to advantage, ensuring 
that we work together to support each other in the collective drive to 
improving public services across the whole of Wales.”
(Edwina Hart MBE AM, Speech at Launch Event of Freedom and 
Responsibility in Local Government, City and County of Swansea, 
County Hall, March 1st, 2002)
These words convey an important message about the Welsh system, 
suggesting that the principle of equity of treatment between local authorities 
was valued. They also acknowledge that the Assembly and local government
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in Wales must work together effectively as the public will not make any 
distinction when it comes to any failures in the public services of Wales 
(Essex, 1998):
“In reality a marriage of convenience is likely to emerge between the 
Assembly and local government, perhaps a marriage of necessity. Both 
partners have a vested interest in making the marriage work, not least 
because the public will not thank either side for a quarrelsome 
relationship...If co-operation does not happen, the public is not likely to 
discriminate between the two. It will blame them both.” (Essex, 1998 
p.306)
The evidence suggests that both ‘sides’ perceived the ‘close relationship’ as a 
strength upon which to build. This was recognised in the Beecham Review 
(Beecham et al 2006) in its theme of small country governance.
Haubrich and McClean (2006) suggest that this is something also perceived 
as desirable in the English system. Their interviewees believed that changing 
Government perceptions about an authority’s performance was not solely a 
function of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment but, that Chief 
Executives and Leaders had to take every opportunity to network with 
Government and portray their authority as one with which Government could 
do business. Haubrich and McClean continue by identifying that some 
interviewees felt this was the reason why promised rewards in the form of 
lighter touch inspection and regulation had not materialised despite improved 
performance -  Government’s views of local authority performance are 
influenced not only by actual performance but also by its perceptions of the 
authority and its performance.
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Likewise in Scotland, Haubrich and McClean (2006) identified that the smaller 
scale allowed for a more intimate relationship. The suggestion being that it 
was physically possible to gather all the chief executives into a room to 
discuss strategy and issues, an option which was unavailable in England. As 
in Wales, league tables were rejected and instead the assessment framework 
is marked by a partnership approach between auditors and auditees with a 
commitment of the latter to not only audit but to support improvement.
It was in this context that ‘Freedom and Responibility’ recognised that the 
Best Value model was becoming increasingly incompatible with the new 
governance arrangements for Wales (Andrews et al, 2002). The view was that 
a prescriptive, closely supervised approach to improving local services was 
not likely to work in Wales and, that an approach based on self-improvement 
was more likely to succeed.
The Audit Commission (2001b) suggested that Welsh councils were 
“experiencing particular problems delivering improvement” (p. 12). This is 
consistent with a view previously expressed by the Commission (2001c) 
which suggested that local authorities in Wales were struggling “to collect 
robust performance information, and to develop performance management 
systems that are capable of continuous improvement” (p. 16). This paints a 
very different cultural picture to that of Griffiths (2000) who suggests that 
Welsh authorities were leading on the modernisation agenda.
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This apparent gulf between external and internal perception was explored by 
Andrews et al (2002). They identified that the performance of Welsh local 
authorities, based on Best Value Inspection reports for 2000-2001 and Audit 
Commission Pis for 1999/2000, was in fact better than their English 
counterparts. The authors suggest that difference in perception is a result of 
disagreement as to the process of achievement.
“Adverse judgements on Welsh local government seem to reflect 
perceptions of their management processes and methods of service 
provision rather than their substantive achievements. This may in turn 
be symptomatic of UK central government’s assumption that public 
service improvement cannot be achieved unless organisations follow the 
specific model of ‘managerial modernisation’ that it is currently 
promoting.” (Andrews et al, 2002, p.2)
Andrews et al (2002) continue by highlighting that a major issue for Welsh 
local authorities was that Best Value inspectors labelled them as ‘unlikely to 
improve’. The authors suggest that was the product of a ‘metropolitan myth’, 
they note that interviewees in Welsh local government expressed 
dissatisfaction with the style and culture of the Best Value Inspectorate and a 
lack of confidence in its inspectors.
From April 2002, the Best Value framework diverged from England (Downe et 
al, 2007) with the introduction of the ‘Wales Programme for Improvement’. 
WPI was premised on the assumption that ownership of continuous 
improvement began with the authority’s acknowledgement of its own 
strengths and weaknesses (Laffin, 2004; Martin and Webb, 2009). Welsh 
Ministers therefore placed trust in local authorities’ ability to drive their own 
improvement (Laffin, 2004).
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Downey et al (2007) suggest that the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment (CPA) in England provided an explicit model to be avoided in 
Wales because of aversion to the “muscular centralism and top-down 
performance management of local government in England, but also 
connected to the small number (22) of unitary authorities in Wales and the 
strong partnership ethos between the Welsh Assembly and local authorities” 
(p.12).
However, the WPI (or Best Value or the CPA) does not specifically address 
the issue of ‘goal alignment’ and how the Welsh Assembly Government might 
‘incentivise’ the pursuit of national as well as local priorities by local 
authorities. Policy Agreements (and Local Public Service Agreements in 
England) were ‘pay-for-performance’ schemes created to address this issue.
This was an interesting development as a ‘pay-for-performance’ scheme 
implies the necessity for differentiation between performance and a payment 
based on level of attainment, so that the higher performers receive more 
funding. This seems at odds with the principle of equal treatment of 
authorities and, the ‘high dependency’, close relationship between local 
authorities and the Welsh Assembly Government which existed at that time 
(for a more detailed discussion on Policy Agreements and LPSAs see 
Chapter 3).
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Conclusions
This Chapter has identified that at the crux of the central-local relationship 
are tensions between central control and local autonomy, uniformity and 
diversity, external regulation and self-improvement, and the delivery of 
national and local priorities. The relationship is multifaceted, ambiguous and 
culturally contextual, both in terms of different Government departments and 
different local authorities. This leads to varying levels of trust, commitment 
and understanding as to the process of policy implementation.
Research on the modernisation agenda in England has suggested that it 
should not only be about cultural change in local government but also central 
government and that the focus on outcomes in performance management 
should be a way of fostering local innovation and ameliorating of the tension 
between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’. However, evidence suggests that while 
this may be the rhetoric the reality is different. This is because there has 
been too much emphasis on process and not enough on organisational and 
cultural change, a failure to consult and involve local authorities and 
professionals in the development of the approach resulting in a lack of 
commitment and an imbalance between external regulation and inspection 
and self-improvement.
Also, public pressure on central government to be ‘seen to be doing 
something’ (Lapsley, 2008) means that, despite criticisms and concerns, 
performance management and the use of targets as a means of driving the 
improvement of public services remain high on the agenda. Evidence from
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the use of these systems suggests the following issues need to be
considered:
• Target Setting -  small numbers of targets seem to work best but care 
needs to be taken in design to ensure that overall programme aims are 
not undermined; targets need to be stretching but realistic -  difficult 
targets are counter productive; the quality and availability of suitable 
measures can be a limiting factor; indicators are tin openers rather than 
dials, the numbers may present an incomplete picture.
• Undesirable Effects -  overall performance may suffer as a result of 
the ‘blind’ pursuit of specified targets, i.e. ‘goal displacement’; targets 
can create undesired ratchet and threshold effects; targets can create 
undesired gaming and data manipulation effects which in turn can lead 
to unethical behaviour and loss of public confidence in the system.
• Inherent Tensions -  the pressure for governments to be effective and 
efficient means performance management systems are appealing, the 
danger is they become all-pervasive; there is a trade off between timely 
and accurate measures; a focus on specific targets may act as a 
counter force to partnership working amongst public service 
organisations, as loss of control over attainment of the target 
increases; outcomes are long term while performance management 
systems tend to measure the more immediate; outcomes are difficult to 
measure, proxy measures require the assumption of causality, many 
systems therefore suffer from ‘poor construct validity’.
•  Trust, Fairness and Communication -  systems work best where 
there is consultation and communication, imposed systems can be 
counterproductive and fail to generate commitment; credibility of the 
system and trust between those involved is vital.
• The Role of Financial Incentives -  financial incentives are intended 
to encourage organisations to focus on and deliver outcomes, as it is 
assumed they stimulate increases in effort in the same way as 
individual PRP schemes are intended to but, organisations are 
complex and the funding may not reach those responsible for the 
improvement. This is an under-researched area.
• Cost Benefit -  constructing and operating the systems, including 
dealing with the perverse effects takes time and resources, in some 
cases these may outweigh the potential benefits.
• Performance and Culture Change -  the system may have dual 
purposes of performance improvement and culture change; focusing 
on outcomes rather than process or inputs is aimed at driving 
innovation by providing incentive to those involved to seek new and 
creative ways to improve public welfare.
The tensions in the central-local relationship are also present in post­
devolution Wales, but, the relationship has become more consensual, less 
polarised, more mutual and seemingly more trust based. This together with a
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political and civil service will to ‘make devolution work’ has resulted in differing 
policies and approaches to implementation, including local government 
performance management. The development of the WPI reflected the trust 
placed in local government by Welsh Ministers and was based on self- 
evaluation. Policy Agreements were designed as a way to complement the 
WPI by addressing goal alignment between the delivery of local and national 
priorities but, as a ‘pay-for-performance’ system were potentially at odds with 
the mutuality of the central-local relationship and the principle of equal 
treatment between local authorities.
It was noted that whilst research evidence exists in relation to the local 
authority performance management system in England, no extensive 
published research exists relating to the system in Wales. This potentially 
limits the benefits of devolution and could lead to isolationism. It also means 
that future Welsh policy in this area could be made on an uninformed basis 
and, in light of the current devolution debate being framed around 
improvement of services, understanding what works in this regard has 
renewed importance.
The next chapter will, therefore, consider in more detail research and other 
evidence relating to performance management systems in England and 
Wales which use targets and financial incentives, keeping in mind the use and 
impact of the latter has been identified as an under-researched area, against 
the contextual evidence and principles identified above to contribute to the 
development of an evaluation model for Policy Agreements.
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CHAPTER 3
CENTRAL- LOCAL PERFORMANCE AGREEMENTS 
Introduction
The previous chapter identified that since devolution there has been a 
divergence in local government performance systems policy in England and 
Wales. However, both countries have developed ‘pay-for-performance’ 
agreements which have the aim of identifying and clarifying areas of shared 
priority. In England this has been captured in Local Public Service 
Agreements (LPSAs) and Local Area Agreements (LAAs), in Wales by Policy 
Agreements.
The inclusion of a financial reward and the formalisation of an individual 
relationship between central government and a local authority makes them 
akin to individual PRP schemes (Boyne and Chen, 2006; Reiter et al, 2006), 
and there may be lessons from this area of literature which could be applied in 
the evaluation of such agreements. But, prior to considering this, the current 
chapter explores and analyses the development of these agreements in both 
countries, reflecting on the contexts and principles identified in Chapter 2.
England
Local Public Service Agreements and Local Area Agreements 
Overview
Boyne and Law (2005) describe LPSAs as an important element of the 
modernisation agenda in England. Their purpose was to ‘stretch’ service 
outcomes beyond the level which would otherwise have been delivered. The
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agreements were intended to focus on the outcomes of service delivery, 
rather than the processes, inputs or outputs (ODPM, 2003). Boyne and Chen 
(2006) described them as quasi contracts and an unprecedented experiment 
in payment by results in the UK public sector.
Underpinning LPSAs were three key assumptions: central and local 
government are mutually dependent on each other to achieve their priorities; 
in order to achieve significant improvement both local and central government 
had to change; and, that this change was most likely to be secured if the 
ownership was shared (ODPM, 2005c).
LAAs are intended to deliver improved outcomes through better co-ordination 
between central government, local authorities and their partners (ODPM, 
2004). There is also a reward grant for achieving specified outcome targets. 
Secondary objectives were improving central-local relations, enhancing 
efficiency, strengthening partnership working, and offering a framework within 
which local authorities can enhance their community leadership role.
Target Setting
Reminiscent of issues identified in Chapter 2, ODPM (2005b) and Entwistle 
and Enticott (2007) note that practical issues bedevilled the setting of targets 
and baselines for LPSAs, as often the data was simply not available and/or 
not robust, and a lack of time meant that the process was not sufficiently 
inclusive with a knock on impact on implementation, where indicators did not 
exist cost was a prohibitive factor in establishing them. The process was also
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seen as a distraction from getting on with the business of delivering a better 
service. ‘Rushed’ implementation was also identified as an issue in the 
previous chapter. Brand (2008) identified similar issues with LAA 
implementation including; a lack of evolved performance management as 
opposed to performance monitoring systems.
Undesirable Effects
Entwistle and Enticott (2007) and ODPM (2005b) found that the LPSA 
process had the unintended effect of allocating resources to projects which 
were easily defined, measured and delivered but which were not the main 
issues of local concern as suggested by local consultation. There was also a 
focus by central government on the methodological rigour of the targets at the 
expense of pursuing other more appropriate but more difficult to measure 
outcomes, resulting in the LPSA model being constraining rather than 
enabling.
Local negotiators were drawn to safe, well established issues and indicators 
as these offered the best opportunity to maximise the pot -  if a local authority 
could agree a target likely to be achieved in the normal course of business 
then the pump priming grant and reward grant were ‘bunce’. By contrast 
those which required additional time and effort were a risk as the resource 
could be committed without the reward. These findings seem to fit with the 
issue of gaming identified in the previous chapter, also goal displacement, 
perverse incentives and the difficulties of measuring outcomes.
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Entwistle and Enticott (2007) also found reluctance amongst Government 
officials to channel funding into areas which Ministers did not express as 
priorities - local interviewees complained bitterly of being steered towards 
national priorities as part of the negotiation process. This combined to create 
‘a narrowly defined agenda of politically acceptable issues’. They conclude 
that having very technical parameters for selection of targets and indictors 
results in a narrowing of the social agenda which may be tackled as part of 
the LPSA process and means that agendas may not reflect public concerns in 
a particular locality.
Brand (2008) notes the LAA process suffers from a lack of systemic approach 
to sharing learning and innovation, limited culture change in Whitehall and, 
whilst the link with community strategies has been enhanced, the link with 
other areas of the local government modernisation agenda remains unclear.
Russell (2008) identifies that LAAs were less ambitious than they might have 
been because they were not influencing the mainstream. In terms of reward 
grant, Russell suggests it could have unintended consequences related to 
skewing activity towards the short term, possibly less important and the 
attainable rather than the interventions which might be more effective in the 
longer term.
Inherent Tensions
As part of their LPSA evaluation, Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) found 
different expectations amongst central and local stakeholders -  whilst there
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was consensus that LPSAs were an opportunity to improve local outcomes, 
there were differing views about the wider ambitions of more joined up 
government and improved central-local relations. Sometimes there were 
differing views locally between those charged with delivery and the 
organisational leaders.
Government departments saw LPSAs as a means of achieving departmental 
priorities. Their significance depended upon the other policy levers available 
to deliver these priorities and the amount of added value seen in the LPSA. 
Stakeholders in central government close to the policy saw more joined up 
government and policy making as an aim which did not seem to be shared 
with their colleagues in other departments.
Gillanders and Ahmad (2007) describe how more ambitious areas sought to 
use their LAA to exact a shift in power between central and local and at the 
same time realise a significant reduction in the burden of performance 
management. They also found differing views about the scope and focus of 
LAAs -  for some they were about ‘everything’, setting out a comprehensive 
agreement to improve an area and a fundamentally new way of doing 
business. For others, they were about how a few select partners could do 
things differently around cross cutting issues.
Gillanders and Ahmad (2007) identified that localities tended to see LAAs as a 
dialogue while central departments viewed them increasingly as a contract, 
with government offices caught in the middle. Many localities failed to engage
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local politicians in what was perceived as ‘boring bureaucracy’ and added to 
this was the ambiguous role of the Government Office -  process facilitator, 
critical friend, broker and advocate. The first two were generally more 
successful. They conclude that while LAAs have contributed to an improved 
central-local relationship there is still an unanswered question as to the right 
balance between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ priorities and the extent to which 
local differentiation is desirable and feasible. Russell (2008) also identifies 
concerns as to whether LAAs have or can deliver a sea change in central- 
local relations, stating the credibility of the approach is still not proven in the 
eyes of many local stakeholders.
Trust, Fairness and Communication
Young (2005) suggests that LPSAs imply a relationship of acceptance and 
trust between central and local government based on agreed outcomes. 
Echoing themes from Chapter 2, it was suggested that the chances of 
‘success’ would be improved if the LPSA system was ‘owned’ by 
organisational stakeholders rather than ‘imposed’ from above (ODPM, 2005a).
Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) suggest that the negotiation process should 
enable both ‘sides’ to gain a better understanding of each other in terms of 
context and concerns. However, the reality seemed mixed, in some cases a 
shared understanding developed and the process of discussing the target 
helped to clarify the nature of the problem and possible solutions, but others 
found the process frustrating, bureaucratic, long and tortuous. It was often felt
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not to be a negotiation but central government ‘telling local government what 
to do’.
Gillanders and Ahmad (2007) suggest that improving outcomes through l_AAs 
is based on both the establishment of a more mature relationship between 
central and local government, and improvements in local partnership working.
Role of Financial Incentives
Entwistle and Enticott (2007) found that LPSAs were perceived as a means of 
increasing the visibility of services but this focus was on the money, or lack of 
it. Their interviewees felt that the LPSA pot was not sufficient to tackle the 
significant challenges of the rural agenda and that their own authorities were 
reluctant to supplement this pot. For a significant proportion of their 
interviewees the LPSA process was seen as a means of extracting additional 
resources from central government rather than as a means of addressing 
pressing social problems.
Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) suggest that at a corporate level the LPSA 
reward grant was seen as a powerful incentive, particularly amongst 
politicians. In service departments the emphasis was more on delivering a 
better service for local people with a strong commitment to achieving 
sustained improvement. Interestingly the owners of individual targets were 
less likely to emphasise the importance of financial resources and financial 
rewards than were co-ordinators, but were more likely to suggest that the staff
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responsible for delivering the target and central government policy had a 
positive influence (DCLG, 2008b).
Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) suggest that the implicit assumption underlying 
LPSAs within central government was that the real barrier to local government 
improvement is ‘will’ and that incentives will succeed where exhortation has 
failed. However, evaluation suggests that it was pump priming grant, 
combined with a limited number of objectives which were the most significant 
in enabling improvement.
Sullivan (2008a) and Russell (2008) both suggest that in relation to LAAs the 
most important driver of change seemed to be a determination amongst local 
players to improve outcomes and that funding levers were not stressed 
amongst either local or national stakeholders.
Cost Benefit
Young (2005) suggested the LPSA reward grant represented a small 
proportion of total local authority spend and that the administrative cost of the 
scheme was likely to be high. This raises questions as to the value for money 
aspect which may only be achieved if improvements are mainstreamed.
Performance and Culture Change
Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) suggest the association of a changed 
relationship between central and local government with improved outcomes 
was unique to LPSAs and, unlike other modernisation agenda policies, LPSAs
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emerged from a dialogue between the Treasury, Department for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) and the Local Government 
Association (LGA). However, they also note that the multiplicity of the central- 
local relationship means that a ‘one size fits all’ policy such as LPSAs is likely 
to generate multiple reactions, but the ‘maximum’ model would generate 
change at both local and national levels leading to better policy and regulation 
and contributing to the achievement of joined up government.
Achieving the organisational change would require more than the adoption of 
targets and performance indicators, it would also require attention to people 
and culture at all levels of local (and central) government (ODPM, 2005a). 
ODPM (2005b, 2005c, 2005d and 2005e), Young (2005) and DCLG (2008b) 
suggest that LPSAs have contributed to the delivery of a number of local 
process outcomes including: the development of increased capacity; better 
understanding of the barriers to improvement; contribution to sustainable 
systemic change; driven local innovation; a focus on corporate performance 
management; clearer strategic thinking; a positive impact on inter­
departmental working; and improved local partnership working. (This seems 
contrary to the evidence in Chapter 2 which suggested that such agreements 
might act as a limiting factor in relation to partnership working.) In terms of 
central government and central local relations, LPSAs have challenged 
entrenched views, developed an awareness of the importance of local 
context, developed new routes for consultation and changes to policy 
planning, and necessitated closer working between central departments.
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Gillanders and Ahmad (2007) identify that LAAs also demanded a radically 
new way of working within central government -  cutting across systems and 
processes and necessitating a culture change that many in government found 
difficult. The Department for Communities and Local Government acted as 
‘cheerleader’ trying to generate wide ownership across government for the 
principles underpinning the LAA. For local partners LAAs seem to have a 
strong symbolic value as a framework to galvanise action and the benefits 
have perhaps been greatest where partnership working had previously been 
weak.
Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) and Boyne and Law (2005) suggest that the 
service improvement attributable to LPSAs is not clear cut. This is because 
the link between actions and outcomes is imperfectly understood and other 
national policies are already pushing in the same direction or outcomes are 
strongly influenced by external factors. It will therefore be difficult to 
demonstrate additionality. Although there are some targets where little was 
happening before LPSAs and there are clear links between LPSA activities 
and improvements.
In terms of improved performance DCLG (2008a and 2008b) suggest that 
LPSAs have been successful in driving service improvement on the targeted 
indicators but that a higher level of ‘stretch’ does not necessarily enhance the 
impact of LPSAs on targeted performance. This fits with parameters identified 
in relation to target setting in Chapter 2.
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Observations
The literature on LPSAs and LAAs evaluates the process and identifies some 
of the key drivers of improved performance, noting that reward grant does not 
seem to be one of the strongest. However, it does not comprehensively 
explore why funding is not a significant driver, nor does it fundamentally 
question, in light of this and the other inherent difficulties identified with short 
term funding, the effectiveness or appropriateness of this aspect of the 
performance agreements.
Scotland
The Scottish Government and COSLA (Convention of Scottish Local 
Authorities) signed a concordat in November 2007 which included the 
agreement that every Scottish local authority would produce a Single 
Outcome Agreement (SOA) which in 2008-09 covers all local authority service 
provision. SOAs contain a section which enables local authorities to raise the 
issues which they consider the Scottish Government needs to address in 
order for SOAs to be delivered successfully. Locally generated indicators 
account for over two thirds of the indicators contained within the 32 SOAs but 
the Agreements are intended to be outcome not output focussed (Scottish 
Parliament, 2008).
However, Midwinter (2009) criticises the agreements as being input and 
output focussed and as removing the discretion of local authorities over policy 
because of the sign up to the delivery of national outcomes as part of the
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Concordat. He also claims that the agreements have cut the link between 
needs assessment and funding for the same reason.
Wales 
Policy Agreements
There has been no previous, comprehensive analysis or evaluation of Policy 
Agreements1, therefore the following section is by necessity partly descriptive 
but has not previously been documented in detail. Limited academic 
references were found relating to the process and these have been included 
at appropriate junctures.
The Concept of Policy Agreements
The Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA) proposed Policy 
Agreements in 2000 (Laffin, 2004) as a way of delivering the Assembly 
Government’s aspirations for a more strategic approach to policy making in 
Wales. The aim was to address tensions in central-local priorities by focusing 
on signing up to an agreed policy agenda, but recognising that this agenda 
could be delivered locally in ways relevant to local people. Laffin et al (2002) 
and Jeffery (2006) confirm that Policy Agreements were co-determined by 
local authorities and the Welsh Assembly Government.
1 This section of the Chapter was developed using the written reports and other documents as 
referred to and, the observation of three of the Policy Agreement evaluation meetings and a 
Policy Agreement review meeting between officials of the Welsh Assembly Government and 
the WLGA.
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For local government, the reasoning was to focus on outcomes and, thus act 
as a counterweight to the perceived increased concentration on inputs, 
hypothecation and ring-fencing of the annual revenue settlement as the main 
lever to drive local authorities to deliver Assembly Government priority areas 
(Laffin et al, 2002; National Assembly for Wales, 1999).
The Agreements also had attractions for the Assembly Government in that 
they emphasised a ‘partnership’ approach to the governance of Wales and 
gave credibility to the Assembly as the strategic body (Laffin et al, 2002; 
Jeffery, 2006; Bradbury, 2003; Bradbury and Mitchell, 2005). They provided a 
clear link between the Assembly Government’s strategic objectives and those 
which authorities would be developing with local partners and communities as 
part of their new responsibilities for community leadership (Laffin et al, 2002). 
The Agreements were, therefore, jointly ‘billed’ as a “radical undertaking with 
no parallel elsewhere in the UK” (National Assembly for Wales/WLGA, 
February 7th, 2000).
Laffin et al (2002) suggest that Policy Agreements were seen as important in 
developing the Assembly-local government relationship and offered a 
compromise between the demands for local autonomy and hypothecation. 
However, as reflected in the evidence from the LPSA evaluation, they noted a 
potential difference in perception in that the Assembly tended to see the 
Agreements as ‘directive’ policy instruments, while local authorities tended to 
see them as ‘coordinative’, i.e. more strongly reflective of local priorities. This 
is supported by Jeffery (2006) who suggests that Policy Agreements were
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criticised for setting uniform targets and hypothecating funding rather than 
leaving greater discretion within and across programmes at a local level. On 
the latter point, hypothecation may have been quoted as a misconception or 
fear as the funding was not ‘top-sliced’ or hypothecated (Laffin et al, 2002).
The joint paper (i.e. prepared by the Assembly Government and the WLGA) 
which introduced the concept of Policy Agreements to the Partnership Council 
on 7 February, 2000 made no mention of attaching financial incentives to the 
Agreements. At the meeting, questions were asked as to what motivation did 
authorities of different political control have for signing up to an agreement 
with a Labour dominated Assembly. It was stressed that the development of 
the Agreements could serve to reinforce a new approach to politics based on 
consensus and what was best for the people of Wales, rather than the old 
focus on party politics. The focus, at this stage, was on mutual goal 
alignment.
The Development of Policy Agreements
A joint task and finish group (Assembly/local government) presented a 
framework based on ‘BetterWales’ (National Assembly for Wales, 2000) to the 
Partnership Council on 10 July, 2000. Key aspects were: targets to be 
challenging but deliverable; a three year time frame; no external assessment 
and, the Assembly Government to review progress with local authorities.
The minutes of the Partnership Council on July 10th re-surfaced the question 
of funding. “If local authorities were to agree to sign up to the Policy
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Agreements the Assembly should consider what it was going to offer in return 
- such as an increase in local government’s revenue allocation by 2%, to 
enable them to deliver agreed priorities.” (Partnership Council Minutes, July 
10th, 2000).
This response from the WLGA may have been driven by the timing of the 
announcement in England of the LPSA pilot scheme which included an 
element of financial reward, tapered based on service performance. 
However, a paper on Policy Agreements put to the WLGA Co-Ordinating 
Committee on June 29th, 2001 argued that this approach would not be 
appropriate for Wales and that the Association should press for a corporate 
payment of grant which it believed would ensure full effort across all areas of 
the Policy Agreement, maximise grant levels and lift ‘whole’ authority 
performance.
Following consultation in October 2000, changes were made to the framework 
agreement, which was now to include a Performance Incentive Grant. The 
final version, implemented in 2001-02 is included in Appendix A. Laffin et al 
(2002) criticise Policy Agreements for not including housing measures, 
despite the publication of a major new housing strategy at around the same 
time. They argue this was a missed opportunity for joining up the social care 
and housing policy silos. Martin and Davies (2002) also identified this as a 
potentially missed opportunity for the original Best Value regime in England. 
The rationale behind the inclusion of the financial reward and its operation will 
be further explored in Chapters 6 and 7, but at this stage it seems to reflect
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the close nature of the relationship between the Assembly Government and 
local authorities and their mutual dependency identified in Chapter 2.
Policy Agreements Process 
Setting and Measuring Objectives
Despite a target date for implementation of April, in June 2001 negotiation of 
social services and other targets and baselines was still ongoing. Much of the 
explanation for this was the lack of a performance management framework for 
social services prior to the start up of the Policy Agreement process. The 
discussions at individual local authority level were an iterative process - both 
targets and baselines were mutually agreed based on the national basket of 
indicators agreed by the WLGA on behalf of its members. This took 
considerable time as illustrated in Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1: POLICY AGREEMENT DATES
Authority Date
Blaenau Gwent 27 February, 2002
Bridgend 12 November, 2001
Caerphilly 8 March, 2002
Cardiff 7 December, 2001
Carmarthenshire 8 November, 2001
Ceredigion 26 February, 2002
Conwy 26 November, 2001
Denbighshire 30 January, 2002
Flintshire 28 February, 2002
Gwynedd 19 February, 2002
Isle of Anglesey 29 January, 2002
Merthyr Tydfil 25 January, 2002
Monmouthshire 13 November, 2001
Neath Port Talbot 16 November, 2001
Newport 11 February, 2002
Pembrokeshire 7 December 2001
Powys 12 November, 2001
Rhondda Cynon Taff 18 March, 2002
Swansea 5 December, 2001
Torfaen 14 November, 2001
Vale of Glamorgan 12 November, 2001
Wrexham 27 November, 2001
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The final baselines and targets for all 22 local authorities across the range of 
the agreed indicators and measures are included in Appendix B.
Feedback of Results
When funding was attached to the Agreements the need emerged for 
evaluation to be put on a more formal footing. This pressure came from the 
WLGA by advising its members that it would not be sensible to sign up to the 
Agreements unless there was a clear process for evaluation of performance 
and determination of reward.
The evaluation protocol was developed as a result of a brief consultation 
exercise between the Assembly Government and local authorities through the 
WLGA. It states that the intention is to award PIG in full wherever ‘best 
endeavours’ have been made towards achieving the targets. Any decisions 
on abatement were to be made by Assembly Government Ministers based on 
direct dialogue between the Assembly Government and local authorities. 
Regulatory agencies were excluded from both the dialogue and decisions on 
the allocation of reward funding (see Appendix C).
The nature of the protocol may have been an attempted reconciliation of the 
tension between having to differentiate between the performance of local 
authorities in a relationship where equity of treatment seemed to be valued 
(see Chapter 2). It may also give an indication of where the power lay in the 
relationship at that time. It will be interesting to explore whether the limited 
consultation period, and thus implied limited communication and engagement
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with key stakeholders, enabled the intentions of this ‘change of heart’ to be 
effectively communicated and understood. These were identified as important 
‘success’ factors in Chapter 2.
Rewards linked to Outcomes
As discussed above, the attachment of a financial incentive to Policy 
Agreements was not part of the original concept, but a product of ongoing 
discussions between the Assembly Government and local authorities. Once 
raised at the Partnership Council there was little room for manoeuvre on the 
part of the Assembly Government as it seemed clear that unless a financial 
incentive was attached local authorities would not be signing up. There was 
also support for including a financial incentive in the Agreements on the 
Assembly Government ‘side’. There was not consensus on this point; some 
felt that attaching finance to the Agreements undermined their main purpose 
in promoting a partnership approach focusing on joint working and political 
consensus (National Assembly for Wales/WLGA, 2000).
However, the majority view carried the day and £40m was allocated as the 
financial incentive/reward. This was ‘new’ funding (as opposed to ‘top-sliced’ 
off the general revenue settlement) to be made available over the duration of 
the Agreements. In the financial year 2001-02, £10m was made available as 
an incentive for signing and to assist with initial costs. The balance was paid 
in 2003-04 on completion of the Agreements and, in theory, dependent on 
performance. ‘Performance Incentive Grant’ (PIG), both instalments, was 
unhypothecated. Authorities were able to add it to their general revenue
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allocations and budget at a local level to determine how best to achieve the 
Policy Agreement targets whilst taking into account other local priorities.
The funding was allocated in proportion to total Standard Spending 
Assessment (SSA) (excluding capital charges) (Table 3.2). The fact that this 
was the agreed allocation method reflects the principle identified in Chapter 2 
of equitable treatment between authorities, all authorities must be seen to be 
receiving their ‘fair share' of any available additional funding - whether
performance related or not.
TABLE 3.2: PAYMENT OF PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE GRANT TO
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Authority Payment 2001- 
2002 
£000
Payment 2003- 
2004 
£000
Total
£000
Blaenau Gwent 251 753 1,006
Bridgend 435 1,305 1,740
Caerphilly 600 1,800 2,400
Cardiff 1,012 3,037 4,048
Carmarthenshire 602 1,806 2,408
Ceredigion 256 768 1,024
Conwy 382 1,146 1,528
Denbighshire 327 981 1,308
Flintshire 474 1,422 1,896
Gwynedd 428 1,284 1,712
Isle of Anglesey 244 732 976
Merthyr Tydfil 216 648 864
Monmouthshire 266 798 1,064
Neath Port Talbot 474 1,422 1,896
Newport 467 1,401 1,868
Pembrokeshire 414 1,242 1,656
Powys 455 1,365 1,820
Rhondda Cynon Taff 841 2,524 3,365
Swansea 748 2,245 2,993
Torfaen 315 945 1,260
Vale of Glamorgan 393 1,179 1,572
Wrexham 399 1,197 1,596
Total 10,000 30,000 40,000
It could be argued that the additional funding is a small percentage of total 
local authority revenue funding both at an aggregate and at an individual 
authority level (Young, 2005). However, authorities tend to operate on the
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basis of incremental budgeting (CIPFA, 2000) and, therefore, any funding at 
the margins which is not hypothecated is arguably a potentially powerful 
incentive.
Amendments to Objectives and Activities
A series of progress review meetings were held between November 2002 and 
January 2003. The discussions were led for the Assembly Government by the 
then Local Government Modernisation Division. The approach to these 
meetings by local authorities was very mixed. Some had prepared reports, 
involved both members and officers and used the meetings to review progress 
against the targets in the Agreements in detail. These types of meeting 
included a post mortem of why targets had not been met and where baselines 
had been over or under estimated (usually in the social services area because 
of on-going system development).
Other authorities took a more broad brush approach to the meetings and 
involved only the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and a number of key 
chief officers. At these meetings the Agreements were discussed at a more 
general level with anecdotal evidence as to progress or otherwise towards the 
targets. The reasons for these differences of approach and their impacts are 
explored in Chapter 7.
These interim meetings highlighted that local authority officers were aware of 
and felt strongly that the purpose of Policy Agreements was not simply to 
improve local authority performance by the use of a financial incentive/reward,
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although most felt that the attachment of a financial incentive would prove to 
be a significant motivator. However, local authority officers also felt that the 
linking of strategic planning between the Assembly Government and local 
authorities, the process of working together, changing cultures and attitudes in 
both the Assembly Government and local authorities and, the shift to focusing 
on outcomes were important. These discussions also highlighted the 
importance of thinking about and delivering Policy Agreements within the 
wider modernisation agenda and linking all of the component parts together 
as a cohesive whole. In particular, it was felt that the links between the Wales 
Programme for Improvement, the community planning framework and Policy 
Agreements should be strengthened. This reflects themes identified in 
Chapter 2.
Generally, authorities felt that the numbers and types of indicators were 
appropriate, but the view was expressed that difficulties had been 
encountered with the social services indicators in terms of agreeing definitions 
and identifying the appropriate information for the baselines. Concern was 
also expressed that the indicator on modal shift (a means of tracking the flow 
of passengers from cars to public transport) was too vague and exceeded the 
time horizon of the Policy Agreements. This was later abandoned as 
unworkable.
Some authorities indicated that attempts had been made to integrate the 
Policy Agreement targets with their own strategic planning process in the 
context of the Assembly Government’s own strategic plans. However, others
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appeared to be treating the Policy Agreement targets as a ‘separate exercise’.
Both these issues will be further explored in Chapters 6 and 7.
Emerging Concerns
In a WLGA Co-ordinating Committee Paper (June 29th, 2001) possible 
tensions in the future development of Policy Agreements were highlighted. 
These included the aspiration that longer term Policy Agreements should be 
better integrated into the community planning process. It was stressed that the 
targets and indicators in Policy Agreements should not be top-down otherwise 
local authorities merely become agents of the Assembly. Concern was also 
expressed that nationally set frameworks do not reflect the major and diverse 
policy priorities at a local level.
Laffin et al (2002) identified that most of the local authority cabinet members 
interviewed for their study had not heard of Policy Agreements or were unable 
to discuss them in detail. Council Leaders tended to be sceptical and 
wondered whether this was hypothecation by the back door. In particular they 
were concerned about punishment for not meeting the targets and that local 
priorities were being skewed in favour of national ones.
Chief officers were also concerned that the targets and indicators were too 
constraining and focussed on the national with little accommodation of local 
conditions. However, they tended to be more positive, especially where they 
were already keen to move towards performance management systems and 
inculcate a performance management culture. In these cases Policy
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Agreements were seized upon as a vehicle for taking these ambitions forward.
Again, these issues will be further explored in Chapters 6 and 7.
The Second Round of Policy Agreements
Haubrich and McClean (2006) conducted a limited piece of research 
comparing performance agreements in England, Wales and Scotland. The 
second round of Policy Agreements (2004-2007) provided authorities with 
some limited additional unhypothecated funds, between 0.5% and 1.5% of an 
authority’s revenue budget for service improvement, if they met specified 
indicators measuring progress towards national strategic objectives.
Haubrich and McClean (2006) suggest that, unlike England, staff in Wales are 
not incentivised by good performance categories or less ring fencing of grants, 
the main motivational drivers to do well appear to be the work ethos of staff, 
political pressure by members of the council, and the threat of more audits if a 
bad assessment report is produced. They also identify that the consensus 
approach adopted in Wales means that developing and implementing ideas 
agreeable to all takes an extraordinary amount of time.
Conclusions
The key themes which have emerged in relation to LPSAs, LAAs and Policy
Agreements are as follows:
• Target Setting -  a higher level of stretch target not necessarily leading 
to higher performance; practical issues bedevilling the process such as 
lack of time for implementation, difficulties in establishing robust targets 
and baselines and underdeveloped performance management 
systems.
83
• Undesirable Effects -  game playing was identified; some potentially 
perverse impacts were developing, including a lack of citizen focus in 
the selection of issues to be taken forward and a loss of ambition 
through the skewing of resources towards the short-term, easily 
identified and defined and the politically acceptable; a focus on robust 
measurement resulting in the exclusion of the difficult to measure 
became a constraining rather than and enabling factor; and, hijacking 
of agendas to raise the profile of services. For LAAs better integration 
with community strategies but not other parts of the modernisation 
agenda and a lack of systematic learning. It will be interesting to 
explore whether the differing context of ‘small country governance’ in 
Wales mitigates or magnifies these difficulties.
• Inherent Tensions -  differing perceptions between central and local 
government players and differing perceptions between those leading 
on LPSAs and LAAs and other departments in central government and 
between the corporate centre in local government and those charged 
with delivering the improved services; Government interest levels 
amongst departments potentially being dependent on the other ‘levers’ 
available; striking the right balance between top-down and bottom-up 
remained illusive. Some early evidence suggested similar issues in 
Wales, again it will be interesting to identify whether these differences 
in perception and other difficulties translate to a different context.
• Trust, Fairness and Communication -  greater levels of trust were felt 
to exist; the Agreements were felt to have strengthened central-local 
relations and been more mutual but the reality was mixed, different 
perceptions existed between different stakeholders.
• The Role of Financial incentives -  LPSAs are a payment by results 
scheme, both pump priming grant and performance reward grant were 
factors in progressing towards the targets. However, the funding may 
motivate corporate centres more than service managers and pump 
priming grant may be a more powerful enabler of improvement than 
reward grant. LPSAs were seen as a way of extracting more funding 
from central government rather than as a means of addressing 
pressing social problems. For LAAs funding levers were not identified 
as significant drivers. For service managers a stronger driver for 
improvement was the desire to improve outcomes for citizens. It was 
identified that Policy Agreements were partly modelled on LPSAs and 
were also intended as a payment by results scheme.
• Cost Benefit -  Concern was expressed over the administrative cost of 
the LPSA scheme, the relatively small amount of total local authority 
funding involved and thus overall value for money. Chapter 2 identified 
this as an issue for organisational performance management systems 
and Chapter 4 will identify that value for money is also an issue for 
individual PRP schemes; this therefore provides corroborating 
evidence for this issue to be considered as part of the evaluation model 
for Policy Agreements.
• Performance and Culture Change -  culture change ‘benefits’ were 
identified as: the release of local innovation; improved dialogue and 
communication; more joining up at both central and local levels; the 
development of a local authority performance culture; focus on
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outcomes and a shared agenda. These were also identified as 
objectives for Policy Agreements in Wales. It will be interesting to 
explore the impact or otherwise of Policy Agreements on these process 
outcomes, what factors may have impacted upon them and whether 
these factors are different to the English experience. It was also 
identified that it would be impossible to isolate the impact of LPSAs 
from the impact of other performance improvement policies and, that 
the definition of outcomes and selection of measures was difficult but 
could be mitigated by sticking to a limited number of desirables, using 
clear criteria and baskets of indicators. This is likely to be the same in 
the Welsh context and these limitations will need to be taken into 
account when considering the impact of Policy Agreements on actual 
service improvement performance.
These themes reflect the evidence in Chapter 2 relating to the use of 
performance management systems and targets in the public sector as a driver 
for improvement. However, there has been no exploration of whether these 
themes are universal or contingent in the context of devolution in the UK, 
which limits opportunities for learning and understanding the drivers of 
improved service performance in different contexts (Martin and Andrews, 
2009). It also potentially limits the benefits of devolution and could result in 
isolationism (Downe et al, 2007, Laffin, 2009 and Hockridge, 2006).
Sullivan (2008) recognises that human interaction is a key aspect of 
governance systems and Chapter 2 identified that this may be highly relevant 
in respect of Wales, given the nature of the central-local relationship (Andrews 
and Martin, 2007). This provides further evidence to suggest that a contextual 
understanding is important. This is also of great relevance for the evaluation 
of policy, as knowledge of how a policy was implemented is important in 
establishing its success or otherwise (Lewis, 2001; Davies, 1999; Blalock, 
1999; Chelimsky, 1997; Drakeford, 2006; and Jeffery, 2006). In addition, 
whilst the LPSA and LAA evaluation evidence considers the impact of
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financial incentives on service managers and local authority corporate 
centres, there is limited explanation of why these impacts occur and limited 
work on the impact of financial incentives in different contexts. Also, the 
evidence has not been related to theories on individual PRP which Boyne and 
Chen (2006) and Reiter et al (2006) suggest Governments are relying on in 
assuming the robustness and appropriateness of their transference to 
organisational levels.
Boyne and Chen (2006) suggest that evidence of the effectiveness of 
organisational pay for performance schemes can be considered with 
reference to the literature on individual motivation, performance management 
and PRP. Reiter et al (2006) note that these schemes are usually applied in 
the individual context and their impact at an organisational level is under­
researched.
In light of this, the literature relating to individual motivation, performance 
management and PRP schemes will be explored in the next chapter to 
determine whether there is an additional dimension which this evidence could 
add to the literature previously reviewed on targets and performance 
management in the public sector in Chapter 2 and the lessons from the 
English LPSA and LAA experiences in Chapter 3, to develop an evaluation 
framework for Policy Agreements.
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CHAPTER 4
PERFORMANCE RELATED PAY AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 have identified themes, issues and critical success factors 
surrounding the development and implementation of inter-governmental 
performance management systems. However, the use and effect of financial 
incentives in these systems is an under-researched area, and it has been 
suggested that research on individual PRP schemes could provide insight and 
facilitate a better understanding of how organisational schemes work (or not) 
(Reiter et al, 2006; Boyne and Chen, 2006). Likewise, Hood (2007) argues 
that translating from the individual to the organisational is not a new concept 
in public management as Taylor’s work on scientific management was 
embraced by Lenin in 1918 to manage the Soviet economy.
It might also be possible to use a framework based on strategic management 
theory, for example the balanced score card. However, these tend not to 
contain an element of organisational payment by results, rather managers are 
individually rewarded based on the performance of their organisations and, 
such schemes also tend to have a strong focus on financial performance, 
including rate of return on capital employed which is not the case with Policy 
Agreements. Other areas of strategic management, such as organisational 
strategy, and their relationship to improved performance have already been 
researched (Boyne and Walker, 2004; Andrews et al, 2008) but, again these 
studies do not focus on the use and effect of organisational financial 
incentives.
87
This Chapter, therefore, critically reviews the literature on individual 
performance management and performance related pay schemes. In 
conclusion, it compares the issues identified to those highlighted in Chapters 
2 and 3 and, looks for gaps and any added value which might be provided by 
synthesis of the two evidence sets.
Performance Related Pay and Performance Management 
Overall Aims
PRP has been identified as having a number of overall aims (Hammond, 
2000; McNabb and Whitfield, 2007 and Schaubroek et al, 2008):
• introduced as part of a package of measures which aim to increase the 
quantitative and qualitative input of workers into the production 
process;
• remains the most popular monetary incentive plan to motivate 
individuals to perform better and help organise their strategic goals;
• means for employers to express the value they place upon their 
employees’ contribution towards achieving business goals and,
• means for employees to create favourable social comparisons with 
others and indicating higher levels of power and control within the 
organisation.
PRP has also been used extensively in the public sector, Reilly (2003) and 
Waine (2000) identify that governments striving for a more efficient, 
performance orientated public sector have homed in on PRP as a means of 
achieving this aim. The emphasis on targets in the approach reflects the 
central critique of both Conservative and Labour administrations: public 
services lacked specific objectives and, thus, a means of evaluating whether 
service goals were being attained (see also Chapter 2).
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For example, Waine (2000) notes that the introduction of the Citizen’s Charter 
was accompanied by a Government announcement that PRP would be 
pursued vigorously (Prime Minister’s Office, 1991). This interest continued 
under Labour (Burgess and Ratto, 2003) and became an important element of 
the modernisation agenda.
Motivation Theories
Developing and implementing a PRP scheme requires an understanding of 
what motivates individuals. ‘Content’ theories focus on fundamental needs 
(Taylor, 1947; Mayo, 1933; Maslow, 1943; McGregor 1960, 1966; Schein, 
1965; Herzberg, 1966) and assume that human beings have a package of 
motives which they pursue and, a set of needs or desired outcomes. 
‘Process’ theories are based on social psychology, Expectancy and Goal 
Setting Theories explore how outcomes become desirable and are pursued by 
individuals. They assume that people are capable of selecting goals and 
choosing the path towards them by a process of conscious or unconscious 
calculation. It is the latter which underpin the design of PRP schemes.
Goal Setting Theory was developed by Edwin Locke in 1968 and Mento et al 
(1987). It argues that the goals pursued by employees can play an important 
role in motivating superior performance. This is because in pursuing these 
goals people examine the consequences of their behaviour. If they feel that 
their goals will not be attained by following their current path they will either 
modify their behaviour or chose more achievable goals. The aim of 
performance management systems is to link these individual goals and
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behaviour of employees to the goals of the organisation. If the employer can 
establish with the employee that the organisation’s goals are worthwhile, they 
can harness a source of motivation by creating goal alignment.
Expectancy Theory was conceived by Vroom (1964) and further developed by 
Galbraith and Cummins (1967). It hypothesises that it is the anticipated 
satisfaction of valued goals which causes individuals to behave in certain 
ways by adjusting their behaviour to the way which is most likely to lead to 
attainment. Nadler and Lawler (1979) suggest that unlike previous theories, 
Expectancy Theory does not assume that all employees and all situations are 
alike. The theory implies that low motivation will be the product of jobs where 
there is little worker control.
PRP Design Principles
PRP is predicated on money as a motivator and Expectancy Theory is 
therefore the principal framework which should be used to analyse the 
motivational effects of PRP. However, as Goal Setting Theory emphasises 
intrinsic rewards in the form of achieving performance goals, it can be used in 
a complementary way. Table 4.1 uses these theories, together with lessons 
from academic research in this field, to set out the key design principles for 
PRP schemes. These are compared with those identified for central-local 
government performance agreements in Chapters 2 and 3. It is identified that, 
in particular, the issue of rewards linked to outcomes is a potentially under­
researched area in the central-local context.
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TABLE 4.1: THE PERFORMANCE RELATED PAY CYCLE
Stage Aims Desiderata Dangers Themes from Central-Local 
Performance Management 
Schemes
Setting
Performance
Objectives
Look at the wider strategic goals, 
‘overall vision’ of the organisation 
and translate them into goals for 
smaller groups or individuals.
Means of engaging employees in 
the search for mutual gain and 
continuous improvement.
Performance management and 
PRP schemes should be part of a 
coherent set of practices aimed at 
improving organisational 
effectiveness and performance.
Set within the context of being a 
‘learning organisation’, focussed 
on continuous improvement.
Few, relatively concrete goals.
Engagement, communication 
and participation in goal and 
target setting.
Performance management 
scheme is set both within a 
coherent set of HRM policies 
and a clear organisational 
vision.
Need to link efforts of 
individuals with business goals 
by goal alignment.
- Organisations may be unable to 
clearly identify and articulate their 
strategic objectives.
- Objectives may be diverse and 
numerous.
- Strategic goals of the organisation 
may be inherently unstable.
- Goals may be contradictory or 
competing.
- This may leave the organisation 
unable to identify the behaviours 
which are most likely to achieve its 
strategic goals.
- Temptation might be to take ‘bite- 
sized’ chunks, risk that it does not 
work as individuals focus on those 
elements of performance which 
have been selected and highlighted 
by the organisation. The results, 
therefore, may not be desirable: a 
pre-existing pride in skill and work 
may be replaced by a contractual 
focus on the rules.
- Activity and goals become 
misaligned.
- Best Value was criticised 
for leading to a focus on 
rules and process rather than 
outcomes (Walker, 1998; 
Sanderson, 1999, 2001; 
Boyne, 1998, 1999, 2001).
- Too many goals can be 
confusing and lead to 
contradictions - public policy 
is complex, therefore clear 
prioritisation of goals, within 
the wider context, is essential 
(Boyne and Gould-Williams, 
2003; Sullivan and 
Gillanders, 2005).
- Engagement and 
participation in the process of 
target setting is more likely to 
lead to motivation (Courty 
and Marschuke, 2008; Boyne 
and Chen, 2006).
- LAA links with the rest 
modernisation agenda 
remain unclear (Brand, 2008)
- Some innovation resulted 
but a danger of becoming a 
boundary rather than an 
enabler (Entwistle and 
Enticott, 2007; Ordonez et al, 
2009).
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Stage Aims Desiderata Dangers Themes from Central-Local 
Performance Management 
Schemes
Measuring
Outcomes
The measure is appropriate, i.e. 
not simply the most easily 
measured.
Context is retained, the ‘big 
picture’ remains clear and a 
performance culture develops.
• The measure should be 
free from ‘noise’, i.e. the 
influence of outside factors.
• It should not be capable of 
manipulation by insiders.
• It should be straightforward 
to understand.
• It should be inexpensive to 
collect.
• It should be relevant in the 
sense that it reports on the 
dimension of performance 
required.
• Targets should be 
demanding but achievable.
- Many activities are difficult to 
measure e.g. increased levels of 
customer satisfaction.
- Perverse incentives may creep in 
if the package is not carefully 
constructed.
- Targets will be ‘gamed’ and/or 
data manipulated.
- Complicated systems run into a 
negative cost benefit.
- Goal displacement may occur.
- Measures need to be 
carefully selected and 
capable of objective 
measurement (Davies, 1999; 
Carter etal, 1995; Lapsley, 
2008).
- They must be within the 
control of local authorities to 
deliver (Courty and 
Marschuke, 2008; Boyne and 
Law, 2005).
- Schemes must be carefully 
constructed to be demanding 
but achievable and avoid 
gaming, perverse incentives, 
goal displacement and data 
manipulation (Boyne and 
Chen, 2006; Davies, 1999; 
Bevan and Hood, 2006a and 
2006b; Entwistle and 
Enticott, 2007; Boyne and 
Law, 2005; Ordonez et al, 
2009).
Cost benefit is questionable 
(Young, 2005).
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Stage Aims Desiderata Dangers Themes from Central-Local 
Performance Management 
Schemes
Feedback of 
Results
Objective discussion to 
consolidate/improve good 
performance and address issues 
such as training which could 
further improve or raise poor 
performance.
• Discussion should focus on 
delivery of the performance 
objective.
• Good communication is 
essential.
• The process must be 
perceived as ‘fair’ and 
objective.
- Can be distorted by subjectivity 
introduced by the assessor.
- Assessor may feel social pressure 
to give ratings better than those 
deserved.
- Appraisers can use the appraisal 
process to consolidate their power 
over the appraisee.
- Appraisees may have raised 
expectations, and are therefore 
surprised when the rating given is 
lower than anticipated. This may 
lead to demotivation.
- Appraisal process can become 
overly bureaucratic - contradictory 
to the ideas of delegation, 
empowerment, teamwork and 
devolution of previously centralised 
policies.
- Credibility of the system 
with those involved is vital 
(Davies, 1999).
- Communication and 
attention to implementation 
are vital (Davies, 1999).
- ‘Supportive’ regulation is 
more likely to have a positive 
impact on local strategies for 
service improvement 
(Andrews et al, 2008).
- Process can be perceived 
as bureaucratic and technical 
(Sullivan and Gillanders, 
2005).
- LPSA process was 
perceived by some local 
authority officials as being 
completely ‘top-down’ and an 
exercise in central 
government ‘telling us what 
to do’ (Sullivan and 
Gillanders, 2005).
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Stage Aims Desiderata Dangers Themes from Central-Local 
Performance Management 
Schemes
Rewards 
linked to 
outcomes
• Expectancy Theory highlights 
the need to tie performance 
outcomes to rewards which 
are valued by employees.
• Goal Setting Theory places 
emphasis on the acceptance 
by the employee of the goals 
per se and that motivation is 
more intrinsically based.
• Expectancy Theory suggests 
there should be strong 
linkages between the 
elements of the system if it is 
to work effectively.
• Effort and performance - This 
is a key link, if employees are 
to adjust their behaviour to 
achieve specific goals leading 
to rewards then they must be 
confident that they will be 
able to affect the performance 
measure. If this entails the 
use of new skills or 
equipment then appropriate 
training must be supplied by 
the employer.
• Expectancy Theory is 
premised on knowing what 
rewards are valued by the 
employee. This is because 
valence suggests that 
successful performance will 
only result to the extent to 
which the rewards on offer 
are valued by the 
employee. Consultation 
needed to determine the 
value of goals. Trivial 
rewards will result in trivial 
amounts of effort and thus 
trivial improvements in 
performance.
• The following rewards may 
be of value to employees: 
money, power, autonomy, 
praise, status and fringe 
benefits.
• Distinction between intrinsic 
and extrinsic rewards. 
Extrinsic rewards are added 
e.g. cash, whereas intrinsic 
rewards arise from within 
the system e.g. satisfaction 
from meeting targets.
• Needs a high level of trust 
between employer and 
employee.
- P.R.P. can be part of the 
performance management system, 
but it should not necessarily be 
assumed that performance is 
entirely driven by money. Need to 
consider the ‘whole’ system.
- Goal Setting Theory can be used 
to compliment Expectancy Theory 
as this places emphasis on intrinsic 
motivation associated with 
achieving targets. The difficulty lies 
in finding the right cocktail of goals 
and rewards that will be valued by 
employees.
- A potentially important difficulty is 
that, even in well designed systems, 
there may be a ‘perception problem’ 
as socially determined 
environments may mean that 
people’s perceptions may not be 
objective pictures of reality.
- Individual PRP may militate 
against team working.
- Different local authority 
officers (corporate and 
service) may be motivated by 
different things in the context 
of performance agreements 
(Boyne and Law, 2005; 
Sullivan and Gillanders, 
2005).
- Pump priming grant and the 
clarification of objectives 
were potentially more 
powerful enabiers of 
improvement than reward 
grant in relation to LPSAs 
(Sullivan and Gillanders, 
2005).
- Financial levers were not 
cited as significant drivers in 
relation to LAAs (Russell, 
2008; Sullivan, 2008).
- The use of financial 
incentives in 
intergovernmental 
performance schemes is an 
under-researched area 
(Boyne and Chen, 2006 and 
Reiter et al, 2006).
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Rewards 
linked to 
outcomes 
(continued)
• Performance and rewards - 
there are two broad 
approaches to this, formal 
and informal. The advantage 
of the formal approach is that 
it may be defended, as being 
more objective, while the 
other option provides more 
flexibility, it may be perceived 
as subjective, thus weakening 
the link between performance 
and rewards. The principal 
independent variable in this 
system is likely to be the level 
of trust between the appraiser 
and the appraisee.
• Promised rewards must 
materialise - employees 
may be sceptical of such 
schemes if in the past they 
have been ‘victims’ of 
reward systems which 
failed to deliver the 
promised rewards after 
targets had been met.
- Potential interference from noise - 
even the best system may not be 
able to avoid this, for example, 
interference from macro economic 
conditions. A contingency 
approach to performance 
measurement might be able to 
alleviate this problem without 
weakening the perceived link.
- Identified conflict between 
delivering on LPSA targets 
and partnership working 
(Gillanders and Ahmad, 
2007).
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Stage Aims Desiderata Dangers Themes from Central-Local 
Performance Management 
Schemes
Amendments 
to objectives 
and activities
This element of the system 
consists of feedback and 
discussion of performance in 
order to assist with continuous 
improvement, and a review of the 
functioning of the system as a 
whole.
• Good communication is 
essential.
• Discussions must allow for 
consideration of coaching 
to improve performance 
and testing of career 
aspirations.
• Important to review the 
process as a whole, goals 
may have changed and 
these are complex systems 
so that reflexivity is 
fundamental to the strategic 
role of performance 
management.
• Process must be 
supportively managed.
- Determination of rewards may be 
in conflict with the coaching role. 
Purposes of appraisal conflict e.g. 
improve current performance, 
provide feedback, increase 
motivation, identify training needs 
and, identify potential rewards. 
Appraiser can develop conflicting 
roles of ‘coach’ and ‘cop’.
- Process can become 
administratively burdensome.
- Distortion effects of appraisal 
process such as halo effects.
- The LPSA process did not 
always feel like a negotiation 
(Sullivan and Gillanders, 
2005)
- Agreements can become a 
process burden rather than a 
force for improvement.
- This facet of the central- 
local performance agreement 
process seems to be under­
developed in relation to the 
quality of the discussions, the 
conflicting roles and the skills 
of those involved.
Source: adapted from Mabey and Salaman (1998), Purcell et al (2000), Fowler (1990), Torrington and Hall (1998), Plachy and 
Plachy (1993), Hendry et al (2000), Bolman and Deal (1997), Grint (1998), Roche (1999), Boselie et al (2005), Audit Commission 
(2001a), Gould-Williams (2002, 2003), Buckingham (2001), Redman and Wilkinson (2001), Connock (1992), Blyton and Turnbull 
(1992), Cannell and Wood (1992), Lloyd (1986), Armstrong and Murlis (1995), Brown (2001), Reilly (2003), Smith (1998), Pearce 
(1987), Lewis (2001), Thurley (1982), Bartol and Locke, 2000, Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990), Delbridge and Turnbull (1992), Lawler 
(1971), LeBlanc and Mulvey (1998), Snape et al (1996), Pfeffer (1994), Homer (2002), Park (2002), Zingheim and Schuster (2002), 
Landy et al (1992) and Marchington and Wilkinson (2000)
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Critique 
Rationality and Ethics
Lewis (2001), Mabey et al (1998), Storey and Sisson (1998) and Waine
(2000) suggest the model makes a number of assumptions;
• business strategy is a rational top-down process rather than something 
which emerges over time;
• a unitarist approach assumes a single set of top-down goals defined for 
the organisation as a whole which those outside the management 
grades should not challenge;
•  employees will endorse the strategy and wish to demonstrate the 
behaviours it implies;
• an effective reward strategy will have a beneficial effect on the 
performance of the organisation. This is difficult to test empirically and 
masks the complexities of organisational life. Managers introduce 
incentive schemes in the belief that they should work without any 
evidence that the method proposed will work in that situation;
• rationality is assumed, but in reality choices are driven by political or 
ideological processes which acquire a symbolic value to particular 
interests. It is then the message rather than the process and its 
outcomes which become important;
• a universalist view of these theories ignores contextualist factors which 
determine whether people think in the way which is assumed.
Mabey et al (1998) and Hendry et al (2000) suggest that from a Foucauldian 
perspective, performance appraisals are simply another example of how 
employees are subject to managerial monitoring, surveillance and control. 
Research tends to consider the use of these practices from the employers 
perspective, as opposed to what it feels like to be on the receiving end as an 
employee (Boselie et al, 2005). For example, Bone’s (2006) study, conducted 
in the direct selling industry, identifies the enormous pressure which 
individuals feel when exposed to a culture which purports to be based on self- 
reliance and individualism but, which feels from the employee’s perspective to 
be exploitative and highly pressured.
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Many authors have questioned the overall ethics of practices which they see 
as manipulation of employees for overall financial gain. This ‘darker’ side is 
outlined by Farnham and Horton (1996); Ackers (2001); Keenoy (1990); Lewis
(2001) and Keenoy and Anthony (1992). It reflects ‘inherent contradictions’ in 
approach as set out by Legge (1995, 2005): commitment versus flexibility; 
individual versus teamwork; and, strong culture versus adaptability. 
Marchington and Grugulis (2000) suggest that some practices actually result 
in stress, work intensification and insidious control through targets - the 
approach offers ‘nice’ rhetoric but ‘harsh’ realities. For example, Marsden and 
French (1998) identify how staff in the Employment Service felt ‘pressurised 
into accepting management’s targets.’
Target Setting
Hendry et al (2000) suggest it is often forgotten that performance 
management is about improving performance and, for the purposes of 
performance management the focus should be on a few key activities which 
make a difference. In addition, PRP measures are usually ‘top-down’ and as 
they are cascaded people loose sight of the ‘big-picture’, ending up following 
targets blindly. Therefore, the amount of measurement should be limited (this 
does not mean neglecting the fact that success in general means getting a lot 
of things right all the time, but this should be part of the normal management 
task and routine of systems, not of a performance management system).
For all PRP schemes the selection of appropriate performance measures is 
an issue but Waine (2000) sets out the particular issues associated with this in
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the public sector. Firstly, there are definitional problems, for example targets 
on pupil attendance can be affected by post registration truancy and differing 
perceptions between schools as to what represents an authorised absence. 
Secondly, the measures might not be within the control of the individual, for 
example, GP immunisation targets can be affected by the location of the 
practice. Thirdly, though not exclusively a public sector issue, targets can be 
open to manipulation, for example, selective entry of pupils into examinations. 
All of these were also identified as issues for organisational target setting 
schemes in the public sector in Chapters 2 and 3.
Hendry et al (2000) suggest that performance management should be goal 
rather than measurement driven. The clarification and communication of 
objectives that flow from this is the key activity. It may not be necessary, 
therefore, to attach specific rewards to the achievement of objectives. In other 
words, improved performance may result from the clarification of goals rather 
than the attachment of a reward.
Undesirable Effects
McCausland et al (2006) suggest that an unintended effect of PRP schemes 
is effort being diverted to achieving those activities which are directly 
rewarded to the detriment of all else. They suggest that subjective 
performance appraisal has been heralded as a potential way of mitigating this 
effect but, this is not without its own difficulties and controversies.
99
Smith (1998) argues that PRP schemes for managers could reinforce short 
termism and, therefore set back overall organisational effectiveness. Storey 
and Sisson (1998) argue that there are signs in many organisations that the 
introduction of individual PRP caused major problems. Firstly, implementation 
was handled badly and, secondly an obsession with individual PRP resulted in 
all other features of performance management being ignored or given 
inadequate attention.
There are also question marks as to the incentivisation effects of PRP, for 
example, would PRP encourage the police to catch more criminals. Then, 
how this would be operationalised? Would the public welcome over 
enthusiastic police or customs and excise officials? Would there be a 
resultant increase in complaints? Also, incentive schemes may distort 
behaviour, for example where quantitative targets are met at the expense of 
quality (Burgess and Metcalf, 1999). Again, these were identified as issues 
for organisational schemes in Chapters 2 and 3.
Kohn (1993a) suggests that financial incentives are likely to undermine 
collaboration and team work, emphasise the power asymmetry between 
management and workforce, and reduce risk-taking, creativity and innovation. 
For example, Marsden and Richardson (1991, 1994) and Marsden and 
French (1998) identify dysfunctions such as jealousy and the undermining of 
team working in the Inland Revenue. This is supported by Procter and Currie 
(2004) who identify that team performance in the Inland Revenue was driven
100
more by outcome interdependence, a shared goal, rather than reward, as this 
remained primarily at the level of the individual.
Inherent Tensions
The design of schemes needs to be carefully considered as there are inherent 
tensions between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Deci (1971, 1975) and 
Leper et al (1973) suggest that extrinsic incentives may erode intrinsic 
motivation and satisfaction which will ultimately have counterproductive 
effects on productivity and profitability. This assumes that rational individuals 
may receive an intrinsic satisfaction from their jobs and the introduction of an 
extrinsic intervention may trigger a response which will alter the individual’s 
‘utility’ from this work. This may be heightened in the public sector when the 
‘public service ethos’ is added to the mix (see later).
Hendry et al (2000) suggest that the misuse of appraisal stems from the fact
that employees are viewed as ‘human resources’ rather than as ‘resourceful
humans’ which highlights the battle between the opposed sets of
‘motivation/development’ and ‘control’. Kohn states,
‘The failure of any given incentive programme is due less to any given 
glitch in that programme than to the inadequacy of the psychological 
assumptions that ground all such plans.’ (Kohn, 1993, p.54)
He continues that incentive schemes must fail and the way to motivate people 
is to give them a good job in the first place. Hackman and Oldman’s (1976) 
theory supports this, suggesting that intrinsic motivation comes from the 
design of the job.
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McCausland et al (2006) and Marsden et al (2000) support these theories and 
suggest that if individuals perceive incentives as supportive they will facilitate 
autonomy, self-esteem and enlarge self-determination. In other words 
intrinsic motivation is ‘crowded in’. However, rewards which are perceived as 
controlling or as intended to coax the individual into performing an activity, are 
likely to shift the locus of control from an internal to an external source and 
thus ‘crowd out’ the utility which the employee derives from the work itself. 
For example, in the case of teachers, Mahoney et al (2004) conclude that 
PRP seems not to have pushed the right buttons in terms of professional 
cultures. This is supported by Schneider (2004) in his study of performance 
management systems forjudges.
Wragg et al (2003) identify how head teachers who were positive about PRP 
were positive about it on the grounds that it benefited teachers financially, as 
opposed to its possible impact on improving pupil performance. In other 
words, the teachers were doing their best for the children anyway, so some 
additional recognition for this was welcome. This seems to reinforce the 
‘jumping through hoops’ perception of the teachers in the study and their view 
that PRP did not make them work harder or better as they were doing that in 
any case.
Role of the Line Manager and Training
Wilkinson (2001) suggests that the new role for middle managers is a move 
from ‘cops’ to ‘coaches’. This is difficult as managers feel threatened at the 
removal of expert power (Marchington et al, 1992; Denham et al, 1997).
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Other managers view the proposition as a ‘soft’ option and a recipe for chaos 
which can result from implementation without the proper training. Storey and 
Sisson (1998), Brown (2001) and Marchington and Wilkinson (2000) identify 
that the inherent tensions in PRP schemes can be exacerbated as employers 
fail to think through the introduction of PRP in a coherent manner and, fail to 
invest in the training of managers carrying out appraisals and in the 
administrative procedures for monitoring processes. This leads to a stifling of 
communication as employees become reticent about discussing performance 
and future training needs with their managers, as they feel it will adversely 
affect their level of pay.
Likewise individuals may be unwilling to make decisions if they feel they are 
still under a watchful eye (Currie and Procter, 1999). Power (1997) also gives 
some support to this premise by suggesting that constant supervision 
undermines the role of professional judgement. Wilkinson (2001) suggests 
that workers welcome the removal of close supervision and the opportunity to 
address problems at source, but research suggests they are not trained 
sufficiently to deal with this.
Boselie et al (2005) identify that much research fails to distinguish between 
policies and practice. In other words, it is not just what you do it is the way 
that you do it. Individuals have to perceive and believe in the 
operationalisation of the policy for it to begin to be effective and, the role of the 
immediate line manager or supervisor in the enactment of this is an 
underdeveloped area of research. For example, supervisors may be lenient
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to avoid conflict, workers may ‘creep’ with their supervisors, supervisors may 
have favourites and so on. Mabey and Salaman (1998) suggest that research 
in this area has found assessments tend to reflect social and political 
influences, rather than any objective notion of performance even if this 
existed.
Reilly (2003) identifies that staff fear their managers do not have the skills to 
exercise judgement in a fair and consistent way and that judgements will be 
clouded by favouritism. A further concern is lack of knowledge as to how staff 
actually perform. Linking the PRP system with these aspects can exacerbate 
the social and political difficulties which surround the appraisal process. This 
is supported by Reilly (2003) who calls for an improvement in the people 
management skills of line managers. So far the public sector does not seem 
to have a good record in this regard. Wragg et al (2003) state how head 
teachers were ‘vitriolic in their condemnation of the two days training they had 
received’.
Likewise Currie and Procter (2003) identify how the selection, training and 
development of team leaders capable of acting as coaches rather than cops is 
crucial to the successful implementation of team working. A command and 
control style led to dysfunctions in implementation while a more facilitative 
style was perceived as enabling higher performance.
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Trust, Fairness and Communication
Hill (1995) argues that employees are not ‘cultural dopes’ - they do not simply 
buy into the rhetoric in an unconditional way. The support of employees is 
dependent upon trust in management and the perceived benefits to 
themselves. Gould-Williams (2002) agrees suggesting its absence can create 
dysfunctions such as cynicism amongst employees, poor motivation, and lack 
of confidence in the organisation. Critical to this is the issue that promises 
must not be made which cannot or will not be kept.
Schaubroek et al (2008) suggest that emphasis should be placed upon 
managing expectations within the system. They identify that employees with 
high expectations are particularly likely to perceive a lower than anticipated 
reward as an indication of deceit and a breakdown in trust follows.
Torrington and Hall (1998) and Mabey and Salaman (1998) suggest that the 
main drawback of a system of selective individual rewards is that it can be 
divisive if it is perceived to be unfair by the majority of participants. Likewise, 
Brown (2001) identifies that where employees are unhappy with the 
distributive justice of the current system they will try to restore their 
perceptions of equity by supporting merit pay. However, employees who are 
dissatisfied with procedural justice within the current system will be less 
inclined to support merit pay. Low levels of distributive justice may therefore 
help to build support for merit pay, but have other negative effects such as low 
morale.
105
Mahoney (2004) identify how the introduction of PRP for teachers, into what 
was already perceived as a low trust/high surveillance environment, served to 
further reinforce low morale and, in many cases, led to an exit from the 
profession. Further potentially demotivating aspects identified by the study 
are a dislike of ‘selling oneself, the stress associated with the process and, 
the potential for divisiveness, both within the organisation amongst peers and 
between assessors and appraisees.
The Role of Financial Incentives
One of the key design issues is ensuring a clear link between effort and 
performance and performance and rewards but, Hendry et al (2000) argue as 
bonuses for chief executives in the private sector are becoming increasingly 
divorced from the reality of organisational performance, it does not help those 
lower down the performance tree to make the links between PRP and 
performance.
McCausland et al (2005) offer an interesting perspective on the controversy 
surrounding executive bonuses. Their findings suggest that PRP exerts a 
positive effect on the mean job satisfaction of highly paid workers because 
they perceive it as a utility benefit from what they view as supportive reward 
schemes. However, lower paid workers are more likely to perceive PRP 
schemes as controlling and, therefore, the impact on mean job satisfaction for 
these workers is on average lower.
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However, the Institute of Manpower Studies (1992) concluded that PRP does 
not serve to motivate employees and, may even act as a demotivator. It found 
there was little evidence to suggest that PRP helps to retain high performers 
and, no evidence to suggest that it encourages poor performers to leave. 
Finally, this research also concluded that employees are negative or neutral 
about its impact on organisational culture (see later).
Lewis (2001) argues that, at best, what could be said is that money may 
motivate some people to behave in particular ways sometimes and in some 
circumstances. He continues by arguing a clear relationship between pay and 
motivation cannot be assumed and an over-reliance on pay to secure the 
motivation of employees may be at the cost of more powerful motivators such 
as meaningful work and a high trust, friendly environment.
Marsden et al (2000) suggest public sector organisations learned from the 
early mistakes and, there was a modification of the emphasis on PRP as a 
financial incentive distinct from an essential part of effective employee 
management and goal setting. This was because much of the early debate 
on PRP in the public sector was dominated by the appealing but questionable 
suggestion that employees will work better for better pay and vice versa. In 
public sector organisations this failed to recognise that identifying fine 
gradations of performance is difficult and, thus, performance rewards can 
seem arbitrary and unfair, and damage rather than improve performance.
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Research undertaken by the Public Management Foundation is discussed by 
Steele (1999) who draws the conclusion that public sector managers are 
primarily driven by a commitment to serve the community which makes the 
implementation of PRP at an individual level problematic. This is supported by 
Perry (1996). It suggests, however, a better alignment of the goals of the 
organisation and the goals of the individual than in the private sector. 
Managers were found to be driven by a desire to produce public value (Moore, 
1995) and be of service to their communities. The authors suggest that more 
could be done to harness this public service ‘ethos’ as despite this goal 
congruence between employer and employee there is little or no ‘joining up’.
Pratchett and Wingfield (1996) identify public sector ethos as being a common 
denominator between various organisational and professional groups that 
populate local government. Key features are: accountability, bureaucratic 
behaviour, public interest, motivation primarily altruistic rather than financial 
and, loyalty. They found that the ethos had been resistant to external 
pressures for change and should be thought of in terms of ‘new 
institutionalism’. They conclude that for public sector reform to be successful 
it should take into account the interdependent relationship between the public 
sector ethos and other political institutions.
Lapsley (2008) suggests that payment by result or PRP schemes in the public 
sector are seen in the context of NPM as a way of aligning managers’ actions 
and the wider interests of the organisation. However, he suggests that there 
are limits to this as the reward systems of many public sector professionals
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have been traditionally aligned with professional values, commitments and 
ideologies. He suggests, therefore, that PRP schemes may impact upon 
managers but not upon the ‘caring professions’, citing plans to introduce 
financial incentives to stimulate greater activity from doctors as limited and 
misguided.
These findings are supported by Reilly (2003) who questions whether policy 
makers really understand what attracts, retains and motivates staff in the 
public sector and that this might be different in different public service 
organisations. He quotes the Public Services Productivity Review Panel 2002 
which reported that staff in the public sector rarely mentioned pay as a 
motivator and that performance pay was inconsistent with the concept of 
public service and professional judgement. The Panel concluded that 
motivation in the public sector is significantly affected by ‘soft’ management 
issues which are at least as important, if not more so than pay. Mahoney et al
(2004) found evidence to support this in the case of teachers. They concluded 
that, leaving pay aside, a performance management system focused on 
development and linked to opportunities for further professional learning was 
welcomed by both teachers and managers.
Cost Benefit of the System and the ‘Normalisation’ of PRP
Torrington and Hall (1998) suggest that incentive thinking is dominated by the 
issue of control and the avoidance of costs getting out of hand. This is 
because employers do not trust employees not take advantage of any 
incentive system put in place. They also identify that these very costly forms
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of remuneration are seldom managed in a positive way, suggesting that 
complex incentive schemes usually represent a working relationship which is 
of mutual mistrust and little common interest.
However, the reverse of this is that costs can easily spiral (Marchington and 
Wilkinson, 2000; Oliver, 1996) because the element of PRP becomes 
consolidated or ‘normalised’ into the individual’s pay and is ‘expected’ to be 
paid at the highest available level unless there are exceptional reasons not to 
do so. So that instead of rewarding excellent or exceptional performance 
PRP becomes the norm. This may be a result of the unwillingness of 
managers to make strong differentiations in performance ratings because 
such distinctions may anger employees (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992). For 
example, Wragg et al (2003) identify how the success rate amongst teachers 
applying to cross the performance threshold was 97%. They suggest that the 
main impact of the PRP scheme was to improve record keeping, but the 
cost/benefit of this is questionable as both teachers and head teachers 
resented the amount of time spent form filling. This is supported by Mahoney 
et al (2004).
Mitra et al (1997) suggest that the amounts of money involved are often 
simply too small to make a difference to performance. However, despite the 
potentially small amounts involved from the perspective of the individual, the 
overall cost to the organisation may be high, both in terms of the total cost and 
the administrative cost (Schaubroeck et al, 2008). Smith (1998) suggests that 
there has been a focus on keeping costs down, rather than on improving the
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value of rewards to employees and, it is questionable whether motivation has 
been increased as a result.
Costs may also be high in terms of lost management credibility, decline in 
worker morale, and lower performance levels (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003). 
McNabb and Whitfield (2007) also note that PRP schemes are costly for 
employers and, whilst they may help increase the input of employees, whether 
this yields better overall organisational financial performance depends on the 
relative magnitudes of the costs and benefits.
Performance and Culture Change
Identifying the contribution of these schemes to improved organisational 
performance is not straightforward (Huselid, 1998; Fleetwood and Hesketh, 
2006). Purcell et al (2000) call this the ‘black box’ problem: how are the inputs 
converted into results in the form of increased productivity, profits, employee 
well-being and/or customer satisfaction? They suggest the presence of 
performance management/PRP schemes themselves is not enough to drive 
organisational performance. Boselie et al (2005) argue that understanding 
how to secure a mutual employee-employer fit is therefore the enduring 
challenge. The system needs to be seen as a totality in terms of its employee- 
employer fit and the effectiveness of implementation must be part of this.
Oliver (1996) states that “No-one can prove performance related pay 
improves performance. But then no one has proved that it doesn’t either” 
(p.55). She continues by suggesting that while the proportion of an
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individual’s pay which is determined by PRP remains relatively small, at 
between 1 and 4% of annual salary, organisational faith in PRP remains high.
Local Authorities Conditions of Service Advisory Body (LACSAB) (1989) 
suggests that few organisations can say unequivocally that PRP on its own 
has created improvement. This is because it is rarely possible to distinguish 
exactly what factors led to higher performance. However, those organisations 
which have had performance orientated PRP schemes in place for some time 
report improved business results and, that PRP encourages an improvement 
in management generally.
Marsden et al (2000) suggest that PRP in the public sector does improve 
performance but, that this improved performance may not be in itself a result 
of the financial incentive. They suggest that the reason for success is that it 
works through the appraisal system by forcing line managers to clarify work 
goals for their staff and that employees then work harder because they know 
exactly what it is management want them to do. They also highlight how 
contextual change, such as the devolution of management decisions to 
business units for which performance indicators were established, led to a 
new focus on delivery, skills, experience and continuous improvement, 
provided the context for the development of PRP schemes.
Waine (2000), Storey and Sisson (1998), Lewis (2001), LACSAB (1990) and 
Clark (1995) suggest that in light of the lack of clear evidence as to whether 
PRP does or does not improve the performance of an organisation, research
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has consistently pointed out that a major reason for its introduction is the 
facilitation of a change in organisational culture. Lawler (1984) suggests that 
PRP can influence the extent to which corporate culture is human resource 
orientated, entrepreneurial, innovative, competence based and participative. 
Reward systems that give benefits to long serving staff are likely to shape a 
culture of loyalty, whereas a system which rewards innovative behaviour is 
likely to create a culture of innovation. Examples of PRP schemes introduced 
for these reasons include: banks and building societies (Mabey and Salaman, 
1998); and, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (Arkin, 2000).
This may be viewed from both a negative and a positive perspective, as 
Hofstede (1980) argues that first changing the behaviour of individuals, such 
as by forcing them to take part in a PRP system, is one of the most effective 
ways of changing value systems, which are in turn a principal component of 
organisational culture (Schein, 1984). It is the ‘forcing’ element which may 
cause ethical objections. However, it should be noted that Chapter 3 
identifies culture and process change objectives as also being important in the 
implementation of Policy Agreements, LPSAs and LAAs.
Conclusions
PRP fits well with the NPM ‘management by targets’ tenet and it is therefore 
perhaps understandable that governments’ belief in PRP for individuals 
identified earlier was translated into organisational level schemes. However, 
the area is under-researched and this development has taken place without
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due consideration of applicability or transferability (Reiter et al, 2006) using 
theory relating to individual schemes.
Evidence from Chapters 2 and 3 suggests that whilst the public management 
literature on managing by targets has much to offer in respect to the 
development of an evaluation framework, it does not provide much 
explanatory evidence of the specific effects of the inclusion of a financial 
reward in performance management schemes (Boyne and Chen, 2006; Reiter 
et al, 2006). In particular, it provides little evidence in relation to the key stage 
of linking rewards to the delivery of outcomes (Table 4.1). This aspect has 
been researched in the literature relating to individual PRP and performance 
management and, therefore, it may have insight to offer in the development of 
an evaluation framework for organisational schemes.
Many common themes emerged with the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 
and 3;
• Target Setting -  the need to measure the right things, this can prove 
challenging in the public sector; measurement should be limited.
• Undesirable Effects -  consideration of the nature of the targets 
themselves, those which are too ambitious may have a demotivating 
effect and/or result in gaming and perverse incentives elsewhere in the 
‘system’; the danger of a mechanistic concentration on pursuing targets 
leading to a loss of focus on the ‘big picture’; PRP tends to undermine 
team work and reduce creativity and innovation; PRP can reinforce 
short-termism and become an obsession at the expense of the other 
features of performance management.
• Inherent Tensions -  different perceptions between employers and 
employees (most research reflects the employers’ perspective; difficult 
to get the balance right between ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’;
• Trust, Fairness and Communication -  achieving a ‘balance’ between 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ is difficult and so the importance of 
communication and participation is also a recurring theme; the 
importance of the creation of a shared vision and the search for
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mutuality of goals; ‘supportive’ management of the scheme, set in an 
environment of trust, being more likely to generate the desired results.
• The Role of Financial Incentives -  financial incentives are intended 
to provide additional and complementary motivation to target setting.
• Cost Benefit and the ‘Normalisation’ of PRP -  ensuring the 
cost/benefit of the scheme is in proportion.
• Performance and Culture Change -  schemes are introduced not only 
to drive improvements in performance, but also to drive more systemic 
changes in culture and attitude; identifying their contribution to 
performance and culture change can be challenging.
In other words, these schemes should be about more than ‘mechanics’, how
they are operationalised by the individuals concerned plays an important role
in whether they are effective. In evaluation terms, it is not just what is done
but how; governance systems in organisations are still reliant on human
interaction to operate (Sullivan, 2008).
The main difference is that whilst the use of targets and performance 
management considered in Chapter 2 mostly relies on the targets themselves 
to drive performance, PRP schemes attach a financial reward to ‘further’ 
incentivise. So at an organisational level, in Chapter 3, Sullivan and Gillanders
(2005) suggest that LPSAs were premised on financially incentivising 
improved performance, but identify it was pump priming grant and having a 
limited number of objectives which were more significant in enabling 
improvement. However, they noted different attitudes amongst local authority 
officers to the reward grant. The reasons behind these reactions and impacts 
need further exploration and discussion as the popularity of organisational 
pay-for-performance schemes in the public sector expands with only a limited 
understanding of whether and how they work.
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PRP schemes are premised on Expectancy Theory which relies on strong 
links between effort and performance and performance and rewards. These 
links may be difficult to establish at an individual level, especially in the public 
sector and, thus it may be extrapolated, potentially exacerbated at an 
organisational level. The complexity of issues relating to defining 
organisational targets was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. A further issue is 
that other organisations may also have to be involved in delivering the targets 
and this further weakens the links between effort and performance and 
performance and reward.
This is compounded by the issue that the literature on individual PRP 
schemes is inconclusive as to their success, in particular in the public sector, 
partly because of the role of professionalism and the public service ethos. 
This was also identified as an important factor in Chapter 2, under-estimating 
their impact can lead to misalignment of goals, disenfranchisement and, loss 
of trust and credibility of the scheme. This suggests that any potential impact 
of a financial reward may not be as powerful as those creating the schemes 
might believe. The balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and the 
possibility of self reinforcement seems to be thrown out of kilter in the public 
sector because intrinsic motivation, driven by professionalism and the public 
service ethos, is dominant. Extrinsic motivators may even erode this intrinsic 
motivation.
Where performance has improved it may be as a result of the process of 
clarifying objectives as opposed to the presence of a financial reward. There
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is also a moral and ethical question mark over their appropriateness. 
However, governments in the UK and across the world continue to develop 
organisational pay-for-performance schemes without any evaluation of the 
specific impact of the financial reward element based on the available theory 
and evidence from individual schemes.
This literature review has identified further areas from research on individual 
PRP schemes which may provide some ‘added value’ if considered in 
conjunction with the evidence from Chapters 2 and 3. These include:
• Rationality and Ethics -  the system is not rational either in terms of 
the operation of business strategy or the choices which individuals 
make within the system, the latter may be driven by political and 
ideological stances; PRP is deterministic -  it is assumed schemes will 
lead to better performance; context is important, a universalist 
approach tends not to be successful; the rhetoric and the reality of PRP 
schemes may be oceans apart -  they can be perceived as tools of 
management control and may lead to stress and work intensification.
• Target Setting -  focusing on the delivery of a few key outcomes which 
are set firmly, not only within a coherent system of performance 
management, but also within a coherent vision/set of strategies which 
the organisation is aiming to achieve; the importance of understanding 
motivation and using motivation theories, especially Expectancy and 
Goal Setting Theories, to inform the design of the scheme.
•  Undesirable Effects -  whilst the existence of any positive impacts 
from individual PRP schemes is questionable, the existence of 
undesirable effects seems well evidenced and documented -  Chapters 
2 and 3 identified similar effects in organisational level schemes.
• Inherent Tensions -  the inherent tension between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation, this may be especially relevant in the public 
service because of the public service ethos.
• Role of the Line Manager and Training -  to be effective in retaining 
trust and credibility, discussion of performance and rewards needs to 
be high quality, the skills and training of those undertaking the 
appraisal process therefore need to be considered; the social 
pressures which might be at work during the determination of the 
reward level need to be considered and managed through effective 
training and skills development, the conflicting roles within the system 
of performance improvement (coaches) and reward determination 
(cops).
• Trust and Fairness -  promises should not be made which cannot or 
will not be kept; expectations within the system need to be carefully
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managed; levels of satisfaction with the distributive justice of the whole 
system will impact on perceptions of and willingness to accept the PRP 
element.
• The Role of Financial Incentives -  the importance of clear links 
between effort and performance and performance and rewards; any 
improvement in performance is difficult to attribute specifically to the 
financial incentive, especially in the public sector because of the role of 
the public service ethos; improvements in performance may well 
accumulate from the clarification of objectives rather that the existence 
of a financial incentive.
• Cost benefit and PRP ‘Normalisation’ -  the importance of managing 
expectations, in particular there is a danger PRP becomes ‘expected’ 
and ‘normalised’ into baseline pay, instead of rewarding excellent 
performance PRP becomes the ‘norm’; the amounts involved can be 
small and unlikely therefore to stimulate higher performance but the 
administrative burden can be high.
• Performance and Culture Change -  the evidence relating to the 
impact of PRP schemes on organisational performance is inconclusive.
The next chapter will, therefore, consider the evidence from Chapters 2, 3 and 
4 to develop an evaluation model for the Policy Agreement process in Wales. 
The aim of the approach is to consider all the ‘critical success factors’ 
identified in the evidence, including an original element, based on the above 
analysis, relating to developing a better understanding of the impact of 
financial incentives and rewards in public sector organisational pay-for- 
performance schemes.
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
Earlier chapters traced the development of central-local relations, including 
the new context of this relationship in light of devolution in Wales. One of the 
key issues was highlighted as performance management, and in Wales, the 
core of this was the Wales Programme for Improvement and Policy 
Agreements. Devolution seems to have fostered a more symbiotic relationship 
with increased levels of mutual dependency between local and devolved 
government (Essex, 1998). In light of this, Wales relies less on ‘formal’ levers 
and more on self evaluation and partnership (Andrews and Martin, 2007). 
This was the rhetoric but, there is no formal published policy evaluation of this 
period in Welsh local government policy making, either in respect of the 
process or the outcome of Policy Agreements, and little published research. 
This also limits the potential benefits of devolution through comparative 
analysis and could lead to insularity (Downe et al, 2007; Hockridge, 2006; 
Laffin, 2009).
Policy Evaluation
Policy evaluation literature (Lewis, 2001; Davies, 1999) and other academic 
work (Drakeford, 2006; Jeffery, 2006) suggest that it is important for policy 
makers to learn and understand not only what was done but how and why. 
Evaluation theory suggests that contribution to knowledge comes not only 
from evaluating the impact of a policy and its resulting change (if any) but also
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from understanding the process of implementation and what worked and what 
did not (Chelimsky, 1997).
Lewis (2001) suggests that the objectives of many Government policies are 
laudable but the way in which they are being implemented will mean they will 
not succeed. Likewise, Blalock (1999) suggests that the emphasis on 
performance management and the outcomes and results of programmes, in 
the absence of information about why and how these results occurred, will 
lead to the development of flawed social policies and misguided judgements 
about the effectiveness or otherwise of programmes. She suggests that where 
the purpose of the evaluation is to learn about process that methods such as 
self-evaluation, descriptive monitoring and other qualitative methods will be 
appropriate, whereas if the purpose of the evaluation is learning about the 
effects, experimental or quasi-experimental designs will be appropriate. In 
this study evidence relating to both the process and the effects has been 
identified as potentially providing an original contribution to knowledge.
In addition, Martin and Andrews (2009) suggest that as quantitative analysis 
of service performance between countries in the UK becomes more difficult 
because of changes in performance frameworks, qualitative evidence could 
provide some explanation as to the extent and causes of variation. Likewise, 
Downe et al (2007) suggest that contextual research looking for the 
contingent factors leading to the success or otherwise of performance 
regimes in different parts of the UK will be important in establishing an 
assessment of the differential impact of the regimes. Also, Hockridge (2006)
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suggests whilst devolution has led to substantial policy innovation, it could 
also lead to insularity; studies enabling comparison can therefore provide 
valuable insight for policy makers in the UK and beyond.
In terms of developing an evaluation model or ‘theory of change’ (Connell and 
Kubisch, 1998), it is possible to identify objectives for Policy Agreements from 
published papers and relevant meetings (see Chapter 3). It is also possible to 
identify some key themes for ‘success’ from Chapters 2 and 3. Boyne and 
Chen (2006) state, it should also be possible to draw on literature relating to 
individual PRP schemes and performance management to help develop an 
evaluation framework (Chapter 4).
Likewise Reiter et al (2006) suggest that pay-for-performance schemes are 
traditionally used as a means of directing the efforts of individuals and the 
effects of such schemes on organisational behaviour is under researched. 
There is growing urgency for research in this area in light of the adoption of 
such schemes across the UK in respect of local government (Local Public 
Service Agreements, Local Area Agreements, Outcome Agreements, Policy 
Agreements, Improvement Agreements) and in health, both in the UK and the 
US. Reiter et al continue by suggesting that pay-for-performance schemes are 
being put to use at an organisational level without any real understanding of 
their potential impacts which, because in many cases those responsible for 
performance do not receive the reward, may be very different from those 
associated with schemes for individuals.
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This is not a new concept, Hood (2007) suggests that Taylor’s work on 
scientific management in relation to individuals was adopted by Lenin and 
became central to soviet management and economics. However, Reiter et al
(2006) argue there has been little research to test whether the assumption of 
transferability from individual to organisational is valid and point out that the 
relationship between effort and reward may not be as strong as for individual 
schemes. Potential exists, therefore, for a study to explore whether these 
assumptions hold true.
Looking at inter-governmental performance systems through a lens partially 
based on theory and evidence from developing and implementing individual 
systems may provide new insight. For example, Sullivan (2008) states that 
the language of policy ‘levers’ and ‘drivers’ implies an ability to engineer 
change through their application, but governance systems rely on human 
interaction, therefore, lessons from the ways in which individuals relate to 
these drivers ands levers may provide valuable insight. Lapsley (2008) also 
notes the importance of considering the effects of ‘human frailties’ on policy 
implementation.
In addition, the ‘human’ aspects of the governance system may be of 
particular relevance to smaller countries such as Wales where the relationship 
between the centre and local is more ‘personal’ and founded on face to face 
relationships between politicians and officers (Andrews and Martin, 2007). For 
example, as identified in Chapter 3, a key difference to the process in England 
was that direct, face to face negotiation took place between central and local
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government - there was no intermediary in the form of a Government 
Regional Office. This absence of an intermediary may make the relevance of 
lessons from individual performance arrangements even more pertinent.
Performance Management and PRP
Chapter 4 identified several factors which were found in academic studies to 
be important in the implementation of these schemes. These included: trust, 
communication, joint development and employee involvement and, clear links 
between effort and performance and performance and reward. With the 
exception of the latter, these were important themes for organisational, target- 
based performance management schemes as identified in Chapters 2 and 3.
Difficulties associated with the development and implementation of individual
performance management systems and related PRP include:
• the assumption of rationality;
• Foucauldian perspective, i.e. systems are based on surveillance not trust;
• contextualist view is ignored;
• rhetoric is concerned with empowerment and commitment but, the reality 
may be control, stress and work intensification;
• top-down approach;
• the employee perspective is often ignored;
• the assumption that employees will comply, i.e. ignoring the issue that 
there is a difference between a behavioural and an attitudinal response; 
and,
• inability to conclusively identify whether and, if so what contribution these 
practices might make to overall organisational performance -  ‘the black 
box’.
It was also identified that, in many cases, it is the symbolism and the process 
of performance management and PRP which have been important. Often, the 
aim of introducing such systems has not been only to improve performance 
per se but to change overall organisational culture. On these occasions, in
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particular, rational choices may not always be made and, the main drivers of 
the system may well be political and ideological ones. If this is the case, then 
the success of the implementation cannot be judged solely on whether 
improved performance has resulted but should also be judged on whether the 
introduction of the system has changed attitudes and culture.
The literature review in Chapters 3 and 4 identified that Policy Agreements 
have many ‘surface’ similarities to individual performance agreements and 
PRP schemes -  a search for mutual gain and a shared agenda, 
incentivisation and reward for delivering specified outcomes, with how to 
achieve the outcomes determined by the individual/local authority.
The Objectives of Policy Agreements
This study therefore looks for ‘success’ based on both process outcomes and 
performance impacts. Process outcomes relate to those matters other than 
improved performance which were identified as objectives for the Policy 
Agreement process in Chapter 3:
• creating a culture of self-improvement in local authorities in terms of 
thinking about improvement and ways of improving proactively and 
focusing on outcomes;
• changing culture within the Welsh Assembly Government in terms of 
focusing on empowering local authorities rather than focusing on control;
• improved relations and greater understanding between the Welsh 
Assembly Government and local authorities; and,
• focusing attention on the desirability of having some form of agreed 
strategic plan for Wales, i.e. agreed between local authorities and the 
Assembly Government.
Performance impacts relate to evidenced improvements in performance in 
those service areas included in the Agreements. This evidence was provided
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by the final performance, as per the Policy Agreement indicators assessed 
against the targets and baselines (published in 2004-05). They also relate to 
efficiency of delivery in terms of ‘value for money’ from the Policy Agreement 
process.
Research Methodology and Method
Before developing a specific research methodology to test the effectiveness of 
the Policy Agreement process, it is important to consider some of the key 
aspects to approaching any form of research. The first is to note that there is 
a distinction between method and methodology. Method refers to the means 
by which data is collected e.g. interviews, surveys, experiments, observation, 
whereas methodology refers to the design of the research project at a more 
philosophical level.
Oppenheim (2000) suggests that it is important research design makes it 
possible to draw valid inferences from the data collected in terms of 
generalisation, association and causality. Blaxter et al (1998) define 
generalisability or representativeness as being whether findings are likely to 
have broader applicability beyond the focus of the particular study.
There are two ends to the research spectrum - deductive and inductive. Gill 
and Johnson (1997) describe the former as the development of a conceptual 
and theoretical structure which is then tested through empirical observation. 
In this method, the logic of deduction is important, as is the operationalisation 
of the process and its consequent testing through empirical methods. This
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approach is partially suitable to be applied to the evaluation of Policy 
Agreements in Wales. This is because the process outcomes and 
performance impacts identified above may be thought of in terms of 
dependent variables. Their impact is determined by the behaviour of 
independent variables in the form of key aspects or critical success factors for 
performance management and PRP systems, identified in Chapters 2, 3 and
4. In other words this is policy evaluation in respect of the effects of policy 
(Lewis, 2001).
This approach relies upon measurement and it is important to remember that 
no measurement will be 100% accurate and that any numerical value which is 
assigned to a particular variable is equal to the true value plus the error 
(Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 1992; Oppenheim, 2000). However, there are 
limitations to designing a deductive study in social sciences as measurement 
will relate to the perceptions of individuals. This limitation is noted as is the 
further limitation of same source bias, i.e. perceptions of the critical success 
factors and objectives of Policy Agreements were gathered from the same 
source. This was unavoidable due to the size of the available sampling 
frame.
However, the main issue with using deductive methods in the social sciences 
is the assumption that the social world is rational and can be observed in the 
same fashion as the natural sciences (Gill and Johnson, 1997). There is a 
fundamental ontological difference between the nature of people and the 
nature of things (Ryan et al, 1992) and social scientists have developed
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approaches to the study of human behaviour which are based on 
‘understanding’ or ‘verstehen’. The alternative to deduction, therefore, is 
induction. An inductive research method involves the construction of 
explanations and theories about what has been observed, i.e. theory is the 
outcome of observation (Gill and Johnson, 1997). The most extreme inductive 
method is grounded theory (Morgan, 1983; Burrell and Morgan, 1992).
Likewise an inductive research approach was determined not to be solely 
appropriate for this study, as a concept or theory relating to individual 
performance management systems with PRP has been identified as the basis 
for testing the relationship between outcomes of a policy and its design. 
However, arguably, this is a form of ‘quasi-grounded theory’ in that the 
transferability of concepts relating to individual systems to those relating to 
inter-governmental ones has not previously been tested. The literature review 
has identified suggestions that there may be transferability (Boyne and Chen, 
2006; Hood, 2007) and the review and comparison of the literature in 
Chapters 2 and 3 provides evidence to support this but, the governmental 
assumption of transferability of principle has not been explored or evaluated 
for robustness or appropriateness. The consideration of results will therefore 
also need to draw conclusions about the relevance and elasticity of this 
potential transferability, as well as providing evidence relating to the actual 
process outcomes and performance impacts of the Agreements and 
evaluation evidence relating to the implementation process (Lewis, 2001).
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Reliability and Validity
Research may be taken as the quest for reliable and valid data which
contributes to the overall understanding of an issue. Bell (1997) provides
definitions as follows:
“Reliability is the extent to which a test or procedure produces similar 
results under constant conditions on all occasions.
Validity is whether an item measures or describes what it is supposed to 
measure or describe.” (Bell, 1997, pp.64-65)
Gill and Johnson (1997) further categorise validity into external and internal. 
Internal validity is the relationship between cause and effect, while external 
validity relates to population validity, i.e. whether it is possible to generalise 
from the sample, and ecological validity - whether it is possible to generalise 
from the social context of the research to other settings. They continue by 
suggesting that methods used by social scientists are a trade off between 
reliability and validity and their appropriateness to the research topic. Also, 
Morgan (1983) and Beattie (2000) suggest that it is becoming increasingly 
acceptable to mix methodologies and methods.
The Research Design
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 identified that the objectives of Policy Agreements 
included both process outcomes and performance impacts. This means, as 
well as considering evidence to establish whether and how the Policy 
Agreement process has resulted in improved performance, considering 
evidence of issues such as; focusing on outcomes, focusing attention on the 
desirability of having some form of cohesive strategic plan for Wales, changed 
cultures and attitudes within the Assembly Government and local authorities,
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and improved central-local relations. The main research question was 
therefore framed as follows:
‘Have Policy Agreements contributed to culture change and improved 
performance in the public sector in Wales?’
There is both a deductive and an inductive element to this study. The first 
combines evidence from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 to design a deductive research 
tool. The second uses both the results from this deductive study and an 
inductive tool to identify whether the assumptions made by Governments 
about the transferability of individual PRP type schemes to inter-governmental 
ones are robust and appropriate. There is an element of bottom-up theory to 
this approach as transferability has not previously been tested. The inductive 
evidence is also used to triangulate and support potential deficiencies in the 
deductive evidence, e.g. levels of questionnaire responses and same source 
bias and, to provide ‘rich’ evidence on the process relating to the 
implementation of Policy Agreements (Lewis, 2001). Inductive and deductive 
are therefore used to support, reinforce and triangulate each other.
Facets of the Main Research Question
The aims of performance systems, whether individual or inter-governmental 
have been identified as at least two fold -  changing culture and improving 
performance. The main research question can, therefore, be deconstructed 
into a set of ‘sub’ research questions (RQs) as follows:
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PROCESS OUTCOMES
RQi Have Policy Agreements helped to create a culture of ‘self-improvement’ 
in local authorities? A culture of self-improvement is defined as local 
authorities focusing on outcomes rather than inputs, proactively seeking 
continuous improvement rather than acting on external stimuli such as 
inspection and regulation.
RQ2 Have Policy Agreements helped to change culture in the Welsh 
Assembly Government? A change of culture in the Welsh Assembly 
Government is defined as demonstration of the Assembly Government 
focusing on results and outcomes rather than inputs, i.e. greater discretion for 
local authorities to determine where to deploy resources, fewer requirements 
for local authorities to produce strategies and plans.
RQ3 Has the Policy Agreement process ‘added value’ to the relationship 
between the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities? ‘Added 
value’ is defined as a greater understanding between the parties and more 
effective communication.
RQ4 Have Policy Agreements contributed to ‘cohesive’ strategic planning at 
national and local levels? ‘Cohesive’ strategic planning is defined as ‘joined- 
up’ strategic planning between local authorities and the Welsh Assembly 
Government based on shared and agreed priorities.
PERFORMANCE IMPACTS
RQs Have Policy Agreements contributed to improved service performance in 
local authorities? Improved service performance is defined as a shift towards 
meeting or exceeding the targets set out in the Policy Agreements.
RQe Have Policy Agreements provided ‘value for money’? ‘Value for money’ is 
defined as increased efficiency in service delivery outweighing the ‘costs’ of 
Policy Agreements where cost equals Performance Incentive Grant plus 
administration costs.
Method
The research design will involve collecting data to establish whether a number 
of critical success factors have been perceived to contribute to achieving the 
process outcomes and performance impacts. A partially deductive 
methodology has been identified as appropriate because theory exists, drawn 
from evidence in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. This, in turn, lends itself to an empirical 
methodology: collecting data to establish the perceived presence of these
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factors by key players in the process and, establishing the extent of the 
relationship between their perceived presence and the outcomes (dependent 
variables).
A difficulty with this study is the timing of the research. The first stage took 
place before the completion of the first round of Policy Agreements (2001/02 
to 2003/04) in the summer of 2003. Earlier chapters have noted that some 
Agreements were not completed until virtually the end of the first year, in 
February and March 2002. The summer of 2003 was, therefore, still very 
early days in the life of the Agreements.
At this stage in the study, therefore, respondents were asked to agree or 
disagree as to the objectives of Policy Agreements. It was felt that if 
respondents were asked about outcomes at this point the response would 
have been that it was too early to tell. Using objectives, therefore, simply 
enables the identification of key critical success factors from a large possible 
number using multiple regression models to ‘filter’ critical success factors (see 
Appendix S for explanation and details). It is these critical success factors, 
not the data relating to objectives, which are used to explore the relationship 
between baseline performance, implementation and actual performance 
(based on performance indicator information -  see Chapter 8). This also 
provides the means to ‘narrow down’ the scope of structured interviews by 
providing a method of filtering significant variables to explore with 
interviewees (Chapter 7). Interviewees were then asked whether the 
objectives of the Policy Agreement process were achieved i.e. impact. The
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inductive element of the study, together with actual performance data, 
therefore provides the evidence of impact which is used to explore whether or 
not the objectives were met (Chapter 9).
The deductive research method was, therefore, a structured postal 
questionnaire targeted at key players in the Policy Agreement process. This 
method was chosen as the most efficient, for a single researcher with no 
access to funding, of collecting data from a large number of individuals to 
provide structured data for initial evaluation against the research questions. 
Advantages
• Low cost of data collection.
• Low cost of processing.
• Avoidance of interviewer bias (although this can enter into the equation in 
the way in which the questionnaire is designed).
• Ability to reach respondents who live at widely dispersed addresses.
• Respondents have time to reflect on the questions so that they can give
more considered responses.
Disadvantages
• Generally low response rates and consequent biases i.e. the likelihood 
that those who respond are likely to feel more strongly or more positively 
about an issue than ‘average’.
• Unsuitability for respondents with poor literacy.
• No opportunity to correct misunderstandings or to probe.
• No control over the order in which questions are answered, no check on 
incomplete responses, incomplete questionnaires or on the passing on of 
questionnaires to others.
• No opportunity to collect ratings or assessments based on observation.
• Reliance placed on the respondents to complete the questionnaires, aided 
only by written instructions.
• Only an introductory letter to motivate people to complete the 
questionnaire and return it.
• Ordering is important as respondents can read through the whole of the 
questionnaire prior to completing it.
Based on Hoinville et al (1989, pp.125-127) and Oppenheim (2000, p.102)
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However, awareness of these strengths and weaknesses allows them to be 
planned for as part of the research design and evaluation of data. In respect 
of this project, it is felt that the cost advantages are suited to a lone 
researcher with no research funding. Also, given that respondents are middle 
to senior managers and politicians, the use of a questionnaire is beneficial as 
respondents can complete this at their own convenience.
In terms of the disadvantages, non-response bias can be planned for (see 
below) and positive action can also be taken to increase response rates 
through the careful design of the questionnaire (see below). The anticipated 
low response rate can be mitigated by triangulation with the inductive method 
(in this case structured interviews, also see below). On this occasion it is not 
anticipated that the level of literacy amongst respondents will be an issue. In 
addition, at an overall level, there was evidence from the progress visits being 
undertaken by Assembly officials to local authorities (a sample of which were 
observed by the researcher, see Chapter 3) which provided a qualitative 
assessment of general attitudes towards Policy Agreements and their 
strengths and weaknesses (see Chapter 3).
However, as noted above, it is recognised that within the research topic the 
perceptions of individuals are the basis of the questionnaire evidence and the 
research design assumes rationality in the responses. This can be addressed 
by triangulating findings with documentary and observation evidence such as 
that gathered in Chapter 3 (e.g. Partnership Council papers and minutes), 
testing the responses of groups of respondents against each other and,
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qualitative comments provided by questionnaire respondents and structured 
interview data (Chapters 6 and 7).
Designing the Questionnaire
Designing the questionnaire included giving consideration to ensuring that it 
was as ‘user friendly’ as possible without unintentionally biasing the 
responses and, to the layout and overall design to ensure that its ‘look’ was 
attractive and not confusing to respondents. This is important, as if a 
questionnaire ‘looks’ complex and/or confusing it is more likely to be put aside 
by respondents. Careful consideration was also given to ensuring that the 
instructions were unambiguous, clear and polite and that the overall flow, 
structure and length of the questionnaire would keep the interest of the 
respondents (Hoinville et al, 1989).
Hoinville et al (1989) suggest that while a self-completion questionnaire of 
eight to ten sides of A4 will tend to act as a deterrent to much of the 
population, this is not necessarily the case where the intended recipients have 
a high degree of interest in the subject and/or a high degree of literacy. They 
conclude that the empirical evidence does not confirm a short questionnaire 
will automatically generate a higher response rate. In fact, if the audience is a 
specialist one it may feel that a short questionnaire is insulting or superficial.
To establish the strength of respondent perceptions requires the use of 
interval type variables capable of measurement, i.e. quantitative integers such 
as scale scores (Oppenheim, 2000). This dictates the nature of the questions
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to be included in the questionnaire, and therefore, questions were designed 
on the basis of an attitude scale. Oppenheim (2000) suggests that the Likert 
scale is the most relevant scale to employ if the purpose of the research is to 
study attitude patterning or to explore theories of attitudes. Oppenheim (ibid) 
continues by stating that reliability in Likert scales is good and that they will 
effectively separate people from within the same group.
The Likert scale is a linear interval scale which permits the scores to be 
treated as integers so that they may be analysed by means of statistical 
techniques. Hoinville et al (1989) suggest that a seven-point scale is useful as 
it provides the benefit of more positions and thus discriminates more finely.
Therefore, a seven point, Likert scale was used in the questionnaire. 
However, Hoinville et al (Ibid) continue by warning that a rating scale is not an 
absolute measure of attitude. It must be remembered that it is a way of 
placing respondents in relative positions to one another. Therefore, the main 
aim when using scales should be to find the one which discriminates most 
effectively between respondents. This is supported by Oppenheim (2000). It 
must also be remembered that equal score intervals do not permit assertions 
to be made about the equality of underlying attitude differences and that 
identical scores may have very different meanings. However, Oppenheim 
(2000) states that Likert scales perform well in terms of providing a rough, 
reliable ordering of individuals with a particular attitude.
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Oppenheim (2000) suggests that personal data should be collected at the end 
of the questionnaire and the collection of this data should be undertaken in a 
sensitive fashion. For example, ‘Would you mind telling us how old you are?’ 
with a selection of boxes for the respondent to tick. On this occasion it was 
determined that the age and sex of the respondents would not be variables of 
any great relevance to the analysis. However, it would be important to 
establish whether direct involvement in the Policy Agreement process, as 
opposed to peripheral involvement, resulted in any significant differences in 
perception, and whether there were differences in the views of politicians and 
officers. These questions were felt not to be sensitive to the respondents and 
therefore were asked at the beginning of the questionnaire.
During the design of the questionnaire, it was recognised that some questions 
would not be of relevance to all of the respondents at which it was aimed. 
Where these instances were identified ‘filter’ questions were used to direct the 
respondent to the next relevant set of questions. Oppenheim (2000) identifies 
that ensuring the respondent’s interest is retained in the questionnaire is an 
important factor in improving response rates (see below).
Piloting the Questionnaire
It is important to pilot data gathering instruments to ensure the length of time 
taken to complete them does not impose an unacceptable burden on the 
recipients, that the questions and instructions are clear and, to enable 
questions to be removed which do not provide any usable data (Bell, 1997). It 
is also important to ensure that the questions are not putting ideas into the
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minds of the respondents or suggesting that they should have opinions when 
they have none (Oppenheim, 2000) and that wording, ordering and layout can 
be refined (Hoinville et al, 1989).
The questionnaire was therefore piloted on three Assembly and three local 
government officials with knowledge of the Policy Agreement process. 
Recipients of the pilot questionnaire were asked to also complete the 
following questions (taken from Bell, 1997, p.85):
1. How long did it take you to complete?
2. Were the instructions clear?
3. Were any of the questions unclear or ambiguous? If so, which and 
why?
4. Did you object to answering any of the questions?
5. In your opinion, has any major topic been omitted?
6. Was the layout of the questionnaire clear/attractive?
7. Any comments?
The average time for completion of the questionnaire by the pilot respondents 
was 20 minutes. This was considered to be an acceptable period of time. 
One pilot respondent took longer than 25 minutes but admitted to having 
spent much time going through the questionnaire looking for repeated 
questions rather than completing the questionnaire itself. This respondent 
stated that the outcome of this exercise was that no questions were repeated.
All respondents stated that the layout and instructions of the questionnaire 
were clear and could identify no major omissions from the question sequence. 
Respondents also felt that the majority of the questions were worded 
appropriately, but as a result of suggestions made by the respondents, the
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following amendments were considered to improve the clarity of the questions 
concerned:
• Question 41 was rephrased to clarify that it was intended to elicit views as 
to whether the ease of measurement had been the main driver in selecting 
the Policy Agreement indicators.
• Questions 55 and 57 were made positive to reflect the tone of the other 
questions in the questionnaire.
• The use of the word ‘unhypothecated’ in question 67 was changed to ‘non­
ring fenced’ as pilot respondents felt that this word might not be familiar to 
all of the intended recipients of the questionnaire.
The pilot respondents also made some suggestions as to the layout at the
beginning of the questionnaire as follows:
• The number of sections in the questionnaire should be included in the 
introduction.
• A category for ‘Other’ should be included in the box on page 1.
• A space should be provided for the respondent to outline their individual 
circumstances in respect of Policy Agreements. This should be optional if 
the respondent felt this information to be pertinent to the context of their 
answers.
These suggestions were felt to be useful additions to the personal information 
section of the questionnaire. This is because it would be important not to 
discourage respondents at the start of the questionnaire, as if the respondent 
felt that he/she did not fit into any of the available categories or needed to 
provide additional information to put their responses in context they might not 
proceed any further.
Population
The population for the questionnaire was identified by means of a review of 
local authority internet sites, contact lists provided by Local Government 
Modernisation Division of the Welsh Assembly Government and the Welsh 
Assembly Government/National Assembly internal directories:
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TABLE 5.1: POLICY AGREEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE POPULATION
Assembly Local
Authorities
Total
Politicians 30 379 409
Officials 73 313 386
Total 103 692 795
Four types of questionnaire were designed to be targeted at these particular 
key groupings. Within each of the main groupings, two sub-groupings were 
identified in the form of those who had a specific area of responsibility within 
the Policy Agreement, i.e. a direct service delivery responsibility and therefore 
a ‘performance involvement’ and, those with a general involvement in the 
Policy Agreement process, i.e. those who had been involved with the overall 
setting up, negotiation and monitoring of Agreements and therefore those with 
a ‘process involvement’. These groupings may be expressed as follows:
TABLE 5.2: POLICY AGREEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE - CATEGORIES OF
RESPONDENT
Process Involvement Performance Involvement
Local Authority Members 
(Questionnaire 1-Appendix 
D)
Leaders, non-relevant 
service cabinet members and 
members of scrutiny 
committees.
Cabinet members with 
service responsibility for 
those services in the 
Agreements.
Local Authority Officials 
(Questionnaire 2- Appendix 
E)*
Chief Executives, directors of 
finance, policy and corporate 
officers.
Heads of service for those 
services in the Agreements, 
managers with responsibility 
for delivering the service 
improvements.
Assembly Members 
(Questionnaire 3- Appendix 
F)*
Members of Cabinet without 
service responsibility for the 
services in the Agreement 
and members of the relevant 
subject committees.
Ministers with responsibility 
for those services in the 
Agreement.
Assembly Government 
Officials
(Questionnaire 4- Appendix
G)*
Relevant officials in Local 
Government Group.
Group directors, heads of 
division and policy leads of 
the services contained in the 
Agreement.
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*The same questions were asked of all respondents but the coversheet was 
designed differently for each of the groups. Appendices D to G contain 
different cover sheets only.
The segregation of the main groups was determined to be important as the 
literature review identified that sometimes the failure of PRP and performance 
management systems resulted from a difference of perception between the 
employer and the employee. Also a weakness in the body of literature was 
identified as employer bias, i.e. most research conducted from the perspective 
of the employer. Therefore, it was felt to be important to establish whether 
there were any major differences in perception between these key groups. 
Policy evaluation work relating to inter-governmental performance systems in 
England also sought the views of similar groupings of officers and politicians 
in local and central government.
It was also felt to be important to establish whether there were any differences 
of perception between those ‘on the ground’ and those involved with the 
process in general. This is because the literature established that one of the 
main reasons that organisations introduced PRP and performance 
management schemes was not solely to improve performance but also to 
change culture. It was felt likely to be useful, therefore, to gain an 
understanding of whether those involved with specific areas of the Policy 
Agreements also had an understanding of the ‘bigger picture’.
The particular nature of the political arena within Wales was identified in 
earlier chapters as being an important contextual consideration for the 
Assembly Government when designing and implementing any policy. Politics
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could affect responses and therefore, it was felt to be important to separately 
identify the views of officials and politicians.
Question Rationale
The literature review in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 resulted in the identification of a 
number of key stages and ‘success factors’ which should be considered when 
introducing, developing, implementing and evaluating PRP and performance 
management schemes. This literature also recognises the importance of 
considering contextual factors during all aspects of the process. The main 
aspects in the process were identified as:
• Setting objectives
• Measuring outcomes
• Feedback of results
• Rewards linked to outcomes
• Amendments to objectives and activities
Each section of the questionnaire was based on a stage in the process. The 
respondent was asked for opinions on statements structured around issues 
which the literature reviews identified as being critical to overall ‘success’. 
This approach is suggested by Oppenheim (2000) who writes that analytical 
questionnaires should be structured on the basis of a ‘pool’ or ‘module’ of 
questions linked to a single variable. These modules should then be ordered 
in the most appropriate fashion. In this study, it seemed logical to follow the 
‘stages’ in the performance management process which also reflect the 
sequence of events with respect to Policy Agreements and other inter­
governmental performance management systems. In addition, the questions 
relate to complex attitudes, therefore they should be explored from many 
different angles by the use of multiple questions (Oppenheim, 2000).
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Therefore, the first section of the questionnaire (see below) was designed to 
gain an overall perspective from the respondent on key issues potentially 
relating to and affecting the process as a whole. The next stage was to devise 
a series of questions for each ‘module’ within the Policy Agreement process 
capable of generating appropriate data for the analysis stage, and to enable 
conclusions to be drawn about the research questions. The necessity to use a 
scaling factor to generate the type of data needed for analysis required the 
use of ‘closed’ questions, i.e. the respondent is offered a choice of alternative 
replies (Oppenheim, 2000). In this case agree, disagree etc. on the basis of a 
seven point scale for the reasons identified above. There are advantages 
and disadvantages in the use of closed and open questions as follows:
TABLE 5.3: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OPEN AND
CLOSED QUESTIONS
Open Questions
Advantages Disadvantages
• Freedom and spontaneity of the 
answers
• Time-consuming
• Opportunity to probe • In interviews: costly of interviewer 
time
• Useful for testing hypotheses 
about ideas of awareness
• Coding: very costly and slow to 
process, and may be unreliable
• Demand more effort from 
respondents
Closed Questions
Advantages Disadvantages
• Require little time • Loss of spontaneous responses
• No extended writing • Bias in answer categories
• Low costs • Sometimes too crude
• Easy to process • May irritate respondents
• Make group comparisons easy
• Useful for testing specific 
hypotheses
• Less interviewer training
Based on Oppenheim (2000, p.115)
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The disadvantages of closed questions have been acknowledged. Efforts 
have been made to overcome them by using ‘pools’ of questions in respect of 
each independent variable, and by paying careful attention to the wording and 
overall design of the questionnaire.
In addition, at the end of the questionnaire space was provided for 
respondents to write free form comments in respect of individual questions, to 
comment on Policy Agreements in general or to raise any important points 
which they felt had been omitted from the questionnaire. Again, the provision 
of this space within the questionnaire for free form response is an opportunity 
to partially overcome the deficiencies of the research method identified above. 
However, any responses made in this fashion must be given careful 
consideration and the possibility of response bias must be taken into account. 
The deductive findings were also supplemented by structured interviews to 
address deficiencies in the method and timing identified above (see later).
In terms of the questions, Hoinville et al (1989) suggest that a good question 
has to be designed to specifically suit the aims of the study and the nature of 
its respondents.
“It needs to have some of the same properties as a good law: to be clear, 
unambiguous and uniformly workable. Its design must minimise 
potential errors from respondents....” (Hoinville et al, 1989, p.27)
Therefore, each question was considered in light of the following criteria 
(Based on Hoinville et al, 1989, pp.28-33 and Oppenheim, 2000, pp.121-130):
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• motivation to the respondent to continue to co-operate;
• the length of the questions was not a deterrent factor in light of the 
respondents ‘interest’ in the subject;
• the question had the correct focus;
• the wording was not ambiguous;
• to ensure no double-barrelled questions were included;
• to ensure the language was clear in the sense of no acronyms, 
abbreviations, jargon, proverbs, technical terms which were not clearly 
explained;
• to ensure no questions could be leading; and,
• to ensure that data could be easily analysed.
In addition to the seven point scale, boxes were also included in the 
questionnaire for ‘Don’t Know’ and ‘Not Applicable’. Oppenheim (2000) 
suggests that it is important to allow for the occasion where a respondent 
does not know the answer to a question or where it is not applicable or else 
they might feel obliged to give a response which is not valid. The 
questionnaire explains that ‘Don’t Know’ is different from the ‘Undecided’ 
category on the seven point scale in an effort to ensure that respondents do 
not use this box as an ‘opt out’. This has to be handled carefully as 
Oppenheim (2000) suggests that respondents do not like to admit a lack of 
knowledge, so a fine balance has to be struck to ensure that respondents do 
not feel uncomfortable in this situation.
Oppenheim (2000) suggests that each question should be thought of in terms 
of being a measure; therefore for each question and groups of questions it is 
important to consider their reliability and validity. He continues by 
suggesting that, in respect of attitudinal questions, sets of questions are more 
reliable than single opinion items. This is because vagaries in question 
wording may be cancelled out and thus any potential bias eliminated, and the 
stable components of the response are maximised and the instabilities
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minimised. However, this assumes that there is such a thing as a ‘true’ 
attitude. The validity of an attitude question is more difficult to assess, as 
there is a lack of criterion against which to assess it. In addition, there is no 
clear link between attitude and behaviour, e.g. we may not like a law but we 
will obey it. In light of this, where an issue is complex in the sense that it is 
potentially multi-faceted or capable of differing interpretation, ‘pools’ of 
questions were designed to test for the presence of these variables, e.g. trust 
and communication. These pools were both within sections of the 
questionnaire and spread throughout it. Other issues are not complex in this 
sense and, therefore, in these instances it was determined that one, carefully 
worded, unambiguous question would be sufficient to test for their presence, 
e.g. whether the targets are demanding but achievable (see Appendix D).
The following table sets out the relationship between the critical success 
factors (CSFs), the individual questions and their expected relationship with 
the process outcomes and performance impacts.
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TABLE 5.4: STRUCTURE OF POLICY AGREEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Critical Success Factor Question (s) 
(see Appendix D)
PO or PI
Overall Process
CSFO01 Integration of the performance management 
system within a clear organisational strategic 
framework.
Qs
1. My authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the development of its Community Plan.
2. My authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the development of its Improvement Plan.
3. My authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the development of its own strategic plan.
4. My authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the development of its budget strategy.
r q 4
CSFO02 Awareness of stakeholders of the system (in this 
case defined as including members of the 
public).
Qs
7. My authority has made public its Policy Agreement, (e.g. on internet, local newsletter etc.)
8. My authority has plans to publish the results of the Policy Agreement in 2004. (e.g. on internet, local newsletter 
etc.)
r q 3
CSFO03 Effective communication throughout the process. Qs
9. I am aware that the Assembly has made commitments in the Agreements to review plans and remove other 
impediments to continuous improvement of local authority services.
10. I am aware of Assembly progress towards meeting these commitments.
RQ3
CSFO04 There must be a relationship of trust. Qs
11. The nature of the funding in the Agreements reflects a mature relationship between local authorities and the 
National Assembly.
12. There is a high level of trust between local authorities and the National Assembly.
r q 3
CSFO05 There must be commitment to the process. Qs
18. The Policy Agreement funding could have been better used in other ways to help build capacity for improvement 
in local authorities.
19. If you have any suggestions as to how the Performance Incentive Grant (PIG) funding might be better employed, 
please outline them below.
RQi and RQ2
CSFO06 The Agreement must be seen as mutual and not 
imposed as if the scheme is perceived as being 
about control it may not be adding any value at 
all to the relationship.
Qs
13. Policy Agreements have added value to the relationship between local authorities and the National Assembly.
14. The processes involved in developing Policy Agreements are as important as the funding.
RQi and RQ2
CSFO07 The overall cost of the system (including 
administration) must be perceived as 
proportionate to the benefits.
Q
15. The existence of Policy Agreements will help to demonstrate to stakeholders that local authorities are providing 
value for money.
RQe
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Critical Success Factor Question (s) 
(see Appendix D)
PO or PI
CSFO08 The performance management scheme must sit 
within a coherent framework of performance 
management policies.
Qs
17. There is a clear link between Assembly policy as articulated through Policy Agreements and other aspects of 
Assembly policy in respect of local government.
5. The National Assembly has integrated Policy Agreements with the other local authority performance initiatives.
6. The National Assembly has integrated Policy Agreements with other local authority finance policies.
RQ 2 (i.e. links with 
NAW policies on 
plans, Wales 
Programme for 
Improvement, 
hypothecation etc.)
CSFO09 Clear links between effort and performance and 
performance and reward must exist.
Q
16. The Policy Agreements clearly indicate to local authorities what is expected of them and what is on offer in 
return.
RQS
Setting Objectives
CSFS01 Setting a few clear objectives which are free from 
‘noise’.
Qs
24. The indicators are specific enough to make it clear what is to be aimed for.
25. The achievement of the targets can be influenced by factors outside the control of this authority. 
28. The numbers of indicators are about riqht.
RQ4
CSFS02 The need for targets to be demanding but 
achievable.
Qs
26. The targets are demanding but achievable.
27. The agreed targets serve to motivate rather than demotivate.
RQ4
CSFS03 The need for a clear organisational strategic 
framework.
Qs
20. The objectives in the Policy Agreements have been framed within a clear overall strategic vision for Wales.
21. There is a clear link between the chosen indicators in the Agreement and my authority’s own strategic plan.
22. The Agreements have created a link between local and national goals.
r q 4
CSFS04 The need for effective communication. Qs
3 4 .1 was involved in discussions in respect of setting baselines and targets which relate to me.
35. There was effective communication between authorities and the Assembly during the period when the baselines 
and targets were set.
36. The purpose of Policy Agreements was clearly communicated to me.
r q 3
CSFS05 The need for mutually agreed objectives. Qs
37. Local authorities played a significant part in determining the services and targets to be included in the 
Agreements.
38. The Agreements have been mutually agreed between local authorities and the National Assembly.
23. The Agreements reflect the right balance between local and national goals.
RQ4
CSFS06 The need for clear links between effort and 
performance and performance and reward.
Qs
39. The targets have made the link between the effort an authority makes and its performance clear.
40. The targets have made the link between an authority’s performance in terms of service delivery and the financial 
reward clear.
RQs
CSFS07 The need for support in terms of training, skills 
and resources to enable the targets to be met.
Qs
32. Local authorities have the skills to make a reasonable attempt at achieving the targets.
33. Local authorities have the resources (including access to training, facilities and staff) to enable them to make a 
reasonable attempt at achieving the targets.
RQ 1
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Critical Success Factor Question (s) 
(see Appendix D)
PO or PI
CSFS08 The need for there to be no conflict between the 
objectives in the agreement and any other 
organisational objectives.
Qs
29. There is no conflict between any of the indicators.
30. There is no conflict between working towards the Policy Agreement targets and achieving the other strategic 
service priorities of this authority.
31. Focusing on specific service areas in this way has created a focus on these areas at the expense of others.
r q 2
Measuring Objectives
CSFM01 The Agreement should be based on outcomes 
with actions being self-determined.
Qs
45. This authority must work with other organisations to achieve some of the targets.
46. This authority has the freedom to determine how to achieve improvements its own performance.
RQ i and RQ2
CSFM02 The costs involved in data collection must be 
'reasonable'.
Q
47. The cost of collecting information to measure progress towards targets does not outweigh the benefits it 
provides.
RQe
CSFM03 The data must not be capable of manipulation. Q
49. None of the data collected in measuring performance could be subject to manipulation.
RQs
CSFM04 The need for clear links between effort and 
performance and performance and reward.
Qs
43. There is a clear link between the effort this authority makes towards achieving the Policy Agreement targets and 
the performance measures in the Policy Agreements.
44. There is a clear link between local authority performance and the amount of funding received.
RQs
CSFM05 The need for indicators to measure outcomes not 
activity.
Q
48. The indicators are measuring the outcome of this authority’s activity, rather than that activity itself.
RQs
CSFM06 The need for indicators to be chosen because 
they are appropriate not because they are a 
proxy which is easy to measure.
Qs
41. Ease of measurement was not the prime consideration in choosing the Policy Agreement indicators.
42. The indicators used are the most suitable to measure achievement of the objectives set out in the Policy 
Agreements.
RQs
CSFM07 The means of assessing subjective performance 
measures must be agreed in advance.
Q
50. Some outcomes are not measured by specific indicators (e.g. working with the voluntary sector) but I am 
satisfied that it will be possible to measure progress against these broader themes.
RQs
Feedback
CSFF01 There needs to be supportive management of 
the scheme.
Qs
58. Policy Agreements are a way for local authorities and the Assembly to work together to improve services.
60. The main role of the Assembly, in the context of Policy Agreements, is not to determine the level of financial 
reward to be paid in 2004.
r q 3
CSFF02 Only the outcome should be specified not the 
means of achieving it.
Q
59. Local authorities have been able to determine how to achieve the targets.
RQ i and RQ2
CSFF03 Evaluation of performance should be free from 
social pressures.
Q
55. The Assembly has not been punitive when monitoring performance.
r q 2
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Critical Success Factor Question (s) 
(see Appendix D)
PO or PI
CSFF04 The need for clear links between effort and 
performance and performance and reward.
Qs
54. Other organisations which contribute to the achievement of targets are included in the appraisal process.
57. The Policy Agreement process has raised expectations in terms of improved performance which can be met.
RQs
CSFF05 Trust plays an important part in the effective 
implementation and operation of the systems, 
especially if there is subjectivity involved in 
determining whether or not targets have been 
achieved - the more complex the system the 
more likely that there is a lack of trust.
Qs
5 1 .1 am satisfied with the feedback process with my manager in respect of tracking progress towards achieving the 
Policy Agreement targets.
52. I am content with the feedback process with politicians in respect of tracking progress towards achieving the 
targets.
53. I am content with the feedback process with representatives from the National Assembly in respect of tracking 
progress towards achieving the targets.
56. The process of appraising performance aqainst targets in the context of Policy Aqreements is too bureaucratic.
RQs
CSFF06 The administrative cost of the system should be 
minimised.
Q
62. The cost of monitoring the Policy Agreements does not outweigh the potential benefits.
RQs
CSFF07 The need for effective communication. Q
61. There has been effective communication of feedback between the Assembly and local authorities.
RQs
Rewards
CSFR01 The overall cost of the system. Q
77. The cost of the Policy Agreement process, including the available funding, is in proportion to the benefits.
r q 6
CSFR02 The rewards on offer must be valued. Qs
68. Those with service responsibilities would have been more motivated to work towards achievement of the targets 
if the funding was linked to specific targets.
69. Managers would have worked towards achieving the targets in the agreements without the attachment of 
funding to the agreements.
RQ i
CSFR03 The perceived ‘fairness’ of the system is crucial 
to success.
Qs
7 0 .1 have read the evaluation protocol. (Filter question)
71. The evaluation protocol is ‘fair’.
72. The nature of the evaluation protocol supports the concept of relating funding to performance.
7 8 .1 am aware of the agreed distribution method for the funding attached to Policy Agreements. (Filter question) 
79. The distribution method for Performance Incentive Grant (PIG) is ‘fair1.
RQi and RQ2
CSFR04 The promised rewards must materialise or else 
the system will be self-defeating in terms that it 
will demotivate not motivate.
Qs
75. The promised funding will ‘materialise’.
76. Local authorities will ‘expect’ this funding in the future regardless of performance.
r q 2
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Critical Success Factor Question (s) 
(see Appendix D)
PO or PI
CSFR05 The need for clear links between effort and 
performance and performance and reward.
Qs
6 3 . 1 know there is funding attached to the Policy Agreements.
65. The attachment of funding to the Policy Agreements has motivated this authority towards achieving the targets.
66. There is a strong link between the Authority achieving the targets and receiving the funding.
67. The attachment of non-ring fenced revenue funding to the Policy Agreement is appropriate.
82. The funding linked to these Agreements is a reward i.e. to reward performance after the event.
83. The funding linked to these Agreements is an incentive i.e. to stimulate performance.
RQs
CSFR06 Schemes must recognise that different 
motivators may be more effective at different 
times.
Qs
73. Managers would have been more motivated by the inclusion of non financial incentives and rewards in the 
Agreements such as greater autonomy, recognition etc.
74. Authorities should be able to choose a ‘reward package’ if Policy Agreements enter a second phase.
RQ<
CSFR07 The marginal valance of money as a motivator. Qs
64. This funding is significant.
RQi
CSFR08 Schemes must be managed in a positive way 
otherwise they become expensive and 
ineffective.
Qs
80. The Policy Agreement process has been handled in a positive way by local authorities.
81. The Policy Agreement process has been handled in a positive way by the Assembly.
r q 3
Amendments to Objectives
CSFA01 Emphasis on ‘coaching’ rather than ‘policing’. Q
86. The role of the Assembly during review sessions has been to help local authorities constructively improve 
performance.
RQi and RQ2
CSFA02 There must be good communication. Q
87. There has been effective communication between the Assembly and local authorities at the review stage.
RQ3
CSFA03 Avoid conflict between discussions on improving 
performance and gaining the promised reward.
Q
85. Most of the discussion during the review sessions has focused on Performance Improvement Grant.
RQi and RQ2
CSFA04 Important at this stage to reflect on the process 
as a whole not just the agreed indicators and 
targets.
Q
84. There has been adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement process as a whole when reviewing targets 
and baselines.
RQe
Key
Q = Question number as per Policy Agreement questionnaire (see Appendix D) 
RQ = Research Question 
PO = Process Outcome 
PI = Performance Impact
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The questionnaire (Appendix D) is divided into the stages of the performance 
management cycle, the first section contains questions about themes which 
the literature reviews in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 identified relating to the 
operationalisation of performance management schemes (referred to as 
Group 0 above). These themes, whilst separately identified in some of the 
sections were felt to be of such fundamental importance that the inclusion of 
these questions acts as a means of gathering overall perceptions of these 
aspects as part of the Policy Agreement process.
The final section in the questionnaire was included to determine the 
perception of respondents as to the objectives in terms of process outcomes 
and performance impacts of the Policy Agreements. As noted earlier, this 
was necessitated by the timing of this stage of the research. This data is not 
used anywhere in the analysis as a proxy for the impact of the policy. 
Interviewees were asked to give their perceptions of impacts (see later and 
Chapter 7). However, the data on objectives enables a ‘filter’ mechanism, 
based on multiple regression to be developed. This is used to identify 
potentially statistically significant critical success factors i.e. facets of the 
implementation process not its objectives, to use in the design of semi­
structured interviews and a statistical model to identify the potential impact of 
aspects of the implementation process on service performance using actual 
performance and baseline data (Chapters 7 and 8).
It is noted that this approach has the potential to introduce same-source bias 
into the evaluation. However, as identified above, the available population for
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the questionnaire is in effect the sample and, to segregate it further might lead 
to levels of questionnaire return too small for statistical analysis to be 
undertaken. In the case of the performance impacts, efforts will be made to 
mitigate potential same-source bias by using actual performance data relating 
to the Policy Agreement indicators (published in October 2004) in a multiple 
regression model to explore the possible effect of the critical success factors 
(Chapter 8).
Distribution and Return of Questionnaires
As the sample was 795 it was not practical for a single researcher to distribute 
each questionnaire individually. Therefore, postal distribution, whilst not ideal, 
was the only viable alternative. However, positive steps as suggested by 
Oppenheim (2000) and Hoinville et al (1989) were taken in an effort to 
maximise the response rate.
Therefore, in addition to an explanation of the aim of the research and an 
introduction to the researcher, the covering letter (Appendix H) and 
distribution were written and undertaken on the following basis:
• explanation as to why the respondent had been selected;
• explanation of the meaning of confidentiality in the context of the research 
study; and,
• all addressed as university post graduate student to underline the 
independence of the research process (see section on reflexivity).
In this case, confidentiality meant that no individual response would be 
identifiable from the published results. The letter also set out how to return the 
questionnaire and a deadline for return.
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The questionnaires were distributed using two postal systems. For 
respondents in the National Assembly/Welsh Assembly Government, the 
internal mail system was used. The letter and questionnaire were sent in hard 
copy as opposed to e-mail as it was felt that this would facilitate a higher 
response rate. For local authority respondents, the questionnaires were 
distributed using the UK postal system, the same arguments applying to 
electronic distribution as above. A stamped addressed envelope was included 
with these questionnaires as evidence suggests that this can also increase 
response rates (Oppenheim, 2000). This was to be returned to the University 
to underline the independence of the research process.
Non-Responses
Evidence suggests that follow up letters can improve response rates and that 
these should be targeted at non-respondents (Oppenheim, 2000; Hoinville et 
al 1989). Therefore, it was determined to send one reminder letter and further 
copy of the questionnaire one week after the return deadline.
Development of the Inductive Method
It was noted above, that using a purely deductive methodology and a single 
deductive tool would not be entirely appropriate as there are deficiencies with 
both in relation to this study. Firstly, the deductive methodology relies on the 
identification of a theory for testing, one was identified in the shape of 
performance management systems relating to individuals which include an 
element of PRP, however, the transferability of this to inter-governmental 
systems in itself, whilst suggested as a possibility, had not previously been
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tested. This implies the need to also build bottom-up from the evidence using 
an inductive methodology and method. This could provide evidence to 
support the ‘leap’ from individual to inter-governmental systems. Also, it was 
identified from policy evaluation theory that evidence in respect of process 
can make an important contribution to understanding the effectiveness of 
policy implementation and that qualitative methods are most appropriate to 
provide this evidence.
Secondly, large scale surveys and the deductive method of the postal 
questionnaire have some inherent deficiencies, such as response rates and 
failing to pick up on nuances and intonations. Inductive methods such as 
interviews can help to overcome these deficiencies (Bell, 1998). It was noted 
in earlier chapters that the Welsh inter-governmental performance system is 
‘human’ reliant in terms of relationships and interactions and, it was felt that 
the level of insight interviews could provide was important in achieving the 
aims of the project, as the complexities and subtleties of the systems 
including the human interactions could have been lost in a large-scale survey.
The Qualitative Method
To support the data from the postal questionnaires it was felt appropriate to 
conduct a series of semi-structured interviews with a sample of key 
participants in the Policy Agreement process. The first aim was to provide 
evidence to fill the gap in the findings of the postal questionnaires in respect 
of the impacts of Policy Agreements. The postal questionnaire data was 
collected before the end of the first Policy Agreement cycle. It, was, therefore
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too early for respondents to make informed judgements as to the attainment 
or otherwise of the desired process outcomes and performance impacts.
The second aim was to triangulate some of the key findings from the review of 
the questionnaire returns. The third aim was, in light of emerging evidence 
from England, to establish whether participants felt there was a difference of 
approach in Wales and, finally, to build from the bottom up evidence relating 
to the assumption by Governments of transferability or otherwise of the 
principles from individual PRP schemes to organisational ones.
Miles and Huberman (1993) suggest that validity from qualitative data can be 
promoted by triangulation (in this case with data from postal questionnaires), 
a balanced assessment and an awareness of the respondents’ ‘interests’ in 
the research. It is also important to note that it might be appropriate to weight 
the evidence provided by some informants over and above that provided by 
others because of the informant’s knowledge etc. Finally, they state that it is 
important not to move too quickly from the particular to the general when 
evaluating the data. This is supported by Yin (1994).
Burrell and Morgan (1992) suggest that reliability in the interpretative 
paradigm can be maximised by recording accurately what is observed and 
making use of established data collection techniques. Therefore it is 
important to pay close attention not only to the research design but also to its 
conduct by making efforts to mitigate reflexivity (see later) and also ensure 
proper recording of data.
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Semi-Structured Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the best method of identifying and 
understanding the nuances and subtleties involved in the process, including 
how it ‘felt’ for participants, e.g. top-down or bottom-up?, like a PRP system? 
Open-ended postal questionnaires might provide some indication of the 
subtleties involved but, it was felt that face-to-face contact would provide the 
opportunity for perceptions to be explored in more depth, whilst at the same 
time providing evidence to support (or not) the desired impacts of Policy 
Agreements.
Bell (1997) states a major advantage of interviews is that they are adaptable 
because they allow follow up questions to probe responses and investigate 
motives and feelings in a way that postal questionnaires cannot. Another 
important aspect of the interview is the way in which the response is made, 
such as tone of voice or use of body language; this may provide important 
evidence at the evaluation stage. However, it is important that the researcher 
remains as objective as possible. As the researcher was known to all the 
interviewees, each interview began with an explanation that the researcher 
was conducting the interview as part of an independent piece of research and 
not as part of work for the Welsh Assembly Government.
It is important to use interview time to best effect, therefore a short list of 
questions (Appendix T - Interview Schedule) was used as the basis for the 
interviews. These were used as prompts to ensure some structure and also to 
aid in the evaluation stage. They also had the advantage of not stifling the 
interviewee in terms of offering opportunity for introducing their own
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perceptions and experiences. Bell (1997) terms this a ‘focused’ interview. 
The advantage of this approach is that it provides a framework but still allows 
the interviewees freedom to give their own views.
Notes were taken during the interview rather than making use of recording. 
This was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the time and resources were not 
available for transcription and secondly, due to the close working relationship 
between the researcher and the interviewees some of the participants may 
have felt it was not appropriate. In light of this, the aim was to put the 
participants at ease and the formality of recording could have put this in 
jeopardy.
The main danger with interviews is that bias can creep into the process, but 
Bell (1997) states that it is probably easier to acknowledge this than attempt 
to eliminate it all together and, the researcher should exercise awareness and 
self control. The process of supervision also serves to mitigate against this.
Development of the Interview Schedule
Section 1 of the Schedule - Earlier chapters identified that Policy 
Agreements were intended to achieve both process outcomes and 
performance impacts. The interview schedule was, therefore, designed to test 
whether or not interviewees felt these had been achieved and, thus, to fill in 
the gap from the postal questionnaire findings which, due to timing, related to 
the objectives themselves as opposed to their achievement. It was also 
designed to collect further data on key aspects identified from statistical
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analysis of the postal questionnaires (Chapter 6 and multiple regression 
analyses contained in Appendix S).
Section 2 of the Schedule -  Section 2 was designed to provide evidence on 
the overall Policy Agreement process and thus triangulate findings from the 
more specific questions in Section 1. Earlier chapters also identified what 
seemed to be a greater emphasis in Wales than in England on the 
relationships and ‘human’ aspects of the system and a more ‘co-produced’ 
feel rather than ‘top-down’ one. Questions were therefore also included to 
test these aspects. Finally, earlier chapters also noted a governmental 
assumption of the transferability of PRP schemes from the individual to the 
organisational and so questions were included to test perceptions of the 
appropriateness and robustness of this assumption (see Appendix T).
Pilot of Interview Questions
The open ended questions constructed for the interviews were piloted on 
colleagues prior to undertaking the research, in order to ensure that ambiguity 
and bias were minimised. No changes were made as a result of this piloting.
Selection of Interviewees
Interviews are time consuming both for the interviewee and the researcher. It 
is therefore important to carefully select those to be interviewed so as to 
maximise the added value to the research process. It was estimated that 
each interview would take between 60 and 90 minutes to complete and, as
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each would provide a large amount of rich data, it was determined that a 
maximum of 10 interviews should be undertaken.
Interviewees were selected from across the categories identified as relevant 
for the postal questionnaire. In the case of local authorities, interviewees 
were selected as the contact in the relevant organisation who led on the 
development and implementation of Policy Agreements in the ‘corporate 
centre’. Typically these individuals were middle to senior level officers 
responsible for leading the negotiation of the Policy Agreement with the Welsh 
Assembly Government and the related progress meetings, explaining and 
discussing the Agreements with senior officers, including the Chief Executive, 
and service managers, and reporting to elected members. These individuals 
were selected on the basis of being in the best position to provide the most 
holistic perspective of the Policy Agreement process within their authorities. 
The local authorities were selected as follows:
Authority A Large, urban, south Wales
Authority B Medium, semi-rural, north Wales, Welsh speaking
Authority C Small, rural, south west Wales
Authority D Medium, deprived, industrial, urban, south Wales
Authority E Large, urban, post industrial, south Wales valleys
Authority F Small, semi-rural, affluent, south east Wales
(Small, medium or large refers to the population of the authorities relative to 
other authorities in Wales)
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To collect evidence on the local political perspective the most senior officer 
who led on the Agreements both nationally and in convening local discussions 
for the WLGA was interviewed. To gain an understanding of the national 
politicians’ perspective the Welsh Assembly Government special advisor who 
led on the development of Policy Agreements was interviewed (this advisor 
was one of those responsible for advising the relevant Cabinet Minister and 
First Minister on local government policy).
The Assembly Government officials’ perspective was collected by interviewing 
the senior and middle level officials in Local Government Modernisation/Policy 
Division who led on the design, development and implementation of Policy 
Agreements between 2000 and 2004. This Division was responsible for the 
development and design of all policies relating to local government 
performance, improvement, democratic structures and community leadership. 
The interviews conducted were therefore as follows:
• Local Authority Officials - 6 (Interviewees A, B, C, D, E and F)
• WLGA -1  (Interviewee G)
• Welsh Assembly Government Special Advisor -1  (Interviewee H)
• Welsh Assembly Government Officials - 2 (Interviewees I and J)
As time had elapsed since the first round of Policy Agreements, the beginning 
of the interview was spent clarifying the relevant time period, explaining the 
purpose of the interview and, explaining the researcher’s role, given her 
position as a current Assembly Government official.
It is acknowledged that the time elapse might have caused issues of recall for 
interviewees, but the gap has the advantage of removing interviewees from
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the currency of events and enabling them to provide a dispassionate and 
objective perspective of the implementation process and the perceived impact 
of Policy Agreements. It also had the advantage of enabling reflection on and 
comparison with the second round of Policy Agreements (2004/05 to 
2006/07). Interviewees had good recall of events and were clear as to their 
views and opinions. The interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes.
Analysis of Data
Miles and Huberman (1993) suggest that one method of analysing qualitative 
data is to use a matrix to attempt to identify themes and patterns which arise 
from the data collected. These can then be used to start to build explanations 
about the data. Yin (1994) suggests the analysis should show that it relied on 
all the relevant evidence, looked for as much evidence as possible and, the 
analysis should include all major rival interpretations. A matrix was therefore 
constructed and used in the analysis.
Ethics and Reflexivity
In terms of the conduct of the research key ethical criteria are honesty and 
professionalism. It is important to be open and honest with questionnaire 
respondents and interviewees, so that, for example, if confidentiality and 
anonymity are promised they are delivered. In this case both were promised 
as this was felt to be important, in particular, in overcoming the close working 
relationship between the researcher and the interviewees. The research has 
been written up in such a way as to ensure that individual names and 
organisations cannot be inferred from the final report. Information should be 
provided from those involved in the research on an informed basis and
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therefore, interviewees and questionnaire respondents were informed that the 
organisation and the responses were to be anonymised. These are important 
issues for the researcher as the outcome of the research is dependent on 
gaining the trust and confidence of those involved. It would be unethical to 
betray confidences at a later stage.
This research was undertaken by an Assembly Government official who 
throughout the research period worked in local government policy and finance 
and in public service reform. This provided some advantage in terms of prior 
knowledge of the process and key players in the system and insight into the 
workings of the Welsh Assembly Government. This could mean the 
introduction of bias into the research so that independence must be guarded 
by means of self-checking and the process of supervision.
Also, as Wales is a small policy space, it is likely that the researcher’s name 
was recognised by many of the questionnaire respondents. This could have 
lead to bias in the responses - efforts were made to guard against this by 
using the University as the return address for questionnaires, and by 
explaining the capacity of the researcher, as a student, in the introductory 
information provided to interviewees participating in the structured interviews.
Conclusions
This Chapter has explained that policy evaluation theory identifies an 
understanding of how policy is implemented, in terms of what works and what 
does not, can provide an important contribution to knowledge and, that
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qualitative methods are the most appropriate means of providing this 
evidence. Likewise evaluation related to the effects of a policy may be best 
undertaken by means of quasi-experimental methods. Both are set against a 
context of developing a ‘theory of change’ in order to work out why the 
intervention is expected to have the anticipated effects (Lewis, 2001; Davies, 
1999; Blalock, 1999; Chelimsky, 1997; Connell and Kubisch, 1998).
The theoretical framework relating to the design and implementation of 
performance and reward management systems, identified from the review of 
relevant literature on target setting in the public sector and performance 
management and PRP systems, can be adapted to provide a deductive 
research method to evaluate whether Policy Agreements have contributed to 
culture change and improved performance in the public sector in Wales, i.e. 
the effects of policy implementation.
This is based on evidence from earlier chapters which identified the possibility 
of transferability of the lessons learnt from the design and implementation of 
performance and reward systems for individuals to inter-governmental ones 
(Boyne and Chen, 2006; Reiter et al, 2006; Hood, 2007; Sullivan 2008). In 
addition, the importance placed on individual relationships in the Welsh 
system (Andrews and Martin, 2007) suggests this is an area worth exploring. 
However, the timing of the deductive method and inherent limitations in its 
application mean that the findings were triangulated with an inductive 
methodology in the form of semi-structured interviews. In addition, these 
provided ‘rich’ evidence as to the process of implementation which could not
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be gleaned from questionnaires. Combined, these also provide evidence to 
maximise the potential benefits of devolution and limit its potential for 
insularity (Downe et al, 2007; Hockridge, 2006).
The next chapter contains descriptive statistical analysis and discussion of the 
questionnaire data, including consideration of whether there are any 
statistically significant differences between the opinions of different groupings 
of respondents, for example, between local authority members and officers. 
Following chapters will then explore the interview and actual performance 
data to consider whether Policy Agreements have delivered the desired 
process outcomes and performance impacts.
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CHAPTER 6
POLICY AGREEMENT QUESTIONNAIRES -  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
QUESTIONNAIRE RETURNS
Introduction
In Chapter 5 the questionnaire was designed to test for respondents’ 
perceptions of the presence or otherwise of the critical success factors (CSFs) 
in the Policy Agreement process. These CSFs were identified from the 
literature reviews in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In Chapter 3 a series of process 
outcomes and performance impacts for Policy Agreements were identified as 
being desirable by both local authorities and the Assembly Government. Both 
placed some value on the potential process outcome elements of Policy 
Agreements, as well as the expected performance impacts. The main 
research question to be considered, at an all Wales level, was therefore 
determined as:
'Have Policy Agreements contributed to culture change and improved 
performance in the public sector in Wales?’
This is a complex and multifaceted concept and, was thus broken down into 6 
‘sub’ research questions relating to both performance impacts and process 
outcomes. Evidence relating to the outcomes and impacts of Policy 
Agreements was provided by the data generated by the interviews and, 
research questions relating to performance impacts were also supported by 
an analysis of the final results of the Policy Agreement process, i.e. in the 
form of the performance indicator information submitted by the 22 authorities, 
in Chapter 8.
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Questionnaire Returns 
Local Authorities - Response Numbers and Rates
Table 6.1 sets out the questionnaires sent to local authorities. The first 
despatch of questionnaires generated 118 returns. Reminders generated a 
further 40 returns making a total of 158 returns (61 from members and 97 
from officers). In light of this, it was determined that a further despatch would 
be unlikely to significantly increase the total number of responses or response 
rate. It is acknowledged that 22.8% is not a particularly high response rate 
overall, but the rate amongst officers is higher and politicians can be difficult to 
elicit questionnaire responses from, for example, several intimated that it was 
not their ‘policy’ to complete questionnaires. Also, the questionnaire data was 
supplemented with interview data.
TABLE 6.1: POLICY AGREEMENT QUESTIONNAIRES - LOCAL 
AUTHORITY RETURNS AND RESPONSE RATES
Sent 15t
Returns
Reminders Total Response
Rate
Councillors 385 45 16 61 15.8%
Officers 307 73 24 97 31.6%
Total 692 118 40 158 22.8%
From Table 6.1 it may be seen that there was a higher level of both returns 
and response rate amongst officers. However, the number of responses from 
members was sufficient to undertake statistical analysis, and so it was 
possible to explore whether the views of members and officers differed 
significantly.
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National Assembly for Wales/Welsh Assembly Government - Response 
Rates and Numbers
Questionnaires were also sent to Assembly Members and Welsh Assembly 
Government officials. 102 questionnaires were sent and 24 returned. A 
reminder was sent after the period for the first distribution had lapsed, on the 
same basis as with local authority respondents, but this generated no further 
responses.
TABLE 6.2: POLICY AGREEMENT QUESTIONNAIRES - NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY FOR WALES/WELSH ASSEMBLY GOVERNMENT RETURNS
AND RESPONSE RATES
Sent 1st
Returns
Reminders Total Response
Rate
Assembly
Members
30 6 0 6 20%
Assembly
Officials
72 18 0 18 25%
Total 102 24 0 24 24%
The overall number of responses, both to the initial distribution and reminder 
was disappointing and implies a general lack of interest, knowledge and 
understanding of Policy Agreements at all levels. In the case of Assembly 
Members (AMs) the number of returns is not sufficient to make any statistical 
analysis robust. One AM returned the questionnaire uncompleted with a letter 
stating that it was his policy not to complete questionnaires as he received so 
many. This may explain some of the non-responses, but not all, and implies a 
low level of knowledge/interest in the Agreements.
Several e-mails (13) were received from Assembly Government officials 
indicating that in many cases they would have liked to help by responding to
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the questionnaire, but that this was either the first time they had come into 
contact with Policy Agreements or that they were vaguely aware of them but 
did not have enough knowledge to complete the questionnaire. One 
Assembly official after offering apologies at being unable to assist because of 
a lack of knowledge of Policy Agreements exclaimed ‘Read into this what you 
will!’
This suggests that some policy divisions across the Assembly Government 
perceived the Agreements as an ‘add on’ or a ‘chore’ and did not mainstream 
them into their every day policy development or, did not see them as a 
sufficiently robust tool in which to invest staff involvement.
The possible limitations of the response rate are acknowledged and the 
statistical analysis in this chapter is supplemented by the qualitative 
comments returned with the questionnaires and the interview data in the next 
chapter. However, the numbers of returns are still sufficient to enable this 
Chapter to explore, by means of descriptive statistical analysis, whether the 
questionnaire respondents perceived any, some or all of the CSFs to be 
present in the Policy Agreement process. The analysis will consider total 
responses and responses by respondent category. The respondent groups 
are as follows:
Group 1- Local authority elected members, n=61 
Group 2- Local authority officers, n=97
Group 3- National Assembly for Wales/Welsh Assembly Government, n=24*
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* The Assembly group has been combined (18 Assembly Government officials 
and 6 AMs) because the AM group is too small to provide any statistically 
significant results. The AMs have been combined with the Assembly officials 
rather than the local authority elected members, as it is their commonality of 
purpose with the Assembly officials which is felt to be most relevant for the 
analysis. In addition, both groups were asked to respond to identical 
questions. All questionnaires were sent and returned during the summer of 
2003.
Overview of the Analysis
Appendices I to L contain qualitative comments made by the questionnaire 
respondents. These will be referred to as appropriate throughout the 
remainder of the Chapter where it is felt that they add context and/or 
understanding to the statistical analysis. Appendices M to R group 
responses by sub research question for each of the respondent groups and 
total responses. For each question, basic measures of central tendency and 
dispersion, i.e. the mean (sum of the scores divided by the total number of 
scores), the median (the central point), the mode (most frequently occurring 
score), the standard deviation (indicates how much, on average, the scores in 
a distribution differ from a central point), the kurtosis (which indicates the 
‘lumpiness’ of the data), and the value of the minimum and maximum scores 
are shown.
Tables in the following sections contain percentage data derived from the 7 
point Likert scales. The scores from the top 3 categories have been 
aggregated (7= agree strongly, 6 and 5). Where the data indicates an unusual
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response pattern such as a bi-modal distribution or a marked positive or 
negative skew, this is also indicated.
These tables show the percentage responses for all of the respondent groups 
and total respondents. Where the result of the ANOVA test (analysis of the 
variance in responses between respondent groups) was significant at 99% 
(0.01), a post hoc Scheffe test has been undertaken to identify statistically 
significant differences between groups. Therefore, unless otherwise stated 
there are no statistically significant differences in the responses between 
respondent groups.
Review of Process Outcomes Data 
RESEARCH QUESTION 1
RQi Have Policy Agreements helped to create a culture of ‘self-improvement’ 
in local authorities? A culture of self-improvement is defined as local 
authorities focusing on outcomes rather than inputs, proactively seeking 
continuous improvement rather than acting on external stimuli such as 
inspection and regulation.
The following table provides a question by question analysis of research 
question 1, critical success factors and the objectives of Policy Agreements, 
on the basis set out above.
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TABLE 6.3: RESEARCH QUESTION 1 - PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS BY GROUP AGREEING WITH QUESTION
% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOS NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
sig.
The Policy Agreement 
funding could have been 
used in other ways to help 
build capacity for 
improvement in local 
authorities.
18 CSFO
05
There must be 
commitment to the 
process.
79.2 52.9 38.9 60.1 .000 EMs
and
LAOs
Policy Agreements have 
added value to the 
relationship between local 
authorities and the National 
Assembly.
13 CSFO
06
The Agreement must 
be seen as mutual and 
not imposed, as if the 
scheme is perceived as 
being about control it 
may not be adding any 
value at all to the 
relationship.
63.8 52.1 77.3 59.1 .276
The processes involved in 
developing Policy 
Agreements are as 
important as the funding.
14 CSFO
06
The Agreement must 
be seen as mutual and 
not imposed, as if the 
scheme is perceived as 
being about control it 
may not be adding any 
value at all to the 
relationship.
76.2 76.8 86.9 78 .757
Local authorities have the 
skills to make a reasonable 
attempt at achieving the 
targets.
32 CSFS
07
The need for support in 
terms of training, skills 
and resources to 
enable the targets to 
be met.
93.1 87.6 76.2 88.1 .022
Local authorities have the 
resources (including 
access to training, facilities 
and staff) to enable them to 
make a reasonable attempt 
at achieving the targets.
33 CSFS
07
The need for support in 
terms of training, skills 
and resources to 
enable the targets to 
be met.
45.9 48.4 71.5 50.3 .105
This authority must work 
with other organisations to 
achieve some of the 
targets.
45 CSFM
01
The Agreement is 
based on outcomes 
with actions being self- 
determined.
93.1 91.6 95.5 92.6 .961
This authority has the 
freedom to determine how 
to achieve improvements in 
its own performance.
46 CSFM
01
The Agreement is 
based on outcomes 
with actions being self- 
determined.
63.3 74.5 85.6 72 .086
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% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOS NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
Slg.
Local authorities have been 
able to determine how to 
achieve the targets.
59 CSFF
02
Only the outcome 
should be specified 
and not the means of 
achieving it.
71.9 85 81 80.2 .099
Those with service 
responsibilities would have 
been more motivated to 
work towards achievement 
of the targets if the funding 
was linked to specific 
targets.
68 CSFR
02
The rewards on offer 
must be valued.
72.7 65.6 80 69.7 .751
Managers would have 
worked towards achieving 
the targets in the 
agreements without the 
attachment of funding to 
the Agreements.
69 CSFR
02
The rewards on offer 
must be valued.
53.5 64.9 42.9 58.4 .234
I have read the evaluation 
protocol.
70 CSFR
03
The perceived 
‘fairness’ of the system 
is crucial to success.
28.3 20.9 10.5 22.1 .278
The evaluation protocol is 
‘fair’.
71 CSFR
03
The perceived 
‘fairness’ of the system 
is crucial to success.
52.6 79 100 68.3 .139
The nature of the 
evaluation protocol 
supports the concept of 
relating funding to 
performance.
72 CSFR
03
The perceived 
‘fairness’ of the system 
is crucial to success.
63.2 66.6 50 64.4 .935
I am aware of the agreed 
distribution method for the 
funding attached to Policy 
Agreements. (If ‘No’, 
please go straight to 
Question 80.)
78 CSFR
03
The perceived 
‘fairness’ of the system 
is crucial to success.
54.1 47.9 42.1 51.2 .271
The distribution method for 
Performance Incentive 
Grant (PIG) is ‘fair’.
79 CSFR
03
The perceived 
‘fairness’ of the system 
is crucial to success.
48.6 48 71.5 50 .078
This funding is significant. 64 CSFR
07
The marginal valance 
of the money as a 
motivator.
29.1 61.9 63.2 51.3 .003 EMs
and
LAOs
The role of the Assembly 
during review sessions has 
been to help local 
authorities constructively 
improve performance.
86 CSFA
01
Emphasis on 
‘coaching’ rather than 
‘policing’.
51 46.1 58.8 49.6 .547
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% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
Sig.
Most of the discussion 
during the review sessions 
has focused on 
Performance Improvement 
Grant.
85 CSFA
03
Avoid conflict between 
discussions on 
improving performance 
and gaining the 
promised reward.
59.6 43.3 25 48.2 .077
One of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements is to 
focus on local authority 
results and outcomes 
rather than inputs.
88 H1 84.5 89.4 100 88.9 .133
One of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements is to 
create a culture of self- 
improvement.
94 H1 83 78.5 95 82 .267
One of the objectives of 
Policy agreements is to 
demonstrate that there is 
no requirement for 
externally driven 
improvement by inspection 
and audit.
96 H1 36.4 28.7 16.7 30.1 .360
Key
Significance tested at the 0.01 level for both ANOVA and post hoc Scheffe 
EMs = Elected Members 
LAOs= Local Authority officers
NAW= the National Assembly group (AMs and officers)
Q= Question number as per questionnaire 
CSF= Critical Success Factor
%= Percentage of respondents in agreement with the statement
The following sections contain an analysis by critical success factor (CSF) of 
the data contained in Table 6.3 and Appendix M.
CSFO05 - There must be commitment to the process.
Question 18 was designed to test the presence or otherwise of commitment 
to the overall process by questioning the respondent's attitude to the way in 
which funding had been attached to the Policy Agreements. An initial review 
of the descriptive statistics suggests that, in total, respondents who answered 
this question were, at the time of questioning, undecided or in agreement with
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the premise that the funding could have been used more effectively in other
ways. This is supported by the comments made by respondents (See
Appendices I to L).
“Too much officer time is taken up by producing Policy Agreements 
rather than providing a good service. Produces too much stress and 
demotivates the staff. Too much bureaucracy and not enough real 
understanding at Assembly level.” (Appendix I, Elected Members, Quote 
4)
This, may, therefore, imply some overall ambivalence to the whole of the 
Policy Agreement process by all respondents with a mean, median and mode 
all greater than 4. It also supports evidence in Chapters 3 and 4 that the 
effect of finance as a motivator may not be as powerful as those designing 
organisational systems seem to have assumed. It may even be a 
demotivator.
Whilst the mode for both elected members and local authority officers is 6 , the 
mean and the median for elected members are both greater than for the 
officers (5.55 vs. 4.43 for the mean and 6 vs. 5 for the median) suggesting 
that elected members felt more strongly that the funding could have been 
better deployed elsewhere. The ANOVA and post hoc Scheffe results indicate 
a significant difference at the 0.01 level between the elected members and the 
local authority officer group supporting the analysis that the former feel more 
strongly than the latter that the funding could have been better used 
elsewhere.
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In contrast, those respondents from the National Assembly were more 
ambivalent about alternative uses of the funding with a mean, median and 
mode of 4 suggesting that this group was still undecided.
CSFO06 - The Agreement must be seen as mutual and not imposed, as if 
the scheme is perceived as being about control it may not be adding any 
value at all to the relationship.
Responses to Question 14 are more positive than those to Question 13, 
perhaps suggesting that respondents recognise the importance of the 
process, but are less convinced as to the current process’s effectiveness. 
Qualitative comments in Appendices I to L also suggest measured support for 
the process, but scepticism amongst some as to the Assembly Government’s 
motivation.
“Policy Agreements tend, in my opinion, to reflect the views of the 
Assembly and not those of the local authority who may have other 
priorities. Assembly holding the purse strings can therefore influence 
decision making.” (Appendix I, Elected Members, Quote 5)
This could also explain the marginally negative response to CSFO04 relating 
to questions on a mature relationship of trust (see analysis of research 
question 3 later). However, these responses may not necessarily be at odds 
with each other, and it may be that whilst 'Nirvana' had not yet been achieved, 
the Policy Agreement process had been perceived as a step in the right 
direction.
“The whole area of Policy Agreements is a complex one, and recently 
subject to consultation on their future scope. Whilst they are a generally 
welcome addition to the policy and strategy-making arena, recent 
consultation suggests that definitions have become rather blurred and as 
such have raised some questions, not least, for 2003/4 the PIG monies 
attached to the Policy Agreements were embedded in the general 
settlement which was helpful and enabled this authority to allocate 
resources based on robust needs assessment, service user consultation 
and in line with specific priorities. However, plans to allocate the PIG
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according to ring-fenced areas of activity is at odds with the freedoms 
and responsibilities promised under the Wales Programme for 
Improvement (WPI) and the maturing relationship between WAG and 
local authorities.” (Appendix I, Elected Members, Quote 17)
CSFS07 - The need for support in terms of training, skills and resources 
to enable the targets to be met.
Questions 32 and 33 relate to ensuring that support, skills and training are 
considered as part of the equation to drive forward achievement of the 
objectives. Responses to Question 32 (skills) were positive, while responses 
to Question 33 (resources) were less so. There was much greater variation 
around the mean showing perhaps that there is less consensus among 
respondents on this issue, perhaps another sign of confusion amongst 
respondents over the role of PIG (Performance Incentive Grant).
CSFM01 - The Agreement is based on outcomes with actions being self- 
determined.
A review of the descriptive statistics suggests that responses to Question 45 
are very much more positive than those to Question 46. However, Question 
45 relates to the necessity of working with others to achieve the Policy 
Agreement targets, and it may be inferred, thus lessens the ability of the 
authority to influence the outcomes.
The responses to Question 46 are also positive which might indicate the 
beginnings of a perception of less ‘micro-management’ by the Assembly 
Government, but there is a greater variation around the mean. However, no 
significant differences were found between respondent groups.
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CSFF02 - Only the outcome should be specified not the means of 
achieving it.
In relation to Question 59 respondents were positive with a mean, median 
and mode of around 5. Initial review suggests there is some evidence to 
support the perceived existence of this CSF. This is consistent with Q46 and 
again perhaps indication of a feeling of less micro-management beginning to 
take root.
CSFR02 - The rewards on offer must be valued.
Questions 68 and 69 are based on Expectancy Theory and the valance of 
rewards. Initial review suggests that respondents do not value the rewards on 
offer. Respondents felt that service managers would have been more 
motivated if the rewards had been linked to specific service improvements in 
the Agreements as opposed to being unhypothecated. Respondents also 
indicate that they feel marginally positive that authorities would have worked 
towards performance improvements without the funding being attached.
The National Assembly/Welsh Assembly responses were undecided to
negative with a mode of 3 suggesting that this group was sceptical about the
prospect. These results are reflected in the comments made by respondents
(see Appendices I to L).
“My knowledge of Policy Agreements is scant, though I am aware that 
the authority has signed up and that municipal waste recycling and 
composting standards are enshrined in the national waste strategy. I am 
not aware of the amount of funding available through the PIG scheme. 
My department is not aware that it will receive any funding at all on 
achievement of targets and so it provides very little incentive. Our drive 
to meet targets is based on professional pride and is extremely 
wholehearted considering the remarkable lack of resource available.” 
Appendix J, Local Authority Officers, Quote 17)
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These results seem almost contradictory; one set of results seems to favour 
the funding being hypothecated while the other suggests that the funding is 
not the main motivator. The conclusion which might be drawn from this is that 
unhypothecated funding is the worst of all worlds. However, it may also be 
that responses to Question 69 are an embodiment of the ‘public service 
ethos’, i.e. a statement by professionals that what is important is doing a good 
job and improving services and, that this would be an objective regardless of 
any financial incentive or reward.
CSFR03 - The perceived ‘fairness’ of the system is crucial to success.
Questions 70, 71, 72, 78 and 79 were designed to collect evidence as to
respondents' perceptions of the fairness of the evaluation protocol and the
distribution of Performance Incentive Grant (PIG). Not all respondents had
read the evaluation protocol (Q70) but those who had were positive that it was
fair (Q71). Those respondents who had read the protocol were positive that it
supported the concept of relating funding to performance (Q72). However,
there was a wider distribution of opinion, with a greater spread of scores and a
higher standard deviation. This seems contradictory to earlier evidence,
therefore the interview data was used to further explore this area. It also
seems contradictory to the qualitative comments provided by respondents;
“Most authorities expect to obtain the funding whether or not they have 
achieved the targets. This makes a mockery of incentive rewards.” 
(Appendix J, Local Authority Officers, Quote 10)
“The fact that every council got the money regardless of performance 
tended to make a mockery of the process. What has been achieved for 
all the extra time and effort?” (Appendix I, Elected Members, Quote 10)
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Again, not all of the respondents were aware of the method of distribution of
PIG, but those who were appeared to be split equally between the negatives
and ‘undecideds’ (cumulative responses of 50%) and those who responded
positively. In this case, it was the local authority officer group which was the
most negative with 52% of this group being negative or undecided. It was in
respect of PIG that local authority officers made the most qualitative
comments, for example;
“Funding needs to be sustainable to be of value not a moveable feast of 
here today and gone tomorrow. It is difficult to recruit to permanent 
established posts and nigh on impossible to get good standard recruits 
to temporary fixed term posts.”
“In respect of PIG - better used as part of general LA funding whilst still 
retaining Policy Agreements for key areas. There is no need for the 
financial stick or carrot if we are to establish true partnership between 
the Assembly and LAs.” (Appendix J, Local Authority Officers, Quotes 16 
and 18)
CSFR07 - The marginal valance of money as a motivator.
Expectancy Theory suggests that for financial incentives to be effective, 
recipients must perceive them to have a high marginal valance. In terms of 
Question 64, respondents felt marginally positive that the funding was 
significant. However, this hides a wide variation around the mean with a large 
standard deviation of 2.18.
Examining the responses by group provides some insight. The elected 
member group was extremely negative in its responses with a mode of 1 and 
60% of respondents scoring this question 3 or less.
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However, local authority officers took a completely opposite perspective with a 
mode of 6 and only 32.2% of respondents scoring this question 3 or less. The 
National Assembly/Welsh Assembly Government group was more ‘middle of 
the road’ in its response with a mode of 5. The variation between the elected 
members and the local authority officers was significant at the 0.01 level. This 
builds further evidence as to the emerging confusion over the role of 
Performance Incentive Grant (PIG).
CSFA01- Emphasis on ‘coaching’ rather than ‘policing’.
Question 86 relates to the importance of emphasis in the review stage being 
upon coaching as opposed to policing. Respondents were undecided to 
slightly positive as to their perception of the existence of this CSF. It may 
have been too early in the process for respondents to form a view on this 
issue and so the interview data was used to provide additional evidence in this 
regard.
CSFA03 - Avoid conflict between discussions on improving performance 
and gaining the promised reward.
Question 85 approaches this from a negative perspective by seeking the 
views of respondents as to whether the main focus of discussions has been 
PIG. Respondents were slightly negative. This suggests that discussions 
have been more holistic performance reviews as opposed to a pure focus on 
PIG. However, the same issue as above applies and so this will be further 
explored in Chapter 7.
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Research Question 1
Objectives of Policy Agreements (Table 6.3 and Appendix M)
Question 88 seeks views on whether one of the objectives of Policy 
Agreements was to focus on local authority results and outcomes as opposed 
to inputs. Respondents agreed with this statement (median and mode=6, 
mean=5.48). This is borne out by the frequencies with only 11.1% of 
respondents answering negatively or undecided.
Question 94 seeks views as to whether one of the objectives of Policy 
Agreements was to create a culture of self-improvement. Responses are 
positive (mode and median=6, mean=5.39). However, there is a slightly higher 
standard deviation, and a greater percentage of respondents (18%) were 
negative or undecided.
Question 96 sought views on whether one of the objectives of Policy 
Agreements was to demonstrate there was no requirement for externally 
driven improvement by means of audit and inspection. Respondents did not 
agree with this statement. There were multiple modes, but the lowest was 2 
and the median and mean were around 3. However, a significant percentage 
of respondents (30.1%) did agree with the statement. This might indicate a 
feeling that a complete elimination of audit and inspection is neither 
practicable nor desirable, but that Policy Agreements might help to support a 
reduction in this area.
The impact of Policy Agreements in relation to achieving or otherwise these 
objectives will be explored in Chapter 7.
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RESEARCH QUESTION 2
RQ2 Have Policy Agreements helped to change culture in the Welsh 
Assembly Government? A change of culture in the Welsh Assembly 
Government is defined as demonstration of the Assembly Government 
focusing on results and outcomes rather than inputs, i.e. greater discretion for 
local authorities to determine where to deploy resources, fewer requirements 
for local authorities to produce strategies and plans.
The following table provides a question by question analysis of research 
question 2, critical success factors and the objectives of Policy Agreements, 
on the basis of the percentage of respondents agreeing with the question.
TABLE 6.4: RESEARCH QUESTION 2 - PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS BY GROUP AGREEING WITH QUESTION
% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOS NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
Sig.
The Policy Agreement 
funding could have been 
used in other ways to help 
build capacity for 
improvement in local 
authorities.
18 CSFO
05*
There must be 
commitment to the 
process.
79.2 52.9 38.9 60.1 0.000 EMs
to
LAOS
Policy Agreements have 
added value to the 
relationship between local 
authorities and the National 
Assembly.
13 CSFO
06*
The Agreement must 
be seen as mutual and 
not imposed, as if the 
scheme is perceived as 
being about control it 
may not be adding any 
value at all to the 
relationship.
63.8 52.1 77.3 59.1 0.276
The processes involved in 
developing Policy 
Agreements are as 
important as the funding.
14 CSFO
06*
75.9 76.8 65.2 78 0.757
There is a clear link 
between Assembly policy 
as articulated through 
Policy Agreements and 
other aspects of Assembly 
policy in respect of local 
government.
17 CSFO
08
The performance 
management scheme 
must sit within a 
coherent framework of 
performance 
management policies.
45.6 39.6 61.2 44 0.12
The National Assembly has 
integrated Policy 
Agreements with the other 
local authority performance 
initiatives.
5 CSFO
08
71.5 48.9 73.3 57.8 0.033
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% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
Sig.
The National Assembly has 
integrated Policy 
Agreements with other 
local authority finance 
policies.
6 CSFO
08
77.5 33.9 53 48.9 0.000 EMs
to
LAOs
There is no conflict 
between any of the 
indicators.
29 CSFS
08
The need for there to 
be no conflict between 
the objectives in the 
Agreement and any 
other organisational 
objectives.
28.3 52.8 29.4 42.1 0.2
There is no conflict 
between working towards 
the Policy Agreement 
targets and achieving other 
strategic service priorities.
30 CSFS
08
32.2 47.9 36.9 41.4 0.188
Focusing on specific 
service areas in this way 
has created a focus on 
these areas at the expense 
of others.
31 CSFS
08
64.3 61.3 44.5 60.5 0.329
This authority must work 
with other organisations to 
achieve some of the 
targets.
45 CSFM
01*
The Agreement is 
based on outcomes 
with actions being self- 
determined.
93.1 91.6 95.5 92.6 0.961
This authority has the 
freedom to determine how 
to achieve improvements in 
its own performance.
46 CSFM
01*
63.3 74.5 85.6 72 0.86
Local authorities have been 
able to determine how to 
achieve the targets.
59 CSFF
02*
Only the outcome 
should be specified 
and not the means of 
achieving it.
71.9 85 81 80.2 0.099
The Assembly has not 
been punitive when 
monitoring performance.
55 CSFF
03
Evaluation of 
performance should be 
free from social 
pressures.
58.3 76 81.3 70.5 0.005 No
Scheffe
sig
I have read the evaluation 
protocol.
70 CSFR
03*
The perceived 
‘fairness’ of the system 
is crucial to success.
28.3 20.9 10.5 22.1 0.278
The evaluation protocol is 
‘fair’.
71 CSFR
03*
52.6 79 100 68.3 0.139
The nature of the 
evaluation protocol 
supports the concept of 
relating funding to 
performance.
72 CSFR
03*
63.2 66.6 50 64.4 0.935
I am aware of the agreed 
distribution method for the 
funding attached to Policy 
Agreements.
78 CSFR
03*
60 47.9 42.1 51.2 0.271
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% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
Sig.
The distribution method for 
Performance Incentive 
Grant (PIG) is ‘fair’.
79 CSFR
03*
48.6 48 71.5 50 0.078
The promised funding will 
‘materialise’.
75 CSFR
04
The promised rewards 
must materialise or 
else the system will be 
self-defeating in terms 
that it will demotivate 
not motivate.
50.9 61.2 62.6 57.8 0.381
Local authorities will 
‘expect’ this funding in the 
future regardless of 
performance.
76 CSFR
04
52.9 63.3 60 54 0.275
The role of the Assembly 
during review sessions has 
been to help local 
authorities constructively 
improve performance.
86 CSFA
01*
Emphasis on 
‘coaching’ and not 
‘policing’.
51 46.1 58.8 49.6 0.547
Most of the discussion 
during the review sessions 
has focused on 
Performance Improvement 
Grant.
85 CSFA
03*
Avoid conflict between 
discussions on 
improving performance 
and gaining the 
promised reward
59.6 43.3 25 48.2 0.077
One of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements is to 
provide discretion for local 
authorities to determine 
where to deploy their 
resources.
89 2 67.8 56.5 81 63.5 0.35
One of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements is to 
minimise the requirements 
on local authorities to 
produce strategies and 
plans.
90 2 36.7 30 70 37.1 0.008 NAW
and
LAOs
Key
Significance tested at the 0.01 level for both ANOVA and post hoc Scheffe
EMs = Elected Members
LAOs= Local Authority officers
NAW= the National Assembly group (AMs and officers)
Q= Question number as per questionnaire 
CSF= Critical Success Factor
%= Percentage of respondents in agreement with the statement
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The following sections contain an analysis by critical success factor (CSF) of 
the data contained in Table 6.4 and Appendix N. (A number of the critical 
success factors relating to this research question are common to research 
question one (marked above with*) the previous analysis is not repeated.)
CSFO08 - The performance management scheme must sit within a 
coherent framework of performance management policies.
Question 17 translates this requirement into the necessity for a clear link
between Policy Agreements and other aspects of Assembly policy relating to
local government. 56% of respondents were either undecided or felt
negatively about this relationship and, there is a considerable spread of
responses around the mean. This suggests some dissonance between Policy
Agreements and the overall context of local government policy. Comments
reflected this result, for example:
“There needs to be a better understanding of the role of PAs vis a vis 
other ‘tools’ of the WAG in driving up performance in key areas of mutual 
concern.” (Appendix J, Local Authority Officers, Quote 3)
“There are too many specific grants and controls which creates the 
perception that NAW officials and (some) AMs do not trust local 
government.” (Appendix I, Elected Members, Quote 10)
Questions 5 and 6 seek to establish links between the Policy Agreement 
process and other performance and finance initiatives. Total responses to 
Question 5 were marginally positive or undecided. The respondents were 
less positive and more undecided in respect of Question 6 and the 
relationship with other aspects of local government finance policy (mean and 
median=4), but once again the mode was 5 with the highest percentage of 
respondents (31.4%) rating this question 5. When the responses are 
considered by respondent group, it is the elected members who seem to be
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the most positive with mean, median and modal scores of 5. The local 
authority officers were more negative: these differences were statistically 
significant in the case of Q6. This may suggest an implementation issue as 
elected members may have perceived a ‘theoretical’ integration at a policy 
level which officers were finding difficult to operationalise at an implementation 
level. This will be further explored in Chapter 7.
CSFS08 - The need for there to be no conflict between the objectives in 
the Agreement and any other organisational objectives.
Responses to Q29 suggest that respondents perceived conflict to be present
between the indicators. There was a spread of responses across the scores
and a significant proportion (58%) responded negatively or were undecided.
The elected member group was more negative about this question (mean,
median and mode= 3) while the local authority officers were more positive
(median and mode=5). The National Assembly group was undecided.
Total responses to Q30 were more negative with a mode of 3. However, a 
significant percentage of respondents (21.9%) answered this question with a 
score of 5 resulting in two peaks. Examination by group indicates that the 
elected members had a mean, median and a mode of 3 suggesting that a 
conflict was strongly perceived by this group.
Finally in this basket, responses to Q31 (phrased negatively) suggest that 
respondents agreed with the statement with a mean, median and mode of 5. 
This suggests some possible negative impacts on performance in areas not 
included in the Policy Agreement process. This provides some evidence to
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support the issues identified from the literature reviews in Chapters 2, 3 and 4
relating to goal displacement and loss of line of sight to the ‘big picture’.
“We should still drive for continuous improvement but the PI and PA 
regime is a blunt instrument for achieving improvement.” (Appendix J, 
Local Authority Officers, Quote 2)
These issues will be further explored in Chapter 8 which considers 
performance against those indicators not included in Policy Agreements 
against those which were.
CSFF03 - Evaluation of performance should be free from social 
pressures.
Question 55 explores this from the perspective of whether or not the 
Assembly Government has been punitive when considering performance 
against targets (negative question). Total responses suggest that there was 
agreement with this statement (mean, median and mode=5). 70.5% of 
respondents agreed, but the ANOVA test suggested there might be a 
difference in opinion between the respondent groups. However, the post-hoc 
Scheffe test indicated that this difference was not statistically significant.
CSFR04 - The promised rewards must materialise or else the system will 
be self-defeating in terms that it will de-motivate not motivate.
Question Q75 responses suggest a positive to undecided response.
Question 76 seeks views as to whether local authorities expect the funding
regardless of performance. This is an important factor, as Expectancy Theory
suggests there should be a strong and clear link between performance and
rewards. Chapter 4 identified that in many systems the reward was expected
regardless of performance and has become ‘normalised’ into an individual’s
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pay. The responses to this question suggest that respondents expected the
funding to be made available, regardless of performance, with the largest
number of respondents scoring 5 in respect of this question. However, in their
qualitative comments a number of respondents indicated that this undermined
the ‘rewards’ process.
“There is considerable scepticism about the funding linked to PAs in 
local government. The message coming from the Assembly is that 
councils will receive the funding whether or not they achieve their 
targets.” (Appendix I, Elected Members, Quote 19)
The rhetoric around PIG may therefore have served to reinforce this aspect of 
financial incentives identified in Chapter 4 and undermined any potentially 
positive motivational impact. This will be further explored in Chapter 7.
Research Question 2 
Objectives of Policy Agreements (Table 6.4 and Appendix N)
Questions 89 and 90 seek respondents’ views on whether objectives of the 
Policy Agreement process are to provide discretion for local authorities to 
determine where to deploy their resources and to minimise the requirement 
for local authorities to produce strategies and plans.
Total responses to Q89 are positive, with 63.5% responding positively. 
Responses to Question 90 are juxtaposed to this, with the majority of 
respondents answering negatively (56% answering 3 or below). It is worth 
noting that a significant number of respondents (24 and 29) scored this 
question as 5 and 6 respectively indicating some disagreement among 
respondents about this objective. However, comments in Appendices I and J 
indicate a perception amongst local authority respondents that Policy
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Agreements are a further tool of top-down control from the Welsh Assembly 
Government.
“Policy Agreements tend, in my opinion, to reflect the views of the 
Assembly and not those of the local authority who may have other 
priorities. Assembly holding the purse strings can therefore influence 
decision making.” (Appendix I, Elected Members, Quote 5)
It is the National Assembly group which is more positive in respect of this 
objective than the other groups with a median and a mode of 5. The other 
groups both scored this question in such a way as to result in a mean and 
median of 3 and a mode of 1 (multiple modes existed for the local authority 
officer group - this is the lowest). Further analysis indicated that the difference 
in the opinion of the NAW group and the local authority officer group was 
statistically significant. Whether these objectives were met, partially met or 
not met will be explored further in Chapter 7 using the interview data.
RESEARCH QUESTION 3
RQ3 Has the Policy Agreement process ‘added value’ to the relationship 
between the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities? ‘Added 
value’ is defined as a greater understanding between the parties and more 
effective communication.
The following table provides a question by question analysis of ‘sub’ research 
question 3, critical success factors and objectives of the Policy Agreement 
process, on the basis of the percentage of respondents agreeing with the 
question.
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TABLE 6.5: RESEARCH QUESTION 3 - PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS BY GROUP AGREEING WITH QUESTION
% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
Sig.
My authority has made 
public its Policy 
Agreement, (e.g. on 
internet, local newsletter 
etc.)
7 CSFO
02
Awareness of 
stakeholders of the 
system (in this case 
defined as including 
members of the public).
86.5 58.9 100 75 0.000 EMs
and
LAOs
My authority has plans to 
publish the results of the 
Policy Agreement in 2004. 
(e.g. on internet, local 
newsletter etc.)
8 CSFO
02
87 72.7 100 82.2 0.005 LAOs
and
NAW
I am aware that the 
Assembly has made 
commitments in the 
Agreements to review 
plans and remove other 
impediments to continuous 
improvement of local 
authority services.
9 CSFO
03
Effective 
communication 
throughout the 
process.
75.9 73.6 69.6 73.8 0.845
I am aware of Assembly 
progress towards meeting 
these commitments.
10 CSFO
03
59 40.6 58.8 48.8 0.115
The nature of the funding in 
the Agreements reflects a 
mature relationship 
between local authorities 
and the National Assembly.
11 CSFO
04
There must be a 
relationship of trust.
44.6 50.6 59.1 49.7 0.969
There is a high level of 
trust between local 
authorities and the National 
Assembly.
12 CSFO
04
43.3 45.2 34.8 43.2 0.961
I was involved in 
discussions in respect of 
setting baselines and 
targets which relate to me.
34 CSFS
04
The need for effective 
communication.
59.3 65.2 50 61.5 0.468
There was effective 
communication between 
authorities and the 
Assembly during the period 
when the baselines and 
targets were set.
35 CSFS
04
46.9 47.4 57.1 48.2 0.745
The purpose of Policy 
Agreements was clearly 
communicated to me.
36 CSFS
04
58.3 80 73.4 71.7 0.003 EMs
and
LAOs
Policy Agreements are a 
way for local authorities 
and the Assembly to work 
together to improve 
services.
58 CSFF
01
There needs to be 
supportive 
management of the 
scheme.
66.6 78.7 95.4 76.7 0.193
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% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVA
Slg.
Scheffe
Sig.
The main role of the 
Assembly, in the context of 
Policy Agreements, is not 
to determine the level of 
financial reward to be paid 
in 2004.
60 CSFF
01
46.1 51.4 56.3 49.9 0.383
I am satisfied with the 
feedback process with my 
officials in respect of 
tracking progress towards 
achieving the Policy 
Agreement targets.
51 CSFF
05
Trust plays an 
important part in the 
effective
implementation and 
operation of the 
systems, especially if 
there is subjectivity 
involved in determining 
whether or not targets 
have been achieved- 
the more complex the 
system the more likely 
there is to be a lack of 
trust.
71.7 71.2 45.5 69.4 0.698
I am content with the 
feedback process with 
other politicians in respect 
of tracking progress 
towards achieving the 
targets.
52 CSFF
05
66.1 55.4 30.8 57.4 0.151
I am content with the 
feedback process with 
representatives from the 
National Assembly in 
respect of tracking 
progress towards achieving 
the targets.
53 CSFF
05
40.7 45.7 35.6 42.9 0.717
The process of appraising 
performance against 
targets in the context of 
Policy Agreements is too 
bureaucratic.
56 CSFF
05
70.7 41.2 20 50 0.001 EMs
and
LAOs
There has been effective 
communication of feedback 
between the Assembly and 
local authorities.
61 CSFF
07
The need for effective 
communication.
46.2 47.3 44.5 46.6 0.887
The Policy Agreement 
process has been handled 
in a positive way by local 
authorities.
80 CSFR
08
Schemes must be 
managed in a positive 
way otherwise they 
become expensive and 
ineffective.
76.4 80.3 15.8 77.6 0.576
The Policy Agreement 
process has been handled 
in a positive way by the 
Assembly.
81 CSFR
08
62.9 75.6 50 72 0.307
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% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVA
sig-
Scheffe
Sig.
There has been effective 
communication between 
the Assembly and local 
authorities at the review 
stage.
87 CSFA
02
There must be good 
communication.
54.9 49.1 53.4 51.9 0.957
One of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements is to 
improve the relationship 
between local authorities 
and the National Assembly 
for Wales.
92 3 59.1 62.9 90.5 64.9 0.031
Key
Significance tested at the 0.01 level for both ANOVA and post hoc Scheffe
EMs = Elected Members
LAOs= Local Authority officers
NAW= the National Assembly group (AMs and officers)
Q= Question number as per questionnaire 
CSF= Critical Success Factor
%= Percentage of respondents in agreement with the statement
The following sections contain an analysis by critical success factor (CSF) of 
the data contained in Table 6.5 and Appendix O.
CSFO02 - Awareness of stakeholders of the system (in this case defined 
as including members of the public).
Questions 7 and 8 were on a ‘Yes’ or 'No' basis as opposed to a scale and 
established the extent to which Policy Agreement information was, or intended 
to be, in the public domain. This relates to the issue of public confidence in 
the system, identified as a potential issue in Chapter 2 where performance 
regimes including targets can become discredited.
Total responses to both questions were positive (75% and 82.2% 
respectively). This suggests that respondents felt awareness of the system by
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stakeholders was important. However, there were some statistically 
significant differences between the groups (Elected members and local 
authority officers for Q7 and local authority officers and NAW for Q8), but 
these difference relate to one group being more positive than another, not a 
difference in perception between groups.
CSFO03 - Effective communication throughout the process.
Questions 9 and 10 were again based on a simple 'Yes’ or ‘No'. The majority 
of respondents (73.8%) were aware that the Assembly had made 
commitments as part of its 'side of the bargain' (i.e. to review plan making 
requirements), but were more vague, with a significant number of blank 
returns, when it came to knowing what progress had been made towards 
meeting these commitments (48.8%). This suggests that effective 
communication in this area was lacking. It is also consistent with the 
responses to Q90, suggesting that poor communication of the commitment 
may be the reason for the negative responses identified above. One 
respondent commented in Appendix J that there had been no communication 
since the signing of the Agreement two years previously.
CSFO04 - There must be a relationship of trust.
Responses to Questions 11 and 12 are in reverse to the mainly positive 
trend to earlier questions. The analysis indicates that the majority of 
respondents (50.3%) were either undecided or disagreed with the premise 
that there is a mature relationship of trust between the Welsh Assembly 
Government and local authorities (although the mode for question 11 is 5).
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The results for Q12 are slightly more negative with only 43.2% of total
respondents agreeing with the statement, however, the mode is again 5.
Appendices I to L also indicate an underlying perception of a lack of trust.
“The Policy Agreement regime is fundamentally at odds with a local 
authority’s wish to determine its own priorities and be accountable to the 
public through the ballot box. The proliferation of specific WAG grants 
and performance rewards conflicts with that basic aim.” (Appendix J, 
Local Authority Officers, Quote 40)
This is at odds with the evidence from Chapter 2 which suggested a more 
‘trusting’ and consensual relationship existed in Wales. These responses may 
indicate that whilst this may be evident at the national level, i.e. WLGA and 
Assembly Government, it does not seem to have permeated to all facets of 
the local level. This will be further explored in Chapter 7.
CSFS04 - The need for effective communication.
Total responses to Q34 suggest the majority of respondents were involved 
(61.5%). However, when this is broken down by respondent group some 
interesting differences emerge. For the local authority officer group and 
elected member groups, the mode response to this question were 7 and 6 
respectively as opposed to the Assembly group where the mode was 1.
Responses to Questions 35 and 36 suggest that respondents were split as to 
whether effective communication took place when the targets and baselines 
were set (with 51.8% replying negatively or undecided). However, only 28.3% 
were undecided or responded negatively to Q36 about the purpose of Policy 
Agreements being clearly communicated. This suggests that communication 
at the very beginning of the process of setting objectives might have been
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more effective than throughout the remainder of this stage in the performance 
management process. This may also partially explain the apparent confusion 
over the role of funding, as Chapter 3 identified that its inclusion and the basis 
of its operation changed at late stages in the development process. The 
ANOVA and post-hoc Scheffe tests indicate there is a statistically significant 
difference between elected members and local authority officers in respect of 
Q36. In this case both groups have responded positively with officers being 
more positive than members.
CSFF01 - There needs to be supportive management of the scheme. 
Questions 58 and 60 relate to managing the potential tension between 
policing the system and using it to support improvement. Responses to Q58 
suggest that 76.7% of total respondents were in agreement with the 
statement. Respondents were less positive in their responses to Q60 with 
only 49.9% of total respondents agreeing with the statement, again perhaps 
suggesting some confusion as to the role of funding in the process and 
underlying tension in the relationship. This issue will be further explored in 
Chapter 7.
CSFF05 - Trust plays an important part in the effective implementation 
and operation of the system, especially if there is subjectivity involved 
in determining whether or not targets have been achieved - the more 
complex the system the more likely that there is a lack of trust.
Responses to both Qs 51 and 52 were positive with only 30.6% of
respondents replying negatively or being undecided in respect of Question 51
and 42.6% responding in the same way to Question 52. Whilst respondents
seemed content with processes within authorities, there seemed to be a lower
level of satisfaction in respect of feedback processes with the Assembly. The
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mean and the median were lower for Q53 but the mode was 5. However, only 
42.9% of respondents were positive about this matter. The National 
Assembly/Welsh Assembly Government group was the most negative in its 
responses (mode=3). This perhaps echoes the earlier comments about lack 
of communication with Assembly officials or the timing of response in that it 
may have been too early for much communication to have taken place. This 
will be further explored in Chapter 7.
Q56 asked respondents to consider whether the process was too 
bureaucratic. The median and the mean for this question are around 4 while 
the mode is 3. The frequency distribution suggests that respondents were 
split on this issue with 50% answering positively. Analysis by respondent 
group indicates some disagreement, with the elected members being 
particularly negative (mode=7) (this is a reverse question), again echoing 
earlier comments, while the local authority officers were undecided (mode=4). 
On the other hand, the National Assembly/Welsh Assembly Government 
group seemed to disagree (mode=3). The difference between elected 
members and local authority officers was statistically significant. The strength 
of feeling amongst local authority respondents, in particular elected members 
is borne out by the qualitative comments in Appendix I. The feelings of 
bureaucracy may also be reflective of the ‘lack of trust’ issues identified by 
responses to Questions 11 and 12. These issues will be further explored in 
Chapter 7.
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CSFF07- The need for effective communication (feedback stage). 
Question 61 is consistent with earlier results; the majority (53.4%) of 
respondents were negative or undecided. Again it may have been too early in 
the process for respondents to have formed a view and so this issue is further 
explored in Chapter 7.
CSFR08 - Schemes must be managed in a positive way otherwise they 
become expensive and ineffective.
Responses to Q80 suggest that respondents felt the process had been 
handled positively by local authorities (mean, median and mode=5). The 
frequency distribution for all respondents shows only 22.4% of respondents 
answering negatively or being undecided. The responses to Q81 are also 
positive (mean, median and mode=5) and the frequency distribution illustrates 
that only 28% of respondents answered this question negatively or were 
undecided. These results suggest that the respondents perceive the process 
has been handled positively by both local authorities and the Assembly 
Government, despite concerns relating to communication, trust, funding and 
overall purpose -  it is almost as if perceptions relate to ‘making the most of a 
bad job’.
CSFA02 - There must be good communication.
The mean for Q87 was 4.33, but both the median and the mode were 5, and 
the frequency distribution suggests respondents were marginally positive with 
51.9% answering positively. Again it may have been too early in the process 
for respondents to have formed a view on this issue, but this is consistent with
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the positivity identified above. The detail of these relationships and 
discussions will be considered in Chapter 7.
Research Question 3
Objectives of Policy Agreements (Table 6.5 and Appendix O)
Question 92 asked respondents whether one of the objectives of the Policy 
Agreement process was to improve the relationship between the Assembly 
and local authorities. Responses were positive with a mean of 4.73 and a 
median and a mode of 5. Chapter 7 will explore whether this objective was 
met, partially met or not met by analysis of the interview data.
RESEARCH QUESTION 4
RQ4 Have Policy Agreements contributed to ‘cohesive’ strategic planning at 
national and local levels? ‘Cohesive’ strategic planning is defined as ‘joined- 
up’ strategic planning between local authorities and the Welsh Assembly 
Government based on shared and agreed priorities.
The following table provides a question by question analysis of ‘sub’ research 
question 4, critical success factors and the objectives of Policy Agreements, 
on the basis of the percentage of respondents agreeing with the question.
TABLE 6.6: RESEARCH QUESTION 4 - PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS BY GROUP AGREEING WITH QUESTION
% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
Sig.
My authority has linked its 
Policy Agreement to the 
development of its 
Community Plan.
1 CSFO
01
Integration of the 
performance 
management system 
within a clear 
organisational strategic 
framework.
93.3 67.2 69.2 77.6 0.000 EMs
and
LAOs
My authority has linked its 
Policy Agreement to the 
development of its 
Improvement Plan.
2 CSFO
01
96.5 86.3 75 88.9 0.001 No
Scheffe
sig
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% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
Sig.
My authority has linked its 
Policy Agreement to the 
development of its own 
strategic plan.
3 CSFO
01
92.8 77.4 93.8 84.7 0.001 EMs
and
LAOs
My authority has linked its 
Policy Agreement to the 
development of its budget 
strategy.
4 CSFO
01
91.1 69.4 73.3 77.3 0.001 EMs
and
LAOs
The indicators are specific 
enough to make it clear 
what is to be aimed for.
24 CSFS
01
Setting a few clear 
objectives which are 
free from ‘noise’.
67.3 60.4 65 63.2 0.576
The achievement of the 
targets can be influenced 
by factors outside the 
control of this authority.
25 CSFS
01
91.4 86.5 85.7 88.1 0.232
The numbers of indicators 
are about right.
28 CSFS
01
44.6 62.7 61.1 56.5 0.044
The targets are demanding 
but achievable.
26 CSFS
02
The need for targets to 
be demanding but 
achievable
76.2 76.6 58.8 74.6 0.352
The agreed targets serve 
to motivate rather than 
demotivate.
27 CSFS
02
67.2 60.8 77.2 64.9 0.524
The objectives in the Policy 
Agreements have been 
framed within a clear 
overall strategic vision for 
Wales.
20 CSFS
03
The need for a clear 
organisational strategic 
framework.
51.8 58.1 47.6 54.7 0.786
There is a clear link 
between the chosen 
indicators in the Agreement 
and my authority’s own 
strategic plan.
21 CSFS
03
71.5 65.5 56.3 66.7 0.18
The Agreements have 
created a link between 
local and national goals.
22 CSFS
03
66.8 72.1 85.8 71.9 0.535
Local authorities played a 
significant part in 
determining the services 
and targets to be included 
in the Agreements.
37 CSFS
05
The need for mutual 
agreed objectives.
45.4 61.1 56.3 54.8 0.683
The Agreements have 
been mutually agreed 
between local authorities 
and the National Assembly.
38 CSFS
05
50.9 74.4 84.2 67.7 0.005 No
Scheffe
sig
The Agreements reflect the 
right balance between local 
and national goals.
23 CSFS
05
51.7 34.5 47.4 41.7 0.193
Managers would have 
been more motivated by 
non-financial incentives 
and rewards in the 
Agreements such as 
greater autonomy etc.
73 CSFR
06
Must recognise that 
different motivators 
may be more effective 
at different times.
58.2 40.2 21.1 44 0.044
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% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
Sig.
Authorities should be able 
to choose a ‘reward 
package’ if Policy 
Agreements enter a 
second phase.
74 CSFR
06
70.6 75.8 47.6 70.5 0.005 EMs
and
NAW
One of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements is to 
generate greater 
coherence between local 
and national priorities.
91 4 68.9 77.1 63.6 76.1 0.048
Key
Significance tested at the 0.01 level for both ANOVA and post hoc Scheffe
EMs = Elected Members
LAOs= Local Authority officers
NAW= the National Assembly group (AMs and officers)
Q= Question number as per questionnaire 
CSF= Critical Success Factor
%= Percentage of respondents in agreement with the statement
The following sections contain an analysis by critical success factor (CSF) of 
the data contained in Table 6.6 and Appendix P.
CSFO01 - Integration of the performance management system within a 
clear organisational strategic framework.
Respondents were positive about Q1 (mean, median and mode=5). The 
frequency table supports this with only 22.4% of respondents answering 
negatively or being undecided. The ANOVA and post hoc Scheffe test 
indicates there is a statistically significant difference between the responses of 
elected members and local authority officers, with members being more 
positive than their officers.
Responses to Q2 were also positive with a mean of 5.76 and a median and 
mode of 6 . The frequency distribution supports this with only 11.1% of
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respondents answering negatively or being undecided. Q3 sought views on 
the level of integration with the authority’s own strategic plan. Responses to 
this question were again very positive with a mean of 5.59 and a median and 
mode of 6 , only 15.3% of respondents responding negatively or being 
undecided. Once again, the elected member group was more positive in its 
responses than the officer group with a mean and a median of 6 and a mode 
of 7. This difference was statistically significant between the elected members 
and their officers.
Finally, Q4 asked respondents to consider the level of integration with the 
authority’s budget strategy. Responses were again positive with a mean of 
5.26 and a median and mode of 6 . The frequency table supports this with 
only 22.7% of respondents answering negatively or being undecided. There 
was a statistically significant difference between local authority members and 
officers with the former being more positive. This set of results contrasts to 
responses relating to integration with local government policy, although as 
previously noted elected members were more positive about this. These 
responses suggest that local authorities were trying to integrate systems 
locally despite perceiving the national system as lacking coherence. It may 
also reflect a level of optimism at earlier stages in the process which evidence 
from Chapter 7 suggests was not played out in practice.
CSFS01 - Setting a few clear objectives which are free from ‘noise’, 
where ‘noise free’ relates to objectives which cannot be influenced by 
external factors.
Q24 asks whether the indicators are specific enough to be clear and whilst the 
mean to this question is 4.61, the median and mode are both 5. The analysis
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indicates that the majority of respondents felt that this was the case with 
63.2% responding positively. Q25 (negative phrasing) had a mean of 5.9 and 
the median and mode were 6 and 7 respectively. The frequencies indicate 
that 88.1% of respondents agreed with this statement. This suggests 
respondents perceived considerable ‘noise’ in the system and supports 
evidence from RQs 1 and 2 (Q45).
However, this is contradictory to evidence in Chapter 7 which suggests that 
authorities deliberately did not involve their partners in the delivery of the 
targets in practice. These responses therefore may reflect a perception, 
rather than a reality. The rhetoric of the Agreements was about working with 
others but, the reality seems to have been that the focus was on achieving the 
targets (and by implication keeping and not sharing the funding) and nothing 
else. This supports evidence from Chapters 2 and 3 that these kinds of 
agreements may undermine partnership working.
For Q28 the mean was 4.57 and the median and mode were 5 and 6 
respectively, suggesting that there was a slight positive skew to the respohses 
in this case, with 56.5% answering positively to the numbers of indicators 
being about right.
CSFS02 - The need for targets to be demanding but achievable.
The mean for Q26 was 4.57 but the median and mode were 5 and 6 
respectively. Only 25.4% of total respondents scored this question negatively 
or were undecided. Q27 invited respondents to agree or disagree with the
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statement that the agreed targets motivate rather than demotivate. The mean 
was 4.68 and both the median and mode were 5. The frequency distribution 
suggests that total respondents were overall positive with only 35.1% 
responding negatively or being undecided.
CSFS03 - The need for a clear organisational framework.
Q20 asked whether Policy Agreement objectives had been clearly framed 
within an overall strategic vision for Wales. The mean for this question was 
4.37 with a median and mode of 5. The result indicates that total respondents 
were still positive but not to the same level as the previous set of questions 
relating to local integration with 45.3% of respondents answering negatively or 
being undecided. This was reflected in interview evidence analysed in 
Chapter 7; national interviewees felt this was the case while local interviewees 
were less positive.
Q21 sought views as to whether a clear link exists between the Policy 
Agreement indicators and the authority’s strategic plan. The mean for this 
question was 4.72 with the median and mode again being 5. Responses were 
slightly more positive than for the previous question with only 33.3% of 
respondents answering negatively or being undecided. Finally, Q22 asked 
respondents to consider whether there was a clear link between local and 
national goals. The mean for this question was 4.92 with the median and 
mode again being 5. Only 28.1% of total respondents answered negatively or 
were undecided about the link. This, however, is at odds with some of the 
comments in Appendices I and J, perhaps suggesting agreement with the
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principle but a failure of operationalisation. The responses to the next basket
of questions support this.
“Policy Agreements tend, in my opinion to reflect the views of the 
Assembly and not those of the local authority who may have other 
priorities. Assembly holding the purse strings can therefore influence 
decision making.” (Appendix I, Elected Members, Quote 5)
CSFS05 - The need for mutually agreed objectives.
Q37 sought the views of respondents as to whether local authorities had 
played a significant part in determining the services and targets to be included 
in the Agreements. The mean for this question was 4.42 while the median 
was 5 and the mode 6 (with 26.4% of respondents scoring 6). However, the 
frequencies show that 45.2% of total respondents answered this question 
negatively or were undecided. Again this perhaps reflects that whilst nationally 
the Agreements were co-designed (see Chapter 3), this did not filter down to a 
local level resulting in a feeling of disenfranchisement. This is supported by 
the interview data in Chapter 7.
Q38 seeks views as to whether the Agreements were mutual between local 
authorities and the Assembly. The mean for this question was 4.89 with a 
median and mode of 5. The frequencies suggest a positive attitude among 
total respondents with only 32.3% of respondents answering negatively or 
being undecided. Therefore, whilst respondents felt less positive about the 
design being mutual, they felt more involved in the process of setting and 
negotiating the targets. This is also supported by the interview data in Chapter 
7.
204
Q23 asked respondents to consider whether the Agreements reflected the 
right balance between local and national goals. The mean for this question 
was 4.08 with a median of 4 and a mode of 5. However, the frequencies for 
this question indicate that the majority of total respondents felt negatively or 
were undecided that this was the case. Whilst 5 was the mode with 23.5% of 
total respondents scoring 5, the next most popular responses were 3 and 4 
with 21.8% scoring them. This perhaps reflects earlier concerns that the 
Agreements tended to be ‘top-down’. So whilst there seems to have been a 
perception of mutuality surrounding the operationalisation of the process as a 
whole, the content and design seem to be perceived as less mutual by local 
authorities.
CSFR06 - Must recognise that different motivators may be more effective 
at different times.
The mean for Q73 was 4.11 with a median of 4 and mode of 5. The results 
for this question (total responses) suggest that whilst the mode was 5 the 
majority of respondents (56%) were either undecided or felt that this was not 
the case. This highlights the possible perceived importance of money as a 
potential motivator but, is at odds with earlier responses indicating that the 
funding would have been better deployed elsewhere and the lack of clear links 
being perceived between effort and performance and performance and 
rewards. This may reflect the position of this question in the questionnaire. 
Earlier questions related to the overall process while this question was located 
in the rewards linked to outcomes section.
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The responses to Q74 provide some contradictory evidence. The mean for 
this question is 5.13 with a median and a mode of 5. The analysis indicates 
that only 29.5% of total respondents were undecided or responded negatively 
to this question. This suggests that, given the choice, authorities might wish 
to receive other kinds of rewards, but perhaps not at the expense of funding. 
There was a statistically significant difference between the elected member 
and the National Assembly/Welsh Assembly Government group, of which only 
47.6% was in favour of this statement.
Research Question 4 
Objectives of Policy Agreements (Table 6.6 and Appendix O)
Question 91 sought views as to whether one of the objectives of Policy 
Agreements was to generate greater coherence between local and national 
priorities. The mean was 5.10 and both the median and mode were 5. The 
frequencies suggest a positive attitude amongst respondents with only 23.9% 
responding negatively or being undecided. The impact of Policy Agreements 
in this regard will be explored in Chapter 7.
Review of Performance Impacts Data 
RESEARCH QUESTION 5
RQs Have Policy Agreements contributed to improved service performance in 
local authorities? Improved service performance is defined as a shift towards 
meeting or exceeding the targets set out in the Policy Agreements.
The following table provides a question by question analysis of ‘sub’ research 
question 5, critical success factors and the objectives of Policy Agreements, 
on the basis of the percentage of respondents agreeing with the question.
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TABLE 6.7: RESEARCH QUESTION 5 - PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS BY GROUP AGREEING WITH QUESTION
% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOS NAW Total ANOVA
sig-
Scheffe
Sig.
The Policy Agreements 
clearly indicate to local 
authorities what is 
expected of them and what 
is on offer in return.
16 CSFO
09
Clear links between 
effort and performance 
and performance and 
rewards.
84.5 66.7 76.2 73.7 0.014
The targets have made the 
link between the effort an 
authority makes and its 
performance clear.
39 CSFS
06
Need for clear links - 
effort and performance 
and performance and 
rewards.
45.9 42.2 55 45.1 0.257
The targets have made the 
link between an authority’s 
performance in terms of 
service delivery and the 
financial reward clear.
40 CSFS
06
66 52.6 47.6 56.6 0.153
None of the data collected 
in measuring performance 
could be subject to 
manipulation.
49 CSFM
03
The data must not be 
capable of 
manipulation.
30.6 23.5 0 22.9 0.108
There is a clear link 
between the effort this 
authority makes towards 
achieving the Policy 
Agreement targets and the 
performance measures in 
the Policy Agreement.
43 CSFM
04
The need for clear links 
between effort and 
performance and 
performance and 
rewards
69.5 56.4 61.1 61.4 0.035
There is a clear link 
between local authority 
performance and the 
amount of funding 
received.
44 CSFM
04
60.7 42.4 31.7 47.4 0.012
The indicators are 
measuring the outcome of 
this authority’s activity, 
rather than that activity 
itself.
48 CSFM
05
The need for indicators 
to measure outcomes 
and not activity.
57.2 54.4 55 55.4 0.386
Ease of measurement was 
not the prime consideration 
in choosing the Policy 
Agreement indicators.
41 CSFM
06
The need for indicators 
to be chosen because 
they are appropriate 
not because they are a 
proxy of what is easy to 
measure.
68.6 72.6 73.7 71.3 0.757
The indicators used are the 
most suitable to measure 
achievement of the 
objectives set out in the 
Policy Agreements.
42 CSFM
06
50 40.7 57.9 45.9 0.025
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% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVASig.
Scheffe
Sig.
Some outcomes are not 
measured by specific 
indicators (e.g. working 
with the voluntary sector) 
but 1 am satisfied that it will 
be possible to measure 
progress against these 
broader themes.
50 CSFM
07
The means of 
assessing subjective 
performance measures 
must be agreed in 
advance.
58.2 44.7 41.2 49 0.369
Other organisations which 
contribute to the 
achievement of targets are 
included in the appraisal 
process.
54 CSFF
04
The need for clear links 
between effort and 
performance and 
performance and 
rewards.
52 36.7 23.1 41.3 0.218
The Policy Agreement 
process has raised 
expectations in terms of 
improved performance 
which can be met.
57 CSFF
04
64.4 62.9 76.2 65.1 0.142
1 know there is funding 
attached to the Policy 
Agreements.
63 CSFR
05
The need for clear links 
between effort and 
performance and 
performance and 
rewards.
88.1 100 95.5 95.4 0.003 EMs
and
LAOs
The attachment of funding 
to the Policy Agreements 
has motivated this authority 
towards achieving the 
targets.
65 CSFR
05
49.1 66.7 65 60.3 0.13
There is a strong link 
between this authority 
achieving the targets and 
receiving the funding.
66 CSFR
05
46.5 59.4 45 51.6 0.112
The attachment of non-ring 
fenced revenue funding to 
the Policy Agreement is 
appropriate.
67 CSFR
05
72 62.5 72.7 67.2 0.714
The funding linked to these 
Agreements is a reward i.e. 
to reward performance 
after the event.
82 CSFR
05
58.2 67 60 68.1 0.137
The funding linked to these 
Agreements is an incentive 
i.e. to stimulate 
performance.
83 CSFR
05
58.2 71.5 80 73 0.504
One of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements is to 
improve local authority 
performance.
93 5 85 93.7 68.2 91.6 0.512
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Key
Significance tested at the 0.01 level for both ANOVA and post hoc Scheffe
EMs = Elected Members
LAOs= Local Authority officers
NAW= the National Assembly group (AMs and officers)
Q= Question number as per questionnaire 
CSF= Critical Success Factor
%= Percentage of respondents in agreement with the statement
The following sections contain an analysis by critical success factor (CSF) of 
the data contained in Table 6.7 and Appendix Q.
CSFO09 - Clear links between effort and performance and performance 
and reward must exist.
The mean response for total respondents for Q16 is 5.12 while the median 
and mode are both 6 . The analysis suggests that the majority of total 
respondents can see how this link is intended to be made in the Policy 
Agreement process with only 26.3% answering this question negatively or 
being undecided. This supports earlier evidence that there was reasonable 
communication at the start of the process.
CSFS06 - The need for clear links between effort and performance and 
performance and reward.
Question 39 seeks views as to whether there is a clear link in the targets 
between effort and performance while Question 40 asks the same in respect 
of the link between performance and rewards. The scores for these questions 
are lower than in the previous section of the questionnaire relating to the 
overall process.
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For Q39 the mean for total responses is 3.99 while the median and mode are 
4 and 5 respectively. The results identify that only 45.1% of respondents 
answered positively. Respondents were therefore more positive about the 
perceived link between performance and rewards. The mean in respect of 
total responses for Q40 was 4.4 while both the median and the mode were 5. 
The frequencies indicate 56.6% of respondents answered positively. These 
results may reflect the perception of having to work with others distorting the 
link between effort and performance, but they conflict with those in the next 
section where the results are reversed. This will be further explored in 
Chapter 7.
CSFM03 - The data must not be capable of manipulation.
Only 22.9% of respondents agreed with Q49 which was negatively phrased. 
The following might provide some explanation:
“The Policy Agreement work has fallen into disrepute as:
- Indicator sets are not well defined
- Because of this they have become too woolly in their application
- The incentive/disincentive of tying them to financial reward/penalty has 
not been fulfilled
- Next steps have to be seen to be real and actioned.”
(Appendix J, Local Authority Officers, Quote 4)
This provides some support for the potential negative effects of performance 
schemes, such as gaming, identified in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
CSFM04 - The need for clear links between effort and performance and 
performance and reward.
The mean for Q43 (total responses) is 4.61 while the median is 5 and mode is 
6. The results here suggest that respondents do see a link between the effort
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put into achieving the targets and the performance measures with only 38.6% 
of respondents answering this question negatively or being undecided.
However, responses to Q44 were less positive with a mean of 3.99 and a 
median and a mode of 4 and 5 respectively. This indicates that the link 
between performance and rewards was perceived to be less clear, therefore, 
in Expectancy Theory terms, calling into question the motivational effect of the 
reward.
Interestingly, these results are more positive as to the link between effort and 
performance than those for similar questions in the setting objectives section 
of the questionnaire. Perhaps the operationalisation of the process highlights 
these links for those participating more than the theoretical objective setting 
stage. However, the reverse seems to be true of the link between 
performance and reward.
CSFM05 - The need for indicators to measure outcomes not activity.
The mean for Q48 is 4.51 for total respondents with a median and mode of 5 
and 6 respectively. The frequencies suggest that respondents were marginally 
positive with 44.6% answering negatively or being undecided.
CSFM06 - The need for indicators to be chosen because they are 
appropriate not because they are a proxy which is easy to measure.
The mean, median and mode for Q41 (total responses) are all 5 suggesting
that respondents felt ease of measurement was not a prime consideration.
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This is supported by the analysis which suggests that only 28.7% of 
respondents disagreed or were undecided about this statement.
However, this was not reflected in the responses to Q42 (mean=3.84, 
median=4 and mode=5). There was more disagreement with the suitability of 
the indicators with 54.2% of respondents disagreeing or being undecided 
about this issue (see earlier quote from Appendix J).
CSFM07 - The means of assessing subjective performance measures 
must be agreed in advance.
Total responses to Q50 suggest that respondents were undecided (mean and 
median=4, mode=5). The frequencies indicate 51% disagreeing or being 
undecided. Chapter 7 identifies that this aspect of Policy Agreements was not 
followed through, arguably a lost opportunity for a wider improvement based 
dialogue which might also have included partners.
CSFF04 - The need for clear links between effort and performance and 
performance and reward.
Only 41.3% of total respondents agreed with Q54. So whilst there was a 
perception of having to work with other organisations to deliver on the targets, 
this was not reflected in progress discussions. This is further explored in 
Chapter 7.
Respondents appear to be optimistic that improved performance would be 
delivered (Q57, 65.1% agree). Evidence from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 suggests 
that targets need to be perceived as achievable, otherwise they may serve to
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de-motivate, and this evidence suggests that there is a degree of optimism 
about achieving the targets.
CSFR05 - The need for clear links between effort and performance and 
performance and reward.
Q63 was a Yes/No question to identify whether the respondent had 
knowledge of the funding, 95.4% of total respondents were aware. There was 
a statistically significant difference between elected members and local 
authority officers, with more awareness amongst the latter than the former, but 
still high awareness in both groups. The mean for Q65 was 4.4 while the 
median and mode were both 5. The frequencies suggest that only 39.7% of 
respondents felt that the funding did not act as a motivator. However, there 
was a large standard deviation of 1.956. This supports earlier evidence as to 
the potential of money as a motivator. (CSFR07, Q64)
Q66 followed on from the previous question and probed the perceived link 
amongst respondents between achieving the targets and receiving the funding 
(it should be noted that the questionnaire was distributed and returned prior to 
the distribution of PIG). The mean was 4.08 with a median and mode of 5. 
The frequencies suggest that, by a small margin, respondents agreed that 
there was a strong link with 48.4% disagreeing or being undecided. The large 
standard deviation of 2.13 is noted, as is the significant number of 
respondents who strongly disagreed with the premise that a strong link 
existed. This is reflected in the comments made by elected members and 
local authority officers in Appendices I and J. Again perhaps reflecting that in
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practice as implementation unfurled, this originally perceived link was 
weakened.
Q67’s mean and the median were 5 with a mode of 6 (multiple modes existed, 
this is the lowest). The frequencies suggest that the majority of respondents 
were in agreement with the premise, with only 32.1% of respondents 
disagreeing with or being undecided. This is an interesting result, as despite 
the apparent confusion over the role of the funding, the majority of 
respondents felt that unhypothecated funding was ‘right’. However, this 
question did not get underneath the skin of whether this was felt to undermine 
the role of funding as a potential motivator, so this will be further explored in 
Chapter 7.
The mean for Q82 for total respondents was 4.69 with a median and mode of 
5. The analysis suggests that only 31.9% of respondents disagreed that the 
funding was a reward. The mean for Q83 is 4.93 while the median and mode 
are both 5. The frequencies suggest that only 27% of total respondents 
disagreed or were undecided that the funding was an incentive. The role of 
PIG will be further explored in Chapter 7.
Research Question 5
Objectives of Policy Agreements (Table 6.7 and Appendix O)
Question 93 sought views as to whether one of the objectives of Policy 
Agreements was to improve local authority performance. The mean was 5 
(total respondents) with a median and mode of 6. The results suggest that 
total respondents felt very positively with only 8.4% disagreeing or being
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undecided. The actual impact of Policy Agreements on service performance
will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
RESEARCH QUESTION 6
RQe Have Policy Agreements provided ‘value for money’? ‘Value for money’ is 
defined as increased efficiency in service delivery outweighing the ‘costs’ of 
Policy Agreements where cost equals Performance Incentive Grant plus 
administration costs.
The following table provides a question by question analysis of ‘sub’ research 
question 6 , critical success factors and objectives of Policy Agreements, on 
the basis of the percentage of respondents agreeing with the question.
TABLE 6.8: RESEARCH QUESTION 6 - PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS BY GROUP AGREEING WITH QUESTION
% % % %
Question Narrative Q CSF CSF Explanation EMs LAOs NAW Total ANOVA
Sig.
Scheffe
Sig.
The existence of Policy 
Agreements will help to 
demonstrate to 
stakeholders that local 
authorities are providing 
value for money.
15 CSFO
07
The overall cost of the 
system (including 
administration) must be 
perceived as 
proportionate to the 
benefits.
68.4 49.6 57.1 56.9 0.001 EMs
and
LAOs
The cost of collecting 
information to measure 
progress towards targets 
does not outweigh the 
benefits it provides.
47 CSFM
02
The costs involved in 
data collection must be 
reasonable
41.4 55.8 68.5 52.3 0.005 No
Scheffe
sig
The cost of monitoring the 
Policy Agreements does 
not outweigh the potential 
benefits.
62 CSFF
06
The administrative cost 
of the system should 
be minimised.
50 63.9 57.9 58 0.056
The cost of the process, 
including the available 
funding, is in proportion to 
the benefits.
77 CSFR
01
The overall cost of the 
system.
32.7 50.7 66.7 45.9 0.046
There has been adequate 
consideration of the Policy 
Agreement process as a 
whole when reviewing 
targets and baselines.
84 CSFA
04
Important at this stage 
to reflect on the 
process as a whole not 
just the agreed 
indicators and targets.
64.9 46.3 11.8 49 0.004 EMs
and
NAW
One of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements is to 
provide ‘top-up’ funding to 
local authorities.
95 6 50.8 44.8 26.3 44.7 0.009 No
Scheffe
Sig
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Key
Significance tested at the 0.01 level for both ANOVA and post hoc Scheffe
EMs = Elected Members
LAOs= Local Authority officers
NAW= the National Assembly group (AMs and officers)
Q= Question number as per questionnaire 
CSF= Critical Success Factor
%= Percentage of respondents in agreement with the statement
The following sections contain an analysis by critical success factor (CSF) of 
the data contained in Table 6.8 and Appendix R.
CSFO07 - The overall cost of the system (including administration) must 
be perceived as proportionate to the benefits.
Question 15 asked respondents to assess whether the Policy Agreement 
process would help to demonstrate value for money to stakeholders. The 
mean was 4.43 with median and mode of 5. The results suggest that 
responses were positive with 43.1% responding negatively or undecided. 
However, there was a statistically significant difference between the opinion of 
elected members and their officers with the former being positive and the 
latter negative. This perhaps reflected the more detailed involvement of local 
authority officers in the process (see Chapter 7).
CSFM02 - The costs involved in data collection must be ‘reasonable’. 
Question 47 sought the views of respondents as to whether the costs of 
collecting data to assess performance did not outweigh the benefits of the 
Agreements. The mean was 4.41 and both the median and mode were 5.
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CSFF06 - The administrative cost of the system should be minimised. 
Question 62 sought views as to whether the costs of monitoring the system 
do not outweigh the benefits. The mean was 4.62 with a median of 5 and a 
mode of 6 . The analysis suggests that total respondents were slightly more 
positive about this aspect with 58% responding positively.
CSFR01 - The overall cost of the system should not outweigh the 
potential benefits.
Question 77 looks at value for money by seeking the views of respondents as 
to whether the cost of the process, including the funding, is in proportion to the 
benefits. The mean for this question is 4.24 with a median and mode of 4. 
The results show only 45.9% of respondents answered positively. This 
distribution of responses perhaps reflects the earlier scepticism around 
whether the promised rewards would materialise, the significance of the 
funding in terms of amount, and the timing of the distribution of the 
questionnaire prior to the completion of the whole process. It also reflects the 
qualitative comments made by local authority elected members in Appendix I. 
So, whilst the cost of collecting data might have been perceived as 
‘reasonable’ when funding was added to the equation, this tipped the balance 
of perception the other way. This may seem perverse but may reflect the 
value placed on the process and discussions (see Q14 and Chapter 7). It 
may also reflect the emerging sense of confusion as to the role and 
application of funding within the process.
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CSFA04 - Important at this stage to reflect on the process as a whole not 
just the agreed indicators and targets.
Question 84 asks respondents whether there has been adequate 
consideration of the whole process throughout. The mean is 4.21 with a 
median of 4 and a mode of 5. However, despite a mode of 5, the frequency 
distribution shows that, overall, the majority of total respondents (51%) are 
negative or undecided. There was a statistically significant difference 
between the elected member groups and the National Assembly/Welsh 
Assembly Government group. The former being positive in their responses 
and the latter negative. This perhaps reflects earlier concerns relating to 
communication, integration of the process with other policies and perception 
of design having a ‘top-down’ tinge. It may also reflect the timing of the 
distribution of the questionnaires and so this aspect will be further considered 
in Chapter 7.
Research Question 6 
Objectives of Policy Agreements (Table 6.8 and Appendix R)
The dependent variable in this case is value for money. Question 95 sought 
the views of respondents as to whether one of the objectives of Policy 
Agreements was to provide ‘top-up’ funding to local authorities. This is a 
negatively phrased question - agreement implies that Performance Incentive 
Grant is ‘top-up’ funding then it is not therefore directly related to improving 
performance standards or increasing efficiency.
The mean for this question was 4.03 with a median of 4 and a mode of 5. The 
frequency table suggests that the majority of respondents (55.3%) were either
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undecided or responded negatively to this question, suggesting that despite 
concerns they felt there should be more to the process than just a vehicle to 
provide additional funding to local authorities. The ‘actual’ value for money of 
the process will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Conclusions
This Chapter has calculated and reviewed the descriptive statistics relating to 
total responses to each question on the Policy Agreement questionnaire (sub­
divided into six research questions). It has also considered and identified 
statistically significant differences in the opinions between respondent groups. 
This initial analysis suggests that respondents have perceived many of the 
critical success factors, identified from the literature in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 to 
be present in the Policy Agreement process.
In respect of the first research question, creating a culture of self- 
improvement, the responses indicate that this is perceived as an objective for 
Policy Agreements. Aspects of this objective relating to focusing on local 
authority outcomes and self-improvement were strongly supported by 
respondents. However, the aspect relating to the removal of the requirement 
for inspection and regulation was not, perhaps because some external 
stimulus was felt to be important.
In terms of the critical success factors, the funding related to the Agreements 
caused some debate, but overall the process was felt to have added value to 
the relationship between the Assembly Government and local authorities, with
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the majority agreeing that the process was as important as the funding. 
However, there seemed to be some emerging confusion over the role of the 
funding and some evidence to suggest that unhypothecated funding, allocated 
on ‘best endeavours’ might be the worst of all worlds.
Respondents also strongly supported the premise that local authorities had 
been able to choose how to achieve delivery of the targets in the Agreements. 
Some evidence presented itself in respect of the public service ethos, where a 
sizeable number of respondents felt that they would have worked towards 
achieving the targets without the attachment of funding -  however, a larger 
number felt that the funding should have been specifically attached to the 
targets. A slim majority felt that the funding was significant. Overall, most 
respondents perceived the process as ‘fair’, but responses to other questions 
indicated a level of suspicion that Policy Agreements were bordering on a 
‘top-down’ approach to performance management.
In terms of the second research question relating to changing culture in the 
Welsh Assembly Government, the respondents were concerned that Policy 
Agreements were not clearly articulated in the context of national local 
government policy, there was more positivity about local government 
performance policy, but less about local government finance policy.
Elected members were more positive than their officers, suggesting a 
‘theoretical’ fit at policy level but dissonance at the implementation level. This 
highlights some issues about policy integration in theory versus policy
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integration in practice and the need for policy makers to understand both. As 
respondents were having some difficulty in ‘making sense’ of Policy 
Agreements in the national context, this might explain the cautious responses 
to other questions relating to trust and whether the promised funding would 
materialise.
In terms of the objectives, there was agreement that one of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements was to allow local authorities discretion over the 
deployment of resources, but not in the case of minimising requirements in 
respect of the production of strategies and plans. This was despite a high 
awareness amongst respondents of this commitment being made (see 
Question 9) by the Assembly Government.
In respect of research question 3, adding value to the relationship between 
the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities, there were some very 
positive results relating to communication of purpose, working together to 
improve services, and the positive handling of the process by both the 
Assembly Government and local authorities. This suggests that despite 
concerns over integration and ‘top-down’ design, some officers were 
endeavouring to ‘make the most of it’ and valued the process for itself. This 
will be further explored in Chapter 7. However, this must be set in the context 
of the results relating to trust which were not so positive. There are maybe 
two issues here - it cannot be assumed that the ‘good’ relationship’ identified 
in Chapter 2 at a national level permeates to all levels of the system and, it 
seems possible for officers to have positive relationships and still perceive
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overall that the central-local relationship lacks trust. This will be explored 
further in Chapter 7, in particular its relationship to any perceived 
disjointedness of the Welsh Assembly Government.
Results relating to communication at the feedback and review stages were 
less positive, suggesting that some attention should be paid to this part of the 
process -  especially as evidence from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 suggests these 
could be the most sensitive and subjective stages of the process. This may 
also reflect the timing of the questionnaire and will be further explored in 
Chapter 7. There was agreement that one of the objectives of Policy 
Agreements was to improve the central-local relationship.
The results for research question 4, ‘joining-up’ between the Assembly 
Government and local authorities showed some positive results in respect of 
local joining-up with issues such as the community plan, but not such positive 
results in terms of being framed in a clear strategic vision for Wales. The 
former results are at odds with interview data (see Chapter 7) suggesting 
perhaps an optimism that this would be achieved which was not borne out in 
practice.
However, there was strong support for the premise that Policy Agreements 
had created a link between local and national goals and that they had been 
mutually agreed. But despite this there was concern that the Agreements did 
not reflect the right balance between local and national goals. There was a 
high level of agreement that one of the objectives of Policy Agreements was
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to generate greater coherence between local and national priorities. These 
results suggest a desire for a mechanism for integration but that Policy 
Agreements may not have delivered this in practice. This may reflect that 
whilst targets were mutually agreed, the Agreements themselves were co­
designed nationally, with limited consultation (see Chapter 3), resulting in local 
officers feeling disenfranchised. This will be further considered in Chapter 7.
Moving on to the performance impact related research questions, these initial 
results suggest that some of the elements of Expectancy Theory were being 
achieved by the Policy Agreement framework, in that links were being 
perceived between effort and performance, although these seem to have 
been clouded by concerns over the involvement of other organisations and, 
performance and reward. The latter however seems more illusive. It also 
seems that the implementation process may have reinforced the perceived 
links between effort and performance whilst weakening those between 
performance and reward.
There were mixed messages as to the role of funding in the process. The 
funding attached to the Agreements seems to be perceived as a motivating 
factor and as just about significant, yet responses also indicate the presence 
of a public service ethos of working to improve services where no reward is 
attached. The funding was perceived as both an incentive and a reward, and 
there was some support for being able to choose a package of rewards as per 
goal setting theory (Q74). The result that respondents did not agree that one 
of the objectives of Policy Agreements was to provide local authorities with
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‘top-up’ funding suggests that they did perceive them as having broader 
objectives.
This may mean that the compromise of unhypothecated funding, allocated on 
the basis of ‘best endeavours’ could be the worst of all worlds, as respondents 
seem unsure as to its purpose. The targets in the Agreements were perceived 
as motivating (Q26) -  therefore, the presence of funding may not have added 
anything other than confusion and complexity. However, it was identified in 
Chapter 3 that some authorities would not have signed up to the Agreements 
if it were not for the funding.
The next Chapter will explore these perceptions in greater detail by means of 
semi-structured interviews with key participants in the Policy Agreement 
process. It will be particularly interesting, in light of the mixed messages 
identified in this Chapter, to explore the role of Performance Incentive Grant in 
the process. Also, this Chapter has identified a level of agreement as to the 
objectives of Policy Agreements and their potential role in meshing local and 
national priorities and activities, but some disillusionment over the 
operationalisation of the process. The interviews conducted after completion 
of the Agreements will provide the opportunity to explore this in more detail, 
generate new evidence as to the effectiveness of the implementation of the 
process and whether the objectives were met.
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CHAPTER 7
ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW DATA 
Introduction
In the previous chapter data from the postal questionnaires returned in the 
summer of 2003 was analysed. Chapter 5 identified that this meant 
respondents were unable to provide their perceptions on whether Policy 
Agreements had achieved their objectives, either in terms of cultural change 
or service performance, as this was before the end of the Agreement period.
Instead, the questionnaire asked respondents to give their views on the 
objectives of Policy Agreements which were identified from a review of 
relevant documentation and observation of a series of Policy Agreement 
review meetings described and analysed in Chapter 3. This represented the 
smaller proportion of the questionnaire (9 questions -  Appendix D, Questions 
88 to 96) whilst in the larger section of the questionnaire (87 questions -  
Appendix D, Questions 1 to 87) respondents were asked to give their views 
on whether or not critical success factors identified from the literature reviews 
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 were present in the design and implementation of the 
Policy Agreement process.
The responses established that respondents agreed the objectives of Policy 
Agreements were multi-faceted i.e. that they had both performance and 
culture change intentions. This was not intended as a proxy for establishing 
the outcome of the policy as clearly this does not establish either service 
performance or cultural change impact. Hence this chapter analyses data
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from interviews (January to March 2009) which were designed to enable 
interviewees to give their views on the perceived impact of Policy Agreements 
in relation to the established objectives (i.e. interviewees were asked to give 
their views on whether the objectives of Policy Agreements had been 
achieved -  e.g. ‘Did Policy Agreements focus on local authority results and 
outcomes rather than inputs?’- see Appendix T), and to triangulate findings 
and further explore issues raised by the analysis of the questionnaire data 
relating to the critical success factors of implementation. They were also 
designed to enable the collection of evidence as to the robustness of 
governmental assumptions that the principles of individual PRP schemes can 
be applied at an organisational level (Boyne and Chen, 2006; Reiter et al, 
2006). Further evidence on the impact of Policy Agreements on actual 
performance is provided in Chapter 8.
Another reason for complementing the questionnaires with a series of 
interviews is to provide evidence on the detailed nature of the implementation 
process which could not be collected using a structured questionnaire. The 
policy evaluation (Lewis, 2001; Davies, 1999) and other academic literature 
(Drakeford, 2006; Jeffery, 2006) suggests that an understanding of how a 
policy was implemented is important to the evaluation of its impact, indeed 
evaluation suggests that its impact may not be fully understood without 
consideration of the ‘how’, which includes an understanding of the human 
interactions within the system (Sullivan, 2008).
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In the case of Policy Agreements, both process outcomes and performance 
impacts have been identified as desirable objectives (see Chapters 3, 5 and 
6). Therefore, as noted above, this analysis will explore the extent to which 
interviewees perceive the objectives have been met i.e. impact and actual 
performance, and consider not only whether the targets motivated in their 
achievement or otherwise, but also whether the inclusion of funding has 
provided ‘additional’ motivation in the way in which PRP schemes are 
intended to by emphasising links between effort and performance and 
performance and reward. This will be tackled by triangulating key 
questionnaire data identified in Chapter 6, relating to the design and 
implementation critical success factors, with the perceptions of the 
interviewees.
Evidence from Chapter 6 suggests the assumption which has been made by 
governments in designing these schemes (Reiter et al, 2006) that these 
concepts are transferable to an organisational level in the public service may 
have some grounding in principle but, that the implementation in this case 
seems to have ‘clouded the water’ and caused complexity and confusion. 
This analysis of the interview data in this chapter will further explore these 
issues.
Chapter 5 noted the time elapsed between the end of the Policy Agreement 
period and the interviews. To mitigate this each interview commenced with a 
process of scene setting and it was noted that each interviewee had good 
recall of the process and events. An advantage of the time elapse was that it
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enabled interviewees to take a more objective position and facilitated 
reflection on and comparison with the second round of the Agreements 
(2004/05 to 2006/07). These reflections will be referred to as appropriate 
during the following analysis (see Appendix T for the interview questions).
Throughout the chapter comparisons are made between the interview and 
questionnaire responses, in some cases there are contrasting views. This 
may be explained by the following:
I. The difference in timing between the survey and the interviews i.e. the 
survey was undertaken before the end of the process while the 
interviews were undertaken five years after the process had concluded. 
Perceptions may have changed in light of the completion of the 
process as new information became available to the interviewees on its 
final impact.
II. The survey results represent a snapshot in time, whereas the interview 
responses reflect the totality of the interviewees’ experience of the 
Policy Agreement process which as noted earlier includes the benefit 
of several years hindsight.
III. The survey results refer to all respondents while the interview data 
relates to a particular grouping of officers who had the most detailed 
and constant involvement with Policy Agreements (see Chapter 5). 
Chapter 6 identifies that there were on occasions statistically significant 
differences between the questionnaire respondent groups.
IV. It is possible for an interviewee to agree, for example, that one of the 
objectives of Policy Agreements was to focus on local authority 
outcomes rather than inputs but not to perceive that this was achieved.
Where differences in perception are identified in the following analysis of the 
interview data, efforts will be made to explain the possible rationale based on 
the above. The analysis is undertaken on the basis of the key themes 
identified in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
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Analysis of Interview Data 
Rationality and Ethics
In relation to the influence of the political context on the design and 
implementation of Policy Agreements, Interviewee J stated “the political 
decision to have a protocol based on best endeavours meant that local 
authorities’ own pride drove the improvement but there was no incentive to 
maximise this improvement”. Interviewees noted that the ‘best endeavours’ 
clause was negotiated at a political level between the Welsh Assembly 
Government and the WLGA and was perceived as a political bi-product of its 
time in that ‘best endeavours’ was about fostering relationships, being fair and 
equitable, being trusting not hard-edged.
This was also embodied in the ‘non-involvement’ of any inspectorates or the 
Audit Commission in Wales in the process. Nonetheless, there was a feeling 
amongst interviewees that this had whipped the rug out from underneath the 
progress discussions and meant they lacked ‘bite’. This implementation failure 
also seemed to have created a poor impression from which the second round 
of Policy Agreements did not escape. Despite the inclusion of local indicators, 
a slightly more rigorous evaluation protocol and an increase in funding, the 
stigma of the first round was carried forward.
Interviewee H described the funding element as the “politicians’ dilemma” -  
some local authorities may have bad managers which resulted in bad 
services, how would not giving them funding help this situation? Chapter 2 
identified equity was an important principle in the Welsh system and Chapter
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3 noted the agreed distribution method for PIG was SSA or ‘need’, therefore 
not allocating the funding on the basis of performance presented the 
politicians with a moral dilemma. How appropriate was it to withhold a needs 
based funding allocation on the basis of the competency of the organisation’s 
managers? Interviewee F described this as Policy Agreements being 
constrained by the relationship between funding and performance.
This highlights the importance of considering context in the design of inter- 
organisational performance agreements in the public sector. Chapter 2 
identified the apparent prevailing mood of the Welsh central-local relationship 
was closeness, equity and trust and, when it came down to implementing a 
‘hard-edged’ pay-for-performance agreement, whilst earlier chapters noted 
trust as a critical success factor, in the case of Policy Agreements when 
combined with closeness and equity it seems to have operated in reverse, 
politically mitigating against the ‘full blown’ operationalisation of a pay-for- 
performance scheme.
Interviewee A noted that in Wales, unlike England, it was not possible to 
identify where good managers were making a difference to service delivery as 
no comparative performance information was published. This seemed to be a 
factor undermining professional pride in doing a good job. However, given the 
contradictions inherent in the politicians’ dilemma, there remains a question 
mark as to whether an organisational pay-for-performance scheme is the 
most appropriate method of rewarding managers for delivering good service 
performance. Perhaps other mechanisms should exist for supporting
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improved performance and dealing with managers not contributing effectively 
to this, rather than the withholding of needs based funding.
Interviewees with knowledge of the development of the equivalent English 
system felt the Welsh approach was very different and ‘design’ appropriate for 
Wales. This was because of the scale and nature of the Welsh central-local 
relationship. There were confessions about being “glad to come home to 
Wales” (Interviewee G) and of the fact that the Welsh approach was focusing 
on dialogue. The English system was perceived as “very top-down, 
mechanistic and questionable in terms of delivering systemic change” 
(Interviewee G). However, Interviewee A who had personal experience of the 
English system at a local level liked the rigour which it demanded and the 
public transparency it fostered over performance, commenting “the Welsh 
case sounded compelling but my experience is that it is not credible”.
As another interviewee suggested, it was “mutually beneficial to be different to 
England as it helped Ministers demonstrate policy divergence and local 
government remained comfortable and unchallenged” (Interviewee J). Others 
reinforced this by describing a prevailing principle for the development of 
Welsh policy at the time as being “it had to be different to England” 
(Interviewee F) and “distinctiveness was an essential political requirement, 
both locally and nationally” (Interviewee H). This supports evidence in 
Chapters 2 and 3 about the divergence of policy between the two countries in 
this area and the reasons for it. However, this seems to have resulted in a 
number of design flaws and, perhaps unintentional, operationalisation failures
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such as an absence of citizen focus (see later) as a consequence of the 
vagaries of the implementation process.
There were mixed responses from interviewees as to whether Policy 
Agreements felt like a performance related pay scheme. One commented 
“expectation was that it would be but the nature of the relationship between 
the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities prevented it” 
(Interviewee J). This reflects earlier comments on the ‘politicians’ dilemma’ 
and the difficulties, perhaps exacerbated in a small country with devolved 
government, of being seen to penalise citizens in an area for the potential 
incompetence or recalcitrance of their council managers.
It also again reflects the nature of the relationship identified in Chapter 2 
between the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities. This was 
identified as being ‘close’, reliant on personal relationships and more mutual 
than the relationship in England. The reality of the situation seems to be that 
in PRP terms discussed in Chapter 4, ‘social pressures’ weighed in and 
prevented the operation of the scheme in the way in which it was originally 
intended. Pressures of context prevailed and a ‘full blown’ PRP scheme was 
rejected on political grounds in practice, even though it had been 
conceptualised and advertised as such. The analysis below shows that in 
some areas this was of limited significance and motivation came from 
participation in the target setting process and a drive for self-improvement but 
in others it added complexity and blurred the purpose of the Agreements.
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Target Setting
Reflecting concerns expressed by the questionnaire respondents (Q42, Table 
6.7), interviewees expressed concern over the performance indicators being 
process based and not outcome focussed, although some also recognised 
that this was a limitation of the performance management system at the time 
and that without Policy Agreements, performance management systems in 
some of the service areas would have taken much longer to develop. This 
latter point supports evidence in Chapters 2 and 3 relating to the quality and 
nature of performance management systems at the beginning of the Best 
Value regime and the development of LPSAs and LAAs.
There was agreement that authorities had been able to determine their own 
route to achieving the agreed targets, thus in Expectancy Theory terms a link 
was being made between effort and performance, but local authority 
respondents felt that this was only a part of the picture. They perceived the 
indicators as being national priorities, chosen nationally and imposed. 
Therefore, whilst welcoming the opportunity to choose how to achieve the 
targets, interviewees considered this was undermined by the prevailing 
question of whether these were the right issues on which to be focussing 
locally, hence the development of an initial lack of commitment to the process. 
A number felt that this meant the Policy Agreements lacked the ability to 
provide serious local direction for improvement and may explain other 
comments about their incompatibility with the Wales Programme for 
Improvement with its focus on self-evaluation as a driver for continuous 
improvement.
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The strength of feeling at the lack of local indicators is reflected in the 
questionnaire responses with only 41.7% of respondents feeling they reflected 
the right balance between local and national priorities (Q23), despite agreeing 
(71.9%) that Policy Agreements had created a link between local and national 
goals. There seems to be a perception that Policy Agreements could have 
been the right vehicle to create an alignment between the local and the 
national but, the implementation was found to be wanting.
However, interviewees noted that where local indicators had been included in 
the second round this had not made a significant impression upon the level of 
local enthusiasm and commitment to the process, even though the amount of 
funding was increased. They suggested that this was because the 
implementation process did not change and the poor perceptions from the first 
round were carried over into the second.
In response to the question whether Policy Agreements were framed within a 
clear overall strategic vision for Wales, the majority of interviewees felt they 
were in the sense that the ‘baskets’ were aligned with ‘Wales: A Better 
Country’ (National Assembly for Wales, 2002) and national interviewees felt 
that Policy Agreements were part of a coherent approach based on 
developing trust and streamlining the central-local ‘toolbox’. However, local 
interviewees felt this coherence was superficial due to a lack of alignment of 
Policy Agreements with other planning cycles, the individualistic behaviour of 
Welsh Assembly Government departments and Ministers, and the failure to 
develop strategic outcomes.
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There was marginal agreement amongst questionnaire respondents (54.7%) 
on this point, and this response seems to be explained by the interview data. 
This was identified as a critical success factor in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and is 
perhaps a missed opportunity of implementation, as there seemed to be 
appetite and support for alignment and coherence but a failure of 
operationalisation.
In terms of the design, 76.1% of questionnaire respondents felt that an 
objective of Policy Agreements was to generate greater coherence between 
local and national priorities. Interviewees felt that there had been some 
positive impacts related to this objective manifested in the Policy Agreement 
implementation process, as there was recognition that the local contribution to 
delivery of national priorities was essential. However, others felt that this 
perceived mismatch was always overstated and, that in reality, there was 
significant alignment of local and national priorities.
However, other interviewees felt because the priorities were entirely national 
the Agreements’ contribution was towards building a coherent performance 
framework rather than creating coherence between priorities. The differing 
levels of enthusiasm between local authorities in the implementation was also 
mentioned as a limiting factor in creating coherence as the ‘change of 
behaviours’ was patchy.
Interviewee H felt that Policy Agreements were “born in a cupboard in Local 
Government Policy Division” and their impact was rather less about 
coherence than driving specific improvements. This was compared to the
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‘accidental’ effect of ‘Wales: A Better Country’ (National Assembly for Wales, 
2002) in providing a framework for the development of the first round of local 
community plans. Others felt that whilst the Agreements had not created 
coherence they had provided clarity and mutual understanding on national 
priorities.
These responses may be linked to those relating to whether there was a clear 
link between Assembly Government policy as articulated through Policy 
Agreements and other aspects of Assembly policy in respect of local 
government. Only 44% of questionnaire respondents felt that this was the 
case and this was borne out by the responses given by the interviewees. 
There was a feeling amongst the interviewees (as with the questionnaire 
respondents) that some links were being made in the area of local 
government policy per se but in relation to wider areas such as education 
these links were weak or absent. For example, Interviewee H commented 
“service departments went off and did their own thing”.
In terms of linking with local plans, despite 77.6% of questionnaire 
respondents stating that authorities had linked Policy Agreements to the 
development of their community plan, there were mixed responses amongst 
the interviewees. Some perceived them as ‘apples and pears’, one about 
holistic well-being, the other about specific improvements (Interviewee C), 
while others saw framing the specific improvements within the ‘bigger picture’ 
of the community strategy as vitally important to keep coherence and 
alignment with the pursuit of that same bigger picture (Interviewee D).
236
However, other authorities who took the Agreements seriously did not make 
the link to community strategies because “at the time they were woolly” 
(Interviewee E) and saw the Agreements as a contributory factor to kick 
starting their organisation’s performance management culture, rather than as 
a significant means of demonstrating progress on delivering outcomes with 
partners. The treatment of PIG may also have been a contributory factor (see 
later). This is interesting as Chapters 2, 3 and 4 suggest that one of the 
critical success factors for performance management tools is integration and 
coherence with other tools and corporate policies. These results suggest this 
could be dependent on context rather than a universal tenet.
Questionnaire respondents were slightly sceptical that there had been 
adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement process as a whole when 
reviewing targets and baselines (Q84, 49%). Interviewees felt that at a local 
level the focus had been on reviewing the targets and progress against them 
and, resentment about the inability to drop targets which they felt were not 
relevant came through again in responses to this question. Likewise, concern 
about the process of review being bureaucratic in the sense of limited to 
discussion about numbers, low level and lessons not being pulled together at 
an all-Wales level were expressed. At a national level, respondents felt there 
had been some efforts to review the overall process, further signs perhaps of 
a disconnect in perceptions and a breaking down of communication.
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Undesirable Effects
Interviewee J described a “focus on performance” rather than outcomes 
because all of the indicators were process or output focussed. Reflecting one 
of the limitations of target driven performance management schemes 
identified in Chapter 2, this was further described as a focus on outputs 
leading to possible perverse incentives and a lack of focus on the ‘big picture’. 
This was balanced by local authority interviewees feeling the information 
needed for the Policy Agreements should have been collected anyway and, it 
was ‘a good thing’ Policy Agreements forced the development of information 
systems in some areas such as social services.
However, interviewees felt “conversations were about the internal 
management of services rather than a focus on making things better for 
citizens” (Interviewee J), reflecting a difficulty in connecting the process with a 
key aspect of the public service reform programme, that of becoming ‘citizen- 
centred’. Policy Agreements included no satisfaction or perception indicators 
or other qualitative measures of ‘citizen-focus’, thus the discussions had a 
technical, narrow focus as opposed to a citizen one, “we rarely mentioned 
service users” (Interviewee J). This supports evidence from Chapter 2 that 
managing by targets can create vertical accountability to Ministers at the 
expense of accountability to citizens.
Interviewee D felt that because the indicators were national and PIG 
unhypothecated, local authorities had to skew resources away from pursuing 
local priorities to meet the targets and maximise the opportunity of being
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awarded PIG. “Backdoor hypothecation” seemed to generate a feeling of 
resentment and further exacerbated the narrow focus of Policy Agreements 
and the scope for perverse incentives. These responses reflect questionnaire 
returns suggesting that Policy Agreements may have resulted in a distortion of 
local priorities (Questions 29, 30 and 31).
However, others felt that Policy Agreements were so marginal that they had 
not affected local authority budgets in any way and, the lack of direction 
meant “we were only playing at performance management, it impinged 
relatively little on my life. Once a year I would send a return in and have a 
chat with someone from Local Government Policy” (Interviewee F). Another 
ironically identified how this had resulted in a “non-bureaucratic process which 
created a bureaucracy” (Interviewee J).
Interviewee D commented that the marginal and short term nature of the grant 
further reinforced the marginal nature of the Agreements because the funding 
was not enough to enable radical innovation and change and, was therefore 
used to ‘prop up’ existing budgets. This reflects evidence from the 
implementation of LPSAs and LAAs in Chapter 3.
In light of this, interviewees suggested the focus on outputs and getting the 
funding had meant “playing around with what we could achieve as opposed 
to what we should be achieving” and “playing a game to get the funding” 
(Interviewee F). In addition, lack of integration with the WPI meant they were 
not an impetus for continuous improvement. Interviewees also noted a lack of
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political ownership, both nationally and locally which meant the Agreements 
were marginalised and that the ambition to have a performance system 
owned by relevant managers was not realised. The lack of national political 
commitment was also blamed for a lack of cross-departmental integration in 
the Assembly Government.
There was a perception amongst questionnaire respondents that the 
performance indicator data could be subject to manipulation (Q49 - 77.1%) 
and when combined with the signs of ‘game playing’ suggested by the 
interviewees not only was the potential contribution of Policy Agreements to 
the desired process outcomes and performance impacts limited but, when 
combined with the unwillingness to be ambitious and involve partners 
because of a fear of losing the money (see below), it exposes some serious 
and difficult challenges for policy makers. It appears that once funding is 
attached to an agreement there is a tendency for it to become “all about the 
funding” and game playing kicks in to maximise the amount of funding to be 
received. This reflects evidence from Chapters 3 and 4.
What emerged in the interviews was the strong role local authority directors of 
finance had played in ensuring PIG was unhypothecated and that it was 
locked into council tax calculations. This put finance directors in a strong 
bargaining position, as if the Assembly Government had not paid out there 
would have been an impact on Council Tax. It also put them in a strong 
bargaining position with their own chief executives and service directors as, 
because they elicited the guarantee that PIG was unhypothecated, they could
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‘ignore’ the demands of service directors that the funding be used to improve 
performance in their specific areas and treat it as part of the ‘general pot’.
This suggests that it was not just interactions between service managers and 
corporate policy leads which were at play locally but also finance directors. 
The behaviour of the finance directors may have inadvertently reinforced the 
view of the performance specialists that the process was becoming a 
‘mockery’ by denying them access to the funding which they felt they had 
been working to achieve -  thus, again undermining the link between 
performance and reward.
From these responses what seems to be missing is a direct mechanism for 
feeding the local experience into national learning and vice versa. Local 
interviewees seemed frustrated that they did not have the opportunity to 
influence the process or change the scheme through the review meetings, 
again perhaps a reflection of the junior level of officials involved. There was a 
juxtaposition of the value placed upon these discussions by most of the 
interviewees (see later) and frustration at a lack of national perspective and 
the non-involvement of service experts limiting the nature of the discussion 
and, therefore, the opportunity for learning.
National level interviewees identified the fact that the focus was on 
performance indicators ‘in the raw’ as a limiting factor in efforts to interest 
politicians who wanted to hear about overall achievements, not a set of 
process indicators. These perspectives reflect evidence from Chapters 2, 3
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and 4 about the tensions between keeping agreements focused, focusing on 
the ‘right’ things and linking these to overall performance and strategy. They 
also reflect similar tensions to those identified in Chapter 4 in relation to 
individual PRP schemes regarding tensions inherent between discussions on 
supporting and improving performance and the allocation of reward (see 
later).
Policy evaluation literature highlights the importance of learning from the ‘how’ 
as well as the measurable impact of a policy. It seems there was a missed 
opportunity for learning in the case of the first round of Policy Agreements 
which could have strengthened later rounds and similar schemes operating 
elsewhere in the public services. Evidence from the interviews suggests that 
some issues such as the introduction of local indicators were addressed but 
there was no widespread learning or communication of lessons learnt. 
Likewise, the literature considered in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 highlights the 
importance of shared reflection of the process as important in generating 
ownership and commitment to delivering the agreed outcomes, whilst other 
factors may have still created a sense of ownership in some areas, this 
commitment was ‘patchy’, the perceived absence of this element may have 
contributed to this patchiness. The absence of a national approach to 
learning also has cost/benefit implications as it does not address the issue of 
potential duplication of effort across authorities or identify opportunities for 
authorities to join forces and become more efficient.
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Inherent Tensions
In discussions linked to Question 45 (The authority must work with other 
organisations to achieve some of the targets) Interviewee G suggested that 
local authorities had backed away from more sophisticated measurement and 
a true outcome focus because of reluctance to work with other parties. This 
not being reluctance in principle but, reluctance based on a desire to 
maximise the pot and utilise it in the local authority, the implication being that 
there was no desire to share the pot with partners. This was despite a 92.6% 
response to the questionnaire that authorities must work with other 
organisations to achieve the targets. This suggests that at the outset 
expectations existed that partnership working would be required to deliver the 
objectives of Policy Agreements but the realities of implementation meant this 
expectation seemed not to have been realised. For example, Interviewee G 
concluded that “Policy Agreements did not promote partnership”.
This may be a result of the PIG being included in calculations to give effect to 
levels of council tax, therefore, any PIG not included in the local authority 
budget would mean either higher council tax, a cut in expenditure or more 
income to be generated elsewhere. However, this raises an interesting 
dilemma for policy makers in Wales, and elsewhere, in that collaboration is a 
strong theme of the public service reform agenda, the assumption being that 
better outcomes for citizens are reliant on organisations working together. 
Therefore, performance frameworks and agreements such as Policy 
Agreements need to incentivise and support this. Arguably, Policy
Agreements did not because of the ‘ruling out’ of areas which would involve
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partners, but then in relation to target setting and PRP principles discussed in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 they were successful in hitting the button relating to the 
criteria of being able to influence performance. However, it is questionable 
whether this was entirely desirable if it disincentivised partnership, limited 
scope and ambition and, prevented an outcome and thus, by implication, 
citizen focus.
However, Authority E seemed able to reconcile using the Policy Agreement 
process as a means of developing relationships with its NHS Trust and 
independent sector partners to tackle delayed transfers of care, whilst also 
using it to drive a performance culture as part of wider implementation of the 
Wales Programme for Improvement. This was partly because of a recognition 
that it was starting from a very low base identified in several external reports 
but also perhaps because of a more pragmatic and opportunist approach by 
managers and elected members in this authority that, if this was something 
that had to be done then better to make it something that worked for them, 
than simply a form filling exercise for the Assembly Government.
However, despite this single example of pragmatism, the balance of the 
evidence suggests that ‘silo’ performance agreements with funding attached 
may be counter intuitive to partnership working and developing a public value 
approach to service delivery. Clearly, there are some services which local 
authorities can deliver (whether directly or by contracting out) where 
partnership is not required, for example waste collection, street lighting or 
highways maintenance. However, these services all relate to wider, citizen-
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focused, partnership issues such as environmental quality and community 
safety so that a ‘silo’ approach to performance management, ‘complicated’ by 
using funding as a driver, seems increasingly at odds with securing progress 
on achieving outcome focused public services.
This could be countered by having a ‘pot’ attached to a partnership agreement 
like LAAs but, arguably, this still means a potential focus on a technical 
discussion around performance indicators, and does not eliminate ‘game 
playing’ or the danger that discussions become about the funding rather than 
real improvement for citizens. Evidence from Chapter 3 suggests there are 
still question marks over how ambitious and innovative LAAs are and whether 
the short term nature of the funding inhibits the pursuit of interventions which 
might be more effective in the longer term.
In relation to citizen focus and collaboration, Chapter 2 identifies that public 
sector reform policy in Wales was crystalised in the final year of the Policy 
Agreement process. However, it recognises that this policy was based on 
Welsh values and practice, so the lack of citizen focus and support for 
collaboration in the Agreements is not explained by this. Also, the Local 
Government Act 2000 clearly put a focus on community leadership and, 
integral to this, was partnership with other public and private sector 
organisations and developing a ‘new’ relationship with citizens and 
communities. The implication is that the addition of funding narrowed the 
scope of the Agreements to a technical exercise about numbers, this may 
have helped develop relationships ‘corporate centre to corporate centre’ but
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did not foster a wider perspective either in terms of service improvement or 
the wider aims of partnership, collaboration and citizen focus.
Local interviewees gave a resounding ‘top-down’ when asked whether the 
process felt ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’, but there were two categories of top- 
down response. The first category (A, C and F) had resulted in Policy 
Agreements being marginalised by the corporate centres of the authorities as 
it had not fitted with their agendas and, they had failed to see any coherence 
with other policies such as the WPI and community planning. These 
interviewees perceived the process as a ‘managerial exercise’ and a technical 
process to get the money. They were not entirely persuaded of its usefulness 
or relevance.
The second category of local respondent (B, D and E) similarly resented the 
perceived imposition of national targets but, had been more pragmatic in their 
approach to implementation. These authorities recognised an opportunity in 
the creation of dialogue with the Welsh Assembly Government and valued it, 
whilst at the same time saw the opportunity to use Policy Agreements to align 
with their own agendas of creating a performance culture and making service 
managers more accountable for their performance. These authorities created 
widespread ownership of the Policy Agreement targets by engaging Cabinets 
and elected members though the scrutiny process and making the targets part 
of the WPI Improvement Plan.
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These are interesting results as the literature reviews in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
suggest where schemes are perceived as top-down and imposed they will at 
best generate compliance rather than ownership of the process and its related 
objectives. These responses suggest this is not universally true in relation to 
organisational schemes set in the context of central-local relations. Despite 
feeling the scheme was imposed and resenting its lack of focus on local 
priorities, some authorities took the ‘tool’, committed to it and used it to drive 
improvement as part of a wider agenda.
These authorities may have had a strong self-improvement and professional 
pride ethic which provided a counter-weight to the top-down perception. 
Authorities which marginalised Policy Agreements may have failed to see 
their potential for a variety of reasons - they felt they already had improvement 
systems in place and therefore no need for a shared corporate agenda, or 
they did not value the opportunity to develop a relationship with the Welsh 
Assembly Government. This highlights a difference in perception and, 
therefore, perhaps a failure in effective communication of concept and 
purpose.
National interviewees responded that Policy Agreements were somewhere in 
the middle and perhaps even a little to the bottom-up side. They stressed the 
process of co-design and the links to ‘Wales: A Better Country’ (National 
Assembly for Wales, 2002) as evidence of mutuality of objectives. If this had 
been better communicated to those operating locally there may have been 
less marginalisation of the process in the ‘Category V authorities above. This
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evidence correlates with the critical success factors relating to 
communication, participation and consultation identified in Chapters 2, 3 and 
4 (also see below).
All interviewees commented on the differential impact of Policy Agreements 
between authorities, between elected members and officers and, between 
corporate centres and service managers. The local profile seems to have 
been very much locally driven; in Category 1 authorities elected members 
were not engaged, “members wouldn’t have known they existed” (Interviewee 
F), whilst Category 2 authorities had employed various techniques including 
Ministerial visits to raise the Policy Agreement profile and generate 
widespread ownership (Interviewee E).
Some of this may reflect the vicious circle of lack of national profile with the 
Cabinet and senior management of the Welsh Assembly Government so that 
lack of profile in Category 1 authorities became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This 
suggests a lesson for future implementation in that there may be a correlation 
between high national profile and local adoption, however, this needs to be 
considered in the context of strong local drivers such as professional pride. 
Also, part of the rationale for the different approach to improvement in Wales 
was making the most of the small scale of the country. In this case it does not 
seem to have paid dividends in that potentially strong levers such as 
Ministerial engagement, identified in Chapter 2, were not effectively or 
consistently deployed.
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Role of the ‘Line Manager’ and Training
Only 49.6% of questionnaire respondents felt that the role of the Welsh 
Assembly Government during review sessions had been to help local 
authorities constructively improve performance. This was supported by the 
interview data. Interviewees were at pains to point out that their comments 
were not a criticism of the individual officers concerned but, a key issue during 
the discussions had been the lack of seniority of those officers. Local 
authority interviewees felt that discussions had been about the indicators and 
whether or not to pay the PIG rather than performance, for the latter they 
needed a certain level of engagement to generate credible, robust and 
meaningful discussions with decision makers in the Welsh Assembly 
Government.
Interviewee A valued the opportunity to build relationships with officials in the 
Local Government Policy Division but, described the sessions as “an 
uninformed conversation in the middle, it came down to who was best 
briefed.” Those officers involved in the feedback discussions on both ‘sides’ 
felt the relationship could only be about the numbers, as they did not have the 
wherewithal to have discussions on service improvement. They, therefore, 
focused on safe and neutral ground.
Interviewees felt the common ground in the discussions between local 
authority corporate centres and Local Government Policy Division had been 
on the development of systems to drive improvement. This was confirmed by 
comments from one national interviewee who stated “we didn’t see ourselves
249
as improvement agents, we saw ourselves as administering a process which 
was about improvement. We assumed improvement would happen through 
discussions in service areas” (Interviewee J). These comments help to 
explain the value placed on these discussions by both ‘sides’ - a common 
interest in systems of improvement. However, it reinforces earlier identified 
limitations about a lack of ‘big picture’ and citizen focus.
There are also a number of underlying issues, firstly the lack of seniority of the 
Assembly Government officials implies a lack of commitment to the 
implementation process (or it could mean a lack of resources) but, this 
coupled with comments that the service departments were not involved in the 
discussions highlights comments made by national interviewees that the 
Assembly Government had difficulty mobilising commitment from policy 
departments outside of Local Government Policy. Interviewee I suggested 
the process opened lines of communication between Local Government 
Policy and other areas such as education and social services but, this does 
not seem to have extended to a ‘de-siloed’ outward perspective.
Interviewees commented that the WLGA did “a lot of work behind the scenes” 
in terms of helping local authorities to improve their performance, the 
Assembly Government was aware of this work and was perhaps content for it 
to be done in this way. However, this does not seem to have generated a 
perception amongst local authorities that there was supportive management 
of the scheme. It seems instead to have reinforced their perception that this
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was a process to be managed rather than a serious attempt at delivering 
process outcomes and performance impacts.
Interviewee D identified a further limitation of this was the desire to build and 
improve relationships meant the challenge was lost, as was the focus on 
improvement. This reflects tensions in the relationship identified in Chapter 4 
between improving performance and allocating reward.
Trust, Fairness and Communication
64.9% of respondents to the questionnaire were in agreement that one of the 
objectives of Policy Agreements was to improve the relationship between the 
Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities and 59.1% felt Policy 
Agreements had added value to the relationship between the Welsh 
Assembly Government. However, there were mixed views amongst local 
interviewees as to whether the relationship improved and a complex picture 
unfolded. Category 1 interviewees felt that it was not a genuine dialogue and 
placed limited value on discussions with the Welsh Assembly Government. 
They felt the dialogue was superficial and questioned the added value. For 
these authorities the opportunity to build corporate relationships did not 
compensate for the lack of senior involvement from the Assembly 
Government and the lack of service involvement, “they carried on their own 
sweet way”. The relationship was not perceived as unhelpful, the response 
was one of bemusement at the perceived lack of gravitas attached to the 
discussions by the Welsh Assembly Government.
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Category 2 interviewees valued the discussions, felt they were genuine and 
that they had led to a better understanding. They valued the relationship, felt 
it had developed, that it was a shared dialogue, that it was as important as the 
funding, and perceived the relationship as supportive and important in 
developing trust. They acknowledged there was a missed opportunity 
because the discussions were mainly between middle and junior level 
corporate centres and, service managers and specialists were rarely, if ever 
involved. This meant they had had to work hard to create a sense of 
cohesion and ownership amongst their service managers, a mirror of the 
situation within the Welsh Assembly Government where Local Government 
Policy Division had had to work hard to engage colleagues from other 
departments in the process.
The mix of these comments is reflected in questionnaire responses to 
Questions 53 and 61 which expressed low levels of agreement about the 
effectiveness of the feedback system (42.9% and 46.6%). Interviewee F was 
“bemused at having junior level officials turn up and talk about our agreement, 
there was no challenge”. But, at the same time, the value placed upon the 
discussions is reflected in responses to Questions 80 and 81 (77.6% and 
72%) which show high levels of agreement with the premise that the process 
had been handled in a positive way by local authorities and the Welsh 
Assembly Government respectively. The apparent absence of any cascade 
effect in communication is also perhaps a contributory factor to in the negative 
responses to Question 12 (43.2%) about levels of trust between local 
authorities and the Welsh Assembly Government.
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Interviewee D suggested the process had contributed to a lowering of rising 
tensions but, that at a national level this had been very personality driven. 
This was illustrated by Interviewee G’s comment that national relationships 
were excellent anyway and Policy Agreements were part of a wider menu of 
policies aimed at building upon this relationship. This is supported by 
evidence from the literature review in Chapter 2.
National interviewees also felt there had been a genuine dialogue and that 
Policy Agreements were very much a product of partnership working. They 
shared the sense of missed opportunity with their local counterparts because 
of limited engagement by other Welsh Assembly Government departments. 
However, they felt that Policy Agreements had built on the existing good 
relationship to create raised expectations about service improvement in a 
“non-big brother way” (Interviewee I). However, they also recognised the 
multiplicity of the relationship and that Policy Agreements had only impacted 
on a limited aspect of it.
Questionnaire respondents seemed optimistic that Policy Agreements were a 
way for the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities to work 
together to improve services with 76.7% of respondents agreeing. However, 
the interview data suggests this aspiration was not realised on implementation 
as the discussions tended to be corporate centre to corporate centre about 
the indicators, targets, how to develop information systems and PIG, rather 
than discussions around service improvement.
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Some examples were given of discussions between service managers and 
their opposite numbers in the Welsh Assembly Government resulting in new 
approaches to tackling issues, for example, delayed transfers of care. But the 
prevailing feeling was there was no evidence to support this as the ownership 
of the Agreements was generally so limited. The impact of this was to limit 
the development of understanding between central and local government in 
the area of service delivery, so whilst in part the Agreements improved 
communication and understanding on a corporate level, there was a lack of 
penetration at both service manager and elected member levels.
These responses triangulate those to earlier questions, providing further 
evidence that Policy Agreements did improve relationships in some respects, 
but the ripple effect was limited within some authorities and mostly limited to 
the Local Government Policy Division within the Welsh Assembly 
Government. Again it was identified that limited political engagement meant 
elected members were largely excluded from the equation.
This is reflected in responses to Question 56 about the bureaucratic nature of 
the process (a bureaucratic process may be an indication of a lack of trust). 
Elected members felt that the process was too bureaucratic with 70.7% 
agreeing while local authority officers and the Welsh Assembly Government 
group disagreed (41.2% (a statistically significant difference of opinion to 
elected members) and 20% respectively). This may again be a reflection of 
the lack of involvement of elected members in the process and, therefore, a
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lack of knowledge (although this may be a political stance) and the value 
placed upon the face to face discussions between corporate officers.
The literature in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 suggests that relationship building and 
the development of trust as part of this process are important in securing 
commitment to the process. Trust was highlighted as a potential issue by the 
questionnaire returns with 49.7% of respondents feeling that the nature of 
Policy Agreements failed to reflect a relationship of trust between local 
authorities and the Welsh Assembly Government (Q11) and, as noted above, 
only 43.2% of respondents felt that there was a high level of trust between the 
two parties.
These results suggest that despite the Welsh Assembly Government and the 
WLGA’s mutual satisfaction on jointly creating Policy Agreements, this co­
design was not communicated effectively to those implementing them on the 
ground, resulting in a feeling that the Agreements were being imposed from 
above. This provides interesting evidence about communication between the 
centre, both in terms of the Welsh Assembly Government and the WLGA, and 
those implementing policies locally.
An emerging theme is that the nationally perceived positive development of 
shared conceptualisation, with recognition of the limitations of that concept 
being implemented in terms of the performance indicators and information 
available, does not seem to have been communicated to those operating on 
the ground. This is despite 71.7% of respondents to the questionnaire feeling
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that the purpose of Policy Agreements had been clearly communicated to 
them (Q36). This may relate to the ‘original’ purpose rather than that which 
may have emerged through the negotiation of the funding (see later and 
Chapter 3). This disconnect between message communicated and the ‘real 
grand national plan’ seems to have been a factor in creating ‘patchy’ 
commitment to the process.
This evidence suggests a lack of widespread commitment to the Policy 
Agreement process meant it was a missed opportunity to improve trust and 
quality on the many levels of the central-local relationship. Chapters 2, 3 and 
4 highlighted the importance of communication, participation and trust in the 
effective operationalisation of performance management schemes and it 
seems that Policy Agreements may have had some ‘patchy’ success, it will 
therefore be interesting to explore whether any factors can be identified as to 
why this was more successful in some areas than others. Where the 
engagement was successful, i.e. where common corporate cause was 
capitalised upon, Policy Agreements were taken more seriously than in those 
areas where it was not and, interviewees were very positive about their 
relationship with the Welsh Assembly Government. A key question is whether 
it was the engagement which was the crucial factor in ensuring commitment 
or whether other factors were at play.
Supporting the results from the questionnaire analysis, where 68.3% of 
respondents felt that the evaluation protocol was fair, all the interviewees felt it 
was fair. However, there tended to be a qualification to this -  “fair but
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pointless, not purposeful”, “fair, had to start somewhere”, “fair from the local 
authority’s perspective but did not drive performance”, “fair but not followed” 
and “fair - oh yes!” These comments echo some of the qualitative comments 
on the questionnaires relating to the process becoming “a mockery”.
The “had to start somewhere” comments are the most forgiving, indicating an 
awareness of the first round of Policy Agreements potentially being the 
foundation for further rounds and, therefore to be built upon. Interviewee I 
expanded on this by commenting that the focus on the first round was 
“emphasis on acceptance of approach rather than rigorous measurement”. 
This suggests the funding being seen as more about ‘signing up’ than 
delivering performance improvements.
However, if this was the case then it does not appear to have been 
communicated effectively to those implementing Policy Agreements on the 
ground, resulting in disillusionment and lack of commitment to the process. 
Those responsible for implementation at local authority level were 
performance specialists and the interview data suggests that they were never 
disabused of their assumption that a performance agreement containing a 
monetary incentive would be just that -  not an evolutionary process of signing 
up, tightening up and development. These may have been unrealistic 
assumptions, but given developments in England at the time (see later 
discussion) perhaps not entirely unfounded.
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The Role of Financial Incentives
In relation to whether or not the evaluation protocol supported the concept of 
relating funding to performance, there was a resounding “Np” from local 
authority interviewees. Comments such as “No teeth to process” and “No real 
steel” were used to describe the ‘best endeavours’ method of determining pay 
out. Interviewee B suggested that “the WLGA had played a blinder” as “it was 
possible to drive a coach and horses through the evaluation protocol”. This 
suggests that in Expectancy Theory terms interviewees were not making the 
link between performance and rewards. The questionnaire returns indicated 
that local authority officers were the least convinced on this before the 
conclusion of the process, with only 50% agreeing with the premise. 
Interviewee G confirmed this perspective by stating that some authorities took 
the process very seriously but others saw it as “money in the bank”.
Local interviewees suggested that the service managers responsible for 
delivery of the targets were either unaware of the funding or reluctantly 
accepted that it was going into the central authority pot and “just got on with 
delivering the targets.” This was because the participation in setting the 
targets and silo to silo discussions, in education and social services in 
particular, were drivers to improving performance where the money was taken 
out of the equation. This was felt to be as strong if not stronger than internal 
pressure to deliver from the authority’s corporate centre.
This supports the evidence identified in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 that professional 
pride and the public service ethos are key issues to be considered in the 
design of both organisational and individual performance management
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schemes. This evidence supports that generated by questionnaire responses 
to Questions 68 and 69 (see Table 6.3) and, perhaps starts to illustrate that 
the Expectancy Theory based premises of individual PRP may be transferable 
to organisational schemes up to a point but, the complexity of 
operationalisation results in a weakening of conceptual links between 
performance and reward, if they were ever important for some officers (see 
Chapter 4), and other drivers related to professional and public service ethos 
come into play. This suggests at this level that Goal Setting Theory may be 
the more appropriate framework.
Question 64 asked survey respondents about the significance of the funding. 
Only 51.3% felt the funding was significant. Chapter 4 identified that 
perceptions as to the magnitude of the reward were likely to be reflected in 
the amount of effort invested in achieving the objectives. If local authorities 
felt the funding was not significant and were not making a link between 
performance and rewards then this puts the comments of one interviewee into 
perspective, “the funding led to a fog and a marginalisation of Policy 
Agreements as a performance framework which diminished their impact” 
(Interviewee F).
The majority of questionnaire respondents (64.9%) felt that the targets served 
to motivate rather than demotivate and this was reinforced by the 
interviewees. They were clear that they had set their own targets and felt 
motivated to achieve them. Interviewee D felt this was a stronger motivating 
factor than the money but, others set this motivation in the context of the
259
funding, “wanted the money” (Interviewee B) and “wouldn’t have wanted to 
explain to the Leader why we didn’t get the money” (Interviewee A).
Interviewee D turned this on its head, saying the fact the money was 
guaranteed and went straight into the base budget was a demotivating factor 
but, because of the opportunity to drive a performance management culture 
and a ‘feeling of having something to prove’, Policy Agreements had been 
taken seriously. Again, perhaps indicating the dangers of not effectively 
communicating the rationale of ‘had to start somewhere’ to the performance 
specialists. These results suggest complex interactions at multiple 
organisational levels between intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors were 
at play. However, as noted earlier, for service managers intrinsic motivation 
was the primary driver and it seems this also held true for some corporate 
officers.
The importance of context, in terms of levels of satisfaction with the 
distributive justice of the system, again surfaced as an issue. Interviewee F 
from a ‘rich’ authority stated “neither, never gave it any great relevance, not 
sharp enough”. The implication being, in his context, that the threat of not 
hitting the targets and not getting the money was not enough to motivate and, 
perhaps, in light of an earlier response to gaming the targets, an expression of 
confidence in hitting the targets anyway.
Like questionnaire respondents (73%), most interviewees felt it was an 
incentive and the funding was significant enough to ‘take an interest’ and put 
a focus on achieving something measurable, but the importance of the
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funding varied between authorities which were ‘comfortable’ in financial terms 
“it was nice to have” (Interviewee F) and those which were not “absolutely 
there was a tension the money wouldn’t arrive” (Interviewee E). Also, 
corporate centres were keen to get their hands on the cash and tried to 
‘mitigate the risk’ of the funding not being received. Perhaps reflecting the old 
Niskanen (1971) adage that bureaucrats are motivated by budget 
maximisation.
However, others felt that in the end it hadn’t been an incentive and, that it had 
been “created for a moment in time” (Interviewee H). It focused minds for a 
short period and then people moved on to other things. Others felt “it would 
have been if there was a sense of the funding really linked to performance but 
it was a political deal” (Interviewee J) and “ridiculous everybody got all the 
funding even if their performance was not that good” (Interviewee C). This 
suggests interviewees perceived the Policy Agreement process as an 
organisational pay-for-performance scheme and were seemingly disappointed 
when it did not operate as such.
Assembly Government interviewees took a different perspective suggesting 
that Policy Agreements were supposed to be about more than the PIG by 
encouraging local authorities to review how their whole budget was utilised. 
Also, this was a first attempt to develop a performance agreement and it was 
recognised that much of the desired improvement would take longer than 
three years, therefore the evaluation protocol was light touch. However, given
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the ‘fog’ over the funding this message does not seem to have reached those 
on the ground resulting in confusion and disillusionment with the process.
These responses suggest that the funding was an incentive for some but, 
maybe not for the reasons intended and, there is the question of quite what it 
incentivised. Given the strong desire of corporate centres to secure the cash 
there may have been a stronger incentive to game the targets and results 
than otherwise -  this could be what amounted to ‘risk mitigation’.
It also seems to have incentivised a different ‘new’ performance management 
relationship between local authority corporate centres and service managers, 
the latter being left to deliver with the financial incentive retained at the centre. 
This suggests that a financial incentive at an organisational level may 
simulate the appearance of operating on the same level as an individual 
payment but, may not necessarily be impacting upon the behaviour of all 
individuals in the organisation in the same way, or indeed may not be one of 
the factors impacting upon their behaviour at all.
This reflects the findings of Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) in relation to 
LPSAs. Reward grant was a strong driver for local authority corporate centres 
but service managers were more motivated by the desire to improve services 
for citizens. However, early evaluation evidence from the implementation of 
LAAs suggests it may have lost even this significance. It also reflects research 
on PRP in the public service discussed in Chapter 4.
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This may be acceptable, although it does not address the politicians’ dilemma, 
if overall the Agreements are achieving the desired process outcomes and 
performance impacts but, these findings suggest that PIG was not a strong 
driver for all corporate centres. In the context of those authorities which did 
not take Policy Agreements ‘seriously’ arguably this was partially because, for 
the corporate centre, the link between performance and rewards was not 
operating effectively and, thus, they became disinterested in the process. So 
in these authorities the PIG was not an incentive for improvement in the 
corporate centre or the service managers. The process was reduced to a 
numbers game with perhaps one officer in the corporate centre and the 
director of finance “playing the game” and “worrying about it” respectively 
(Interviewee A).
Another interpretation of this is the way in which the Assembly Government 
worked with corporate centres meant it was not important that the funding 
reached the service areas as the corporate centres drove the improvement, 
based on their desire for the funding, not the funding driving the improvement 
per se. Failure to engage the corporate centre and identify mutual goals 
resulted in ‘total’ operationalisation failure in those authorities rather than the 
‘partial’ success identified in others.
Understanding these impacts at different organisational levels and in different 
contexts is important for theory relating to organisational pay-for-performance 
schemes and future policy making. In particular if holistic, sustainable 
improvement and widespread culture change are desirables, this evidence
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suggests that a financial incentive operated in the way in which PIG did might 
not be the most appropriate tool for ‘reaching’ all parts of the organisation 
and, in particular, service managers. It also raises questions as to whether 
organisational level financial rewards are appropriate at all.
Some local interviewees agreed that it felt like a PRP scheme or a first step in 
that direction while others answered an emphatic “No”. Some interviewees 
confessed to worrying that the funding would not arrive while others like 
Interviewee D stated “I was never worried we wouldn’t get it, it was more 
about delivery on our promises. I think ‘best endeavours’ was a positive, put 
the focus on positive discussion and support.” This did not correlate with the 
Category 1 and 2 authorities identified above, regardless of whether there 
was a positive or a negative reaction to PIG, those authorities which took 
Policy Agreements seriously seemed to be driven to meet the targets through 
a strong sense of professional pride, wanting to deliver on their promises 
through recognition that whilst they had not chosen the indicators they had set 
the targets and, a desire to develop a performance culture in their authorities.
This reinforces earlier analysis that, in Expectancy Theory terms, authorities 
were making the links between effort and performance but not between 
performance and rewards in the purely financial sense. The prize for these 
authorities was being able to deliver on their promises and drive cultural 
change. This supports the suggestion by Reiter et al (2006) that governments 
have been implementing organisational pay-for-performance schemes without 
understanding their impact and assuming that they would work in a similar 
way to individual schemes, even though, as Chapter 4 identifies, the impact of
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these schemes is debateable. This evidence suggests that the operational 
impact of organisational pay-for-performance schemes may be a long way off 
the theoretically based intention of incentivising improved performance by 
creating a link between performance and rewards.
Analysis of the questionnaire returns and comments in Chapter 6 highlighted 
that respondents appeared confused over the role of the funding in the 
process. ‘Fudging’ the purpose seems to have been the worst of all worlds. It 
de-motivated some authorities from taking the Agreements seriously and 
raised questions about the ‘fairness’ of the process -  “why bother to take it 
seriously when we were going to get the money anyway” (Interviewee F).
The evidence suggests that the funding was significant in the sense that it 
drew attention to the process, was enough to be ‘useful’ to authorities, 
especially those which were financially challenged and, was politically 
expedient and symbolic in getting the full support of the WLGA. The issue 
seems to have been that Policy Agreements, on the surface, looked like a 
pay-for-performance scheme but, in reality seemed to be meant as more of a 
‘hybrid’.
Ironically, this was perhaps one of Wales’ best kept secrets at the time, in the 
sense that these aims were not widely known outside Wales (Interviewee G 
suggested that “England thought the Welsh approach was soft”) or widely 
known locally inside Wales. 71.7% of questionnaire respondents felt that the 
purpose of Policy Agreements had been clearly communicated to them -  this 
may have been the ‘official’ purpose which raised expectations in relation to
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pay-for-performance which were not delivered and, it seems, perhaps never 
entirely intended.
This ambivalence and confusion over the funding seemed to have extended 
into round two of the process, where once again ail authorities had received 
the reward funding regardless of progress. Interviewees felt the funding 
process was tainted from the way in which it was politicised and used in the 
first round and that once this precedent had been set it was impossible to 
move away from it.
Building expectations that Policy Agreements were a pay-for-performance 
scheme seems to have created confusion and frustration, on a conceptual 
level links between performance and reward were put in place but never 
operationalised. Chapter 4 suggested that PRP schemes need to make these 
links clear and fair both conceptually and in practice. This operationalisation 
failure created a ‘funding fog’ which meant that some areas could/would not 
see beyond it to consider the potential value of the process outcomes, such 
as culture change and relationship building which the Agreements were also 
intended to deliver.
Cost Benefit and PRP Normalisation
Questionnaire respondents felt that the purpose of Policy Agreements was not 
to provide local authorities with ‘top-up’ funding, only 44.7% of respondents 
agreed with this premise. However, interviewees felt that whilst this was not 
the purpose it had been the result, citing evidence given in response to earlier
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questions that the whole process smacked of a political deal and the 
confusion relating to the ‘best endeavours’ principle.
Interviewees also reflected that because local authorities built the funding into 
their base budgets and “could not do without it”, it did feel like ‘top up’ funding 
(Interviewees D and E). It also meant that the ‘politicians’ dilemma’ came to 
the fore again, as once the money, allocated on the basis of need (i.e. SSA), 
was built into base budgets it was politically difficult to take it away, even if 
there was a clear cut case of non-performance. The funding, in both rounds, 
was ‘normalised’ into base budgets and became expected regardless of 
performance. This is reflected in questionnaire responses (Q76 -  see Table 
6.4). This latter point was also identified as an issue with individual PRP 
schemes in Chapter 4.
However, with the benefit of hindsight some interviewees felt that, despite the 
identified confusion, including the PIG, the process had yielded a positive cost 
benefit because of the inculcation of performance management cultures into 
authorities and the development of relationships with the Welsh Assembly 
Government. It is perhaps telling that no reference was made at this point to 
improved service performance, reinforcing the evidence that Policy 
Agreements were perceived as an exercise in system development rather 
than service improvement for citizens.
Questionnaire respondents were positive in relation to two out of the three 
questions (Q47, 52.3% and Q62, 58%) relating to cost benefit but negative in
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the third (Q77, 45.9%) with elected members being the most negative. This 
question was situated in the feedback section of the questionnaire in a basket 
of questions relating to PIG which might explain this result. One of the critical 
success factors identified from the literature reviews in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 is 
the cost benefit of the scheme. Clearly despite the weaknesses identified 
and, the scepticism and confusion over the way in which the funding was 
attached, most interviewees felt there was an overall value to the process, 
some indicating that the process had been as important as the funding (78% 
of questionnaire respondents agreed with this, Q14). The latter suggesting 
that interviewees placed a high value on trying to achieve the relationship 
development, communication, and culture change process outcomes 
identified as objectives for Policy Agreements. However, as noted in earlier 
analysis, the limited nature of these improvements must be kept in mind.
Performance and Culture
There was a high level of agreement (82%) amongst questionnaire 
respondents that creating a culture of self-improvement in local authorities 
was an objective of the Policy Agreement process. However, there were 
mixed responses from interviewees in relation to whether or not Policy 
Agreements had achieved this. The most generous responses suggested 
that, in conjunction with the Wales Programme for Improvement, they had 
contributed by helping improvement and performance management to be 
taken more seriously. For example, Interviewee E identified the benefit of the 
Agreements as a tool to ‘drive’ performance management within local 
authorities. However, despite this they were seen very much as a “secondary 
driver”.
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Other interviewees felt that because of the ‘marginal’ nature of the 
Agreements, their failure to create a strong sense of local ownership, strong 
focus on being a process to get the money and, lack of coherence with the 
Wales Programme for Improvement, they had failed to achieve this objective, 
even in a contributory sense. Interviewee A described them as “relatively 
inconsequential”, and stronger drivers had been public opinion, resulting in 
elected member pressure, or arising from joint reviews, inspection reports and 
the Wales Programme for Improvement.
So why did some feel it was coherent while others felt that it was something 
extra, disconnected from the WPI and another hurdle to get over? This seems 
to be again connected to communication, some authorities could see/were 
prepared to make the connections with other policies while others were/did 
not. Possibilities for this reaction include; failure by national partners to 
effectively communicate this message and the possibility for mutual gain, or a 
political angle at play in that some of the ‘non-believers’ were not Labour led 
authorities. However, politicians did not seem to be looming large in the 
discussions. Also, there may have been complacency and a feeling of ‘we 
knew better’, but clearly something persuaded some authorities to ‘make the 
most of it’ while others marginalised the process and refused to treat Policy 
Agreements as anything more than a paper chase, despite similar levels of 
engagement from the Welsh Assembly Government. What was the ‘X ’ factor?
One explanation might be linked to the corporate capacity to take Policy 
Agreements forward. However, some of the authorities which marginalised
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the Agreements did not lack corporate capacity and, therefore, made a 
conscious choice that the Agreements were not worth serious effort. This 
seems to have been based on a number of factors including: perceived lack of 
alignment with the local authority’s own agenda for improvement which was 
being driven through the WPI; complacency that there were already better 
local systems for driving improvement in place; a perceived lack of importance 
placed upon the process by the Welsh Assembly Government; a feeling that 
the money would arrive any way so why bother; and, perceived disconnect 
with other local government policies. These authorities also talked of self- 
improvement and performance cultures in passionate terms, so it was 
potentially not a lack of ambition which resulted in ambivalence towards the 
Policy Agreement process.
As emerged above, the pivotal axis seems to have been the local corporate 
centre - if a decision was taken there to embrace the Agreements then efforts 
were made to spread ownership and use them to best effect, if not the 
process remained a purely managerial one, managed by the corporate centre. 
The absence of strong national drivers in the form of serious sustained 
political and senior management engagement from the Welsh Assembly 
Government enabled this to take root early in the process and it was then 
difficult to recover from this position.
In policy evaluation terms there is perhaps a valuable implementation lesson 
to be learned from this experience. Organisational performance agreements 
between central and local government might be structured on an organisation
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to organisation basis but, the interaction around these agreements needs to 
be multi-faceted and co-ordinated to leverage universal commitment or else 
implementation will be patchy, the possibility for national learning limited and, 
the impact upon any desired process outcomes will not be maximised. In 
theory terms the transference of principles from the individual level needs to 
be alive to this multiplicity of relationships -  there are significant risks in 
assuming and/or relying on a single aspect of this relationship.
Questionnaire respondents were very positive (88.9%) that focusing on local 
authority results and outcomes rather than inputs was an objective of Policy 
Agreements. This positivity was common across the respondent groups of 
local authority officers, elected members and the Welsh Assembly 
Government. Responses from interviewees as to whether this was achieved 
were mixed. There was a feeling that Policy Agreements had made a 
contribution to this as a wider aim of local government policy but, the way in 
which the process had been implemented meant the contribution was not as 
large as perhaps it might have been.
Questionnaire respondents were not convinced that one of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements was to demonstrate there was no requirement for 
externally driven improvement by inspection and audit with only 30.1% of 
respondents agreeing. Interviewees recognised this was an aspiration and a 
few felt that Policy Agreements had made a limited contribution to achieving a 
reduction in inspection and regulation. However, most felt the debate was 
about proportionality and that the battle still had to be won. The key to it was
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proving the contribution self-evaluation and scrutiny could make. Policy 
Agreements had not contributed to this in a significant way.
63.5% of questionnaire respondents agreed that providing discretion for local 
authorities to determine where to deploy their resources was one of the 
objectives of Policy Agreements. This was set in the context of the intention, 
identified in Chapter 3, for Policy Agreements to be a counteracting force to 
pressures for hypothecation of funding. In the case of the PIG itself, 
interviewees agreed this was the case and some felt that it provided limited 
relief from what were perceived as constant pressures for hypothecation in 
the form of specific grants, others also felt it had played a part in ensuring that 
the Revenue Support Grant remained unhypothecated.
Only 37.1% of questionnaire respondents felt that one of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements was to minimise requirements on local authorities to 
produce strategies and plans (despite this being enshrined in the agreement). 
In terms of the impact of Policy Agreements in this regard, interviewees felt it 
was minimal, at best laying the foundations for later work and discussions in 
this area. Interviewees suggested the lack of impact in these areas was 
related to a lack of corporate ownership of Policy Agreements in the Welsh 
Assembly Government. It was suggested that directors did not review or use 
the data as part of their portfolio management showing “a reluctance to use a 
tool which was not invented in their policy silo” (Interviewee H). Likewise, 
Interviewee H suggested that Cabinet showed little interest in using them
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either as an integrating tool or as an alternative to more traditional levers such 
as hypothecated grants to drive performance.
This all suggests that Policy Agreements were not a powerful force for driving 
culture change in either local authorities or the Welsh Assembly Government. 
To add insult to injury, in the case of the latter, this does not seem to have 
been a very well kept secret and, exacerbated feelings of disillusionment, lack 
of purpose and commitment already emerging locally as a result of the 
confusion surrounding the nature and purpose of the PIG.
There are a number of possibilities for failure to secure senior and political 
commitment in the Assembly Government including; attachment to tried and 
tested levers such as specific grants and statutory guidance; the structure of 
portfolios reinforcing siloism and making a focus on outcomes and cross 
portfolio working difficult; and, loss of faith in the process resulting from the 
way in which the PIG was operationalised. Also, this lack of interest and 
commitment at national level may be self-reinforcing based on the extent to 
which local authorities themselves treated Policy Agreements as serious tools 
for delivering process outcomes and performance impacts. Interviewees 
noted that silo contacts, for example between education policy leads in the 
Welsh Assembly Government and local directors of education, were taking 
place outside the Policy Agreement world - the lack of involvement of these 
individuals in the core process becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of lack of 
political commitment both locally and nationally, and resulted in a vicious 
circle which seemed to have been impossible to break.
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There was a high level of agreement (91.6%) amongst questionnaire 
respondents that improving local authority performance was an objective of 
Policy Agreements. There were qualified responses from interviewees as to 
whether this was achieved. The qualifications related to: in the main the 
services included in the Agreements had seen improvements but, whether 
this was holistic, sustainable improvement was questionable and no attempts 
were made to establish this, for example, by cross referencing with other 
information such as inspection reports; the perceived lack of salience of the 
Policy Agreement framework; the focus on it being ‘a numbers game’; and, 
Policy Agreements were a contributory factor as part of a wider drive to 
develop a performance culture. On the latter point two interviewees (B and E) 
felt that the fact Policy Agreements were ‘forced on us’ provided the internal 
leverage with members and service managers to drive improvement, “without 
this forcing we might not have been so successful” (Interviewee E).
This again suggests that the critical success factor of mutuality might be 
contingent on context. In this instance the ‘top-down’ approach enabled local 
corporate teams to point a finger at “the big, bad Assembly” to drive a 
performance culture, thus becoming complicit in supporting the Assembly to 
achieve its objectives (and keeping all the funding for itself). This may further 
explain the feeling of positive ‘corporate centre to corporate centre’ 
relationships as the corporate centres had shared purpose and mutually 
reinforcing goals.
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65.1% of questionnaire respondents felt that Policy Agreements had raised 
expectations in terms of improved performance which could be met. This was 
supported by the interview responses. The relevance of this question relates 
to the importance of having realistic targets so that the links between effort 
and performance can be made. Questionnaire responses suggest that these 
links could be seen (Q43, 61.4%) but, the links between performance and 
reward were a little more hazy (Q44, 47.4%, Q66, 51.6%). As noted above 
this was reflected in interviewees’ responses to whether or not the PIG was 
an incentive. This raises questions as to whether improved performance in 
those services included in the Agreements owed more to the clarification of 
objectives, a happy co-incidence in terms of a shared corporate objective to 
improve performance management systems, the public service ethos and 
professional pride rather than a financial incentive.
Conclusions
1. The Impact of Policy Agreements
The evidence suggests that the impact of Policy Agreements was limited and 
differential both geographically and in relation to the groups involved in 
implementation. The analysis of the interview data suggests that none of the 
objectives identified at the start of the process were met in full, some were 
partially met and others were not met at all. This position will be reviewed in 
Chapter 9, so that evidence relating to the actual performance impacts of 
Policy Agreements identified in Chapter 8 may be considered in conjunction 
with the evidence discussed above.
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2. Key Themes
Funding - It was clear from the questionnaire and interview data that 
participants understood the principles of linking effort and performance and 
performance and rewards at a conceptual level within Policy Agreements. 
However, whilst implementation reinforced the links between effort and 
performance, allaying fears about reliance on others, it undermined the link 
between performance and reward.
This may be a peculiarity of the ‘politicisation’ of the Welsh system. It seems 
the heady cocktail of the ‘good relationship’ at national level (Laffin, 2004; 
Jeffery, 2006), mutual national and local desire to be different to England ‘at 
any cost’ (Laffin and Thomas, 2001), the policy deficit which enabled the 
WLGA to input and influence the early stages of policy making (Laffin et al, 
2002; Laffin and Thomas, 2001; Drakeford, 2006) and a prevailing value of 
equity (Hart, 2002) meant that a system of reward based on differential 
criteria, when combined with the ‘politicians’ dilemma’, seemed doomed to 
failure and relegation to the performance management technical silo, as it was 
incompatible with the context. The potential strengths of being a small 
country were not brought into play, instead, because of the contextual 
incompatibility, weaknesses were exemplified and an unintentional bi-product 
was a lack of focus on citizens throughout the process.
In addition, lack of effective communication of this flexing of funding purpose, 
in the sense of moving from a motivator to something to ‘sweeten the deal’ 
seems to have created a ‘funding fog’ and unnecessary complexity and
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confusion. It also seems for some to have undermined the credibility of the 
process leading to claims of it becoming a ‘mockery’. There seem to be two 
messages; schemes have to be conceptually compatible with the context and, 
any change in purpose must be clearly communicated and understood by all 
the participants at all levels.
The extent to which the funding acted as a motivator either for service or 
corporate managers is debateable. This correlates with evidence of the 
English system discussed in Chapter 3. When combined with the difficulties 
identified as inherent in the allocation of short term funding, the vagaries of 
the implementation process itself and the politicians’ dilemma, it raises 
questions as to the robustness and appropriateness of organisational pay-for- 
performance schemes.
Achievement of the process outcomes seemed not to be dependent on the 
reward funding, which if anything seemed to cloud discussions and 
relationships, and intrinsic motivation seemed a stronger driver in the delivery 
of performance impacts than extrinsic motivation in the form of funding. Once 
the funding was included it may have encouraged undesirable behaviours by 
creating perverse incentives, increasing the risk of gaming, limiting ambition 
and partnership and encouraging budget maximisation to become the 
predominant motivation resulting in the creation of a siloed technocracy. If 
this is the case then the value of allocating funding at an organisational level 
based on managerial competency rather than citizen need should be 
questioned.
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Process - a recurring theme was the lack of seniority of the Welsh Assembly 
Government officials involved in the performance review sessions and the 
way in which this limited the discussions. Feelings on this ranged from the 
mildly bemused to a sense that this conveyed a lack of commitment to the 
process on the part of the Assembly Government. The latter was fanned by 
the inability of the Assembly Government, not through want of trying by 
officers leading the process, to mobilise widespread interest within its own 
departments in Policy Agreements. This was rather the result of an endemic 
lack of senior political and management interest and involvement. This 
seems to have created a vicious circle at local level reinforcing feelings of 
resentment and lack of commitment. The less than secret siloed behaviour of 
the Assembly Government may also have contributed to the lack of trust 
identified below.
This has to be set against the value which middle ranking officers placed on 
the discussions, and there is little doubt relationships between these officers 
did improve and develop over the period of the Agreement. However, these 
effects were not replicated at other levels in the system and reinforced the 
technical nature of the discussions identified above. This caused 
improvements in relationships to be limited and they became one rather than 
multi-dimensional. This meant at the all-Wales level there were no 
opportunities to feed local experience into national learning and vice versa.
It is as if the various levels were operating in isolation from each other rather 
than in harmony. Those at a national level seemed to have assumed that the
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‘warmth’ of their relationship would glow and spread to other parts of the 
system but, instead it seems to have cooled resulting in low levels of trust 
between local participants and the centre which were not mitigated by 
developing good relationships with junior and middle tier Assembly 
Government officials. This was reinforced by the mutual co-design at national 
level crowding out opportunities for universal local input into the development 
of the Agreements, exacerbated by limited wider consultation (See Chapter 3) 
-  again the value placed on being able to set targets locally and determine 
how they were to be achieved was undermined by the ‘joint’ national 
prescription of the framework.
A further undermining factor was the perceived lack of integration of Policy 
Agreements with other aspects of local government policy. This was felt to 
reinforce the marginalisation generated by the lack of political and senior 
commitment nationally and, was supplemented by a feeling that the 
Agreements were ‘top-down’. However, this was not a universal limiting factor 
as where mutual gain was identified by a local authority corporate centre in 
terms of driving its own agenda, the Agreements were seized, in conjunction 
with the Wales Programme for Improvement, as an opportunity to inculcate a 
performance culture amongst elected members and service managers.
This mix of factors associated with the funding and process implementation 
resulted in a multi-faceted differential impact, different between authorities, 
local corporate centres, elected members and officers. This, combined with
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the lost opportunities for learning, meant that Policy Agreements did not 
realise the potential identified for them by the Laffin et al (2002) study.
3. The Principles of PRP Schemes at an Organisational Level
Using the blended evidence from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 has enabled a lens to 
be focused on a previously under-researched area of the central-local 
performance agreement process in the form of the operational impact of 
rewards linked to outcomes, as well as providing new insight to explore other 
stages in these agreements. The above analysis provides some support for 
the use of this approach as participants were clearly making conceptual links 
between effort and performance and performance and rewards. However, the 
motivational impact of the reward grant seems limited in both the Welsh and 
English contexts and this model helps to explain why and raises questions as 
to the appropriateness and robustness of this practice. This issue will be 
further explored in Chapter 9 so that evidence from Chapter 8 may be 
considered in the analysis.
To complete the evaluation, the next chapter will review actual performance 
against baselines and consider whether there was a greater level of 
improvement in those areas included in the Agreements as opposed to those 
which were not. It will also build a multiple regression model to attempt to 
identify key aspects of the implementation process which might influence 
performance.
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CHAPTER 8
POLICY AGREEMENTS - FINAL PERFORMANCE 
Introduction
Previous chapters have considered the perceptions of stakeholders in relation 
to the Policy Agreement process through analysis of the questionnaire returns 
and a series of interviews. The latter also considered perceptions relating to 
the process outcomes and performance impacts of the Agreements. This 
Chapter aims to consider whether any actual performance impacts can be 
established.
Firstly, final performance against the Policy Agreement targets is considered 
by reference to published performance indicator data. Secondly, a regression 
model is built to determine the extent of variation in actual performance, which 
might be explained by baselines and any statistically significant, relevant 
factors relating to implementation, based on the evidence from Chapters 2, 3 
and 4.
Measuring Actual Performance
The results of the analysis of the questionnaire and interview data suggest 
that one of the objectives of Policy Agreements was to improve the 
performance of local authority services and that their implementation has had 
some limited perceived impact in that regard. However, measuring the actual 
impact of Policy Agreements upon performance is not straightforward for 
reasons including:
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The nature of the Policy Agreement process
>  All local authorities in Wales were included in the first round of 
Agreements and, therefore, no ‘control group’ exists against which to 
evaluate performance improvements.
> Likewise all authorities used the same set of performance indicators in 
their Agreements.
> It is not known how each individual local authority used its PIG funding. 
However, it could be argued that this is largely irrelevant as improved 
performance is not necessarily directly correlated with increased 
resources. Value for money in terms of the effectiveness of resource 
deployment using good management information systems is arguably the 
critical factor. Policy Agreements are about embedding these, pump 
priming might help initial improvements by allowing the development of 
good systems to support improved performance, but a more permanent 
solution is required to sustain it.
Contextual factors
>  Contextual factors such as published reports from regulators could have 
impacted on the resources and emphasis placed upon some of the 
services included in the Agreements over the three years. This is 
particularly the case in respect of social care where the Chief Inspector of 
Social Services had been highly critical of social service provision across 
Wales during the period of the Agreements. However, this has been seen 
as an all-Wales issue and in this case is likely to impact upon all 
authorities.
> The Welsh Assembly Government has targeted many of the areas in the 
Agreements with other forms of ‘support’ such as hypothecated grants and 
capacity building support. It has also prioritised the service areas in other 
ways, for example by setting a requirement for a plan to be submitted. 
Any service improvements may, therefore, not be solely attributable to 
Policy Agreements. This impacts upon all of the authorities.
> Local authorities may have already chosen these services as local priority 
areas and be targeting their unhypothecated resources at service 
improvement. In other words, the services might have improved in any 
case without the intervention of Policy Agreements. However, it is not 
possible to determine a breakdown of the resources applied to the specific 
services by individual local authorities by reference to their published 
accounts or National Assembly statistical returns. It is unlikely that local 
authorities would be able to supply this information, and, if it were 
possible, unlikely that returns would be received from all twenty two.
> Services may have improved or declined as a result of factors largely 
outside the control of the authority such as deprivation levels. However, 
these factors should be built into the baselines and targets.
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> Many of the areas covered by the Policy Agreement indicators are those 
where there have been entrenched problems such as delayed transfers of 
care between hospitals and social services. In these cases, significant 
improvement may only be possible over a period longer than three years. 
Also, in this example, the local authority will be heavily dependent on the 
co-operation of partner organisations such as the NHS.
Data problems
>  Measuring whether there has or has not been an improvement in the level 
of service is difficult in some areas covered by the Agreements. This is 
because the robustness of the baselines in some cases is questionable. 
Prior to the implementation of Policy Agreements some levels of service 
had not been measured, and therefore finding robust data for baselines 
was difficult. In some cases it was not possible and therefore no baselines 
exist.
> Some of the outturn data for the 2003/04 NAWPIs (National Assembly for 
Wales Performance Indicators) have been qualified by the relevant 
auditor.
> Determining whether or not targets have been achieved is difficult as 
different authorities took different perspectives on setting the targets. 
Some were purely aspirational, while others appear to be purely the 
maintenance of the status quo, and others look achievable but not 
demanding. However, it is noted that previous chapters have identified 
that the perception from local authorities is that the targets are demanding 
and achievable which may be what counts.
Similar difficulties were identified by Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) and Boyne 
and Law (2005) in relation to their evaluation work on LPSAs in England. 
However, despite these difficulties, the analysis would not be complete 
without some review of actual performance in the service areas covered by 
the Agreements. Appendix U uses the baseline performance agreed with the 
local authorities (see Appendix B - the baseline year was 2000-01, except for 
recycling which is 1999-00) to set out performance by local authority, by 
Policy Agreement indicator for 2003-04.
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No analysis has been published by the Welsh Assembly Government, and the 
following has, therefore, been compiled by reference to the NAWPIs (National 
Assembly for Wales Performance Indicators) for 2003-04 as published by the 
Local Government Data Unit Wales.
Analysing Actual Performance
Table 8.1 sets out the actual change in performance from the baseline for the 
Policy Agreement indicators. The change is also expressed as a percentage 
improvement or deterioration on the baseline. This provides not only the 
absolute change in performance but, an indication of the magnitude of the 
change (positive or negative) from the starting position. It is acknowledged 
that the latter is a crude indication but, it is important to try and put the level of 
improvement or deterioration in perspective. This sort of broad trend analysis 
must also be mindful that in some areas the client numbers are small, and 
therefore an individual case may have a significant influence on the 
percentages. That said, in most cases the indicators relate to vulnerable 
individuals, and therefore the handling of each case can have a significant 
impact on that person and his or her family.
Table 8.2 provides the same data for the non-Policy Agreement performance 
indicators over the same period. The purpose of this analysis is to determine, 
on a broad level, whether there has been a greater level of improvement in 
the Policy Agreement services as opposed to those which were not included 
in the Agreements. There are some gaps in the data due to changes in the 
definition of some indicators over the period.
284
TABLE 8.1: POLICY AGREEMENT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PERCENTAGE IMPROVEMENT ON BASELINE 2003/04
2.2 2.4 2.7 2.14 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.9
Percentage 
of pupils in 
schools 
maintained 
by the 
authority in 
the previous 
summer 
achieving 5 
or more 
GCSEs at 
grades A*-C 
or the 
vocational 
equivalent.
Percentage 
of 11 year 
olds in 
schools 
maintained 
by the 
authority in 
the previous 
summer 
achieving: 
Level 4 or 
above in the 
National 
Curriculum 
Key Stage 2
Percentage 
of 15/16- 
year-olds 
leaving full­
time 
education 
without a 
recognised 
qualification.
The
percentage
of
attendance, 
those 
present or 
on approved 
educational 
activities, in 
secondary 
schools.
The 
percentage 
of young 
people in 
care on their 
16th
birthday who 
have a care 
plan and/ or 
pathway 
plan for their 
continuing 
care
The 
percentage 
of first 
placements 
(for looked 
after 
children) 
beginning 
with a care 
plan in 
place.
The rate of 
older people 
(aged 65 or 
over) helped 
to live at 
home per 
1,000 
population 
aged 65 or 
over.
The rate of 
delayed 
transfer of 
care for 
social care 
reasons per 
1,000 
population 
aged 75 or 
over.
The
percentage 
of adult 
clients 
receiving a 
written 
statement of 
their needs 
and how 
they will be 
met.
2000-01 Average 
(Baseline)
49% 62% 3.44% 90% 82% 56% 91.2 17.51 84%
2003-04 Average 51% 80% 2.51% 91% 92% 80% 110.87 16.73 91%
% Improvement 5% 28% -27.11% 1% 12% 41% 22% -4% 9%
() = deterioration in 
performance
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TABLE 8.1: POLICY AGREEMENT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PERCENTAGE IMPROVEMENT ON BASELINE 2003/04
3.13 3.14a 3.14b 3.14c 3.15a 3.15b 5.1 a&b
The number 
of people 
aged 65 or 
over whom 
the authority 
supports in 
residential 
care homes 
or nursing 
homes per 
1,000 
population 
aged 65 or 
over
The number 
of physical 
or sensory 
disabled 
adults aged 
under 65 
whom the 
authority 
helps to live 
at home per 
1,000 adults 
under 65.
The number 
of learning 
disabled 
adults aged 
under 65 
whom the 
authority 
helps to live 
at home per 
1,000 adults 
under 65.
The number 
of adults 
with mental 
health 
problems 
aged under 
65 whom 
the authority 
helps to live 
at home per 
1,000 adults 
under 65.
The 
percentage 
of cases of 
children on 
the child 
protection 
register with 
an allocated 
social 
worker who 
is providing 
a service 
appropriate 
to the child's 
need.
The 
percentage 
of cases of 
children 
looked after 
with an 
allocated 
social 
worker who 
is providing 
a service 
appropriate 
to the child's 
need 
(exclude 
those 
children in 
group (a) 
above)
Total
tonnage of
municipal
waste
arisings:
percentage
recycled,
reused or
composted
2000-01 Average 
(Baseline)
28.41 3.69 3.27 2.53 93% 95% 6.83%
2003-04 Average 29.29 6.36 4.24 4.14 98% 98% 16.45%
% Improvement (3%) 73% 30% 63% 5% 4% 141%
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TABLE 8.2: NON POLICY AGREEMENT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PERCENTAGE IMPROVEMENT ON BASELINE
2003/04
2.1 2.3 2.5 (a) 2.5 (b) 2.5 (c) 2.5 (d) 2.6 2.8 (a) 2.8 (b)
Average Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Number of Number of
GCSE/GNV of pupils in of 14 year of 14 year of 14 year of 14 year of 15/16- pupils pupils
Q points schools olds in olds in olds in olds in year-olds permanently permanently
score of maintained schools schools schools schools achieving excluded excluded
15/16 year by the maintained maintained maintained maintained the ‘core during the during the
olds in authority by the by the by the by the subject year from year from
schools achieving authority in authority in authority in authority in indicator’. schools schools
maintained one or more the previous the previous the previous the previous Those pupils maintained maintained
by the GCSEs at summer summer summer summer achieving at by the by the
authority. grade G or achieving: achieving: achieving: achieving: least grade authority per authority per
above or the Level 5 or Level 5 or Level 5 or Level 5 or C in GCSE 1,000 pupils 1,000 pupils
vocational above on above on above on above on English or on rolls of on rolls of
equivalent. the National the National the National the National Welsh, schools schools
Curriculum Curriculum Curriculum Curriculum Mathematics maintained maintained
scale in scale in scale in scale in and Science by the by the
Mathematics English. Welsh (first Science. in authority: for authority: for
language). combination. primary secondary
schools schools.
2000-01 Average 38.55 92.54 61.92 62.00 69.97 63.48 35.96 0.24 1.56
(Baseline)
2003-04 Average 39.33 93.08 67.70 62.94 74.93 70.38 37.16 0.20 1.65
% Improvement 2% 1% 9% 2% 7% 11% 3% -19% (6%)
( )  = deterioration in performance
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TABLE 8.2: NON POLICY AGREEMENT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PERCENTAGE IMPROVEMENT ON BASELINE
2003/04
2.8 (c) 2.11 (a) 2.11 (b) 2.11 (c) 2.12(a) 2.12(b) 2.13(a) 2.13(b)
Number of pupils 
permanently excluded 
during the year from 
schools maintained by 
the authority per 1,000 
pupils on rolls of 
schools maintained by 
the authority: for 
special schools.
The
percentage
of
permanently 
excluded 
pupils 
attending: 
less than ten 
hours a 
week of 
alternative 
tuition.
The
percentage
of
permanently 
excluded 
pupils 
attending: 
between ten 
and twenty- 
five hours a 
week of 
alternative 
tuition.
The
percentage
of
permanently
excluded
pupils
attending:
more than
twenty-five
hours a
week of
alternative
tuition.
The
percentage 
of primary 
school 
classes with 
more than 
30 pupils in 
years: 
reception to 
two inclusive
The
percentage 
of primary 
school 
classes with 
more than 
30 pupils in 
years: three 
to six.
The number 
of
statements 
issued 
during the 
year.
Percentage
of
statements
with special
educational
need
prepared
within 18
weeks
excluding
those
affected by 
the
'exceptions 
to the rule' 
under the 
SEN Code 
of Practice.
2000-01 Average 
(Baseline)
1.75 62.02 23.47 12.98 1.99 16.30 84.50 77.33
2003-04 Average 1.78 34.45 49.29 16.26 2.55 11.41 85.45 74.63
% Improvement (2%) -44% *110% 25% (29%) -30% 1% (-3%)
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TABLE 8.2: NON POLICY AGREEMENT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PERCENTAGE IMPROVEMENT ON BASELINE
2003/04
3.1 3.2 (a) 3.2 (b) 3.5 3.6 (a) 3.6 (b) 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.15(c)
Stability of 
placements of 
children looked 
after by the 
authority by 
reference to 
the percentage 
of children 
looked after on 
31 March in 
any year with 
three or more 
placements 
during the 
year.
Educational 
qualifications 
of children 
looked after 
by reference 
to the 
percentage 
of young 
people 
leaving care 
aged 16 or 
over with one 
or more 
GCSE's at 
grades A*-G, 
or General 
National 
Vocational 
Qualification.
Educational 
qualifications 
of children 
looked after 
by reference 
to the
percentage of 
young people 
leaving care 
aged 16 or 
over with 2 or 
more GCSE's 
at grades A*- 
G, or General 
National 
Vocational 
Qualification.
Costs of 
services for 
children 
looked after 
by an
authority by 
reference to 
gross 
weekly 
expenditure 
per looked 
after child in 
foster care 
or in a 
children’s 
home.
Cost of 
providing 
social 
services to 
adults by 
reference to 
gross cost 
per week for 
residential 
and nursing 
home care.
Cost of 
providing 
social 
services to 
adults by 
reference 
to gross 
cost per 
week for 
home care.
The rate of 
assessments 
of people 
aged 65 and 
over per 1,000 
population 
aged 65 or 
over.
The number 
of nights of 
respite care 
provided or 
funded by 
the authority 
per 1,000 
population 
aged 18 or 
over.
The
percentage
of children
on the child
protection
register
whose
cases
should have 
been 
reviewed 
that were 
reviewed.
The
percentage 
of cases of 
children in 
need with an 
allocated 
social
worker who 
is providing 
a service 
appropriate 
to the child's 
need 
(exclude 
those 
children in 
group (a) 
and (b) 
above)
2000-01
Average
(Baseline)
8.10 40.74 414.98 203.59 130.57 99.58 66.70
2003-04
Average
9.94 43.99 36.97 539.43 493.64 144.97 150.02 107.69 83.10 80.95
% Improvement (23%) 8% (30%) (142%) 15% 8% 25%
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The performance against baselines may be summarised as follows:
TABLE 8.3: POLICY AGREEMENT AND NON POLICY AGREEMENT 
INDICATORS PERFORMANCE ‘TREND’ 2003-04
Total
Number
Education Social
Services
Waste
Policy
Agreement
Improved 16 4 10 1
No Change
Not Improved 1
Total 16 4 11 1
Average % 
Improvement
15.28% 23.64%
Non Policy 
Agreement
Improved 21 12A 4~
No Change
Not Improved 4 1
Total 21 16 5
Average % 
Improvement
7.53%* 6.6%
Average % 
Improvement
14%”
A excludes 2.13 (a)
-  excludes 3.5 and 3.6 (a)
* excludes 2.11 (b) from the average as this was considered to be an
exceptional result. 
“ includes 2.11 (b).
In terms of the Policy Agreement indicators, there has been an all-Wales 
improvement on the baseline for all the indicators except 3.13 but, this should 
be considered in conjunction with improvements in 3.8 and 3.7. However, this 
disguises a wide range of ‘patchy’ performance at individual local authority 
level, both in terms of exceeding the baseline and, whether targets have been 
met (Appendix U). The only area where there has been wholesale 
performance improvement is in recycling, but this area has also been the
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recipient of hypothecated funding, and could be ‘quick fixed’ in the short term 
with technical solutions.
This all-Wales level analysis is supported by findings from a review of the 
performance against baselines of the second round of Policy Agreements 
(Welsh Assembly Government, 2008) which demonstrated that all of the 
included indicators, bar one, showed an improvement over the Policy 
Agreement period (2004/05 to 2006/07) but, that this concealed a wide 
variation in the level of performance across authorities.
A number of the non-Policy Agreement indicators have been disregarded from 
the analysis in Table 8.3 as they relate purely to measures of activity in terms 
of the number of cases handled or costs. Many of these indicators also saw 
improvements on the baseline, but the magnitude of the improvements is not 
as great as for those indicators included in the Agreements. There could be a 
number of reasons for this. For example, it might be that discussions 
between Assembly and local government officials relating to performance 
tended to be service based, the evidence from Chapter 7 suggests that some 
‘silo’ to ‘silo’ discussions took place in education and social services, and/or 
the non-Policy Agreement services might have been the subject of other 
initiatives and/or the Policy Agreement funding might have been directed at 
the service as a whole.
However, the average percentage improvement for the education and social 
care indicators is higher for those included in the Policy Agreements than for
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those that were not. This is a simple, rough indication of rate of improvement, 
but does suggest that Policy Agreements might have contributed to an overall 
higher performance in these particular service areas. However, responses to 
Q31 (Focusing on specific service areas in this way has created a focus on 
these areas at the expense of others) showed that 60.5% of respondents 
agreed with this statement, which in a way corroborates these findings but, 
raises further questions as to whether these were the right areas to be 
focusing on in every area of Wales, whether the data might have been gamed 
or manipulated in some way (although NAWPIs are audited), whether these 
improvements are sustainable and, whether this focus resulted in a loss of 
coherence.
Because of the limitations identified earlier in this Chapter, it is still not 
possible to say absolutely whether the service improvements which have 
taken place might not have done so if Policy Agreements had not existed or 
indeed that they would have taken place in any case. However, there is one 
further piece of analysis which can be undertaken to attempt to identify 
whether the perceptions of key aspects of the implementation process (as 
measured by questionnaire responses) impact upon actual performance.
Perceptions and Performance
This final piece of analysis uses the questionnaire results for local authority 
service managers, on the assumption that it is these officers who are 
responsible for directly influencing performance by their behaviour (this was
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evident from the analysis of structured interview data in Chapter 7 and 
identified in the evaluation of the LPSA system reviewed in Chapter 3).
The aim is to identify whether a multivariate regression model can be 
developed by taking the statistically significant results from the multivariate 
analysis in Appendix S to build a model which will then identify whether a 
proportion of actual service performance is explained by the baseline 
performance and the critical implementation factors identified as significant. 
The analysis in Appendix S was undertaken as a means of filtering the large 
number of independent variables to identify those which were significant in 
relation to the various objectives of Policy Agreements (process outcomes 
and performance impacts). The limitations of this analysis are acknowledged 
in that the dependent variables relate to perceptions of the objectives of Policy 
Agreements rather than perceptions as to whether these objectives were 
actually achieved. The limitation of the timing of the questionnaire returns and 
the impact this may have had on some of the responses, especially those 
relating to the feedback stages of the process are also acknowledged.
In this model, actual performance becomes the dependent variable. The 
‘ideal' model would be able to match actual performance, baselines and local 
authority officer perceptions to the performance indicators included in the 
Policy Agreements. However, this was not possible for the following reasons:
• questionnaire returns were not received from every local authority and 
where returns were received not all of the services were ‘covered’ by 
returns from officers;
• 116 returns were received from officers working in finance, corporate 
services, scrutiny and cross cutting areas such as equal opportunities. 
These were rejected on the grounds that whilst their perceptions are
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important for the previous analysis, they had no ability to directly influence 
service performance;
• some indicators had to be excluded from the analysis because either the 
data on baselines or actual performance was incomplete; and,
• even when categories of indicator were ‘grouped’, where data existed, 
models were built but ‘n’ was not sufficient i.e. it was not possible to build a 
service based model because of limitations of the data. As follows:
Service n Comment
Education 11 Model ran but collinearity was 
outside tolerable limits.
Social care (older people) 9 As above.
Social care (younger people) 6 ‘n’ too small to run model.
Social care (adults) 8 As above.
Recycling 6 As above.
To overcome this data was standardised by converting it to a percentage of
the Welsh average. Then, within services the percentage of the Welsh
average was averaged by service to create a composite measure as follows:
• Education - an increase in the proportion of 11 year olds achieving at least 
level 4 in the core subject indicator (NAWPI 2.4) and an increase in the 
proportion of 15 year olds achieving 5 or more GCSEs (A* to C) or 
vocational equivalent (NAWPI 2.2)
• Social Care (Older People) - Older people helped to live at home per 1000 
population aged 65 or over (NAWPI 3.7) and older people in residential 
homes per 1,000 population aged 65 or over (NAWPI 3.13)
• Social Care (Adults) - People with physical and sensory disabilities helped 
to live at home per 1000 of the population under 65, people with learning 
disabilities helped to live at home per 1,000 population under 65, people 
with mental health problems helped to live at home per 1,000 of the 
population under 65 (NAWPI 3.14)
• Social Care (Children) - The percentage of placements for looked after 
children beginning with a care plan in place (NAWPI 3.4) and Young 
people looked after on their 16th birthday with a plan for continuing care 
(NAWPI 3.3)
• Recycling - an increase in the proportion of municipal waste recycled or 
composted (NAWPI 5.1)
To determine whether the building of such a model was feasible within the 
parameters of the available data, average actual performance per local
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authority per service was plotted against average baseline per local authority 
per service (see Figure 8.1) which illustrates a positive relationship between 
the two variables.
FIGURE 8.1: AVERAGE BASELINES 2000/01 (X) AND AVERAGE 
ACTUALS 2003/04 (Y) FOR ‘USEABLE’ POLICY AGREEMENT
INDICATORS
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This is important as it illustrates that whilst averaging the data ‘washes out’ 
the individual service affect to overcome the low ‘n’ per service, the approach 
has retained a positive relationship between the averaged baselines and 
performance per service. This facilitates the building of the regression model 
using averaged baselines as an independent, explanatory variable of average 
performance. This method is based on published research by Andrews at al 
(2006 and 2008).
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Building the Model
Having identified this positive relationship, further potential independent 
variables needed to be identified. It was determined that those independent 
variables in the multivariate analysis (Appendix S) of the performance impact 
research questions (5 and 6) identified as statistically significant would be a 
good starting point. Two variables were found to be significant in respect of 
research question 5, Q57 (The Policy Agreement process has raised 
expectations in terms of improved performance which can be met) and Q83 
(The funding linked to these Agreements is an incentive, i.e. to stimulate 
performance). Evidence from Chapter 7 supports the case for including these 
variables as a number of interviewees supported these statements in their 
description of how the process had been implemented in their authorities in 
conjunction with their service manager colleagues. Also, given the confusion 
over the role of the funding which emerged in Chapter 6 and the ‘funding fog’ 
which emerged in Chapter 7 it was felt important to include a variable relating 
to the funding in this analysis.
The regression analysis of research question 6 identifies Q84 (There has 
been adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement process as a whole 
when reviewing targets and baselines) and Q47 (Costs of collecting data to 
assess performance does not outweigh the benefits) as significant variables. 
This is supported by the literature review which identified that the perception 
of sitting down, thinking and talking about performance will have an impact on 
actual performance (provided that the process is cost effective). Again, the 
case seems compelling for inclusion in the model. Evidence from Chapter 7
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in relation to Q47 was mostly positive, while Q84 was less so, the majority of 
interviewees had placed value upon the discussions. It is noted that the local 
interviewees represented the corporate centre, however, the evidence in 
Chapter 7 suggests that their service manager colleagues valued similar 
discussions with service experts.
The regression models for the process outcomes were reviewed (Appendix S) 
to identify whether any further statistically significant variables should be 
included in the model. Q46 (Authorities have the freedom to decide how to 
meet targets) was significant in two models, research questions 1 and 2, while 
Q86 (NAW role has been to help local authorities constructively improve 
performance) was significant in models relating to research question 2 in 
respect of two separate dependent variables. Evidence from the interview 
data in Chapter 7 was strong in respect of Q46, but less so in relation to Q86. 
However, as above, value was placed on the discussions by the majority of 
corporate centre interviewees who suggested the same held true for their 
service manager colleagues. The final regression model is, therefore, as 
follows:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Actual Averaged Performance = Averaged baselines+Q46+Q86+Q57
+Q83+Q47+Q84
The following tables provide the descriptive statistics and the regression 
output for the model (actual performance for 2003/04 is the dependent 
variable).
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TABLE 8.4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PERFORMANCE REGRESSION MODEL
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
Variance Skewness Std. Error Kurtosis Std. Error
AVBL 65 135 34 169 92.815 22.998 528.903 0.364 0.297 1.503 0.586
AVACT 65 71 53 124 95.231 17.731 314.399 -0.808 0.297 0.313 0.586
Authority has the freedom to 
decide how to meet the targets 
(Q46)
64 6 1 7 4.656 1.645 2.705 -0.993 0.299 0.081 0.590
NAW role has been to help 
LAs constructively improve 
performance(Q86)
41 4 2 6 3.902 1.179 1.390 0.197 0.369 -0.930 0.724
Process has raised 
expectations of improved 
performance which can be met 
(Q57)
60 6 1 7 4.350 1.696 2.875 -0.272 0.309 -0.732 0.608
The funding is an incentive 
(Q83)
64 6 1 7 4.359 1.637 2.678 -0.448 0.299 -0.545 0.590
Costs of collecting data to 
assess performance do not 
outweigh the benefits (Q47)
65 5 2 7 4.600 1.498 2.244 0.002 0.297 -1.171 0.586
Adequate consideration of the 
PA process as a whole when 
reviewing targets and 
baselines (Q84)
59 6 1 7 3.661 1.493 2.228 -0.002 0.311 -0.998 0.613
Valid N 40
• the baseline for education and social care is 2000-01, for recycling 1999-00.
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TABLE 8.5: REGRESSION MODEL FOR ACTUAL AVERAGED 
PERFORMANCE 2003/04
Unstandardized
Coefficients T Sig.
B
Std.
Error
(Constant) 65.996 13.744 4.802 .000
AVBL .266 .095 2.798 .009
The Authority has the freedom to determine how 
to achieve improvements in its own performance 
(Q46)
.416 1.624 .256 .799
The role of the Assembly during review sessions 
has been to help local authorities constructively 
improve performance(Q86)
5.667 2.502 2.264 .030
The Policy Agreement process has raised 
expectations which can be met (Q57) .441 1.480 .298 .768
The funding linked to these Agreements is an 
incentive (Q83) .345 1.285 .268 .790
The cost of collecting information to measure 
progress towards targets does not outweigh the 
benefits it provides (Q47)
-.419 1.519 -.276 .785
There has been adequate consideration of the 
Policy Agreement process as a whole when 
reviewing targets and baselines (Q84)
-6.324 1.670 -3.787 001
a Dependent Variable: AVACT
N=40
R Squared = 0.521 
Adjusted R Squared= 0.417 
ANOVA Significance= 0.001 
F Value = 4.977
The shaded areas above show variables which are significant at a 10% level. 
No significant levels of collinearity were identified. This model was also tested 
for heteroscedasticity, none was found.
Analysis of Results
The model shows that the baseline is, as expected, a significant independent 
variable. It also shows that Q86 (NAW role has been to help local authorities 
constructively improve performance) has a positive statistical significance 
while Q84 (adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement process as a 
whole when reviewing targets and baselines) has a negative significance.
299
The Q86 result supports evidence in the literature review in Chapters 2, 3 and 
4 which identified that there is a tension between supporting and ‘policing’ 
performance and, that when support is seen as constructive this is more likely 
to have a positive impact on performance (Boyne and Chen, 2006 and Table 
4.1). Likewise, evidence from the structured interviews suggested that some 
local authority corporate officers placed value on the discussions with the 
Welsh Assembly Government, as did their service manager colleagues.
This appears to have been borne out by the model which is suggesting that in 
those local authorities where officers perceived the role of the Welsh 
Assembly Government as providing constructive support then performance 
was likely to improve. However, it must be remembered that regression 
significance is not absolute proof of causality as the relationship may be 
spurious. However, this result is also corroborated by the findings of Andrews 
et al (2008) who found that regulation which is viewed as supportive by 
service managers is likely to reinforce the effectiveness of a successful 
strategy and to shift a neutral strategy in a positive direction. “In other words, 
if the regulatory regime is seen as helpful, then the impact of local strategies 
for service improvement is enhanced” (p. 198).
Q84 (adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement process as a whole 
when reviewing targets and baselines) provides a more challenging and 
interesting result in that it has negative significance within the model. In the 
research question 6 regression model (Appendix S), this independent variable 
has a positive significance, the difference in the performance regression 
model result may be explained as follows.
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The original research question 6 model was run using all respondents with the 
variable (Q84) having the frequency distribution in the following first graph. 
The performance model was run using local authority officers directly involved 
in the running of the Policy Agreement services only as shown in the second 
graph.
FIGURE 8.2: Q84 ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OF THE POLICY 
AGREEMENT PROCESS AS A WHOLE - FREQUENCIES
The two sets of data have different profiles, with service managers being more 
negative as regards adequate review of the process as a whole when 
reviewing targets and baselines. This may be a realistic result and is 
evidenced by the analysis of interview data in Chapter 7. Corporate policy 
officers and elected members were more likely to have engaged with Welsh 
Assembly Government Local Government Division officials on the review of 
the process as a whole and, to see this as an important aspect of 
demonstrating value for money (research question 6) than their service
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manager counterparts. The latter were more likely to have been involved in 
‘silo to silo’ discussions with education or social services policy experts from 
the Assembly Government where the focus was on the services and not the 
process.
Therefore, whilst service managers are likely to see constructive support as 
important in improving performance and have experience of this from their silo 
to silo discussions, arguably they are less likely to have been involved in 
adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement process as a whole when 
reviewing targets and baselines. Therefore, they may perceive that this has 
not happened adequately (this is supported by the descriptive statistics - see 
Table 8.4 where the mean is 3.66 and there is negative skewness) - however, 
this has not affected their pursuit of improved performance. Thus, it is 
possible to have a negative perception amongst this group, they may see 
discussions about process as a distraction, but still have improved 
performance.
However, these results are counter to the review of literature in Chapters 2 
and 4 which suggested that review of overall process was a contributory factor 
to the overall success of the performance management schemes. However, 
for local authority service managers there is also a statistically significant 
negative correlation between Q84 and actual performance (2003/04) which 
bears out the performance regression model’s results and the suggestion that 
these officers potentially see discussion about process as detracting from 
delivering improvement. However, this may limit the potential for learning 
transfer and widespread ownership of and commitment to the process.
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TABLE 8.6: CORRELATION ACTUAL PERFORMANCE 2003/04 AND Q84
AVACT
Adequate 
consideration of the 
PA process as a 
whole when reviewing 
targets and baselines 
(Q84)
Spearman's
rho
AVACT Correlation
Coefficient 1.000 -.2590
Sig. (2- 
tailed) .048
N 65 59
Adequate
consideration of the 
PA process as a 
whole when 
reviewing targets 
and baselines (Q84)
Correlation
Coefficient
-.259(*) 1.000
Sig. (2- 
tailed) .048
N
59 59
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
This result may provide some limited supporting empirical evidence for the 
findings of Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) discussed in Chapter 3. They found 
differing expectations amongst local stakeholders in the LPSA process where 
the reward grant was seen as a powerful incentive in the corporate centre but, 
amongst service managers the emphasis was more on delivering a better 
service for local people with a strong commitment to achieving sustained 
improvement. The LPSA process was seen as a distraction to this. Therefore, 
for organisational wide schemes, review of the process as a whole is 
important at some level in the organisation but, perhaps not at all.
A further possibility to explain this result relates to the nature of the 
Performance Incentive Grant. As noted above, the actions of service 
managers are more likely to deliver improved services if they believe that the
role of the Welsh Assembly Government in discussions is to provide 
constructive support for improvement. From the service manager’s 
perspective, the ‘incentive’/ ’reward’ element of the Policy Agreements may not 
have been perceived to be as important as the support, therefore 
demonstrating its ‘value for money’ is important to the organisation as a whole 
but not necessarily to individual service managers. This again supports the 
findings of Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) in relation to LPSAs.
In Wales this might have been even more of a rationale, as the funding was 
unhypothecated and not linked to performance in particular services. The 
evidence in Chapter 7 suggests that the funding was rarely, if ever, deployed 
specifically on activity to support the delivery of the Policy Agreement targets. 
Therefore, to the organisation as a whole the review process is important, as 
was minimising the process costs (Q47) to demonstrate value for money to 
citizens of the Policy Agreement process, i.e. benefits exceed costs. 
However, at individual service manager level improved performance is driven 
by ‘stronger’ variables, in particular the non-financial, constructive support 
offered by Welsh Assembly Government policy specialists. The following 
correlation highlights that for service managers no statistically significant 
association exists between actual performance and funding as an incentive, 
which is supported by evidence from Chapter 7 that service managers ‘just 
got on with it’.
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TABLE 8.7: CORRELATION ACTUAL PERFORMANCE 2003/04 AND Q83
AVACT
The funding 
is an 
incentive 
(Q83)
Spearman's rho AVACT Correlation
Coefficient 1.000 .013
Sig. (2-tailed) .922
N 65 64
The funding is an 
incentive (Q83)
Correlation
Coefficient .013 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .922
N 64 64
This may also help to explain some of the mixed messages identified earlier in 
relation to funding and, may be an explanation as to why the variable relating 
to incentive funding (Q83) has not been identified as significant in this model. 
This may suggest that different theoretical frameworks need to be applied at 
different levels in local authorities. As identified in Chapter 7, at the overall 
level there seemed to be some conceptual acceptance that funding might 
motivate. However, at the service manager level, these confusions are not so 
apparent, as what seems to be more valued is practical support from national 
specialists to help improve services.
Conclusions
This Chapter has considered the actual performance of Welsh local 
authorities against the Policy Agreement targets and baselines. It has noted 
the difficulties inherent in considering this performance but, has identified an 
overall upward trend in performance, both for services included in Policy 
Agreements and those which were not. It has also noted that performance at 
individual local authority level is ‘patchy’ and that in average percentage terms
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the improvement in those services included in the Agreements was greater 
than those which were not.
The limitations of the construction and the results of the multiple regression 
model are acknowledged. The results identified that the baseline and Q86 
(the role of the Assembly Government in helping authorities constructively to 
improve performance) were significant. This was very much supported by 
evidence identified in the previous chapter and the literature review.
Q84 (adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement process as a whole 
when reviewing targets and baselines) was also found to be significant, but 
negatively. This variable was also negatively statistically significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable of average actual performance. This 
raises some interesting questions about the transferability of some of the 
premises from individual performance management to an inter-organisational 
approach.
These results highlight and provide limited, corroborative empirical evidence 
for the conclusions drawn in Chapter 7 and studies relating to the English 
system (Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005) of the possibility of different drivers for 
different local actors in the performance agreement arena. Funding and the 
ability to influence and develop the overall process may be important for 
corporate centres, but for service managers the ability to receive constructive 
support from national experts is potentially a more powerful driver, together 
with a desire to improve services based on professional pride and public 
service ethos.
306
The results also highlight that service managers do not appear to see the 
attachment of funding to the Agreements as a significant motivator. This is 
supported by and supports evidence in Chapters 3 and 7. Again highlighting 
that those at different levels and with different roles in local authorities may be 
motivated by different things. To those with the most likely significant impact 
on service improvement, funding was not identified as explaining a statistically 
significant proportion of the variation in the independent variable of actual 
performance.
However, the approach to funding may have contributed to ‘winning over’ 
some local senior managers and politicians to the process, as evidence from 
Chapters 6 and 7 suggests it was perceived as an incentive. The flip side is 
that it appears to have caused confusion in terms of what the funding was 
actually for. It was conceived and sold as a PRP equivalent but, in 
Expectancy Theory terms, no strong, clear links were created in the 
implementation between performance and reward. The question is whether 
this matters for service managers if other more powerful drivers, such as the 
effects of participation in target setting are at play.
The evidence when considered together suggests that Governments may 
have been premature is supposing that the premises relating to individual 
PRP could be ‘simply’ transferred to the operation of such agreements at an 
organisational level. The operational complexity and different drivers for 
different local participants mean that implementation needs to be alert to the 
triumvirates of interaction between funding, support and self motivation and, 
local corporate centres, local service managers and central officials during the
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operationalisation of the schemes. Chapter 7 evidence also suggests that 
governments need to be alive to the contextual compatibility of the proposed 
scheme.
The evidence that the individuals who are in a position to influence the 
‘success’ of the implementation process are motivated by different things does 
not necessarily preclude the aggregation of these individual motivators into a 
collective model for inter-organisational performance management, but if 
funding is involved there needs to be clarity over its purpose. To overcome 
some of the limitations identified in Chapter 7, the conclusion may be drawn 
that in future service managers should be included in the review of the overall 
process as this might result in improvements to process which further drive 
improvements in performance. However, this would need to be carefully 
constructed so as not to be perceived as a distraction from improving services 
for these individuals. This might be overcome by underlining the opportunities 
for national learning and shared improvement.
The next chapter will draw together all of the analysis from previous chapters, 
and consider what conclusions may be drawn as to whether Policy 
Agreements have contributed to culture change and improved performance in 
the public sector in Wales and, what lessons might be learnt for future theory 
and practice.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction
One of the greatest debates in public policy has been the nature of central- 
local government relations. At one end of the spectrum are the forces of 
centralism and control and, at the other, the forces of localism and self- 
determination. A key question arising from the debate is ‘what is the most 
appropriate performance framework to generate and deliver improvements in 
service performance in local government?’
The development and implementation of Policy Agreements in Wales was 
noted as an opportunity to explore this performance management relationship 
in some depth and provide new evidence, as the area had not been the 
subject of any previous evaluations. It was also identified that value could be 
added by considering the Agreements in a framework developed from 
evidence relating to performance management regimes based on target 
setting in the public sector, including evidence from the development of such 
systems in England. This could provide corroborative evidence for these 
studies (Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005; Boyne and Law, 2005) and new 
evidence of the implementation process and impact of the Agreements for 
both policy making in Wales (Lewis, 2001; Chelimsky, 1997; Drakeford, 2006; 
Jeffery, 2006) and, maximising the benefits of devolution (Downe et al, 2007; 
Martin and Andrews, 2009) and minimising the potential for isolationism 
(Hockridge, 2006; Laffin, 2009).
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Finally, organisational pay-for-performance schemes in the public sector are 
an under-researched area and there is a limited amount of literature and 
theory development in this field. However, governments are adopting these 
schemes on the assumption they will operate in a similar fashion to individual 
schemes but with little understanding of their effect, appropriateness or impact 
(Reiter et al, 2006). In conjunction to this, it was identified that evidence from 
individual PRP schemes might provide a lens through which to consider the 
operation of organisational pay-for-performance schemes (Boyne and Chen, 
2006). Again this provided an opportunity to develop theory in this previously 
under researched area.
Aims of the Thesis
This thesis therefore aimed to provide new, original insight and evidence in 
relation to both the implementation process and effects of Policy Agreements 
and, identify the resulting implications for theory and the literature relating to 
organisational performance schemes in the public sector, especially those 
with a pay-for-performance element and to central-local relations. The specific 
aims of the thesis identified in Chapter 1 were to consider:
• The effectiveness of the first round of Policy Agreements in relation to 
improving the performance of local authority services and delivering 
desired process outcomes.
• What worked and what did not in relation to the policy implementation 
of the first round of Policy Agreements.
• The contribution of the first round of Policy Agreements to the 
development of central-local relations in Wales during the period 2001- 
02 to 2003-04.
• Whether using a lens which includes the principles relating to 
performance management/PRP schemes for individuals, provides new 
insight into considering inter-governmental ‘pay-for-performance’ 
schemes and contributes to the development of theory in this regard, 
including whether the governmental assumption of transferability is 
robust and appropriate.
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These aims, if achieved, as well as contributing to the development of theory 
in relation to organisational performance schemes and central-local relations, 
will enable lessons for policy making in Wales to be identified and, also 
provide evidence for qualitative comparison with other regimes in the UK. 
This will enable the benefits of devolution to be maximised whilst at the same 
time acting as a counterforce to isolationism. This evidence includes 
identification of different drivers for service improvement in different contexts. 
It has been identified that the latter issue is becoming critical in Wales as a 
result of focus in the current stage of devolution being put upon service 
improvement (Andrews and Martin, 2007).
Building the Research Framework
To provide context for the evaluation of Policy Agreements, Chapter 2 traced 
the history of central-local relations prior to Welsh devolution (Stewart, 2000; 
Wilson, 2001) which included evidence on the development of the 
modernisation agenda (Benington, 2000; Martin 1999, 2000; Brooks, 2000). It 
was noted that, continuing on from NPM (Hood, 1991), there was emphasis 
within the modernisation agenda on using performance management regimes 
to drive change in the delivery of public services (Haubrich and McClean, 
2006; Boyne and Law, 2005; Lapsley, 2008). The theory and practice behind 
these schemes was explored and key lessons identified. It was also identified 
that organisational pay-for-performance schemes are an under-researched 
area (Reiter et al, 2006) and that literature relating to individual PRP schemes 
could provide a lens through which to consider their operation and impact 
(Boyne and Chen, 2006).
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Chapter 2 also explored Welsh central-local relations post-devolution where it 
was highlighted that a divergence occurred from the English model, not only 
in terms of the nature of the relationship, which was identified as more mutual 
and ‘trusting’ (Laffin et al, 2002; Wilson, 2003; Jeffery, 2006), but also in the 
policies developed (Laffin, 2004; Drakeford, 2006; Martin and Webb, 2009; 
Brand, 2007). It was also noted that the latest debates relating to the 
extension of powers in the context of Welsh devolution have moved on from 
the creation of distinctive Welsh policies to meet the needs of Wales to the 
delivery of better services (Andrews and Martin, 2007). It was identified that 
this makes learning the lessons from what works, both within Wales and other 
countries, even more critical. However, it was also noted that no formal, 
published policy evaluation, either of the Welsh system as a whole or specific 
components of it, has ever been undertaken and, therefore, a gap in learning 
and knowledge existed. When combined with the under-researched area of 
organisational pay-for-performance schemes in the public sector (Reiter et al, 
2006), the potential for learning across devolved performance regimes in the 
UK (Martin and Andrews, 2009; Downe et al, 2007) and the opportunity to 
minimise isolationism amongst devolved administrations (Hockridge, 2006), a 
powerful case emerges for a policy evaluation of Policy Agreements in Wales 
as this could provide an original contribution to knowledge in all of these areas 
of theory and practice.
Chapter 3 continues to build the evaluation model by considering literature 
relating to local government pay-for-performance schemes in England 
including LPSAs (Boyne and Law, 2005; Boyne and Chen, 2006; Young,
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2005; Entwistle and Enticott, 2007; Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005) and LAAs 
(Gillanders and Ahmad, 2007; Brand, 2008; Russell, 2008; Sullivan, 2008). It 
was identified that many of the key issues highlighted in Chapter 2 relating to 
performance management regimes using target setting were corroborated by 
evidence from the operation of these schemes, for example, a higher level of 
‘stretch’ target did not necessarily enhance the impact on performance. It was 
noted that participants at different levels in the system, and sometimes on the 
same level, did not have similar perceptions as to the purpose and nature of 
the agreements. It was also noted that the effect of funding was variable 
across the categories of participants and, that funding was not necessarily the 
strongest driver of improving performance. However, it was identified that this 
literature did not explicitly question the appropriateness or robustness of the 
organisational reward element of the schemes.
The development of Policy Agreements in Wales was also explored in this 
Chapter (Laffin et al, 2002; Jeffery, 2006; Bradbury and Mitchell, 2005) and it 
was identified that they had many commonalities with the agreements in 
England, for example, multiple objectives relating to both improving 
performance and process outcomes were identified. However, opportunities 
for learning about the drivers of service improvement in different contexts 
(Martin and Andrews, 2009) and maximising the benefits of devolution 
(Downe et al, 2007; Hockridge, 2007) had been limited as there was no 
comparative analysis of the Welsh system. Also, whilst the evidence on the 
English system had considered the role of funding and identified some 
potentially interesting areas for exploration, it had not made reference to
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evidence from individual PRP schemes which seemed to be implicit in the 
governmental assumption of the appropriateness of transfer of these 
arrangements to an organisational level (Boyne and Chen, 2006; Reiter et al, 
2006).
Chapter 4 therefore reviews the theory, including Expectancy and Goal 
Setting Theories (Vroom, 1964; Locke, 1968; M ento et al, 1987), and 
evidence relating to individual PRP schemes, in particular those in the public 
sector (Wragg et al, 2003; Lapsley, 2008; Mahoney, 2004). The importance 
of the public sector ethos and professionalism are identified as factors which 
need to be considered in the design and operation of these schemes 
(Pratchett and Wingfield, 1996; Lapsley, 2008). This complements evidence 
in Chapter 2 of the effect of management by targets and detailed inspection 
and regulation upon public service professions (Boyne and Chen, 2006; 
Farrell and Morris, 1999). Chapter 4 also identifies that evidence relating to 
the effectiveness and impact of these schemes is inconclusive, especially in 
the public sector where the evidence suggested a lack of response to a 
financial incentive (Mahoney et al, 2004; Marsden e t al, 2000). The best that 
might be said is no-one can prove PRP schemes improve performance but 
no-one can prove they do not (Oliver, 1996; Lewis, 2001). Arguably, this 
renders the issue that governments are applying these schemes at 
organisational level without any evidence or understanding of their impact 
even more concerning (Reiter et al, 2006) and provides compelling evidence 
for further studies in this under researched area (see T ab le  4.1).
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Many shared themes are identified from the PRP literature with the evidence 
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, for example, schemes being introduced not 
only to improve performance but also to change culture. However, the PRP 
literature provided additional dimensions for consideration in the design and 
development of an evaluation framework for Policy Agreements which had not 
been considered in previous studies of organisational pay-for-performance 
schemes (Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005; Boyne and Law, 2005; Reiter et al,
2006), for example, the importance of understanding motivation and using 
motivation theories to inform the design of the scheme, the ‘social pressures’ 
which might be at work during the determination of the reward level, the 
possibility of PRP becoming ‘normalised’ and, being alive to the conflicting 
roles within the system of performance improvement and reward 
determination.
Chapter 5 used consolidated evidence from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 to build an 
evaluation model for Policy Agreements. The first element consisted of a 
postal questionnaire. This quantitative method was an application of the 
theory identified in earlier chapters. The survey was distributed and returned 
before the end of the Policy Agreement period. The research design explains 
that interviews are used to triangulate the questionnaire evidence by exploring 
the implementation process in more depth and, collect evidence as to the final 
impacts of the Agreements in a way which the questionnaires could not 
because of their timing.
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The interviews also provide ‘rich’ evidence as to the implementation process 
to gain an understanding of what worked and what did not (Lewis, 2001; 
Drakeford, 2006). Finally, the interviews were also designed to enable the 
development of theory by the building of evidence as to the robustness and 
appropriateness of the governmental assumption of the transferability of the 
principles of individual PRP schemes to organisational levels.
Limitations of this Research
This research has adopted a partially quantitative approach. There has been 
triangulation with qualitative data gathered from free-form responses on the 
questionnaires (Chapter 6), the observation of several of the Policy 
Agreement feedback meetings (Chapter 3), observation of meetings between 
the national stakeholders (Chapter 3) and interview data (Chapter 7). 
Nonetheless, the limitations of the quantitative data must be acknowledged in 
that they represent a snapshot in time and, the data is based on the 
perceptions of individuals and thus subject to potential bias.
The quantitative data is also limited by the timing of the distribution of the 
questionnaire (before the end of the Agreements) and therefore is unable to 
provide evidence as to the impact of the Agreements, only perceptions as to 
their objectives. There is potential for same source bias, as the size of the 
population precluded segregation of the collection of the data relating to 
objectives and that relating to critical success factors. The questionnaire 
response rate is also low and attempts have been made to mitigate all of 
these weaknesses with the design of the interview programme.
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Despite a low response rate, adequate numbers of questionnaires were 
returned to undertake group by group analysis on elected members and local 
authority officers, this was not the case for the two Assembly Government 
groups, Assembly Members and officers. The groupings had to be combined 
to facilitate a group analysis. Again attempts are made to mitigate for this in 
the interview programme by interviewing two Assembly Government officers 
and a special advisor to provide the political perspective.
The study has attempted to overcome criticism associated with literature 
relating to individual PRP schemes, in that it has sought the views of both 
‘sides’ party to Policy Agreements in both the questionnaire distribution and 
the interview programme. However, this does not completely remove the 
potential for bias.
The interviews were conducted in January to March 2009 which was almost 
five years after the end of the Agreements in March 2004. There was a 
danger, because of the time elapsed, that the interviewees’ recall of the 
events would not be as clear as it might have been at the time. However, 
efforts were made during the interviews to set the scene and interviewees 
seemed to have good recall of the events. As noted, there is a danger of bias 
in the interview responses but, the elapse of time may have enabled 
interviewees to feel more removed from the events which took place five 
years previous, for example, some had moved to different jobs and/or 
organisations. Also, the time elapse facilitated comparison with and reflection 
on the second round of Policy Agreements (2004/05 to 2006/07).
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In the case of the performance impacts, the research has attempted to 
mitigate both the effects of same source bias and perception bias (both in the 
interview and questionnaire data) by using audited performance data to 
review actual performance against the Policy Agreement baselines and build 
a regression model to identify factors which might have affected that 
performance. However, it must be acknowledged that this data in itself has 
limitations, such as being the subject of audit qualifications and the quality of 
the measurement process.
Likewise the consideration of the performance indicator data and the 
interpretation of this in relation to the impact of Policy Agreements have 
several limitations relating to the nature of the process, for example there was 
no control group. Also contextual factors may also have impacted on 
performance, such as many of the service areas in the Agreements were in 
receipt of hypothecated funding during the period. It is only therefore possible 
to draw very limited conclusions as to the impact of Policy Agreements upon 
performance by use of this data.
The data limitations of the performance indicator information are replicated in 
the development of the multiple regression analysis model in Chapter 8 which 
is also limited by the data on critical success factors being based on the 
questionnaire respondents’ perceptions of their presence in the process. The 
interpretation of the data from the model is limited as regression analysis is 
not absolute proof of a relationship, any relationships found might be
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spurious. Attempts are made to mitigate these limitations by triangulation of 
the results with evidence in Chapters 3 and 7.
This research has examined only one element of the framework of the 
relationship between local authorities and the Welsh Assembly Government. 
It has attempted to identify the perceived fit of this aspect of policy with other 
key aspects of local government policy in Wales, but there was no meta­
evaluation of the ‘modernisation’ agenda during the relevant period so it is not 
possible to place this work in that wider context.
The research is set in Wales. Whilst on the one hand this is a strength, as no 
previous research has been undertaken in this context, it is also a potential 
limitation. The contextual nature of the Welsh policy space has unique 
characteristics which might limit the transferability of this research to other, 
larger countries. However, it has been identified that qualitative studies could 
help to provide evidence to develop an understanding of what drives service 
improvement in the different contexts of devolution in the UK (Martin and 
Andrews, 2009) and this study might also help to provide evidence to 
maximise the benefits of devolution (Downe et al, 2007) and limit the potential 
for isolationism (Hockridge, 2006). It also provides evidence on the nature of 
Welsh central-local relations to enable comparisons, for example, with 
England (Laffin, 2009).
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The researcher is an officer of the Welsh Assembly Government who during 
the period of the research worked on local government finance and public 
service reform policy. Whilst this provides some advantages in terms of prior 
knowledge of the Welsh system and key participants, it could lead to issues of 
reflexivity as bias might creep into the research process. This was guarded 
against by self-checking and the process of independent supervision.
As Wales is a small policy space, it is likely that the researcher’s name was 
known to many of the questionnaire respondents. Efforts were made to 
explain the researcher was undertaking an independent piece of research and 
the University was used as a return address to mitigate against potential bias. 
Likewise all of the interviewees were known in a personal capacity through 
working relationships by the researcher, so time was taken at the start of each 
interview to explain the terms of the interview and that it was part of providing 
evidence for an independent piece of research.
Discussion and Overview of Evidence - Thesis Aims 1, 2 and 3
• The effectiveness of the first round of Policy Agreements in relation to 
improving the performance of local authority services and delivering 
desired process outcomes.
• What worked and what did not in relation to the policy implementation 
of the first round of Policy Agreements.
• The contribution of the first round of Policy Agreements to the 
development of central-local relations in Wales during the period 2001- 
02 to 2003-04.
The following questions were identified as key issues to be considered in 
relation to determining the impact and effectiveness of Policy Agreements:
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RQi Have Policy Agreements helped to create a culture of ‘self-improvement’ 
in local authorities? A culture of self-improvement is defined as local 
authorities focusing on outcomes rather than inputs, proactively seeking 
continuous improvement rather than acting on external stimuli such as 
inspection and regulation.
RQ2 Have Policy Agreements helped to change culture in the Welsh 
Assembly Government? A change of culture in the Welsh Assembly 
Government is defined as demonstration of the Assembly Government 
focusing on results and outcomes rather than inputs, i.e. greater discretion for 
local authorities to determine where to deploy resources and fewer 
requirements for local authorities to produce strategies and plans.
RQ3 Has the Policy Agreement process ‘added value’ to the relationship 
between the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities? ‘Added 
value’ is defined as a greater understanding between the parties and more 
effective communication.
RQ4 Have Policy Agreements contributed to ‘cohesive’ strategic planning at 
national and local levels? ‘Cohesive’ strategic planning is defined as ‘joined- 
up’ strategic planning between local authorities and the Welsh Assembly 
Government based on shared and agreed priorities.
RQs Have Policy Agreements contributed to improved service performance in 
local authorities? Improved service performance is defined as a shift towards 
meeting or exceeding the targets set out in the Policy Agreements.
RQe Have Policy Agreements provided ‘value for money’? ‘Value for money’ is 
defined as increased efficiency in service delivery outweighing the ‘costs’ of 
Policy Agreements where cost equals Performance Incentive Grant plus 
administration costs.
Evidence from Chapter 6 suggested that questionnaire respondents perceived 
these, with the exception of eliminating the need for external inspection and 
regulation and minimising requirements for strategies and plans, to be the 
objectives of Policy Agreements. However, evidence from Chapter 7 
suggests that none of the objectives were met in full, some were partially met 
and others were not met at all. For example, focusing on outcomes rather 
than inputs and driving self-improvement were only partially met as the 
opportunities to achieve the objectives were limited, both by the siloed nature 
of the implementation process which undermined a true outcome focus and 
alienated partnership working and, the fact that other ‘tools’ such as the 
Wales Programme for Improvement were perceived as stronger drivers in
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achieving these objectives. Indeed, in some areas Policy Agreements were 
seen as irrelevant and an additional layer of complexity.
Likewise the evidence from Chapter 7 suggests that perceived increasing 
levels of hypothecation may have been slightly abated by the implementation 
of the Agreements. However, this was undermined by the short term nature 
of the Policy Agreement funding, the way in which the Agreements were 
operationalised and, a local feeling of ‘backdoor hypothecation’ resulting from 
a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to determining the targets, so that the objective 
relating to providing local authorities with the freedom where to deploy their 
resources was met only to a very limited extent.
Critically, the interview evidence suggests that Policy Agreements had an 
extremely limited impact on changing culture in the Welsh Assembly 
Government. The evidence in Chapter 7 suggests there was no significant 
change in the behaviour of Ministers or senior officials as a result of the 
Agreements and their perceived lack of commitment seems to have reinforced 
the marginal levels of local enthusiasm for the Agreements. Ministers 
remained attached to ‘old school’ levers such as specific grants for getting 
their imperatives delivered rather than using potentially powerful, ‘small 
country’ approaches, such as wide-spread Ministerial engagement (Andrews 
and Martin, 2007). This further reinforced the local perception of Policy 
Agreements as an extra layer in the system rather than driving a de-layering 
of complexity.
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The interview evidence in Chapter 7 suggests that the actual impact of Policy 
Agreements on the relationship between the Welsh Assembly Government 
and local authorities was very limited. Relationships at a national level were 
perceived to be ‘good’ by both the Welsh Assembly Government and the 
WLGA (this also reflects evidence in Chapter 2) but, the questionnaire 
responses relating to trust discussed in Chapter 6 suggested this was not 
replicated throughout Wales at all the levels in the system. The way in which 
the Agreements were implemented meant the improvement in relationships 
was limited to junior to middle ranking officers and corporate centre to 
corporate centre and thus were one-, rather than multi-dimensional.
In most, but not all, cases value was placed upon the improvement of these 
corporate relationships but, the evidence suggests these improvements did 
not radiate out to local elected members, ‘other’ Ministers, ‘other’ senior 
Assembly Government officials, all chief executives or senior local service 
managers. This served to reinforce the inevitability of review discussions 
becoming technically focused and about the shared corporate centre goal of 
better systems, rather than focusing on citizens and service improvement.
This also meant the Agreements, after the initial rush, lost profile as a policy 
‘tool’ and, when combined with the perceived laissez-faire approach to the 
funding, this became self-reinforcing of the loss of credibility of the 
Agreements as a tool for either improving services or processes. The 
interview data suggests that the second round, despite an injection of funding, 
the inclusion of local indicators and commitment from those officers involved
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with implementing the process locally and nationally, never recovered from 
this position.
The interview data in Chapter 7 relating to impact also suggests there was an 
appetite and support for alignment of priorities but, that Policy Agreements 
failed in the operationalisation. Firstly, the alignment with ‘Wales: A Better 
Country’ (National Assembly for Wales, 2002) was felt to be superficial, which 
was reinforced by the continued siloed behaviour of Assembly Government 
Ministers and senior officials. Secondly, the entirely national frame of the first 
round, despite being co-designed with the WLGA, was felt to have provided 
clarity on national priorities but not coherence, as local priorities were entirely 
excluded. This meant the ripple effect of Policy Agreements locally was 
limited and only the minority of authorities integrated the targets in to key local 
strategic documents such as the community plan. The latter also provides 
evidence that Policy Agreements effectively ‘side-lined’ partnership working. 
It also meant that despite more flexibility as regards the inclusion of local 
targets in the second round, the Agreements retained a reputation for being 
‘top-down’.
The entirely national focus of the targets also did nothing to address the trust 
issues identified above and, whilst the perceived ‘top-down’ nature of the 
agreements by local participants did not entirely exclude commitment to the 
process where there was a shared agenda of developing a performance 
culture, it did undermine commitment in those areas where this was not the 
case.
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It also meant the positive process impact of involvement in the target setting 
process was tainted by the lack of input into the choice of indicators and, 
made participation a less powerful driver than it might have been amongst 
service managers. This was particularly important as participation in the 
target setting process was perceived as a powerful driver amongst this group, 
where professional pride and the public service ethos were felt to be 
strongest. Their commitment was perceived to be predicated upon this, given 
the retention of the Policy Agreement funding at the centre of local authorities.
The interview evidence relating to service performance impact from Chapter 7 
suggests a qualified achievement of this objective. The perceptions of 
interviewees were that performance did improve in the areas included in the 
agreements but, it was questioned whether this related to holistic and 
sustainable improvement. Success was also qualified on the basis of a lack 
of salience of the scheme, it becoming a focus purely on numbers rather than 
citizens and that it was a contributory, rather than a driving factor in improving 
service performance.
Chapter 8 explored actual final service performance against the Policy 
Agreement baselines by reference to published, audited performance 
indicator data. It was identified that there were many difficulties inherent with 
the data and the nature of the analysis and, some of these had also been 
found to be present in the reviews of the English system considered in 
Chapter 3. Acknowledging these limitations, it was found that performance 
against the baselines included in the Policy Agreements had improved more
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than in those areas which were not, but these had also improved. This all- 
Wales improvement disguised a wide range of local ‘patchy’ performance 
against baselines and the only area where there had been wholesale 
improvement was in recycling. However, again because of other interventions 
in the form of a large hypothecated grant this could not be solely attributed to 
Policy Agreements. Similar results were identified in relation to a published 
review of performance against baselines of the second round of Policy 
Agreements (Welsh Assembly Government, 2008).
However, it is still not possible to say absolutely whether Policy Agreements 
were a significant driver in achieving these improvements and questions still 
remain as to whether these were the ‘right’ areas to be focusing on across the 
whole of Wales (see response to Q31, Table 6.4), whether the data might 
have been gamed or manipulated, whether the improvement is sustainable 
and whether focusing on these areas created a loss of coherence.
The regression model in Chapter 8 carries forward all of the data limitations 
identified above, as well as the limitations of the questionnaire data and the 
model itself. These limitations are acknowledged but, the evidence generated 
provides some corroboration for earlier findings. Service managers perceived 
a relationship between a Welsh Assembly Government role of helping local 
authorities to improve their performance as being significant in actually 
delivering improvement.
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This supports findings in Chapter 7 that service managers were felt by their 
corporate colleagues to have valued silo to silo discussions with their national 
policy expert counterparts. However, discussions about the system as a 
whole were found to be negatively related to improving performance, 
suggesting they might detract from improvement. Whilst this ‘fits’ with these 
managers’ focus being service delivery, it may limit the potential for learning 
transfer and the potential to generate widespread ownership of and 
commitment to the process.
Variables relating to funding were not found to be significant in the model, 
again providing some limited corroborating evidence for earlier findings that 
service managers seemed more driven by the participation in the target 
setting process, professional pride and the public service ethos. This also 
supports the findings of Sullivan and Gillanders (2005), Russell (2008) and 
Sullivan (2008) in relation to LPSAs and LAAs.
Therefore, whilst the evidence generated suggests that Policy Agreements 
have contributed to improved service performance in local authorities, this 
must be qualified as the impact seems variable across Wales, and the 
operationalisation failures resulting in the marginalisation of the Agreements 
mean they were more likely to have been a minor, contributory factor rather 
than a major driver to improving performance.
The evidence from Chapter 7 suggests that interviewees felt the cost-benefit 
impact of the process was at best marginal. It created an initial ‘buzz’ and
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was instrumental in getting some authorities to ‘sign up’ (see Chapter 3). In 
those authorities where Policy Agreements were used as part of an armoury 
to inculcate a performance culture, the value placed on the meetings with 
Assembly Government officials and the low level of bureaucracy meant the 
process was felt to be just about breaking even. The development of the 
Agreements also forced the national and local development of performance 
management systems, which Chapter 3 identified were woefully inadequate at 
the time, especially in the area of social care.
However, the process did not represent sustained engagement and playing 
against these positives were feelings that the politicisation of the process and 
the ‘best endeavours’ principle had been so undermining that it had become a 
managerial exercise in getting the money rather than a means of improving 
service performance. A further negative was felt to be the lost opportunity for 
all-Wales learning from the Agreements as the ‘low level’ of discussions 
meant there was no mechanism for feeding local experience into national 
learning and vice versa. The wider cost-benefit was also limited by the focus 
of the discussions being on system rather than service improvement for the 
benefit of citizens.
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The Overall Impact of Policy Agreements
'Have Policy Agreements contributed to culture change and improved 
performance in the public sector in Wales?’
As noted in Chapter 3, Laffin et al (2002) suggested Policy Agreements were 
at the heart of the central-local relationship in Wales and had the potential to 
effectively articulate both Assembly and local government priorities. However, 
the evidence above suggests that Policy Agreements did not fulfill this 
potential.
The impact of the Agreements on both culture change and service 
improvement seems to have been severely limited by the nature of the design 
and implementation process. This was not for want of effort or commitment 
from many officers, both locally and nationally, but because of failings in high- 
level communication, and the vicious circle of the perceived down-grading of 
the funding to ‘best endeavours’ leading to the technical back-water of the 
performance management silo. This meant the process became a managerial 
one, rather than one about service improvement. Once this circle was 
established it proved impossible to break, even in the second round with the 
addition of local indicators and more funding and, meant that a lack of senior 
and political engagement both locally and nationally became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.
Also the Agreements did not fulfil their potential to develop and support 
improved central-local relations in Wales. The one-dimensional nature of the 
relationship between corporate centres meant the potential value of the 
process in generating dialogue about service improvement and alignment of
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priorities was limited and almost non existent, as politicians, senior managers 
and service managers were either not involved at all or were having separate 
siloed discussions.
Policy Agreements failed to capitalise on the good relationship at the top to 
maximise the opportunities for engagement throughout the rest of the system. 
The Agreements could have encouraged this engagement in a way that the 
Wales Programme for Improvement could not as this was perceived as a 
relationship with regulators and inspectors, rather than an opportunity for 
central and local government to mutually benefit from the development of a 
shared sense of purpose and understanding. This resulted in almost no 
national learning and dissemination of good practice from the process, which 
in turn limited the opportunities for better policy making and improved local 
implementation.
Implications for Practice based on Evidence Relating to Thesis Aims 1, 2 
and 3
The implications for practice are that care should be taken when designing 
organisational pay-for-performance schemes as whilst some of the effects 
may be the same as for individual schemes, these effects may not necessarily 
be the ‘desirable’ ones. Also, the funding seems to drive some powerful local 
lobbies to focus discussions on the technical, number based aspects of the 
Agreements, which crowd out a more holistic approach based on service 
improvement and limit their potential impact. Ambition becomes muted and 
game playing, lack of cohesion with the ‘big picture’ and perverse incentives 
amplified. The limited, low-level nature of the discussions therefore becomes
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self-reinforcing and reinforces the lack of senior and political commitment,
both locally and nationally. Further implications for practice are as follows:
• Practical issues should not be underestimated such as the quality of 
the existing performance management system (Chapters 3 and 7 and 
Martin, 1999; Brand, 2007; Lapsley, 2008) or the time required for 
implementation (Courty and Marschuke, 2007; Entwistle and Enticott,
2007).
• Concerted action needs to take place on all levels to maximise the 
impact of the Agreements otherwise they will become ensnared in the 
technical silo of performance management specialists. Policy makers 
need to be aware that this has implications for resources; this kind of 
engagement is time consuming, highly-skilled, resource intensive and 
cannot be completely delegated to middle and junior level officers.
• A process may be judged to be non-bureaucratic but, in the case of 
performance agreements, limiting discussions to ‘numbers’ between 
technical experts means the impact of the agreements is reduced 
because the focus is on systems, not people and service improvement. 
Discussions therefore also need to involve service managers and 
experts and should be happening in the same, not difference spheres.
• Separate discussions between local and national policy experts and 
corporate centres reinforce siloism and reduce the potential for 
coherence.
• A more inclusive, higher level dialogue could better enable national 
learning from local experience and national to local dissemination of 
‘best practice’. A silo to silo model limits the learning potential.
• Central government needs to act corporately and be seen to be joined 
up in its approach to the Agreement which needs to be given a high 
national profile, otherwise this sends a signal that the Agreements are 
marginal and unimportant.
• Senior officers need to be involved and engaged both locally and 
nationally otherwise decisions relating to the prioritisation of 
implementation of policies will be relegated to middle managers in local 
corporate centres, which perhaps gives them more power within the 
system than they should hold.
• However, the corporate to corporate relationship is important in 
delivering successful implementation, especially where a policy is 
perceived as ‘top-down’. This is because it may be possible to find 
shared purpose at a system level. In this case, there was a shared 
mutual goal of improving systems and driving a performance culture. 
Where local corporate centres saw Policy Agreements as an 
opportunity to drive their own agendas there was likely to be a ‘deeper’ 
local implementation effect. Where corporate centres were not 
engaged there was almost total operationalisation failure.
• Politicians need to be involved both locally and nationally to 
‘encourage’ and maintain the interest and involvement of senior 
officers.
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• If a policy/process is a developmental one this needs to be clearly 
communicated otherwise it becomes tainted and marginalised. It is 
very difficult to recover from this situation and the only option may be 
abandonment.
Key issues for policy and practice are also establishing a high national profile 
and clear lines of integration with other performance management policies to 
minimise the potential for system incoherence and wasted effort and, 
maximise the opportunities for holistic dialogue about citizen-centred and 
outcome-focused service improvement and the potential for shared learning.
This study has also further highlighted the importance of learning from the 
detailed implementation and operationalisation of policies as advocated in 
policy evaluation (Davies, 1999; Blalock, 1999; Chelimsky, 1997) and other 
literature (Drakeford, 2006; Jeffery, 2006; Jones and Stewart, 2001; 
Benington, 2000) in order to understand how the impact or lack of impact of a 
policy was realised. This literature also identified that governments and policy 
makers continue to fail to understand and take account of the complexities 
and contexts of policy implementation and that this is vital to achieving the 
desired impacts of these policies. These findings reinforce this imperative.
Implications for Theory relating to Organisational Performance 
Schemes, Expectancy and Goal Setting Theories and Central-Local 
Relations (based on evidence relating to Thesis Aims 1, 2 and 3)
Introduction
In the following section the implications of the research findings for the above 
theories are considered in relation to the themes identified and used in 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 7. This is so the research findings can be located in 
existing theory and highlight the contribution made to its development.
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The Role of Financial Incentives
In relation to individual pay-for-performance schemes Mitra et al (1997) 
identify that the amounts involved are often too small to make any significant 
difference to performance. The evidence from Chapter 7 suggests that this 
also holds true for organisational schemes. In those authorities which were 
‘resource rich’ the corporate centres perceived the investment of time and 
effort needed to make the Policy Agreement process ‘work’ as excessive in 
comparison to the potential reward. The Agreements were marginalised in 
these areas. In Expectancy Theory terms the marginal valance of money as a 
motivator is limited by context at the organisational level. This is supported by 
similar evidence from England (Entwistle and Enticott, 2007).
The evidence suggests that a financial incentive at an organisational level 
may be a factor in stimulating improved performance but this may not be a 
result of the [government’s] expected relationship between effort, performance 
and rewards. Budget maximisation (Niskanen, 1971) seems to drive corporate 
centres and directors of finance (see below) to pursue the funding, in turn they 
drive a performance culture using the Agreements as part of their armoury. 
The funding is not passed on to service managers so by implication there is a 
different motivation at this level to pursue the targets. Goal Setting Theory 
combined with professional pride and the public service ethos seem to have 
more explanatory power amongst service managers. Evidence from Chapter 
8 supports this as variables relating to funding were not found to be significant 
in the service manager regression model. This was also evidenced in both the 
English and the Welsh systems in Chapters 3, 6 and 7. This evidence
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contributes to theory by suggesting that, as with some individual systems 
(Marsden et al, 2000), where the scheme has resulted in better performance 
this is more likely to be attributable to the clarification and discussion of goals 
than the financial reward.
This suggests that unhypothecated funding allocated as it was in Wales was 
the worst of all worlds, as it undermined powerful intrinsic motivators related 
to participation in target selection and setting and, the public service ethos 
and professional pride. It also suggests that, as with individual schemes 
(Reilly, 2003; Mahoney et al, 2004, Schneider, 2004) money as a reward at 
the organisational level, when combined with the increased ‘surveillance’ that 
PRP schemes entail is not a strong motivator for service managers and 
professionals in the public sector. The public service ethos and 
professionalism (Patchett and Wingfield, 1996; Jacobs, 1998; Kirkpatrick et al, 
2005; Robinson, 2000; Lapsley, 2008; Farrell and Morris, 1999; Power, 1997; 
Cope and Goodship, 1999) are stronger drivers and both individual and 
organisational performance schemes need to be designed to crowd in this 
intrinsic motivation otherwise extrinsic motivation becomes counter-productive 
(Leper et al, 1973; Deci, 1971 and 1975). Evidence to support this was 
identified in both England (Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005; Gillanders and 
Ahmad, 2007) and Wales but in Wales, Haubrich and McClean (2006) 
suggest that the public service ethos is particularly strong and prevalent 
amongst local authority officers.
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Cost Benefit and the ‘Normalisation’ of PRP
It was identified in Chapter 4 that individual PRP schemes can get to a point 
where there is no link between pay and performance (Lawler and Jenkins, 
1992; Oliver, 1996; Marchington and Wilkinson, 2000; Mahoney et al, 2004). 
For example, Wragg et al (2003) identified that 97% of teachers hit the 
performance threshold for higher levels of PRP. The payment was seen not 
as linked to performance, as teachers were doing a good job anyway but, as a 
means of expressing the value placed upon their work. Teachers ‘expected’ 
the payment and it became ‘normalised’ into their baseline salary. Another 
aspect of this is that appraisers are subject to social pressures and dislike 
denying colleagues access to payment (Boselie et al, 2005; Mabey and 
Salaman, 1998; Wragg et al, 2003; Mahoney et al, 2004). Head teachers 
were clearly uncomfortable at being put in the position of having to 
differentiate between staff to determine financial reward, likewise the 
‘politician’s dilemma’ in relation to Policy Agreements.
The evidence gathered in this thesis contributes to the development of theory 
relating to organisational pay-for-performance schemes by suggesting that 
this effect can also hold true at the organisational level. It was clear that once 
‘best endeavours’ was introduced as a means of payment, local authorities 
expected payment regardless of performance. However, as with the teachers 
scheme this did not entirely undermine efforts to improve performance as 
powerful intrinsic motivation was at play and the opportunity for discussion 
and clarification of objectives was welcomed but, it did result in a feeling of 
unnecessary complexity and created a low trust environment. This may have
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been amplified by the Welsh method and context but evidence from England 
(Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005; Gillanders and Ahmad, 2007) discussed in 
Chapter 3 also suggested that funding became a driver of limited importance 
as time passed and relationships and systems developed.
Target Setting
Again, as with individual PRP schemes, there is strong evidence to suggest 
that participation in the target setting process is important (see Table 4.1) but 
at the organisational level the evidence suggests that participation in the 
selection of the targets is equally as important, not only to deliver real 
commitment to the scheme but also to reconcile the perceived differences 
between local and national priorities. Again evidence from both England 
(Entwistle and Enticott, 2007; Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005) and Wales 
supports this. It is suggested that theory in relation to organisational schemes 
should recognise the importance of participation in both the selection and 
setting of targets, especially as a means of mitigating any perceived or 
genuine tension between local and national priorities.
As with individual schemes (see Table 4.1), the evidence suggests that an 
organisational one needs to be designed and perceived to be integrated into a 
sensible and ‘meaningful’ package at a national level, otherwise the sense- 
making is done locally resulting in some potentially important policies (in this 
case Policy Agreements, see Laffin et al, 2002) being marginalised and not 
integrated within the local implementation system. If this is not achieved, it 
reinforces the perception that Government is not joined up, further 
undermining potentially fragile relationships with those officers responsible
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locally for implementation. It is suggested that the importance and relevance 
of the context of an organisational performance scheme both within the 
panoply of polices aimed at improving services and the overall strategic 
direction of the relevant country should be a consideration in the development 
of theory in this area.
Performance and Culture Change
Evidence from both England and Wales (Entwistle and Enticott, 2007; Sullivan 
and Gillanders, 2005; Gillanders and Ahmad, 2007) suggests there is an 
interdependency between culture change in central and local government 
which, if not recognised, will mean that performance agreements with specific 
objectives relating to local culture change to drive service improvement will 
have a limited impact. This interdependency was recognised in some of the 
early literature relating to Best Value (Martin, 1999; Brooks, 2000; Keenan, 
2000, Hirst, 2002) but, the evidence generated by this thesis suggests theory 
should recognise this as both inherent to the development of organisational 
performance schemes (with or without a PRP element) in the public sector 
and a limiting factor of their nature.
In particular, evidence in this thesis suggests that the absence of any 
significant change in behaviour by the Welsh Assembly Government 
compounded operationalisation failures and resulted in the marginalisation of 
Policy Agreements, while changes in Whitehall’ behaviour was a contributory 
factor in participants’ perceptions as to the ‘success’ of the English system 
(Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005). It should also be noted that this ‘change
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interdependency’ does not seem to have been explored in relation to 
individual PRP schemes and may be a worthwhile area for future research.
Chapter 4 identified that in terms of impact on performance the best that could 
be said about PRP is that it motivates some people to behave in the desired 
way for some of the time (Steele, 1999; Oliver, 1996; Huselid, 1998; 
Fleetwood and Hesketh, 2006; Purcell et al, 2006), this also seems to hold 
true for organisational schemes. For some managers the target setting, the 
ownership of the targets and the challenge of meeting them was the 
motivating factor, so that Goal Setting Theory was the prevailing conceptual 
framework. However, some authorities admitted to wanting the money so it 
was a driver for corporate centres. When this occurs, the resulting 
implementation process will mean the funding becomes a driver for a 
managerial process, about the indicators and getting the money, rather than 
ambitious service improvement. In other words as noted above, the goal 
becomes budget maximisation rather than service improvement. Evidence 
from England supports this and also identifies the limited significance of 
reward grant as a driver for service improvement (Sullivan and Gillanders, 
2005: Gillanders and Ahmad, 2007). The limited potential and potentially 
counter-productive impact of including funding as a reward in organisational 
pay-for-performance schemes has not previously been evidenced or 
discussed within the public sector organisational performance system 
literature (Boyne and Chen, 2006).
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Involving funding in the Agreements also means directly involving Directors of 
Finance who have their own agenda to maximise budgets and control over 
them, in the Welsh case they proved to be a powerful lobby that resulted in a 
treatment of the funding which limited options for both their local colleagues 
and the Assembly Government. As with corporate centres in both England 
and Wales the goal was budget maximisation rather than service 
improvement. This reinforces the evidence discussed above and presents 
new evidence to suggest that theory should be developed to recognise that 
attaching funding to an organisational performance agreement does not 
necessarily drive service improvement per se, rather it drives more ‘primitive’ 
bureaucratic behaviour relating to budget maximisation (Boyne and Chen, 
2006; Reiter et al, 2006).
Rationality
Evidence from England and Wales suggests that Governments have made 
the mistake of assuming rationality but, as with individual schemes (Lewis, 
2001; Mahoney et al, 1998; Waine, 2000), it should be recognised that 
rationality cannot be assumed. The process becomes politicised, and 
decisions about targets and rewards become driven by political necessity 
and/or imperative which militate against the attractiveness of a system which 
should operate by mutually setting targets and making links between effort, 
performance and reward. Previous discussions in the literature have not fully 
explored or recognised the assumption of rationality as an issue (Boyne and 
Chen, 2006; Reiter et al, 2006, Locke and Latham, 2009).
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For example, evidence in Chapter 7 confirmed the suspicion raised in 
Chapters 2 and 3 of the lack of compatibility of a differential, reward based 
performance management system with the ‘good’ national relationship 
(Jeffery, 2006; Laffin, 2004) and the prevailing principle of equity of treatment 
amongst Welsh authorities (Hart, 2002). This meant inevitably the process 
became politicised as those at the centre (both Welsh Assembly Government 
and WLGA) did not want to ‘risk’ the good relationship, failing to identify firstly 
that this was not replicated throughout the multiple levels of the relationship 
and secondly that this undermined the effectiveness of the policy as a means 
of driving both cultural change and performance improvement.
There was therefore strong evidence of politicisation in the Welsh system but 
evidence from Chapter 3 also suggests that politics was also at play in the 
English system in terms of pressure for certain areas to be included in the 
Agreements and the ‘stretch’ targets being Ministerial ‘must haves’ rather than 
evidence based (Entwistle and Enticott, 2007).
However, in Wales a multiplicity of ‘political’ factors were present, for example 
the design was driven by a mutual local-national desire to be different to 
England (Downey et al, 2007), but a policy making deficit (Drakeford, 2006; 
Laffin et al, 2002) resulted in a failure to identify that a differential approach 
was unlikely to be compatible with the Welsh context (Hart, 2002). Therefore, 
arguably unlike England where LPSAs and LAAs were identified as having a 
relatively wider and deeper policy penetration (Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005; 
Gillanders and Ahmad, 2007), in Wales Policy Agreements remained
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superficial and marginal both at a national and a local level as unnecessary 
complexity and confusion were added to the relationship and the benefits of 
being a small country were not maximised (Laffin et al, 2001; Andrews and 
Martin, 2007). This suggests that, as with individual schemes, context (Lewis, 
2001; Mahoney et al, 1998; Waine, 2000) should be considered at the design 
phase and reinforces that rationality should not be assumed to prevail either 
in terms of design or implementation of organisational pay-for-performance 
schemes in the public sector.
Also, in terms of the drivers of service improvement in different devolved 
administrations in the UK (Martin and Andrews, 2009), this research suggests 
that, as rationality cannot be assumed, its absence and the scale and nature 
of the context will result in a differential impact for broadly similar policies 
dependent upon the characteristics of that context.
Trust, Fairness and Communication
The evidence generated in the thesis suggests that trust in the central-local 
relationship is multi-faceted and multi-layered. Arguably, the complexity of the 
English system described in Chapter 3 was the manifestation of the lack of 
trust identified in Chapter 2 and is also a trait associated with individual PRP 
schemes as noted in Chapter 4. However, the evidence generated by this 
thesis suggests that it cannot be assumed a good relationship at the top of the 
pyramid (Haubrich and McClean, 2006; Laffin et al, 2002) is replicated 
throughout and will be enough to drive implementation of an organisational 
performance management scheme.
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An implication for theory on central-local relations therefore is that a ‘good’ 
relationship at a national level is not sufficient to mitigate policy 
implementation deficits such as communication failures, lack of appropriate 
contextualisation of policy and high level lack of commitment to the 
implementation process. There seems to be a danger that a ‘good’ 
relationship at the top, if not replicated elsewhere in the system may result in 
poor design, even if it is mutually satisfying ‘national’ co-design, and loss of 
sustained commitment to implementation. The design and implementation of 
Policy Agreements seemed to be a victim of this ‘good’ relationship, mutual 
dependency (Essex, 1998) and a desire to be different (Downey et al, 2007), 
rather than a product of it.
The evidence in this thesis suggests that trust seems to develop as a result of 
face to face engagement and this engagement needs to take place at all 
levels and in all facets of the relationship. This is challenging as 
communication both between and within organisations is crucial. Haubrich 
and McClean (2006) identified that central government’s views on the 
performance of individual local authorities were not solely a product of their 
knowledge of actual performance. Government’s perception of performance 
was also based on face to face contact and anecdotal evidence. This 
suggests that ‘contact time’ is an important facet of the central-local 
relationship and research in this thesis confirms and supports this.
Therefore, as identified in Chapter 2 (Walker, 2006; Laffin et al, 2002; 
Rhodes, 1986), the nature of the relationship is confirmed as complex and
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multi-faceted and dangers exist in characterising central-local relations as a 
single, abstract relationship which is ‘good’ or ‘poor’. This evidence could 
develop theory relating to central-local relations by identifying that policies 
which are aimed at improving this relationship need to be operating 
simultaneously on many different levels.
The Welsh system built expectations in respect of a pay-for-performance 
scheme which were never met in the eyes of the majority of participants. For 
those authorities which had internalised the approach as a means of self- 
improvement this did not matter as funding was not a motivator (other than 
budget maximisation) for service improvement. For other authorities, the 
marginal valance of the funding and the failure to have expectations met 
resulted in a marginalisation not only of Policy Agreements but also of the 
relationship with the Welsh Assembly Government. The implications of this 
for organisational pay-for-performance scheme theory are that, as with 
individual schemes (Schaubroek et al, 2008), expectations must be clearly set 
out and managed, where they change and develop this should be clearly 
explained as communication is critical to managing expectations at the 
organisational as well as the individual level.
The Welsh evaluation protocol was perceived as ‘fair but pointless’, this 
suggests that, as with individual PRP schemes (Brown, 2001), where whole 
system distributive justice is based on equity and each authority being seen to 
get ‘its fair share’ based on need, this undermines a differential reward based
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system and results in loss of credibility. This aspect had not previously been 
identified in relation to organisational pay-for-performance schemes.
Undesirable Effects
As with individual schemes (McCausland et al, 2006; Smith, 1999), the 
addition of funding to an organisational performance agreement seems to limit 
the ambition of that agreement by forcing a focus on what is controllable by 
the organisation concerned and generating a focus on what can be achieved 
to get the money rather than what could/should be achieved to deliver better 
outcomes for citizens. Evidence from both the English and the Welsh systems 
supports this and it is suggested that theory in relation to organisational 
schemes should recognise these issues as limiting factors (Entwistle and 
Enticott, 2007; ODPM, 2005b, Russell, 2008).
Likewise, the addition of funding to organisational performance schemes 
seems to increase the already existing potential for gaming, loss of focus on 
the ‘big picture’ and perverse incentives such as ‘backdoor hypothecation’, as 
discussions focus on the technical aspects of hitting the targets to trigger the 
funding. As noted, it also limits ambition and the scope for national learning 
as the focus becomes what needs to be done to get the reward rather than 
what should be done. Evidence from both England (Entwistle and Enticott, 
2007 and Brand, 2008) and Wales supports this and highlights the tension 
inherent in individual PRP schemes relating to discussions about supporting 
and improving performance and allocation of reward also holds true in the 
organisational context (Wilkinson, 2001; Marchington et al, 1992; Denham et 
al, 1997). Theory relating to organisational schemes should therefore note
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these tensions and that an organisational-pay-for-performance scheme could 
magnify the undesirable behaviours inherent in individual schemes. This 
needs to be balanced against potential benefits, including political 
expediency.
Inherent Tensions
The evidence should enable theory in relation to organisational pay-for- 
performance schemes to be developed by identifying that, as with individual 
PRP schemes which militate against team working (Kohn, 1993a; Marsden 
and Richardson, 1991 and 1994; Marsden and French, 1998), organisational 
schemes side-line partnership working. This therefore precludes a true 
outcome and citizen focus and is at odds with the ethos of the public service 
reform agenda discussed in Chapter 2. Evidence from Chapter 3 in relation to 
LAAs suggests that when partnership performance agreements are 
developed the inclusion of funding may still limit ambition and prevent a focus 
on longer term interventions which might be more beneficial (Gillanders and 
Ahmad, 2007).
The tension between top-down and bottom-up exists in both individual and 
organisational schemes (see Table 4.1). Evidence from individual schemes 
suggests that a top-down approach will result in at best compliance, however, 
evidence from the Welsh system suggests that some organisational factions 
will take a top-down scheme and use it to drive their own agendas within their 
organisations, almost a ‘making the most of a bad job’ approach. This 
resulted in not just compliance but commitment to the process amongst these 
factions. This suggests theory relating to organisational schemes should be
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developed to recognise that for these schemes top-down does not always 
equal ‘simple’ compliance.
Role of the ‘Line Manager’ and Training
The evidence suggests that scaling up pay-for-performance schemes to the 
organisational level does not remove the importance of person to person 
interaction within the system. Evidence from both the English (Sullivan and 
Gillanders, 2005) and the Welsh systems indicates that where these 
interactions are valued by the participants the impact of the scheme will be 
greater.
Transference of the ‘concept’ from the individual to the organisational level in 
both England (Sullivan and Gillanders, 2005) and Wales meant that 
discussions about performance took place in the abstract, corporate centre to 
corporate centre. This was described as an ‘uninformed conversation in the 
middle’ where the common ground was about systems rather than services 
and citizens. This relegated the agreement to a process to be managed 
rather than a serious attempt to deliver process outcomes and performance 
impacts.
This depersonalisation of the process might seem an attractive way of 
minimising some of the dangers identified as inherent in individual schemes in 
Chapter 4 but has its own inherent danger of creating another layer of 
complexity in an already complex system and relationship. In addition, the 
funding driven focus on systems and performance indicators may have been 
a contributory factor in limiting the involvement of politicians. Arguments were 
made that a more holistic approach would have resulted in more engagement
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at this level because the focus would then be the reality rather than the 
abstract world of numbers.
This evidence suggests it should be recognised that interaction within an 
organisational scheme needs to be co-ordinated and multi-faceted because it 
is simplistic to assume that the single interaction between employers and 
employees in individual systems can be translated to an organisational 
scheme. The findings therefore provide evidence to support Sullivan (2008) 
that human interactions within the ‘system’ are critical but adds to this debate 
by confirming the multiplicity of the human interactions which must be 
considered at all levels and in all parts of the system. This confirmation of the 
‘multiplicity of relationships’ therefore further develops theory relating to 
organisational schemes.
Discussion of Evidence Relating to Thesis Aim 4
• Whether using a lens which includes the principles relating to 
performance management/PRP schemes for individuals, provides new 
insight into considering inter-governmental ‘pay-for-performance’ 
schemes and contributes to the development of theory in this regard, 
including whether the governmental assumption of transferability is 
robust and appropriate.
The use of the framework developed from literature reviews in Chapters 2, 3
and 4 is in itself unique and has enabled a new ‘consolidated’ lens to be used
to analyse the under-researched area of linking performance to rewards at an
organisational level in the public sector (Reiter et al, 2006; Boyne and Chen,
2006). This facilitated the exploration of conceptual and ‘in practice’ links
between effort and performance and performance and reward within a system
of organisational performance management by target setting. This has led to
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a clearer understanding of the functions and dysfunctions of funding within 
such a system than previous studies.
In relation to theory and the literature on organisational pay-for-performance 
schemes, these findings illustrate that not only are some of the critical 
success factors of individual PRP schemes transferable to the organisational 
level but that the dysfunctions are equally transferable. In addition, whilst 
context seems to be an important design and implementation consideration, 
many dysfunctions do not seem to be dependent upon it, as they were also 
identified in the evaluations of the ‘equivalent’ English systems. The 
‘consolidated lens’ has contributed to the development of theory by enabling 
these critical success factors and dysfunctions to be identified and analysed in 
a new and systematic way.
This exploration has included two elements. The first involved using a 
framework developed from Expectancy Theory, Goal Setting Theory and 
evidence from the implementation of PRP schemes in practice, in conjunction 
with evidence from Chapters 2 and 3, to analyse the questionnaire and 
interview data. This identified that participants understood the motivation 
frameworks and could see the conceptual links within the system. It also 
enabled the importance of context and shared principles such as equity to be 
considered. This suggests that Expectancy and Goal Setting Theories are 
appropriate frameworks to use to consider the design and effectiveness of 
organisational as well as individual pay-for-performance schemes.
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The second element of the study, the interview data, also suggests the 
framework holds true in the conceptual sense. Participants can see the 
principles of linking effort, performance and rewards. However, design and 
implementation has, in the case of Policy Agreements, clouded the link 
between performance and rewards resulting, as evidence from individual 
schemes suggested, in an undermining of the credibility of the scheme and 
the ‘normalisation’ of the reward element. However, even in LPSAs where 
arguably the link between performance and rewards was stronger both in 
design and implementation, reward grant was less of a significant enabler of 
improvement than pump priming grant and the value placed upon the 
discussions.
Implications for Theory relating to Organisational Performance Schemes 
in the Public Sector
This evidence suggests a theoretical justification for the assumption by many 
governments that the principles of individual PRP schemes might be extended 
to organisational ones (Reiter et al, 2006; Boyne and Chen, 2006). However, 
the evidence in this thesis identifies that complex design and implementation 
issues relating to individual schemes in Chapter 4, particularly in respect of 
the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the public sector, 
are compounded when such agreements are scaled up to the organisational 
level and, therefore, likewise the issues of public service ethos and 
professional pride identified in Chapters 2 and 4 limit the potential of funding 
as a driver for improvement amongst some organisational participants. This 
contributes to the development of theory in this under-researched area by 
identifying that the governmental assumption of transference (Reiter et al,
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2006) is simplistic because it fails to recognise that the assumed relationship 
between effort, performance and reward in individual schemes is complex and 
can be dysfunctional, and when the concept is transferred to an organisational 
level these complexities and dysfunctions are also transferred, magnified and 
added to.
In addition, Chapter 4 identified that employers have multiple reasons for 
introducing PRP schemes and whilst improving performance and changing 
culture have been identified in this thesis as common objectives for 
organisational schemes (although their impact in this regard has been proven 
to be limited), other employer objectives such as demonstrating to the 
employee they are valued and reinforcing organisational hierarchy are 
potentially not as relevant or not relevant at all. This means the opportunity 
for the ‘success’ of organisational schemes is by their nature more focused 
and thus has a narrower scope within which dysfunctions may manifest 
themselves to outweigh potential benefits.
The implications of this for theory relating to organisational pay-for- 
performance schemes are that, as with individual PRP schemes, the best that 
can be said is, in the case of Policy Agreements, the funding acted as a 
motivator in some authorities but, did not generate the widespread changes in 
behaviour which were hoped for, and did not drive improvement in the way in 
which might have been imagined, as none of the funding appears to have 
reached those with the responsibility for actually improving services. The 
motivation for these managers and many in the corporate centre seems to
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have been intrinsic in the form of the internalisation of the targets, but for the 
majority of the latter once the funding was added it could not be ignored and 
the urge to maximise budgets kicked in. This also corroborates evidence from 
evaluations of the LPSA and LAA process in England (Chapter 3) but, the use 
of the consolidated evaluation framework has highlighted the importance of 
understanding how these links should work ‘in theory’ and how they may be 
playing out in practice.
However, the elephant in the room is whether the same or a better impact 
might have been achieved without the attachment of funding. The funding 
seems to have exacerbated a number of significant operational dysfunctions 
in both England and Wales and in the Welsh system in particular seems to 
have created a fog in the operationalisation space which enabled some 
authorities to justify the ‘normalisation’ of the reward element and the 
marginalisation of the Agreements. As previously noted, this can also happen 
with individual schemes, particularly in the public sector where intrinsic 
motivation and the public service ethos are stronger drivers than extrinsic 
motivation in the form of a reward.
The question of ‘whether’ is therefore an important one. The ‘politicians’ 
dilemma’ represents an ethical question - should an area be deprived of 
needs’ based funding because of the incompetence of its managers, whether 
this is exhibited as failure to effectively manage services or failure to be able 
to ‘play the performance management game’? However, this does not seem 
to have raised its head as a question in the evaluations of the English models
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- the limited motivational impact of reward grant was identified but, the 
rationale does not seem to have been questioned, even though operational 
difficulties were identified in relation to it.
One explanation is that the political dilemma may have crystalised as an issue 
in Wales because of the way in which PIG was consolidated into Council Tax 
calculations and, the small policy space made it more difficult for politicians to 
make decisions which involved withholding funding. It was noted in Chapter 2 
that recriminations between central and local government could be amplified 
because of the small scale of the country (Hart, 2002), whereas English 
Ministers seemed more prepared to make differential decisions, for example 
the categorisation of authorities under Best Value led to different levels of 
‘privilege’. However, this does not invalidate questioning the robustness and 
appropriateness of attaching funding to an inter-organisational performance 
management scheme in the public sector.
This, combined with all of the operationalisation difficulties identified above 
and the problems inherent in short-term funding (such as achieving continuity 
of service), raises serious questions about the robustness of the 
governmental assumption that organisational pay-for-performance schemes 
will lead to better performance. Better performance has resulted in both 
England and Wales (although the difficulties of attributing this increased 
performance solely to LPSAs and Policy Agreements has previously been 
noted) but, this does not seem to be significantly dependent on the reward
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grant element of the schemes. Questions have also been identified relating to 
the sustainability and limited ambition of these improvements.
The implications for theory relating to organisational pay-for-performance 
schemes, based on evidence from both countries, is that the intrinsic 
motivation of delivering better outcomes for citizens was the stronger driver 
for improvement amongst local officers. In Wales, once the reward funding 
was introduced, it led to unnecessary complexity and uncertainty, short- 
termism, reduced ambition and led to a technocratisation of the process which 
almost entirely negated the process benefits of cultural change, clarification of 
objectives and improvements in the central-local relationship. Whilst some of 
these effects may have been compounded by the limited nature of the 
implementation process in Wales, similar impacts were identified in England 
and the evidence suggests that theory should be alive to the issue that 
introducing funding into an organisational performance scheme in the public 
sector creates a boundary within which the process seems to operate rather 
than acting as a launch pad for a holistic, dynamic programme of service 
improvement.
Conclusions
It is suggested that the thesis aims have been met, the findings above 
providing an original contribution to knowledge, in respect of both theory and 
practice. The discussion has highlighted that governments have been 
premature in assuming the simple transference of PRP schemes from the 
individual to the organisational level because their operation and effect, as
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with individual schemes, is not as assumed. Also, some of the rationale for 
the introduction of individual schemes is simply not applicable to 
organisational ones and this limits their scope for success and compounds the 
potential for failure. The implications are that organisational schemes cannot 
escape the complexities and dysfunctions of individual ones such as the 
‘normalisation’ of reward and loss of ambition, and these effects may even be 
magnified by transference to the organisational setting. The robustness and 
appropriateness of these schemes is therefore questionable.
The thesis has also identified an area for potential future research in relation 
to individual PRP schemes regarding culture change interdependency 
between employers and employees. It has provided corroborating and 
additional evidence for the literature discussed in Chapter 2, in relation to the 
positive and negative impacts of these schemes, for example, Hood (2007), 
Bevan and Hood (2006a and b), Ordonez et al (2009), Courty and Marschuke 
(2007), Boyne and Chen (2006) and Reiter et al (2006), whilst adding to 
knowledge by exploring the specific impact and rationale of adding a financial 
reward to organisational performance schemes in the public sector.
The original contribution to knowledge and understanding is not only of value 
to policy makers and practitioners in Wales, as many of the issues identified, 
such as the different motivation of different participants in the system, hold 
true in different contexts. The evidence generated provides new, 
corroborating evidence for some of the studies relating to the English LPSA 
and LAA systems and perhaps also provides more detailed explanation for
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some of the officer behaviours, for example, the limited motivational impact of 
funding within the system on service managers because of professional pride 
and the public service ethos and the significance of the funding to corporate 
and finance managers because of budget maximisation. The study also 
provides evidence to support the finding in England that service managers 
value constructive support and opportunity for discussion around service 
improvement with experts in the field over and above an organisationally 
based financial reward.
New evidence is also provided as to the importance of context and rationality 
in the design and implementation of organisational pay-for-performance 
schemes. These may be both a limiting factor and an enabler and, policy 
makers need to identify this from the outset. In terms of the relevant theory 
and the literature, it might be argued that the necessity of taking a 
contingency approach is not a new finding but, it is new in relation to 
organisational pay-for-performance schemes in the public sector and is often 
forgotten and over-looked, as highlighted by the governmental assumption of 
lock, stock and barrel transference of one-size-fits-all approaches from 
individual schemes (Reiter et al, 2006).
The thesis has also provided new evidence relating to the nature of central- 
local relations in Wales. Previous studies have called this relationship ‘good’ 
but failed to qualify this as a one dimensional ‘good’. This study has 
highlighted the veneer was not replicated throughout the system and 
academics and policy makers need to be alert to the dangers of assuming a
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high level positive relationship will be sufficient to drive ‘successful’ policy 
implementation at all levels.
The design of an evaluative framework which includes theory and lessons 
from the development of individual PRP schemes is unique in itself and has 
enabled a new lens to focus on the under-researched area of organisational 
pay-for-performance schemes. This lens has provided a rounded framework 
to fully explore the rationale for the differential impacts of funding upon 
different participants in the system and develop an understanding of their 
individual and collective motivations. Likewise it has provided a systematic 
means of identifying the functions and dysfunctions of organsational pay-for- 
performance schemes.
Using the framework helped to develop existing theory by highlighting why the 
funding may not be impacting in the way in which governments might have 
assumed and why it may have little or no impact in some parts of the system. 
It has also enabled new lessons for theory on organisational pay-for- 
performance schemes to emerge, such the ‘normalisation’ of the reward and 
the impact of its marginal valance on the amount of organisational effort 
exuded to meet the targets, by learning from and applying lessons from theory 
relating to individual PRP schemes. Finally, it enabled the robustness and 
appropriateness of these schemes to be questioned.
The original contribution of these findings relating to the drivers for 
improvement in different contexts has the potential to be further magnified
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when considered in conjunction with studies relating to other administrations 
in the UK and beyond (Martin and Andrews, 2009). This will be important in 
maximising the potential benefits of devolution and minimising the potential for 
isolationism (Downe et al, 2007; Hockridge, 2006; Laffin, 2009).
In addition, learning from what delivers service improvement and in what 
contexts is important for all administrations but, has become even more 
critical for Wales as it enters the third stage of devolution and pressure 
mounts for the devolution dividend to deliver better services (Andrews and 
Martin, 2007) -  this should become the focus for policy making rather than a 
steady determination to be different from England. It is considered that this 
study provides valuable, new insight into these issues whilst at the same time 
providing an original contribution to knowledge in respect of central-local 
relations and organisational pay-for-performance schemes in the public 
sector.
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APPENDIX A
POLICY AGREEMENT FINAL VERSION
POLICY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR 
WALES AND ??????????? COUNTY COUNCIL
Purpose of the Agreement
1. The National Assembly for Wales ("the Assembly") and ??????????? 
County Council ("the Council") jointly share the broad policy aims and 
objectives set out in the strategic plan "A Better Wales". This 
Agreement sets out specific targets in areas of shared priority which 
the Council will seek to achieve with the aid of the Assembly. It also 
sets out how the Assembly and the Council will work together and with 
other partners to pursue those broader shared aims.
2. The Assembly and local government are committed to partnership 
working arrangements, focused on achieving agreed policy outcomes 
that will contribute to the achievement of social, economic and 
environmental well-being for people in each part of Wales. They 
recognise the distinctive role that each has in the governance of Wales, 
and in achieving complementary and effective strategic policy 
development and action at the national and local levels. The concept 
of this Policy Agreement has been agreed by the Local Government 
Partnership Council for Wales - the statutory joint council of the 
Assembly and local government in Wales.
3. This Agreement is set in the context of:
£ the duty on local authorities in Wales to promote the economic,
social and environmental well-being of their area, giving them a 
leadership role in developing community planning which will foster 
a shared strategic approach between all the key players across 
each local authority area;
£ many other procedures for improving performance information in
Welsh local government through the annual Best Value 
Performance Plan and information relating to specific services 
such as education and social services;
£ the local government scheme which the Assembly has set out
under the Government of Wales Act 1998 on how it will promote 
local government.
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4. This Agreement shifts the emphasis from inputs to outcomes. It is based 
on the understanding that the problems to be tackled and the opportunities 
to be grasped can only be handled effectively if the broad policy 
framework and the key objectives are shared, while leaving maximum 
discretion for local flexibility in how they are to be achieved. We expect 
the concept of Policy Agreements to develop further, in tandem with the 
development of partnership working to deliver community strategies. This 
first Agreement represents a "point of entry" and the beginning of a new 
era in the relationship between the Assembly and local government.
5. Local authorities and the National Assembly are committed to the 
modernisation of public services. Fundamental to the achievement of this 
agenda is a commitment to change and improvement. This policy 
Agreement and the objectives and targets that support it are an important 
means of giving effect to this commitment.
6. This is a framework document. The targets for achievement identified in it 
do not replace the comprehensive strategies, plans, objectives, 
performance measures and detailed targets which the Council and the 
National Assembly have in place, but rest upon them. Delivery of the 
targets identified here will depend on the quality and successful delivery of 
those plans as well.
Our Shared Aims
7. The Assembly and local government have a shared determination to 
achieve the vision which "A Better Wales" (which was refined by the 
National Assembly's Sustainable Development Scheme made on 16 
November 2000) sets out:
They agree that action needs to be taken to secure:
£ Better opportunities for learning 
£ A better, stronger economy
£ Better health and well being
£ Better quality of life
£ Better simpler government.
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OUR VISION
We want Wales to be:
s United, confident and creative
s Committed to fostering its unique and diverse identity, and the
benefits of bilingualism, while looking confidently outwards and 
welcoming new cultural influences
s Prosperous, well-educated, skilled, healthy, environmentally and 
culturally rich
s Served by modern, effective, efficient and accessible public 
services
s Active in its local communities, where the voice of local people is 
heard
s Fairer - a place where everyone is valued and given an opportunity 
to play a full part
s A place which values its children and where young people want to 
live, work and enjoy a high quality of life
8. The Council will address these key action areas in developing its 
community strategy in partnership with local people, voluntary 
organisations, business, all other key public sector organisations and 
the Assembly itself. In doing so, it will develop the following three 
fundamental themes:
s Sustainable development: meeting the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own
s Tackling social disadvantage: the development of an inclusive 
society where everyone has the chance to fulfil their potential
s Equal opportunities: the promotion of a culture in which 
diversity is valued and equality of opportunity is a reality________
9. The Council will publish its Community Strategy and Best Value 
Performance Plan in ???????. As well as containing its Policy 
Agreement targets and specific objectives and the areas of success, it 
recognises that the community strategy is a prime vehicle for the 
achievement of the above fundamental themes, specifically we will:
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INDIVIDUAL COUNCIL TO INPUT ITS FUNDAMENTAL THEMES 
RESPONSE HERE. OR TO ATTACH RETURNS AS ANNEXES. 
REFERRED TO AT THS POINT
10. The Council also recognises the value of co-operation and joint 
working with other local authorities and with the NHS. This will be 
essential to the delivery of the targets identified. For its part, the 
Assembly will consider any representations from the Council regarding 
barriers to joint working which the Assembly could help to address. It is 
vital that the issues of health and well-being are addressed in a holistic 
manner which recognises that many local government services have a 
major impact on the determinants of ill-health.
11. The Assembly will strongly encourage the organisations and groups 
over which it has influence to play their full part as a willing partner to 
the Council in the preparation and implementation of the community 
strategy. It will also review the scope for streamlining the requirements 
it places on local government. This will include:
£ aiming for a clearer, simpler framework of planning 
requirements so that people can see how individual strategies 
and service plans fit under the overarching community 
strategy;
£ encouraging similar flexibility over partnership requirements;
£ reviewing and consolidating grant schemes where it makes 
sense to do so, in order to reduce the administrative burden 
on local government and allow greater flexibility in the way 
that the Council and its partners can achieve shared 
objectives; and
£ looking for scope to remove regulatory restrictions on local 
authorities where these are hindering them from pursuing the 
shared objectives.
The Assembly will report periodically on the specific measures it has
taken.
Appraisal of Targets
12. The Council and the Assembly recognise that the issues addressed by 
the targets set in this Agreement are ones which are relevant to 
improving people's lives in every part of Wales. But different areas of 
Wales start from a different baseline of existing achievement. The 
specific targets set out overleaf are ones which have been proposed by 
the Council and agreed by the Assembly as representing a real 
improvement over existing levels of attainment and compatible, when 
taken together with targets set by other authorities across Wales, with
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progress towards national or European targets where they exist. The 
Council and the Assembly will assess performance against the targets 
in the Agreement with reference also to other performance information 
available in the Council's plans for education, social services, transport, 
environmental services and the Best Value Performance Plan and 
through other existing means such as inspection services.
Duration of Our Agreement
13. This Agreement is made for the three years beginning 1 April 2001. 
Progress under this Agreement will be monitored annually against the 
milestones identified, in accordance with a mechanism agreed between 
the Assembly and the Welsh Local Government Association. The 
agreement will be subject to an annual appraisal, which will provide an 
opportunity to review it and to respond to changing circumstances. For 
instance this annual review will be used to change the education 
targets as allowed by the statutory review of Education Strategic Plan 
targets. It will also allow further refinement of the social services 
indicators in the light of developments in what is a new performance 
measurement framework.
In that sense the targets set out in this agreement are accepted 
conditionally, but can only be changed with the mutual agreement of 
the authority and the National Assembly.
14. The conclusion of this Agreement, with the targets identified below, has 
been supported by a specific grant of £?? from the Assembly to 
assist the Council in achieving those targets. It is at the discretion of 
the Council how exactly that grant is deployed. Achievement of the 
targets will result in payment of a further grant of £?? (based on the 
current distribution formula) relating to the financial year 2003/2004. 
Partial achievement, or achievement at the expense of other stated 
targets and requirements, will result in partial payment of that sum. The 
way in which performance against targets will be assessed will be set 
out in a protocol to be agreed between the Assembly and the WLGA. 
The precise terms and conditions of the grant will be set out separately.
Signed Signed
On behalf of the National On behalf o f ................County Council
Assembly for Wales
V
KEY OBJECTIVES AND TARGET MEASURES
1. BETTER OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEARNING
Our Objective
That standards of teaching and attainment in all our schools continue to rise, 
that high quality physical conditions are secured and that all young people can 
gain the range of knowledge and skills required to fulfil their potential.
The prime indicators and targets for this are:
s an increase in the proportion of 11 year olds achieving at 
least Level 4 in the Core Subject Indicator from ??% in 2000 
to ??% in summer 2003.
s an increase in the proportion of 15 year olds achieving five 
or more GCSE grades A* to C or vocational equivalent from 
??% in 2000 to ??% in 2003.
s an increase in the rates of attendance ("those present or on 
approved educational activities") in secondary schools 
from ?.?% in 1999/2000 to ?% in 2002/2003.
s a reduction in the number of 15 year olds (including those 
in local authority care) leaving full-time education without a 
recognised qualification from ?.?% in 2000 to ?? in 2003.
2. BETTER HEALTH AND WELL-BEING 
Our Objective
That older people live in comfort and dignity in their own homes wherever 
possible, by providing support which also recognises the role and wishes of 
carers.
The prime indicators for this are:
❖ the number of older people (aged 65 or over) helped to live 
at home per thousand population aged 65 or over.
❖ the rate of delayed transfers of care for social care reasons 
per thousand population aged 75 or over.
♦♦♦ the number of people aged 65 or over whom the authority 
supports in residential care homes or nursing homes per 
thousand population aged 65 or over.
VI
The following baselines and targets have been agreed with the Assembly:
❖ Older People Helped to Live at Home: an increase from the 
baseline of per thousand in 2000/2001 to (between) ?? and ?? 
per thousand by 2003/2004.
❖ Delayed Transfers: a decrease from the baseline of ?? per 
thousand in 2000/2001 to (between) ?? and ?? per thousand by 
2003/2004.
❖ Older People in Residential and Nursing Homes: a decrease 
from the baseline of ?? per thousand in 2000/2001 to ?? per 
thousand by 2003/2004.
Our Objective
That adults with physical disabilities, learning difficulties and mental health 
problems live independently in the community wherever possible and that the 
burdens of long term care on families are reduced.
The prime indicators and targets for this are:
❖ the percentage of adult clients receiving a written 
statement of their needs and how they will be met;
❖ the number of adults aged under 65 whom the 
authority helps to live at home per thousand 
adults aged under 65, in each of the following 
client groups separately:
£ physical or sensory disabled 
£ learning disabled 
£ with mental health problems.
The following separate baselines and targets have been agreed with the 
Assembly:
❖ Written Statement of Needs: an increase from the baseline of 
??% in 2000/2001 to (between) ??% and ??% by 2003/2004.
❖ People with Physical and Sensory Disabilities Helped: an
increase from the baseline of ??.?? per thousand in 2000/2001 
to 10 per thousand by 2003/2004.
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❖ People with Learning Disabilities Helped: an increase from 
the baseline of ?.? per thousand in 2000/2001 to ?.? per 
thousand by 2003/2004.
❖ People with Mental Health Problems Helped: maintaining our 
baseline performance in 2000/2001 of ?.? per thousand into 
2003/2004.
Our Objective
That vulnerable children are protected from harm and those looked after by 
authorities are provided with the best possible start in life.
The prime indicators for this are:
❖ the proportion of young people in care on their 16th 
birthday who have a suitable plan for their continuing care.
❖ the proportion of first placements for looked after children 
beginning with a care plan in place.
❖ the percentage of cases of children with an allocated social 
worker who is providing a service appropriate to the child’s 
need in each of the following groups separately:
£ children looked after 
£ children on the child protection register.
The following separate baselines and targets have been agreed with the
Assembly.
❖ Young People with a Care Plan: maintaining our baseline 
performance in 2000/2001 of into 2003/2004.
❖ First Placements for Looked After Children: maintaining our 
baseline performance in 2000/2001 of ??% into 2003/2004.
❖ Allocation of Social Workers to Children Looked After:
maintaining our baseline performance in 2000/2001 of 100% into 
2003/2004.
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3. A BETTER STRONGER ECONOMY 
Our Objective
To develop a better co-ordinated and sustainable transport system to support 
local communities, improving accessibility and supporting the creation of a 
successful economy.
The ???? Consortia have combined to develop a consistent approach across 
the ??? region. The agreed approach is:
s to measure public transport patronage [location]
s to measure the patronage based on ticket information for a 
particular month.
s to use baseline figures as at October 2001.
Currently we are:
£ establishing a robust baseline
£ fully researching historic trends in patronage
decline in the area 
£ understanding causes behind trends and
extrapolate into a forecast 
£ agreeing targets.
4. BETTER QUALITY OF LIFE 
Our Objective
To achieve high standards in the management of our environment.
The prime indicator and target for this is:
£ an increase in the proportion of municipal waste recycled or 
composted from ?.?% in 1999/2000 to ??% in 2003/ 2004.
The Council proposes to achieve the overall % target through ??% recycling 
and ??% composting.
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APPENDIX B
FINAL TARGETS AND BASELINES FOR ALL LOCAL AUTHORITIES- Better Opportunities for Learning
Authority An increase in the proportion of 
11 year olds achieving at least 
level 4 in the Core subject 
Indicator
An increase in the prop, of 15 
year olds achieving 5 or 
more GCSE (A* to C) or 
vocational equivalent
An increase in the rates of 
attendance in secondary 
schools
A reduction in the no. of 15 year 
olds (inc. those in care) leaving 
full time education without a 
recognised qualification
Baseline Target Baseline Target Baseline Target Baseline Target
Blaenau Gwent 50% 55% 36% 42% 87.9% 91% 38 pupils/4.9% 16 pupils/2%
Bridgend 58.6% 68% 46% 55% 90.2% 91.2% 74 pupils 67 pupils
Caerphilly 58.9% 65% 40% 49% 88.5% 90% 93 pupils/4.1% 3.8%
Cardiff 61.5% 69.8% 45% 49.7% 87.9% 90.2% 238 pupils 131 pupils
Carmarthenshire 63% 69% 52% 66% 90.8% 91% 2% 1%
Ceredigion 66% 70% 60% 62% 91.3% 94% 7 pupils 5 pupils
Conwy 64.1% 67% 55% 58% 90.4% 92% 2% 1.6%
Denbighshire 60.1% 65% 48% 56.8% 90.9% 92% 27 pupils 25 pupils
Flintshire 63.2% 66.5% 50% 53% 91.2% 91.4% 40 pupils 14 pupils
Gwynedd 62% 66% 56% 58.5% 91.7% 92% 1.5% 1%
Isle of Anglesey 63.3% 64% 49% 56% 90.8% 92% 3.5% 2%
Merthyr Tydfil 62.6% 66% 41% 50% 89.7% 91% 10% 6%
Monmouthshire 70% 75% 54% 58% 91.4% 92.9% 12 pupils/1 % >1%
NPT 63% 65% 49% 52% 89.9% 90.7% 30 pupils 26
Newport 61% 64% 42% 46% 89.6% 90.4% 5.7% 3.2%
Pembrokeshire 67.6% 71% 52% 53% 91.8% 92.5% 2% 2%
Powys 64% 69% 56% 58% *0.4% 0.3% 1% 1%
RCT 60.8% 65% 45% 50% 89.1% 90.5% 4% 3%
Swansea 65% 65% 51% 55% A1.9% 1.6% 4.5% 3%
Torfaen 57.7% 64% 45% 51% 90.5% 93.5% 14 pupils 12 pupils
VoG 67% 68% 58% 58% 90.3% 92% 1.9% 1.5%
Wrexham 62.4% 70% 44% 50% 90.4% 91% 41 pupils 37 pupils
* Expressed as lessons missed A Expressed as unauthorised absence reduction
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APPENDIX B
FINAL TARGETS AND BASELINES FOR ALL LOCAL AUTHORITIES- Better Health and Well-Being
Authority Older people helped to live at 
home per 1000 population
Delayed Transfers per 1000 
population
Older people in residential 
homes per 1000 population
Percentage of adult clients 
receiving a written statement of 
their needs
Baseline Target Baseline Target Baseline Target Baseline Target
Blaenau Gwent 109 109 74 62 37.21 30.25 81% 92%
Bridgend 90.59 85-90 ? 13 26-28 26-28 90% 95%
Caerphilly 102.7 107 1.24 1.24 24 24 100% 100%
Cardiff 73.6 75.9 17.4 11.5 27 27 59% 95%
Carmarthenshire 175 135 39.1 20 30.76 26 78.5% 100%
Ceredigion 82.77 86.5 26.14 15-20 28.23 28.5 50% 100%
Conwy 54.37 100-125 14 14 29.1 27 100% 100%
Denbighshire 90 98 2.53 2.53 24 22 85% 100%
Flintshire 47.9 47.9 10-15 10-15 27.8 27.8 81% 98%
Gwynedd 73.54 75.69 22.22 15 40.01 39.57 93.77% 97%
Isle of Anglesey 90 111 15 10 33.06 27.75 88% 98%
Merthyr Tydfil 117.54 123 3.1 1.1 34.94 27.5 87.5% 100%
Monmouthshire 113.9 114.2 18.92 10-15 19.5 19.2 100% 100%
NPT 119.72 122 19.5 15 30.48 28.9 60% 100%
Newport 48.77 50-55 5 5 29.39 27-28 100% 100%
Pembrokeshire 87.9 100 18.8 15 24.48 24 100% 100%
Powys 98.93 99.5 24 ? 19.48 20 100% 100%
RCT 96.58 101 33.96 14 32.14 32 60% 95%
Swansea 109.6 112.4 20.2 15 28.6 26.6 78% 100%
Torfaen 47 65 37 30 25 22 80% 100%
VoG 41 43 3.5 1.29 25 27 90% 100%
Wrexham 136 100-125 16 10-15 27.9 26-30 81% 100%
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FINAL TARGETS AND BASELINES FOR ALL LOCAL AUTHORITIES- Better Health and Well-Being
Authority People with physical and sensory 
disabilities helped to live at home 
per 1000 population
People with learning 
disabilities helped to live at 
home per 1000 population
People with mental health 
problems helped to live at 
home
Young people looked after on 
their 16th birthday with a plan for 
continuing care
Baseline Target Baseline Target Baseline Target Baseline Target
Blaenau Gwent 8.23 (over­
estimate)
3.39 4.98 4.98 3.15 3.15 90% 100%
Bridgend 3.88 3.5-3.8 4.53 4.5-4.8 2.4 2.5-2.8 84.6% 95%
Caerphilly 5.2 5.46 1.5 1.86 0.8 0.84 91% 100%
Cardiff 3.92 4.04 1.91 1.96 0.49 0.5 76% 100%
Carmarthenshire 9.06 9 2.86 3.5 0.97 3 100% 100%
Ceredigion 1.41 3 2.8 3.2 4.7 5.2 77.78% 100%
Conwy 2.47 2.5 2.98 3 1.46 3 100% 100%
Denbighshire 3.46 3.46 2.22 5 5.25 5.25 62.5% 100%
Flintshire 1.79 1.79 3.89 3.89 2.62 2.62 100% 100%
Gwynedd 2.72 2.77 4.02 4.69 2.72 2.91 60% 100%
Isle of Anglesey 2.28 4.18 3.44 3.97 4.52 4.52 58% 100%
Merthyr Tydfil 7.86 9 3.37 3.5 5.11 6 55% 95%
Monmouthshire 3.66 4 3.5 3.61 2.9 3.2 90% 95%
NPT 4.18 4.7 3.97 4 3.25 3.6 93% 100%
Newport 1.75 1.75-2 2.13 2.13-2.5 0.99 0.99-1.2 71.43% 95-100%
Pembrokeshire 1.26 2 3.56 3.8 1.86 2.5 100% 100%
Powys 1.66 1.75 5.07 5.05 0.95 0.95 25% 100%
RCT 1.33 3 3.38 3.38 2.41 2.5 100% 100%
Swansea 3.7 4 3.4 3.7 2.2 3 67% 100%
Torfaen 3.09 3.09-3.94 2.85 2.85-3 1.21 1.21-1.36 100% 100%
VoG 2.8 3.2 2.5 3.5 3 3.4 100% 100%
Wrexham 5.37 3-5 3.1 3.5-5 2.68 3-5 100% 100%
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APPENDIX B
FINAL TARGETS AND BASELINES FOR ALL LOCAL AUTHORITIES- Better Health and Well-Being
Authority First placements for 
looked after children
Allocation of social workers to 
children on the child protection 
register
Allocation of social workers to 
children looked after
Baseline Target Baseline Target Baseline Target
Blaenau Gwent 72% 95% 100% 100% 45% 100%
Bridgend 66.7% 95% 100% 100% 99% 100%
Caerphilly 6.7%? 95% 100% 100% 97% 100%
Cardiff 20% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Carmarthenshire 31% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Ceredigion 43.1% 90-95% 94.8% 100% 92.2% 100%
Conwy 50% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Denbighshire 85% 95% 100% 100%
Flintshire 83% 100% 75% 95% 100% 100%
Gwynedd 34% 95% 100% 100% 93% 100%
Isle of Anglesey 78% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Merthyr Tydfil 0% 95% 100% 100%
Monmouthshire 90% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100%
NPT 55% 95% 94% 100% 97% 100%
Newport 87.97% 90-100% 95-100% 95-100% 95-100% 95-100%
Pembrokeshire 50% 100% 90% 100% 90% 100%
Powys 92% 92% 100% 100%
RCT 34.1% 95% 100% 100% 95.2% 100%
Swansea 37% 95% 100% 100%
Torfaen 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
VoG 97% 98% 80% 100% 80% 100%
Wrexham 28% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100%
APPENDIX B
FINAL TARGETS AND BASELINES FOR ALL LOCAL AUTHORITIES- Better Stronger Economy and Better Quality of Life
Authority To measure pi 
patronage on c 
Newport and Car< 
overall patronagi 
and Care
jblic transport 
ordons around 
zliff, together with 
3 in the Newport 
iff areas
An increase in the proportion 
of municipal waste recycled 
or composted
Baseline Target Baseline Target
Blaenau Gwent 4.71% 15%
Bridgend 6.26% 22%
Caerphilly 5% 15%
Cardiff 4.8% 13%
Carmarthenshire 5.5% 20%
Ceredigion 12.18% 15%
Conwy 13% 15%
Denbighshire 4.2% 15%
Flintshire 7% 14%
Gwynedd 5.7% 12%
Isle of Anglesey 2.7% 15%
Merthyr Tydfil 3.49% 15%
Monmouthshire 9% 18%
NPT 6.3% 22%
Newport 6.48% 12%
Pembrokeshire 11.51% 15%
Powys 9% 25%
RCT 6% 15%
Swansea 7.2% 15%
Torfaen 5.2% 15%
VoG 12% 15%
Wrexham 3% 10%
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APPENDIX C
PROTOCOL ON EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE AGAINST 
POLICY AGREEMENT TARGETS AND COMMITMENTS
1. This paper outlines the approach which will be taken for the allocation 
of the Performance Incentive Grant (PIG) in response to the 
achievements made under policy agreements.
Background
2. Each policy agreement between an individual local authority and the 
National Assembly for Wales has established:
I. A “basket” of targets relating to education
II. A “basket” of targets relating to social services for adults and 
children
III. A target / actions relating to transport and the aim of achieving 
modal shift
IV. A target relating to waste management (composting and 
recycling)
V. Commitments on sustainable development, tackling social
disadvantage, equality of opportunity and the voluntary sector,
linked to the development of community strategies.
3. The duration of the agreement is for 3 years from April 2001.
Authorities are entitled to their formula share of £10m upon signing an 
agreement and to their formula share of £30m upon achievement by 
end March 2004 of the targets and commitments set out in the 
agreement.
Monitoring
4. The National Assembly for Wales and each local authority will monitor
annually the progress on each policy agreement. Most authorities have 
already identified annual “milestones” relating to the targets which will 
assist in this process. Where appropriate, the monitoring process will 
be combined with existing processes such as the consideration of 
Education Strategic Plans. There will be continuous dialogue between 
the local authority and the NAW on the progress made.
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5. In exceptional circumstances there may be an agreement between the 
NAW and the local authority to revise targets. This may occur, for 
instance, if the original data on baseline performance is found to be 
incorrect or if the conditions affecting performance change significantly.
6. There will be consistent, open and fair dialogue between the NAW and the 
local authority on progress in the first year and joint consideration given 
to any action necessary to achieve the final agreed targets. Any actions 
agreed will be documented in the review.
Second year review
7. The second year review will be particularly important. It is at this stage 
that the Assembly and the authority should be able to make fairly firm 
predictions about the likely outcomes; the action needed to address 
any potential shortfall against the agreed targets and commitments; 
and the consequences of any failure to make substantial progress. At 
the end of the second year review, it will be possible for the NAW and 
the local authority to reach any of the following conclusions:
I . There is substantial progress and reasons to be confident that the 
agreed targets will be reached; sufficient to conclude that the final 
PIG should be paid in full in 2003/4
II. There is progress but justifiable concern that several targets may 
not be met by the end of the next year; negotiations, which will be 
open, transparent and clearly reasoned, will take place on the 
proportion of PIG to be paid during 2003/4
III . There is evidence that for a variety of possible reasons several 
targets will not be met. Judgement will be exercised on the scale 
of eligibility for PIG in 2003/4 depending on the reasons for the 
shortfall
The final settlement
8. Any PIG money not allocated in 2003/4 because of anticipated shortfall 
in performance against targets will be available for distribution in 
2004/5 subject to an assessment of actual achievement. It is 
anticipated that in 2004/5 a further PIG will be available for the 
completion of a further policy agreement; the parameters and contents 
of which will have been negotiated in 2003/4.
9. If a local authority achieved less in 2003/4 than anticipated by the PIG 
allocated in that year; it will be liable to abatement in its grant in 2004/5.
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Conclusion
10. The shared aim in the policy agreements is to achieve substantial 
improvements in service outcomes which are jointly considered to be 
very important to people in Wales.
11. The intention is to award the PIG in full wherever the best endeavours 
have been made towards achieving the targets.
12. If the National Assembly Finance Minister in consultation with other 
Assembly Ministers were to conclude that there will be an abatement in 
the level of PIG, it will be with the judgement that more could 
reasonably have been done to achieve the agreed target.
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QUESTIONNAIRE (1)
APPENDIX D
POLICY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR 
WALES AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Please tick if you are:
An elected member with specific service responsibility (If so please specify 
which area below and answer questions on the basis of your service area 
responsibility)
An elected member involved in the Policy Agreement process but with no 
specific service responsibility (If so please specify below if you are a member of 
your authority’s Scrutiny Committee)
Please indicate the political party (or otherwise) which you represent.
Please insert the total number of years (to nearest full year) for which you have 
been an elected representative.
If you have a particular service related interest or other particular 
interest in Policy Agreements please tick the appropriate box below:
Pupil attainment
Social care for older people
Social care for adults
Social care for children
Transport modal shift or reducing fatalities
Recycling of municipal waste
Sustainable development
Tackling social disadvantage
Equal opportunities
Voluntary sector
Member of local authority scrutiny 
committee
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Please note that there is space for additional comment at the end of the 
questionnaire. This can be used to outline any general comments you may 
have in respect of Policy Agreements or to make a particular point in relation 
to a particular question. If the latter, please indicate to which specific question 
your comments refer.
The questionnaire is divided into sections: some sections deal with the Policy 
Agreement process as a whole and some deal with a particular aspect of it 
such as setting the Policy Agreement objectives in respect of service 
improvements. Each section contains a number of statements with which you 
are requested to agree or disagree or answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, because the 
questionnaire is divided in this way it seems that some statements are 
repeated. This is not intended to try and ‘catch you out’. It is important to try 
and establish how effective each stage of the Policy Agreement process has 
been as well as to establish how well the stages have ‘fitted together’. 
Therefore, as some features of the process contribute to the success 
otherwise of more than one stage, they have been referred to more than 
once.
Please complete the questionnaire by ticking the box with the score which 
best reflects your view in respect of each of the following statements where:
Simply remember that generally speaking the higher the number you tick the 
higher your level of agreement with the statement.
Please use the ‘Don’t Know’ (DK) box where you feel you are unable to 
make a response, as you do not have enough information.
Please use the ‘Undecided’ (U) box where you have sufficient information to 
make a decision but are genuinely undecided as to your opinion.
If a question is not applicable to you please tick the ‘Not Applicable’ (NA) 
box.
Some questions require a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer, again please tick the 
appropriate box.
1 Disagree strongly
2 Disagree
3 Disagree Slightly
4 Undecided
5 Agree Slightly
6 Agree
7 Agree Strongly
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jase tick the box with the score which best reflects your view in respect of each of the
lowing statements where 7= Agree strongly, U=Undecided and 1= Disagree Strongly or tick
or ‘N\
C= Don’t Know
Not Applicable
1 2 3 U 5 6 7 D
K
N
A
re rail Policy Agreement Process
1. My authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the development 
of its community plan.
2. My authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the development 
of its Improvement Plan.
3. My authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the development 
of its own strategic plan.
4. My authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the development 
of its budget strategy.
5. The National Assembly has integrated Policy Agreements with 
the other local authority performance initiatives.
6. The National Assembly has integrated Policy Agreements with 
other local authority finance policies.
7. My authority has made public its Policy Agreement, (e.g. on 
internet, local newsletter etc.)
Y N
8. My authority has plans to publish the results of the Policy 
Agreement in 2004. (e.g. on internet, local newsletter etc.)
Y N
9. I am aware that the Assembly has made commitments in the 
Agreements to review plans and remove other impediments to 
continuous improvement of local authority services. If ‘No’, 
please go straight to Question 11.
Y N
10.1 am aware of Assembly progress towards meeting these 
commitments.
Y N
11. The nature of the funding in the Agreements reflects a mature 
relationship between local authorities and the National 
Assembly.
12. There is a high level of trust between local authorities and the 
National Assembly.
13. Policy Agreements have added value to the relationship between 
local authorities and the National Assembly.
14. The processes involved in developing Policy Agreements are as 
important as the funding.
15. The existence of Policy Agreements will help to demonstrate to 
stakeholders that local authorities are providing value for money.
16. The Policy Agreements clearly indicate to local authorities what 
is expected of them and what is on offer in return.
17. There is a clear link between Assembly policy as articulated 
through Policy Agreements and other aspects of Assembly policy 
in respect of local government.
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;ase tick the box with the score which best reflects your view in respect of each of the 
lowing statements where 7= Agree strongly, U=Undecided and 1= Disagree Strongly.
1=  Don’t Know
Not Applicable
1 2 3 U 5 6 7 D
K
N
A
18. The Policy Agreement funding could have been used in other 
ways to help build capacity for improvement in local authorities.
19. If you have any suggestions as to how the Performance
Incentive Grant (PIG) funding might be better employed, please 
outline them below.
tting Policy Agreement Objectives for Service Improvement
20. The objectives in the Policy Agreements have been framed 
within a clear overall strategic vision for Wales.
21. There is a clear link between the chosen indicators in the 
Agreement and my authority’s own strategic plan.
22. The Agreements have created a link between local and national 
goals.
23. The Agreements reflect the right balance between local and 
national goals.
24. The indicators are specific enough to make it clear what is to be 
aimed for.
25. The achievement of the targets can be influenced by factors 
outside the control of this authority.
26. The targets are demanding but achievable.
27.The agreed targets serve to motivate rather than demotivate.
28. The numbers of indicators are about right.
29. There is no conflict between any of the indicators.
30. There is no conflict between working towards the Policy 
Agreement targets and achieving other strategic service 
priorities.
31. Focusing on specific service areas in this way has created a 
focus on these areas at the expense of others.
32. Local authorities have the skills to make a reasonable attempt at 
achieving the targets.
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ease tick the box with the score which best reflects your view in respect of each of the 
I lowing statements where 7= Agree strongly, U=Undecided and 1= Disagree Strongly.
<= Don’t Know 
\=  Not Applicable
1 2 3 U 5 6 7 D
K
N
A
33. Local authorities have the resources (including access to
training, facilities and staff) to enable them to make a reasonable 
attempt at achieving the targets.
34.1 was involved in discussions in respect of setting baselines and 
targets which relate to me.
35. There was effective communication between authorities and the 
Assembly during the period when the baselines and targets were 
set.
36. The purpose of Policy Agreements was clearly communicated to 
me.
37. Local authorities played a significant part in determining the 
services and targets to be included in the Agreements.
38. The Agreements have been mutually agreed between local 
authorities and the National Assembly.
I.The targets have made the link between the effort an authority 
makes and its performance clear.
).The targets have made the link between an authority’s performance 
in terms of service delivery and the financial reward clear.
easuring Outcomes
.The Policy Agreement indicators have been chosen because they 
are easy to measure rather than appropriate.
LThe indicators used are the most suitable to measure achievement 
of the objectives set out in the Policy Agreements.
L There is a clear link between the effort this authority makes towards 
achieving the Policy Agreement targets and the performance 
measures in the Policy Agreement.
I. There is a clear link between local authority performance and the 
amount of funding received.
>.This authority must work with other organisations to achieve some 
of the targets.
5. This authority has the freedom to determine how to achieve 
improvements in its own performance.
^.The cost of collecting information to measure progress towards 
targets does not outweigh the benefits it provides.
5. The indicators are measuring the outcome of this authority’s activity, 
rather than that activity itself.
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se tick the box with the score which best reflects your view in respect of each of the
wing statements where 7= Agree strongly, U=Undecided and 1= Disagree Strongly or tick
r ‘N’.
Don’t Know 
Not Applicable
1 2 3 U : f f 6 7 D
K
N
A
lone of the data collected in measuring performance could be 
ubject to manipulation.
tome outcomes are not measured by specific indicators (e.g. 
working with the voluntary sector) but I am satisfied that it will be 
ossible to measure progress against these broader themes.
Jback
am satisfied with the feedback process with my officials in respect 
f tracking progress towards achieving the Policy Agreement 
argets.
am content with the feedback process with other politicians in 
Bspect of tracking progress towards achieving the targets.
am content with the feedback process with representatives from 
ie National Assembly in respect of tracking progress towards 
chieving the targets.
)ther organisations which contribute to the achievement of targets 
re included in the appraisal process.
The Assembly has been punitive when monitoring performance.
he process of appraising performance against targets in the 
ontext of Policy Agreements is too bureaucratic.
The Policy Agreement process has raised expectations in terms of 
nproved performance which can be met.
tolicy Agreements are a way for local authorities and the Assembly 
d work together to improve services.
_ocal authorities have been able to determine how to achieve the 
argets.
he role of the Assembly, in the context of Policy Agreements, is to 
etermine the level of financial reward to be paid in 2004.
here has been effective communication of feedback between the 
assembly and local authorities.
he cost of monitoring the Policy Agreements does not outweigh the 
otential benefits.
ards linked to Outcomes
know there is funding attached to the Policy Agreements. Y N
his funding is significant.
he attachment of funding to the Policy Agreements has motivated 
lis authority towards achieving the targets.
here is a strong link between this authority achieving the targets 
md receiving the funding.
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>ase tick the box with the score which best reflects your view in respect of each of the
lowing statements where 7= Agree strongly, U=Undecided and 1= Disagree Strongly or tick
or ‘N\
= Don’t Know 
= Not Applicable
1 2 3 U 5 6 7 D
K
N
A
The attachment of general revenue funding to the Policy Agreement 
is appropriate.
Those with service responsibilities would have been more 
motivated to work towards achievement of the targets if the funding 
was linked to specific targets.
Managers would have worked towards achieving the targets in the 
agreements without the attachment of funding to the Agreements.
I have read the evaluation protocol.
If ‘No’, please go straight to Question 75.
Y N
The evaluation protocol is ‘fair’.
The nature of the evaluation protocol supports the concept of 
relating funding to performance.
Managers would have been more motivated by the inclusion of non 
financial incentives and rewards in the Agreements such as greater 
autonomy, recognition etc.
Authorities should be able to chose a ‘reward package’ if Policy 
agreements enter a second phase.
The promised funding will ‘materialise’.
Local authorities will ‘expect’ this funding in the future regardless of 
performance.
The cost of the Policy Agreement process, including the available 
funding, is in proportion to the benefits.
I am aware of the agreed distribution method for the funding 
attached to Policy Agreements. (If ‘No’, please go straight to 
Question 82.)
Y N
The distribution method for Performance Incentive Grant (PIG) is 
‘fair’.
The Policy Agreement process has been handled in a positive way 
by local authorities.
The Policy Agreement process has been handled in a positive way 
by the Assembly.
The funding linked to these Agreements is a reward i.e. to reward 
performance after the event.
The funding linked to these Agreements is an incentive i.e. to 
stimulate performance.
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ase tick the box with the score which best reflects your view in respect of each of the 
owing statements where 7= Agree strongly, U=Undecided and 1= Disagree Strongly.
[= Don’t Know 
Not Applicable
1 2 3 U 5 6 7 D
K
N
A
lendments to Objectives and Activities
There has been adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement 
process as a whole when reviewing targets and baselines.
Most of the discussion during the review sessions has focused on 
Performance Improvement Grant.
The role of the Assembly during review sessions has been to help 
local authorities constructively improve performance.
There has been effective communication between the Assembly and 
local authorities at the review stage.
ijectives of Policy Agreements
One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to focus on local 
authority results and outcomes rather than inputs.
. One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to provide discretion 
for local authorities to determine where to deploy their resources.
. One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to minimise the 
requirements on local authorities to produce strategies and plans.
.One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to generate greater 
coherence between local and national priorities.
. One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to improve the 
relationship between local authorities and the National Assembly for 
Wales.
. One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to improve local 
authority performance.
. One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to create a culture of 
self-improvement.
. One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to provide ‘top-up’ 
funding to local authorities.
. One of the objectives of Policy agreements is to demonstrate that 
there is no requirement for externally driven improvement by 
inspection and audit.
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE (PTO)
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ne space below is provided for any thoughts or suggestions you may have in respect of Policy 
3ireements. These may be of a general nature or in respect of a specific question above. If the 
tier please indicate to which question your comments refer.
ease also indicate below by including your name and contact details if you would be willing to 
scuss your comments, or any aspect of this questionnaire, with the researcher. Any discussions 
iHI also be treated as confidential in the sense that it will not be possible to identify individual 
sponses from the published results.
lease return this questionnaire (in the SAE provided) to: 
isa James
ost Graduate Student 
ardiff Business School 
Cardiff University 
:olum Drive 
-ardiff 
:F10 3EU
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QUESTIONNAIRE (2) APPENDIX E
’OLICY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES AND LOCAL
AUTHORITIES
ase tick if you are:
1. A local authority officer with responsibility for achieving specific targets in the 
Policy Agreement (If so, please specify which targets below and answer 
questions from the perspective of this service)
2. A local authority officer involved in the Policy Agreement process but with no 
specific service responsibility.
3. Please indicate the number of years (to the nearest whole year) for which 
you have been a local authority officer.
If you have a particular service related interest or other particular interest in Policy 
Agreements please tick the appropriate box below:
Pupil attainment
Social care for older people
Social care for adults
Social care for children
Transport modal shift or reducing fatalities
Recycling of municipal waste
Sustainable development
Tackling social disadvantage
Equal opportunities
Voluntary sector
Service a local authority scrutiny committee
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QUESTIONNAIRE (3) APPENDIX F
POLICY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES AND LOCAL
AUTHORITIES
jase tick if you are:
1. An Assembly Member with specific service responsibility (If so please 
specify which area below and answer questions on the basis of your 
service area responsibility)
2. An Assembly Member with a general interest in Policy Agreements.
3. Please indicate the political party (or otherwise) which you represent.
4. Please insert the total number of years (to nearest full year) for which 
you have been an Assembly member.
If you have a particular service related interest or other particular interest in Policy 
Agreements please tick the appropriate box below:
Pupil attainment
Social care for older people
Social care for adults
Social care for children
Transport modal shift or reducing fatalities
Recycling of municipal waste
Sustainable development
Tackling social disadvantage
Equal opportunities
Voluntary sector
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QUESTIONNAIRE (4) APPENDIX G
>OLICY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES AND LOCAL
AUTHORITIES
ase tick if you are:
1. A National Assembly official with responsibility for agreeing and monitoring a 
specific service area of the Policy Agreements. (Please specify which 
service area below and answer questions from the perspective of this 
service area)
2. A National Assembly official with responsibility for the Policy Agreement 
process as a whole.
3. Please indicate the number of years (to the nearest whole year) for which 
you have been a civil servant.
If you have a particular service related interest or other particular interest in Policy 
Agreements please tick the appropriate box below:
Pupil attainment
Social care for older people
Social care for adults
Social care for children
Transport modal shift or reducing fatalities
Recycling of municipal waste
Sustainable development
Tackling social disadvantage
Equal opportunities
Voluntary sector
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APPENDIX H
Cardiff University Business School 
Cardiff University 
Colum Drive 
Cardiff 
CF10 3EU
July 14, 2003
jar Councillor/Sir/Madam,
POLICY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES AND LOCAL
AUTHORITIES
im studying for a PhD at Cardiff University and my chosen research topic is the development of 
)licy Agreements between local authorities and the National Assembly for Wales. As part of this 
search I would like to find out and try to understand the views and opinions of elected members 
id officers in local authorities in respect of the Policy Agreement process, the contents of the 
jreements and the monitoring arrangements.
vould therefore be extremely grateful if you would be prepared to complete and return the enclosed 
lestionnaire to me by Friday August 1st, 2003 in the stamped addressed envelope provided. The 
lestionnaire should take no more than 15 minutes to complete and will provide vital evidence to 
>lp me with my research.
le  responses will be analysed and published as part of my PhD requirements but it will not be 
)ssible to identify individual responses in the published research.
nee again many, many thanks for sparing some of your valuable time to complete and return the 
jestionnaire.
ours sincerely,
sa James
X X X
APPENDIX I
QUESTIONNAIRE COMMENTS FROM ELECTED MEMBERS
These comments have not been edited but are grouped into common themes. Some 
comments are relevant to two or more themes and have therefore been repeated.
The Overall Policy Agreement Process
1. I disagree with the emphasis of this questionnaire. In my view the action of the WAG 
has been to undermine the role of local authorities. It has taken away L.A. duties and 
given them to unelected bodies- QUANGO Mad with little or no accountability. The 
quicker the WAG is done away with the better for WALES.
2. Where I have indicated that I am undecided this indicates that as County Councillors 
we are frequently frustrated that:
i) Central Government through WAG is still operating via GWANGOS that usurp 
the excellent previous work done at local level e.g. education at plus 16 now 
with ELWA.
ii) Frustration caused often by the remoteness to local issues to the WDA: - a 
frequent in-action causing worthwhile projects to be lost.
3. Recent consultations again strongly suggest that the WAG is concentrating on the 
relationship between Policy Agreements and Community Strategies-again an important 
link-but with little or no reference to the WPI and general improvement agenda prompts 
one to question the purpose of Policy Agreements- a focus for organisational improvement 
and development? Or some kind of hybrid with future funding perhaps subject to partners’ 
approval?
4. Too much officer time is taken up by producing Policy Agreements rather than 
providing a good service. Produces too much stress and demotivates the staff. Too much 
bureaucracy and not enough real understanding at Assembly level.
Setting Policy Agreement Objectives for Service Improvement
5. Policy Agreements tend, in my opinion, to reflect the views of the Assembly and not 
those of the local authority who may have other priorities. Assembly holding the purse 
strings can therefore influence decision making.
6. Policy Agreements should create a link between local and national priorities but 
respondent felt that they had not.
Measuring Outcomes
7. Too much officer time is taken up by producing Policy Agreements rather than 
providing a good service. Produces too much stress and demotivates the staff. Too much
X X X I
bureaucracy and not enough real understanding at Assembly level. (This comment has 
been included twice as it is relevant to more than one theme- in this case reference is 
made to the cost/benefit of the outcome measurement process.)
Feedback
No comments were made in respect of feedback.
Rewards linked to Outcomes
8. Allocate PIG on a spend to save basis.
9. Unhypothecated funding which can be used for local priorities. The process can ‘skew’ 
funding into areas which may not be the authority’s most important priorities.
10. The fact that every council got the money regardless of performance has tended to 
make a mockery of the process. What has been achieved by all the extra time and effort? 
There are too many specific grants and controls which creates the perception that NAW 
officials and (some) AMs do not trust local government.
11. I very much welcome the un hypothecated grant as it allows the authority to invest in 
services identified by the authority as being in need of extra funding.
12. (In respect of PIG) should be more flexible criteria.
13. PIG money has not necessarily been hypothecated to areas for improvement i.e. L.A. 
may have reached targets anyway. Therefore able to redirect PIG monies to other service 
delivery areas.
14. (In respect of PIG) An improved timescale could help local authorities.
15. In respect of PIG- return to local authorities to use on their own local priorities.
16. In respect of PIG- There is far too much bureaucracy involved. Better if simple grant 
and allow Councils to direct as they see fit. It is all too much central control.
17. The whole area of Policy Agreements is a complex one, and recently subject to 
consultation on their future scope. Whilst they are a generally welcome addition to the 
policy and strategy-making arena, recent consultation suggests that definitions have 
become rather blurred and as such have raised some questions, not least, for 2003/4 the 
PIG monies attached to the Policy Agreements were embedded in the general settlement 
which was helpful and enabled this authority to allocate resources based on robust needs 
assessment, service user consultation and in line with specific priorities. However, plans 
to allocate the PIG according to ring-fenced areas of activity is at odds with the freedoms 
and responsibilities promised under the Wales Programme for Improvement (WPI) and the 
maturing relationship between WAG and local authorities?
18. In respect of PIG- ‘Base budget’
X X X II
19. There is considerable scepticism about the funding linked to PAs in local government. 
The message coming from the Assembly is that councils will receive the funding whether 
or not they achieve their targets.
20. In respect of PIG- by discussing with Members (as well as civil servants) what 
priorities are- WLGA.
21. Further encourage good performing authorities by giving increased PIG. Implement 
‘Beacon Authority’ status.
22. In respect of PIG- Most new policies have implications which tend not to be funded. 
Amendments to Objectives and Activities
No comments were made in respect of Objectives and Activities 
Objectives of Policy Agreements
23. I disagree with the emphasis of this questionnaire. In my view the action of the WAG 
has been to undermine the role of local authorities. It has taken away L.A. duties and 
given them to unelected bodies- QUANGO Mad with little or no accountability. The 
quicker the WAG is done away with the better for WALES. (This comment has been 
included twice as it is relevant to more than one theme)
24. Where I have indicated that I am undecided this indicates that as County Councillors 
we are frequently frustrated that:
iii) Central Government through WAG is still operating via GWANGOS that usurp 
the excellent previous work done at local level e.g. education at plus 16 now 
with ELWA.
iv) Frustration caused often by the remoteness to local issues to the WDA: - a 
frequent in-action causing worthwhile projects to be lost.
(This comment has been included twice as it is relevant to more than one theme)
25. Recent consultations again strongly suggest that the WAG is concentrating on the 
relationship between Policy Agreements and Community Strategies-again an important 
link-but with little or no reference to the WPI and general improvement agenda prompts 
one to question the purpose of Policy Agreements- a focus for organisational improvement 
and development? Or some kind of hybrid with future funding perhaps subject to partners’ 
approval? (This comment has been included twice as it is relevant to more than one 
theme)
26. The whole area of Policy Agreements is a complex one, and recently subject to 
consultation on their future scope. Whilst they are a generally welcome addition to the 
policy and strategy-making arena, recent consultation suggests that definitions have 
become rather blurred and as such have raised some questions, not least, for 2003/4 the 
PIG monies attached to the Policy Agreements were embedded in the general settlement 
which was helpful and enabled this authority to allocate resources based on robust needs 
assessment, service user consultation and in line with specific priorities. However, plans 
to allocate the PIG according to ring-fenced areas of activity is at odds with the freedoms
X X X III
and responsibilities promised under the Wales Programme for Improvement (WPI) and the 
maturing relationship between WAG and local authorities? (This comment has been 
included twice as it is relevant to more than one theme)
Miscellaneous Comments
27. This aspect of local government policy is changing rapidly as such some of the 
responses to your questions, at this stage, very much fall into the ‘undecided’ territory.
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APPENDIX J
QUESTIONNAIRE COMMENTS FROM LOCAL AUTHORITY OFFICERS
These comments have not been edited but they have been grouped into common themes. 
Some comments are relevant to two or more themes and have therefore been repeated.
The Overall Policy Agreement Process
1. Modal transfer is no indicator of the success of transport policy in rural areas, let alone 
economic regeneration. The PA regime for modal transfer thus starts with a pedigree that 
is more appropriate to a St. Bernard/Pomeranian cross than any sensible base. That said 
the goal of Policy Agreements -  to improve local authority service is a worthy one. That is 
why I have scored WAG and LA involvement in the PA regime highly; they are at least 
trying to address a very important issue.
2. We should still strive for continuous improvement but the PI and PA regime is a
blunt instrument for achieving improvement.
3. There needs to be a better understanding of the role of PAs vis a vis other ‘tools’ of the 
WAG in driving up performance in key areas of mutual concern.
Setting Policy Agreement Objectives for Service Improvement
4. The Policy Agreement work has fallen into disrepute as:
- Indicator sets are not well defined
- Because of this they have become too woolly in their application
- The incentive/disincentive of tying them to financial reward/penalty has not been fulfilled
- Next steps have to be seen to be real and actioned.
5. PAs do not take into account the local capacity in private residential/nursing home beds 
and the number of closures and loss of beds in individual authorities. Negotiations with 
WAG were fruitful on this but the number of closures is beyond the LAs control in a 
number of instances.
6. The authority would like to invest in preventative services that enable people to live in 
their community. The push of the Pis is around the number of people helped to live at 
home- the provision of these services can create dependency and cut across the strategic 
approach to prevention. There should be Policy Agreements which measure how well we 
link up with other sectors e.g. health, the voluntary sector in terms of prevention and 
reablement.
Measuring Outcomes
7. Modal transfer is no indicator of the success of transport policy in rural areas, let alone 
economic regeneration. The PA regime for modal transfer thus starts with a pedigree that 
is more appropriate to a St. Bernard/Pomeranian cross than any sensible base. That said 
the goal of Policy Agreements — to improve local authority service is a worthy one. That is 
why I have scored WAG and LA involvement in the PA regime highly; they are at least
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trying to address a very important issue. (This comment has been included twice as it is 
relevant to more than one theme)
8. The fact that the Assembly has commissioned a review of the performance 
management framework says it all. Current indicators not so useful performance 
measures- and these include Policy Agreement indicators.
9. One of my major concerns with the number of indicators is the statistical significance of 
the outcome given the likely small numbers involved from an SSD perspective.
Feedback
10. Most authorities expect to obtain the funding whether or not they have achieved the 
targets. This makes a mockery of incentive rewards. We have had little communication 
with WAG officials since the PA was signed over 2 years ago (1 meeting) no support at all. 
We still do not have a definition for modal shift.
Rewards linked to Outcomes
11. PAs (and Pis) may be a useful diagnosis tool for poor performance but they have little 
role to play in the reward and rectification process.
12. Each authority should be able to use the funds in response to local need.
Unfortunately it is not being used specifically to improve performance to agreed targets.
13. In respect of PIG- Need to be more focused to authorities’ priorities and needs 
identified through deprivation indicators, WPI etc. Targets need to be SMARTer.
14. The Policy Agreement work has fallen into disrepute as:
- Indicator sets are not well defined
- Because of this they have become too woolly in their application
- The incentive/disincentive of tying them to financial reward/penalty has not been 
fulfilled
- Next steps have to be seen to be real and actioned.
(This comment has been included three times as it is relevant to more than one theme)
15. In respect of PIG- A consortium of authorities is looking at a new social care IT system 
for Wales capable of interfacing with unified assessment tools. The PIG monies could 
have been used to fund this.
16. Funding needs to be sustainable to be of value not a moveable feast of here today 
and gone tomorrow. It is difficult to recruit to permanent established posts and nigh on 
impossible to get good standard recruits to temporary fixed term posts.
17. My knowledge of Policy Agreements is scant, though I am aware that the authority 
has signed up and that municipal waste recycling and composting standards are enshrined 
in the national waste strategy. I am not aware of the amount of funding available through 
the PIG scheme. My department is not aware that it will receive any funding at all on 
achievement of targets and so it provides very little incentive. Our drive to meet targets is
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based on professional pride and is extremely wholehearted considering the remarkable 
lack of resource available.
18. In respect of PIG- better used as part of general LA funding whilst still retaining Policy 
Agreements for key areas. There is no need for the financial stick or carrot if we are to 
establish true partnership between the Assembly and LAs.
19. In respect of PIG- I think it should be more specifically linked to the criteria identified. 
It should also be of sufficient scale and realistic in relation to making improvements.
20. In respect of PIG- to increase project management capacity.
21. My service has benefited from PIG money but the initiative taken has not been 
sustained by the Authority and so we have largely gone backwards again. Policy Officer 
posts have been funded from PIG money and the investment has been well worthwhile. In 
2 years time without the continuation of such funding we may go backwards again.
22. In respect of PIG- Adopt the approach outlined in the Wanless Review of Health and 
Social Care
23. In respect of PIG- link an authority’s PA targets/funding to the authority’s self review 
which should identify weakest performance. Make PIG conditional on each LA match 
funding to ensure that it is locked into achieving improvements.
24. PIG funding should be used to help local authorities meet mutually agreed targets, 
over a three year period, which take account of local circumstances and meet both 
national and local priorities. Individually negotiated agreements, both in terms of indicators 
and targets is the best way forward.
25. Q18 I don’t believe that the PIG funding was designed to help build capacity for 
improvement, it was designed to secure specific improvements which it did.
26. In respect of PIG- needs to be incorporated within the RSG settlement rather than 
given retrospectively as a specific grant.
27. In respect of PIG- Providing direct services to address underfunding of home care 
services to maintain people in the community.
28. In respect of PIG- capacity building across all service areas especially around the 
areas of performance and project management to ensure VFM.
29. In respect of PIG- Allocate funds to a wider performance improvement agenda rather 
than just restricting to PAs.
30. In respect of PIG- In improving performance management information and data 
collection to ensure appropriate comparison across Wales.
31. In respect of PIG- by matching local priorities with PIG.
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32. In respect of PIG- add to settlement and earmark for specific services to help them 
deliver the targets in their own community and service plans.
33. In respect of PIG- it was not specific to the targets within the Policy Agreement. In my 
authority it was used to support the overall budget but this might not be a bad thing!
34. In respect of PIG- Paid strictly on achievement of targets
35. Most authorities expect to obtain the funding whether or not they have achieved the 
targets. This makes a mockery of incentive rewards. We have had little communication 
with WAG officials since the PA was signed over 2 years ago (1 meeting) no support at all. 
We still do not have a definition for modal shift. (This comment has been included twice as 
it is relevant to more than one theme)
36. In respect of PIG- incorporate into base RSG therefore maximise flexibility annual 
review of community strategy and Improvement Plan.
37. In respect of PIG- Funding statutory pressures on councils
Amendments to Objectives and Activities
38. PAs (and Pis) may be a useful diagnosis tool for poor performance but they have little 
role to play in the reward and rectification process. (This comment has been included twice 
as it is relevant to more than one theme)
39. The Policy Agreement work has fallen into disrepute as:
- Indicator sets are not well defined
- Because of this they have become too woolly in their application
- The incentive/disincentive of tying them to financial reward/penalty has not been fulfilled
- Next steps have to be seen to be real and actioned.
Objectives of Policy Agreements
40. The Policy Agreement regime is fundamentally at odds with a local authority’s wish to 
determine its own priorities and to be accountable to the public through the ballot box. The 
proliferation of specific WAG grants and performance rewards conflicts with that basic aim.
41. The PAs are too simplistic to stimulate real improvements in performance The
presence of the modal transfer PA is more likely to distort management priorities than it is 
to motivate service improvement. The same can almost certainly be said of the other PA 
headings.
42. The PAs were well intentioned to drive forward performance. It has not been used 
effectively to achieve this. In comparison to the English PAF and CPA Wales has failed to 
tackle the issues- acknowledge the development of excellence and isolate poor 
performance. If Wales and England employed the same systems (PAF and CPA) then the 
full extent of poor performance would become apparent. Politicians in both the WAG and 
LAs are failing to ‘bite the bullet’.
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43. My service has benefited from PIG money but the initiative taken has not been 
sustained by the Authority and so we have largely gone backwards again. Policy Officer 
posts have been funded from PIG money and the investment has been well worthwhile. In 
2 years time without the continuation of such funding we may go backwards again. (This 
comment has been included twice because it is relevant to more than one theme)
44. More closely linked with Local Government Act 2000 and requirement to publish a 
community strategy. As with other key strategies provide a ‘funding pot’ for 
delivery/development of community planning process.
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APPENDIX K
QUESTIONNAIRE COMMENTS FROM ASSEMBLY MEMBERS
These comments have not been edited but have been grouped into themes. Some 
comments are relevant to two or more themes and have therefore been repeated.
The Overall Policy Agreement Process
1. To date no policy agreements have been published, therefore there is no way to judge 
whether Performance Incentive Grant is used effectively. In the last financial year it was 
used as a mechanism for distributing extra money to councils.
2. I have asked on a number of occasions for Policy agreements to be put in the public 
domain.
3. We need a more open process for a start- at the moment we exist in a vacuum.
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APPENDIX L 
QUESTIONNAIRE COMMENTS FROM ASSEMBLY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
These comments have not been edited but have been grouped into themes. Some 
comments are relevant to two or more themes and have therefore been repeated.
The Overall Policy Agreement Process
No comments were received on this theme.
Setting Policy Agreement Objectives for Service Improvement
1. On q26 there was a variation between the different sections of the Policy Agreement.
On waste, yes the targets were demanding but achievable. On education some of the 
targets were not demanding, some were too demanding. On social services thee are still 
question marks about the robustness of data- particularly on adult services- which mean 
that some of the targets need to be taken as indicative. In short there are underlying 
questions about the existence of robust baselines and the ability to set stretching but 
achievable targets, particularly where as with some of the education targets authorities are 
coming to the limits of what can easily be achieved and the law of diminishing returns 
becomes an issue.
Measuring Outcomes
2. It would have to be more specific than the current modal shift one to be effective.
Feedback
3. We have not co-ordinated as well as we should the work on policy agreements with 
other work to assess performance. For example, information on individual LA targets was 
not available to SSIW for the latter’s performance evaluation.
Rewards linked to Outcomes
4. There should be stronger link between achievement of targets/outcomes and funding 
under PIG.
5. The impression given was that this was handed out wholesale without any 
measurement of performance. The ‘reward’ available to authorities should not only be 
financial but should be linked in some way to greater freedoms.
X L I
6. In respect of PIG- only pay if local targets are actually met. You have to be prepared to 
withhold money if there is no progress. This year’s ‘because you tried’ approach was very 
misleading.
Amendments to Objectives and Activities
No comments were received in respect of this theme.
Objectives of Policy Agreements
No comments were received in respect of this theme.
Miscellaneous comments
7. Questions have been answered on an overall basis. There are large variations in 
policy agreements, performance monitoring etc. across Wales.
8. Undecided responses sometimes indicate that some authorities have, some haven’t.
X L II
Appendix S -  Multiple Regression Models for Research Questions 1 to 6 
Explanation of Multiple Regression
A multiple regression model takes the following form:
Y= bo+biXi+b2X2 etc
The term ‘b0‘ is the intercept or constant which represents a kind of baseline value for ‘Y’ 
around which it varies due to the effects of the explanatory variables. The co-efficient which 
is associated with each explanatory variable represents the average marginal change in Y 
associated with a unit change in that explanatory variable, so that if the variable x is increased 
by one unit and all of the other variables are held constant then the regression model predicts 
that Y would on average change by bi units. The regression co-efficients are thus measures 
of the size of the effects of the independent or explanatory variable on the response or 
dependent variable. A large regression co-efficient indicates that a small change in the 
explanatory variable has, on average, a large impact on the response variable, ceteris 
parabus (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001; Clegg, 2001; National Audit Office/Audit Scotland, 
2004). Some of the research questions have more than one dependent variable, therefore, a 
regression model will be built for each of the dependent variables which relate to a specific 
aspect of the research question.
Each research question has several critical success factors (CSFs) associated with it, and in 
many cases these CSFs are designed on the basis of a basket of related questions. In order 
to maximise the effectiveness of the multivariate regression model, for each of the dependent 
variables, the independent variables will be scrutinised to ensure that where two independent 
variables have a strong correlation this does not adversely affect the statistical robustness of 
the model.
This is because it is assumed in regression analysis that no two independent variables are 
perfectly correlated with each other. If a high degree of correlation exists this is termed 
collinerarity, and can lead to regression coefficients which are unstable because they will be 
highly sensitive to small changes in the data or the model. A small amount of collinearity can 
be managed, but it is best not to include two highly correlated independent variables in a 
multiple regression model. Where possible, the independent variable included will be based 
on the highest correlation with the dependent variable (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001; Clegg, 
2001; National Audit Office/Audit Scotland, 2004).
Research Question 1
RQ1 Have Policy Agreements helped to create a culture of ‘self-improvement’ in local 
authorities? A culture of self-improvement is defined as local authorities focusing on 
outcomes rather than inputs, proactively seeking continuous improvement rather than acting 
on external stimuli such as inspection and regulation.
The dependent variable for the first model in respect of this question is - One of the objectives 
of Policy Agreements is to focus on local authority results and outcomes rather than inputs 
(Question 88). Chapter 5, Table 5.4 identifies that there are ten CSFs and 19 questions 
associated with this dependent variable (the measurement of some critical success factors is, 
in some cases, related to a basket of questions). To build the model the following survey 
questions were excluded for the reasons set out below:
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BUILDING THE REGRESSION MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 1 (Q88)
Question Reason for Exclusion from Regression Model for Question 88
13 This question relates to the next dependent variable for this research 
question - i.e. self improvement and a move away from inspection (Qs 94 
and 96)
19 This was a free form qualitative response question, the answers to which 
have been considered in the previous chapter.
32 As with Q13 this question relates to the self-improvement aspect of this 
research question.
70 This was a simple ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ question to determine whether or not the 
respondent had read the evaluation protocol. However, it should be 
noted that the presence of this 'filter' question is the reason for the lower 
‘n’, i.e. number of responses considered by the model, as not all of the 
respondents had read the protocol.
71 As with Qs13 and 32, the perception of fairness is about creating an 
‘appropriate culture’ and therefore is included in the model for dependent 
variable Q94 (see next section).
78 As for Q70.
79 As above.
This results in the following independent variables being included in the multiple regression 
model: Qs 18, 14, 33, 45, 46, 59, 68, 69, 72, 64, 86 and 85, and all of the CSFs being 
included in the model.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1- FOCUS ON RESULTS AND OUTCOMES - REGRESSION
MODEL
Coefficients(a)
Model
Unstand’ised
Coefficients
T Sig.
B Std. Error
(Constant) 1.577 1.214 1.300 0.208
The Policy Agreement funding could have been better used 
in other ways to help build capacity for improvement in local 
authorities (Question 18)
-0.071 0.135 -0.524 0.606
The processes involved in developing Policy Agreements 
are as important as the funding (Q14)
0.082 0.148 0.553 0.586
Local Authorities have the resources (including access to 
training, facilities and staff) to enable them to make a 
reasonable attempt at achieving the targets (Q33)
-0.203 0.158 -1.282 0.215
The authority must work with other organisations to achieve 
the targets (Q45)
0.481 0.226 2.126 0.046
The authority has the freedom to decide how to achieve 
improvements in its own performance (Q46)
0.317 0.162 1.956 0.065
Local authorities have been able to determine how to 
achieve the targets (Q59)
0.074 0.213 0.346 0.733
Those with service responsibilities would have been more 
motivated to work towards the achievement of the targets if 
the funding was linked to specific targets (Q68)
-0.090 0.166 -0.544 0.592
Managers would have worked towards the targets in the 
Agreements without the attachment of funding to the 
Agreements (Q69)
0.006 0.122 0.049 0.961
The nature of the evaluation protocol supports the concept 
of relatinq funding to performance (Q72)
0.265 0.113 2.352 0.029
The funding is significant (Q64) -0.123 0.096 -1.279 0.215
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The role of the Assembly during the review sessions has 
been to help local authorities constructively improve 
performance(Q86)
0.030 0.142 0.214 0.833
Most of the discussion during the review sessions has 
focused on Performance Improvement Grant (Q85)
-0.186 0.140 -1.326 0.200
• Dependent Variable: Focus on LA results and outcomes rather than inputs (Q88) (a)
N 33
R Squared 0.673
Adjusted R Squared 0.477
ANOVA Significance 0.007
F Value 3.432
The shaded areas above highlight the variables which are significant in the model at the 10% 
level. No significant collinearity was identified. It should also be noted that as some of the 
questions related to this research question follow filter questions on the questionnaire, a 
smaller number of cases are available for inclusion in the model. These variables, and all of 
the variables included in later models, were examined for skewness to ensure that the 
distribution of responses is normal (see skewness tests for questions relating to research 
questions 1 to 6 in Appendices M to R). In this instance no cases of exceptional skewness 
were found, i.e plus or minus 1.8 at the total response level. These results, and the results 
from all of the models in this appendix, were also tested for heteroscedasticity by undertaking 
a scatter plot, as part of the regression analysis, using the standardised residuals as Y and 
the standardised predicted values as X. This plot checks for the linearity and equality of 
variances. Heteroscedasticity is present if the distribution is not uniform across the centre of 
the graph. In all cases no heteroscedasticity was found.
The next dependent variable is - One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to create a 
culture of self-improvement (Question 94). There are ten CSFs and 19 questions associated 
with this dependent variable (see Chapter 5, Table 5.4). To build the model the following 
survey questions were excluded for the reasons set out below:
BUILDING THE REGRESSION MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 1 (Q94)
Question Reason for Exclusion from Regression Model for Question 94
14 This question relates to the previous aspect of this research question and 
was included in the model for Q88.
19 This is a free form qualitative question and the responses to this question 
have been included in the previous chapter.
33 As with Q14, this question relates to the focusing on outcomes aspect of 
the research question related to Q88.
45 As above.
68 As above.
70 This is a Yes/No ‘filter’ question and its inclusion in the CSFs relating to 
this research question (although not in the model) explains the lower ‘n’, 
i.e. number of valid responses included.
72 As with Qs 14, 33, 45 and 68, this question relates to the dependent 
element of the research question set out in Q88.
78 As for Q70.
The model therefore includes the following questions, 18, 13, 32, 46, 59, 69, 71, 79, 64, 86 
and 85 (covering all of the related CSFs) and is set out in the following table.
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1- CREATING A CULTURE OF SELF-IMPROVEMENT -
REGRESSION MODEL
Coefficients(a)
Model
Unstand'ised
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std.
Error
(Constant) 5.071 3.292 1.540 0.142
The Policy Agreement funding could have been better 
used in other ways to help build capacity for 
improvement in local authorities (Question 18)
0.057 0.198 0.290 0.775
Policy Agreements have added value to the relationship 
between local authorities and the National Assembly for 
Wales (Q13)
0.299 0.225 1.329 0.201
Local Authorities have the skills to make a reasonable 
attempt at achieving the targets (Q32)
-0.128 0.393 -0.327 0.748
The authority has the freedom to determine how to 
achieve improvements in its own performance (Q46)
-0.082 0.248 -0.329 0.746
Local authorities have been able to determine how to 
achieve the targets (Q59)
-0.111 0.322 -0.345 0.735
Managers would have worked towards achieving the 
targets in the Agreements without the attachment of 
funding to the Agreements (Q69)
-0.090 0.180 -0.502 0.622
The evaluation protocol is fair (Q71) -0.343 0.200 -1.719 0.104
The distribution method for Performance Incentive Grant 
is fair (Q79)
0.339 0.292 1.162 0.261
The funding is significant (Q64) 0.034 0.160 0.211 0.835
The role of the Assembly during the review sessions has 
been to help local authorities constructively improve 
performance(Q86)
0.081 0.255 0.319 0.754
Most of the discussion during the review sessions has 
focused on Performance Incentive Grant (Q85)
0.064 0.269 0.237 0.816
• Dependent Variable: Create a culture of self improvement (Q94) (a)
N 29
R Squared 0.422
Adjusted R Squared 0.049
ANOVA Significance 0.397
F Value 1.131
The shaded areas highlight the variable which was significant at the 10% level in the model. 
No significant levels of collinearity were detected. It should also be noted that as some of the 
questions related to this research question follow filter questions on the questionnaire, a 
smaller number of cases are available for inclusion in the model.
The next dependent variable in respect of Research Question 1 is - Demonstrate that there is 
no requirement for externally driven improvement (Question 96). There are ten CSFs and 19 
questions associated with this dependent variable (Table 5.4). To build the model the 
following survey questions were excluded for the following reasons:
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BUILDING THE REGRESSION MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 1 (Q96)
Question Reason for Exclusion from Regression Model for Question 96
18 This question relates to the funding, i.e. focusing on outcomes rather 
than inputs part of this research question considered in the model 
relating to Q88.
19 This is a free form qualitative question and the responses to this question 
were considered in the previous chapter.
14 This question relates to the creating a culture of self- improvement 
aspect of this research question and was included in the model related to 
Q94.
33 This question relates to the funding, i.e. focusing on outcomes rather 
than inputs part of this research question in the model relating to Q88.
45 This question relates to the focusing on outcomes aspect of the research 
question and was included in the model relating to Q88.
70 This is a Yes/No ‘filter’ question and whilst not included in the model 
explains the lower ‘n’ for the number of valid responses included.
72 This question relates to the funding, i.e. focusing on outcomes rather 
than inputs part of this research question considered in the model 
relating to Q88.
78 As for Q70.
79 As above relates to dependent variable Q88.
85 Despite a correlation result with the dependent variable, this independent 
variable was excluded as it created unacceptably high levels of 
collinearity in the model.
The model was therefore built including the following questions: 13, 32, 46, 59, 68, 69, 71, 64 
and 86 (this excludes two CSFs, CSFO05 and CSFA03, both relating to previous aspects of 
this research question).
RESEARCH QUESTION 1- DEMONSTRATE NO REQUIREMENT FOR EXTERNALLY 
DRIVEN IMPROVEMENT - REGRESSION MODEL
Coefficients(a)
Model
Unsti
Coel
and'ised
fficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error
(Constant) 1.989 3.519 0.565 0.578
Policy Agreements have added value to the relationship 
between local authorities and the National Assembly (Q13)
-0.005 0.312 -0.017 0.987
Local authorities have the skills to make a reasonable attempt 
at achieving the targets (Q32)
-0.316 0.407 -0.776 0.446
This authority has the freedom to determine how to achieve 
improvements in its own performance (Q46)
0.258 0.308 0.837 0.412
Local authorities have been able to determine how to achieve 
the targets (Q59)
-0.323 0.402 -0.803 0.430
Those with service responsibilities would have been more 
motivated to work towards achievement of the targets if the 
funding was linked to specific targets (Q68)
0.247 0.339 0.730 0.473
The evaluation protocol is fair (Q71) -0.021 0.252 -0.085 0.933
The funding is significant (Q64) -0.007 0.197 -0.035 0.972
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The role of the Assembly during the review sessions has been 
to help local authorities constructively improve 
performance(Q86)
0.607 0.299 2.033 0.054
• Dependent Variable: Demonstrate that there is no requirement for externally driven improvement 
by audit and inspection (Q96) (a)
N 31
R Squared 0.302
Adjusted R Squared 0.049
ANOVA Significance 0.348
F Value 1.192
The shaded area highlights the variable which was significant at the 10% level. No significant 
levels of collinearity were detected. It should also be noted that as some of the questions 
related to this research question follow filter questions on the questionnaire, a smaller number 
of cases are available for inclusion in the model.
Research Question 2
RQ2 Have Policy Agreements helped to change culture in the Welsh Assembly Government? 
A change of culture in the Welsh Assembly Government is defined as demonstration of the 
Assembly Government focusing on results and outcomes rather than inputs, i.e greater 
discretion for local authorities to determine where to deploy resources, fewer requirements for 
local authorities to produce strategies and plans.
The first dependent variable in respect of Research Question 2 is - One of the objectives of 
Policy Agreements is to provide discretion for local authorities to determine where to deploy 
their resources (Question 89). There are 11 CSFs and 23 questions (Chapter 5, Table 5.4) 
which relate to this research question. There are also 2 dependent variables relating to its 
different aspects. The first of these relates to providing discretion for local authorities to 
determine where to deploy their resources. The following table sets out those survey 
questions which have been excluded from this aspect of the research question, and therefore 
from the model for this dependent variable.
BUILDING THE REGRESSION MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 2 (Q89)
Question Reason for Exclusion from Regression Model for Question 89
19 This is a free form qualitative question and responses to it have been 
considered in the previous chapter.
13 The inclusion of this question in the model resulted in unacceptably high 
levels of collinearity.
14 As above
17 This question is about coherence between local and national planning 
systems and therefore relates to the dependent Q90 aspect of the 
research question.
5 As above.
29 As above.
30 As above.
70 This is a Yes/No ‘filter’ question, and whilst not included in the model 
explains the lower ‘n’ in terms of the number of valid responses included 
in the reqression.
71 This question is about the perception of fairness and reducing ‘control’ 
and was included in the model for the Q90 dependent variable aspect of 
the research question.
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72 As above.
78 This is a Yes/No ‘filter1 question, and therefore whilst not included in the 
model it explains the lower ‘n’ in terms of the number of valid responses 
included in the regression.
79 As for Qs 71 and 72
The remaining questions are therefore as follows: 18, 6, 31, 45, 46, 59, 55, 75, 76, 86 and 85 
which excludes two CSFs, CSFO06 and CSFR03, both relating to aspects of the research 
question considered in the next model. The results are set out in the following table.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2- DISCRETION FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO DETERMINE 
WHERE TO DEPLOY RESOURCES - REGRESSION MODEL
Coefficients(a)
Model
Unstand'ised
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std.
Error
(Constant) -1.060 1.447 -0.733 0.467
The Policy Agreement funding could have been better used in 
other ways to help build capacity for improvement in local 
authorities (Question 18)
-0.005 0.125 -0.044 0.965
The National Assembly has integrated Policy Agreements with 
other local authority finance policies (Q6)
0.096 0.108 0.890 0.377
Focusing on specific areas in this way has created a focus on 
these areas at the expense of others (Q31)
0.041 0.122 0.336 0.738
The Authority must work with other organisations to achieve 
some of the targets (Q45)
0.214 0.171 1.254 0.215
The Authority has the freedom to determine how to achieve 
improvements in its own performance (Q46)
0.432 0.146 2.966 0.004
Local Authorities have been able to determine how to achieve 
the targets (Q59)
0.104 0.169 0.616 0.541
The Assembly has been punitive when monitoring performance 
(Q55)
0.141 0.141 1.001 0.321
The promised funding will materialise (Q75) -0.065 0.163 -0.401 0.690
Local authorities will expect this funding in future regardless of 
performance (Q76)
0.133 0.115 1.156 0.253
The role of the Assembly during the review sessions has been 
to help Local Authorities constructively improve 
performance(Q86)
0.232 0.150 1.553 0.126
Most of the discussion during the review session has focused 
on Performance Improvement Grant (Q85)
-0.162 0.129 -1.253 0.216
• Dependent Variable: Provide discretion for LAs to determine where to deploy resources (Q89) (a)
N 67
R Squared 0.445
Adjusted R Squared 0.334
ANOVA Significance 0.000
F Value 4.008
The shaded areas above highlight significant variables in the model at the 10% level. No 
significant levels of collinearity were detected.
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The dependent variable for the next model in respect of Research Question 2 is - One of the 
objectives of Policy Agreements is to minimise the requirements on local authorities to 
produce strategies and plans (Question 90). The second element of Research Question 2 is 
set out in the dependent variable Question 90, and relates to minimising the requirement on 
local authorities to produce strategies and plans. The following table sets out the survey 
questions which have been excluded from the model and the reasons for their exclusion.
BUILDING THE REGRESSION MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 2 (Q90)
Question Reason for Exclusion from Regression Model for Question 90
18 This relates to the freedom to deploy resources aspect of the research 
question related to the Q89 dependent variable in the previous model.
19 This is a free form qualitative response and responses to this question 
were discussed in the previous chapter.
14 This question is excluded to avoid unacceptable levels of collinearity.
6 This question relates to the coherence of the scheme with other policies, 
and is also measured by Qs 5 and 17. It was excluded to avoid 
unacceptably high levels of collinearity. Q6 was slightly more highly 
correlated to the dependent than Q5, but the difference was slight and 
Q5 has a wider perspective on links with other policies. In addition, Q6 
was included in the previous model as it relates to finance policy.
30 This relates to the avoidance of conflict between the objectives in the 
Agreement and other objectives and is also measured by Q29. It is 
therefore excluded to avoid unacceptable levels of collinearity.
31 As above.
45 This question relates to the aspect of this research question related to 
Q89 and is not therefore relevant to minimising the requirement for 
strategies and plans.
70 This is a Yes/No ‘filter’ question, and whilst excluded from the model 
explains the lower ‘n’ in terms of the number of valid responses included 
in the regression.
72 This relates to the perceived fairness of the system and is also measured 
by Q71 (which was correlated to the dependent). It is therefore excluded 
to avoid unacceptable levels of collinearity.
78 This is a Yes/No ‘filter’ question and whilst excluded from the model 
explains the lower ‘n’ in terms of the number of valid responses included 
in the reqression.
79 As for Q72.
75 This relates to the freedom to deploy resources aspect of this research 
question and was included in the previous model relating to Q89.
76 As above.
85 As above.
The remaining questions are therefore as follows: 13, 17, 5, 29, 46, 59, 55, 71 and 86. It 
excludes CSFO05, CSFR04 and CSFA03. All relate to the previous aspect of this research 
question. The model is set out in the following table.
LXXXIX
BUILDING THE REGRESSION MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 3 (Q92)
Question Reason for Exclusion from Regression Model for Question 92
10 This aspect (CSFO03) relating to effective communication throughout the 
process was excluded to avoid unacceptable levels of collinearity.
11 There is a high level of correlation with Q12 (CSFO03) effective 
communication throughout the process. It has therefore been excluded 
to avoid to high levels of collinearity.
34 Qs 34, 35 and 36 are all highly correlated with each other and measure 
CSFS04 relating to the need for effective communication between 
employers and employees. Therefore Q35 has been included in the 
model as it has the highest correlation with the dependent variable. 
Inclusion of all of the questions in the model created unacceptably high 
levels of collinearity.
36 As above.
60 This variable is highly correlated with Q58.CSFF01 - the need for a lack 
of tension between the ‘cop’ and ‘coach’ role of the appraisor. It has 
therefore been excluded to avoid unacceptably high levels of collinearity.
51 Qs 51, 52 and 53 are all highly correlated with each other (CSFF05) - the 
role of trust. Therefore Q53 has been included in the model as it has the 
highest level of correlation with the dependent variable. The other 
variables were excluded to avoid unacceptably high levels of collinearity.
52 As above.
81 This variable is highly correlated with Q80 which is more highly 
correlated with the dependent variable, it is therefore excluded to avoid 
collinearity. Both variables relate to CSFR08 - the need for positive 
management of schemes.
The following questions, covering all of the relevant CSFs, therefore remained to be included 
in the model which is set out below: 7, 8, 9, 12, 35, 58, 53, 56, 61, 80 and 87.
RESEARCH QUESTION 3- IMPROVING RELATIONSHIPS -REGRESSION MODEL
Coefficients(a)
Model
Unstand'ised
Coefficients
T Sig.
B Std.
Error
(Constant) 0.026 0.918 0.029 0.977
The Authority has made public its Policy Agreement (Question 7) 0.084 0.110 0.765 0.448
My Authority has plans to publish the results of the Policy 
Agreement in 2004 (Q8)
0.158 0.140 1.127 0.265
I am aware that the Assembly has made commitments in the 
Agreements to review plans and remove other impediments to 
continuous improvement of local authority services (Q9)
-0.003 0.093 -0.030 0.976
There is a high level of trust between local authorities and the 
National Assembly (Q12)
0.216 0.143 1.518 0.135
There was effective communication between authorities and the 
Assembly during the period when the targets and baselines were 
set (Q35)
0.123 0.136 0.902 0.371
Policy Agreements are a way for local authorities and the 
Assembly to work toqether to improve services (Q58)
0.384 0.117 3.293 0.002
I am content with feedback process with representatives of the 
Assembly in respect of tracking progress towards achieving the 
targets (Q53)
-0.213 0.144 -1.475 0.146
The process of appraising performance against targets in the 
context of Policy Agreements is too bureaucratic (Q56)
0.149 0.084 1.774 0.082
There has been effective communication of feedback between 
the Assembly and local authorities (Q61)
0.233 0.139 1.671 0.101
XCI
RESEARCH QUESTION 2 -  MINIMISE THE REQUIREMENT TO PRODUCE STRATEGIES
AND PLANS - REGRESSION MODEL
Coefficients(a)
Model
Unstand'ised
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std.
Error
(Constant) -0.722 2.044 -0.353 0.728
Policy Agreements have added value to the relationship 
between local authorities and the National Assembly (Q13)
-0.235 0.256 -0.919 0.370
There is a clear link between Assembly policy as articulated 
through Policy Agreements and other aspects of Assembly 
policy in respect of local government (Q17)
0.612 0.283 2.163 0.043
The National Assembly has integrated Policy Agreements with 
the other local authority performance initiatives (Q5)
-0.171 0.248 -0.687 0.501
There is no conflict between any of the indicators (Q29) -0.309 0.314 -0.983 0.338
This Authority has the freedom to determine how to achieve 
improvements in its own performance (Q46)
0.579 0.237 2.447 0.024
Local Authorities have been able to determine how to achieve 
the targets (Q59)
-0.010 0.326 -0.031 0.976
The Assembly has been punitive when monitoring performance 
(Q55)
-0.022 0.276 -0.080 0.937
The evaluation protocol is fair (Q71) 0.164 0.226 0.727 0.476
The role of the Assembly during review sessions has been to 
help Local Authorities constructively improve performance(Q86)
0.419 0.244 1.722 0.101
• Dependent Variable: Minimise the requirements on LAs to produce strategies and plans (Q90) 
(a)
N 29
R Squared 0.652
Adjusted R Squared 0.487
ANOVA Significance 0.006
F Value 3.954
The shaded areas above highlight the variables which are significant within the model at a 
10% level. No significant levels of collinearity were found. The smaller number of responses 
included in the model is because of filter questions.
Research Question 3
RQ3 Has the Policy Agreement process ‘added value’ to the relationship between the Welsh 
Assembly Government and local authorities? ‘Added value’ is defined as a greater 
understanding between the parties and more effective communication.
The dependent variable is - One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to improve the 
relationship between local authorities and the National Assembly for Wales (Q92). There are 
9 CSFs and 19 questions related to it (see Chapter 5, Table 5.4), the following table sets out 
the survey questions which have been excluded from the model and the reasons for their 
exclusion.
XC
The Policy Agreement process has been handled positively by 
Local Authorities (Q80)
-0.079 0.115 -0.685 0.496
There has been effective communication between the Assembly 
and Local Authorities at the review stage (Q87)
-0.020 0.160 -0.124 0.902
• Dependent Variable: Improve the relationship between NAW and LAs (Q92) (a)
N 65
R Squared 0.464
Adjusted R Squared 0.353
ANOVA Significance 0.000
F Value 4.175
The shaded areas above highlight the significant variables in the model at a 10% level. No 
significant levels of collinearity were identified.
Research Question 4
RQ4 Have Policy Agreements contributed to ‘cohesive’ strategic planning at national and local 
levels? ‘Cohesive’ strategic planning is defined as ‘joined-up’ strategic planning between local 
authorities and the Welsh Assembly Government based on shared and agreed priorities.
The dependent variable for this research question is- One of the objectives of Policy 
Agreements is to generate greater coherence between local and national priorities (Q91). 
Research question 4 has one dependent variable, 6 CSFs and 17 questions (see Chapter 5, 
Table 5.4). The following table identifies the survey questions excluded from the model and 
the reasons for their exclusion.
BUILDING THE REGRESSION MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION
4 (Q91)
Question Reason for Exclusion from Regression Model for Question 91
3 Q3 was highly correlated with the other questions relating to CSFO01, 
integration of the performance management system with a clear strategic 
framework. It was therefore excluded to avoid collinearity.
28 This question has a high level of correlation with Q27, therefore, it was 
excluded to avoid unacceptably high levels of collinearity.
26 Q26 has a high level of correlation with Q27 - CSFS02 - the need for 
targets to be demanding but achievable. It was therefore excluded from 
the model to avoid a high level of collinearity. Q27 was included as it has 
the higher level of correlation with the dependent.
21 Qs 20, 21 and 22 all relate to CSFS03 - the need for a clear 
organisational strategic framework. They are all highly correlated with 
each other and several of the other variables. Q20 was included in the 
model, as it whilst Q22 has the higher level of correlation with the 
dependent, its inclusion resulted in unacceptably high levels of 
collinearity.
22 As above.
37 Qs 37, 38 and 23 all relate to CSFS05 - the need for mutually agreed 
objectives. They are highly correlated with each other. Q38 was 
included in the model as it has the highest level of correlation with the 
dependent. The others were excluded to prevent unacceptably high 
levels of collinearity.
23 As above.
The following questions, covering all of the relevant CSFs were therefore included in the 
following model: 1,2,4, 24, 25, 27, 20, 38, 73 and 74.
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RESEARCH QUESTION 4- COHERENCE BETWEEN LOCAL AND NATIONAL
PRIORITIES - REGRESSION MODEL
Coefficients(a)
Model
Unstand'ised
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std.
Error
(Constant) 2.679 0.890 3.011 0.003
The authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the 
development of its Community Plan (Q1)
-0.189 0.102 -1.853 0.067
The authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the 
development of its Improvement Plan (Q2)
-0.028 0.119 -0.231 0.818
The authority has linked its Policy Agreement to the 
development of its budget strategy (Q4)
0.091 0.088 1.039 0.302
The indicators are specific enough to be clear what is to be 
aimed for (Q24)
0.138 0.094 1.471 0.145
The achievement of the targets can be influenced by factors 
outside the control of the Local Authority (Q25)
0.033 0.097 0.344 0.732
The Agreed targets serve to motivate rather than demotivate 
(Q27)
0.185 0.094 1.957 0.053
The objectives in the Policy Agreements have been framed 
within the overall strategic vision for Wales (Q20)
0.238 0.095 2.496 0.014
The Agreements have been mutually agreed between Local 
Authorities and National Assembly (Q38)
0.136 0.089 1.528 0.130
Managers would have been more motivated by the inclusion of 
non financial incentives and rewards in the Agreements (Q73)
-0.021 0.087 -0.241 0.810
Authorities should be able to chose a reward package (Q74) -0.028 0.098 -0.280 0.780
• Dependent Variable: Generate greater coherence between ocal and national priorities (Q91) (a)
N 104
R Squared 0.333
Adjusted R Squared 0.262
ANOVA Significance 0.000
F Value 4.647
The shaded areas above highlight the variables which are significant in the model at a 10% 
level. No significant levels of collinearity were detected.
Research Question 5
RQs Have Policy Agreements contributed to improved service performance in local 
authorities? Improved service performance is defined as a shift towards meeting or exceeding 
the targets set out in the Policy Agreements.
The relevant dependent variable is - One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to improve 
local authority performance (Q93). Research question 5, the first relating to a performance 
impact, relates to the improvement of service delivery by local authorities and has one 
dependent variable, 9 CSFs and 18 questions (See Table 5.4). The following table sets out 
the survey questions which were excluded from the model and the reason for their exclusion.
BUILDING 1rHE REGRESSION MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 5 (Q93)
Question Reason for Exclusion from Regression Model for Q93
39 Q's 39 and 40 were highly correlated with each other and a number of 
the other variables, these questions were excluded to avoid unacceptably 
high levels of collinearity.
40 As above.
63 This is a Yes/No ‘filter’ question.
The following questions, covering all of the relevant CSFs except CSFS06, were therefore 
included in the following model: 16, 49, 43, 44, 48, 41, 42, 50, 54, 57, 65, 66, 67, 82 and 83.
XCIII
The excluded CSF, relating to the links between effort and performance, and performance
and rewards was felt to be adequately measured by other variables included in the model.
RESEARCH QUESTION 5 -  IMPROVE LOCAL AUTHORITY PERFORMANCE -
REGRESSION MODEL
Coefficients(a)
Model
Unstand'ised
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error
(Constant) 2.274 0.683 3.331 0.001
The Policy Agreements clearly indicate to local authorities what 
is expected of them and what is on offer in return (Q16)
-0.034 0.094 -0.362 0.719
None of the data collected in measuring performance could be 
subject to manipulation (Q49)
-0.060 0.085 -0.704 0.484
There is a clear link between effort the authority makes towards 
achieving the Policy Agreement targets and the performance 
measures in the Policy Agreements (Q43)
0.111 0.123 0.899 0.371
There is a clear link between Local Authority performance and 
the amount of funding received (Q44)
-0.033 0.086 -0.389 0.698
The indicators are measuring the outcome of the authority’s 
activity, not the activity itself (Q48)
0.031 0.081 0.376 0.708
The Policy Agreements indicators have been chosen because 
they are easy to measure rather than appropriate (Q41)
0.036 0.083 0.436 0.664
The indicators used are the most suitable to measure 
achievement of the objectives set out in the Policy Agreements 
(CM2)
0.048 0.097 0.498 0.620
Some outcomes are not measured by specific indicators but I 
am satisfied that it will be possible to measure progress against 
these broader themes (Q50)
0.133 0.099 1.348 0.182
Other organisations which contribute to the achievement of the 
targets are included in the appraisal process (Q54)
0.012 0.092 0.127 0.899
The Policy Agreement process has raised expectations in 
terms of improved performance which can be met (Q57)
0.228 0.095 2.397 0.019
The attachment of funding to the Policy Agreements has 
motivated authorities towards achieving the targets (Q65)
0.102 0.096 1.061 0.292
There is a strong link between the authority achieving the 
targets and receiving the funding (Q66)
-0.115 0.095 -1.219 0.227
The attachment of general revenue funding to the Policy 
Agreement is appropriate (Q67)
0.057 0.069 0.819 0.416
The funding linked to these Agreements is a reward (Q82) -0.026 0.093 -0.280 0.780
The funding linked to these Agreements is an incentive (Q83) 0.197 0.102 1.921 0.059
N 90
R Squared 0.380
Adjusted R Squared 0.254
ANOVA Significance 0.001
F Value 3.021
The shaded areas highlight the variables which are significant within the model at a 10% 
level. No significant levels of collinearity were detected.
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Research Question 6
RQe Have Policy Agreements provided ‘value for money’? ‘Value for money’ is defined as 
increased efficiency in service delivery outweighing the ‘costs’ of Policy Agreements where 
cost equals Performance Incentive Grant plus administration costs.
The dependent variable is - One of the objectives of Policy Agreements is to provide ‘top up’ 
funding to local authorities (Q95). All of the independent variables relating to Research 
Question 6 were included in the model as the collinearity statistics illustrated the model was 
within acceptable levels of tolerance.
RESEARCH QUESTION 6 - VALUE FOR MONEY - REGRESSION MODEL
Coefficients(a)
Model
Unstand'ised
Coefficients
T Sig.
B Std.
Error
(Constant) 3.608 0.660 5.468 0.000
The existence of Policy Agreements will help to demonstrate to 
stakeholders that local authorities are providing value for money 
(Q15)
0.027 0.085 0.318 0.751
The cost of collecting information to measure progress towards 
targets does not outweigh the benefits it provides (Q47)
-0.233 0.118 -1.978 0.050
The cost of monitoring the Policy Agreements does not outweigh 
the potential benefits (Q62)
0.048 0.126 0.384 0.701
The cost of the Agreement process, including the available 
funding, is in proportion to the benefits (Q77)
0.004 0.116 0.033 0.974
There has been adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement 
process as a whole when reviewing targets and baselines (Q84)
0.287 0.115 2.496 0.014
Dependent Variable: Provide 'top up' funding to LAs (Q95)(a)
N 123
R Squared 0.092
Adjusted R Squared 0.053
ANOVA Significance 0.043
F Value 2.379
The shaded areas above highlight the significant variables in the model at a 10% level. No 
significant levels of collinearity were detected.
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Appendix S (continued)
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES -  PROCESS OUTCOMES
Research Question 
Survey Question
RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 RQ4
Q45 Authority must work with others to 
achieve the targets
X (Q88)
Q46 Authority has the freedom to 
determine how to achieve 
improvements in its own performance
X (Q88) X (Q89 
&Q90)
Q72 The nature of the evaluation 
protocol supports the concept of 
relating funding to performance
X (Q88)
Q71 The evaluation protocol is fair X (Q94)*
Q86 The role of the Assembly during 
review sessions has been to help local 
authorities constructively improve 
performance
X (Q96) X (Q89 & 
Q90)
Q17 There is a clear link between 
Assembly policy as articulated through 
Policy Agreements and other aspects 
of Assembly policy in respect of local 
government
X (Q90)
Q58 Policy Agreements are a way for 
local authorities and the Assembly to 
work together to improve services
X
Q56 The process of appraising 
performance against targets in the 
context of Policy Agreements is too 
bureaucratic
X
Q61 There has been effective 
communication of feedback between 
the Assembly and local authorities
X
Q1 The authority has linked its Policy 
Agreement to the development of its 
Community Plan
X*
Q27 The agreed targets motivate 
rather than demotivate
X
Q20 The objectives in the Policy 
Agreements have been framed within 
a clear overall strategic vision for 
Wales
X
*= negative relationships between the independent and dependent variables
XCVI
Appendix S (continued) 
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES -  PERFORMANCE IMPACTS
Research Question 
Survey Question
RQ5 RQ6
Q57 The Policy Agreement process 
has raised expectations in terms of 
improved performance which can be 
met
X
Q83 The funding linked to these 
Agreements is an incentive
X
Q47 The costs of collecting information 
to measure progress towards targets 
does not outweigh the benefits it 
provides
X*
Q84 There has been adequate 
consideration of the Policy Agreement 
process as a whole when reviewing 
targets and baselines
X
*= negative relationship between the independent and dependent variable
XCVII
Appendix T
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Part 1 - Objectives of Policy Agreements and Critical Success Factors 
Objectives 
Research Question 1
Did the first round of Policy Agreements help to create a culture of ‘self- 
improvement’ in local authorities? A culture of self-improvement is defined as 
local authorities focusing on outcomes rather than inputs, proactively seeking 
continuous improvement rather than acting on external stimuli such as 
inspection and regulation.
i) Did Policy Agreements focus on local authority results and outcomes rather 
than inputs? (Q88)
ii) Did Policy Agreements create a culture of self- improvement? (Q94)
iii) Did Policy Agreements help to demonstrate that there is no requirement for 
externally driven improvement by inspection and regulation? (Q96)
Research Question 2
Did the first round of Policy Agreements help to change culture in the Welsh 
Assembly Government? A change of culture in the Welsh Assembly 
Government is defined as demonstration of the Assembly Government 
focusing on results and outcomes rather than inputs, i.e. greater discretion for 
local authorities to determine where to deploy resources, fewer requirements 
for local authorities to produce strategies and plans.
i) Did Policy Agreements provide local authorities with discretion to determine 
where to deploy their resources? (Q89)
ii) Did Policy Agreements help to minimise the requirements on local 
authorities to produce strategies and plans? (Q90)
Research Question 3
Did the first round of Policy Agreement process ‘add value’ to the relationship 
between the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities? ‘Added 
value’ is defined as a greater understanding between the parties and more 
effective communication.
i) Did Policy Agreements improve the relationship between the Welsh 
Assembly Government and local authorities? (Q92)
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Research Question 4
Did the first round of Policy Agreements contribute to ‘cohesive’ strategic 
planning at national and local levels? ‘Cohesive’ strategic planning is defined 
as ‘joined-up’ strategic planning between local authorities and the Welsh 
Assembly Government based on shared and agreed priorities.
i) Did Policy Agreements generate greater coherence between local and 
national priorities? (Q91)
Research Question 5
Did the first round of Policy Agreements contribute to improved service 
performance in local authorities? Improved service performance is defined as 
a shift towards meeting or exceeding the targets set out in the Policy 
Agreements.
i) Did Policy Agreements improve local authority performance? (Q93)
Research Question 6
Did the first round of Policy Agreements provide ‘value for money’? ‘Value for 
money’ is defined as increased efficiency in service delivery outweighing the 
‘costs’ of Policy Agreements where cost equals Performance Incentive Grant 
plus administration costs.
i) Did Policy Agreements provide ‘top-up’ funding to local authorities?- (Q95)
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Critical Success Factors
Q45 Did authorities have to work with other organisations to achieve some of 
the targets?
Q46 Did authorities have the freedom to determine how to achieve 
improvements in their own performance?
Q72 Did the nature of the evaluation protocol support the concept of relating 
funding to performance?
Q71 Was the evaluation protocol is ‘fair’?
Q86 Was the role of the Assembly during review sessions to help local 
authorities constructively improve performance?
Q17 Was there a clear link between Assembly policy as articulated through 
Policy Agreements and other aspects of Assembly policy in respect of local 
government?
Q58 Were Policy Agreements a way for local authorities and the Assembly to 
work together to improve services?
Q56 Was the process of appraising performance against targets in the context 
of Policy Agreements too bureaucratic?
Q61 Was there effective communication of feedback between the Assembly 
and local authorities?
Q1 Did (your authority) (authorities) link Policy Agreements to the 
development of (its community plan) (community plans)?
Q27 Did the agreed targets serve to motivate rather than de-motivate?
Q20 Were the objectives in the Policy Agreements framed within a clear 
overall strategic vision for Wales?
Q57 Did the Policy Agreement process raise expectations in terms of 
improved performance which were met?
Q83 Was the funding linked to the Agreements an incentive?
Q47 Was the cost of collecting information to measure progress towards the 
targets in proportion to the benefits?
Q84 Was there adequate consideration of the Policy Agreement process as a 
whole when reviewing targets and baselines?
C
Part 2 — Themes from Literature Review and Analysis of Questionnaires
1. Were Policy Agreements ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ or somewhere in the 
middle?
2. Did the participation feel like partnership -  was the dialogue genuine?
3. What was the impact of Performance Incentive Grant? Did it incentivise 
better performance or would public service ethos, professional pride in 
meeting targets have had the same impact or was this the driving force 
anyway? Was this undermined by the feeling the funding would be 
forthcoming no matter what the performance?
4. Was the impact of Policy Agreements the same across the board -  same in 
all authorities? Same for corporate teams as for service managers? Same for 
elected members as for officers?
5. Did the process change relationships? Create a shared dialogue? Was it as 
important as the funding?
6. Did the process feel different to any knowledge/impressions you may have 
of similar initiatives in England -  if so why?
7. How did you perceive the role of the Welsh Assembly Government -  was it 
supportive helping you to improve performance, encouraging and challenging 
or was it constricting you to a particular course of action, blocking unhelpful?
8. Did Policy Agreements feel part of a coherent approach to local 
government policy and performance by the Welsh Assembly Government?
9. Did Policy Agreements feel like a performance related pay scheme?
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Appendix U - POLICY AGREEMENT RESULTS 2003-04
2.2 2003/04 2.4 (a,b,c&d) 2.7
Percentage of pupils in schools maintained by the 
authority in the previous summer achieving 5 or 
more GCSEs at grades A*-C or the vocational 
equivalent.
Percentage of 11 year olds in schools maintained 
by the authority in the previous summer achieving: 
Level 4 or above in the National Curriculum Key 
Stage 2
Percentage of 15/16-year-olds leaving full-time 
education without a recognised qualification.
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Blaenau Gwent 36% 74% 42% 43% 84% 1% 50% 80% 55% 72% 89% 17% 5% 142.3% 2% 2% 64% -3.29%
Bridgend 46% 94% 55% 48% 95% -7% 59% 94% 68% 80% 99% 12% 74 pups 67 pups 2% 92%
Caerphilly 40% 82% 49% 45% 87% -4% 59% 94% 65% 79% 98% 14% 4% 119.1% 4% 4% 144% -0.48%
Cardiff 45% 92% 50% 48% 94% -2% 62% 99% 70% 83% 104% 13% 238pus 131 pus 5% 190%
Carmarthenshire 52% 107% 66% 54% 106% -12% 63% 101% 69% 78% 98% 9% 2% 58.09% 1% 3% 109% 0.74%
Ceredigion 60% 123% 62% 63% 122% 1% 66% 106% 70% 79% 99% 9% 7 pupils 5 pupils 1% 49%
Conwy 55% 113% 58% 52% 101% -6% 64% 103% 67% 83% 104% 16% 2% 58.09% 2% 2% 69% -0.27%
Denbighshire 48% 98% 57% 47% 91% -10% 60% 96% 65% 79% 98% 14% 27 pups 25 pups 3% 114%
Flintshire 50% 102% 53% 53% 104% 0% 63% 101% 67% 82% 102% 15% 40 pups 14 pups 3% 106%
Gwynedd 56% 115% 59% 61% 120% 3% 62% 99% 66% 79% 98% 13% 2% 43.57% 1% 0% 15% -1.13%
Isle of Anglesey 49% 100% 56% 56% 110% 0% 63% 101% 64% 76% 95% 12% 4% 101.7% 2% 1% 24% -2.90%
Merthyr Tydfil 41% 84% 50% 43% 84% -7% 63% 100% 66% 75% 94% 9% 10% 290.5% 6% 4% 155% -6.11%
Monmouthshire 54% 111% 58% 52% 102% -6% 70% 112% 75% 85% 106% 10% 1% 29.05% >1% 3% 127% 2.18%
Neath Port Talbot 49% 100% 52% 52% 101% 0% 63% 101% 65% 79% 98% 14% 30 pups 2600% 3% 103%
Newport 42% 86% 46% 46% 90% 0% 61% 98% 64% 81% 101% 17% 6% 165.6% 3% 1% 59% -4.22%
Pembrokeshire 52% 107% 53% 52% 102% -1% 68% 108% 71% 81% 101% 10% 2% 58.09% 2% 2% 66% -0.35%
Powys 56% 115% 58% 63% 122% 5% 64% 103% 69% 85% 106% 16% 1% 29.05% 1% 2% 61% 0.53%
RCTf 45% 92% 50% 46% 90% -4% 61% 97% 65% 80% 99% 15% 4% 116.2% 3% 4% 161% 0.03%
Swansea 51% 104% 55% 49% 95% -7% 65% 104% 65% 83% 104% 18% 5% 130.2% 3% 4% 155% -0.60%
Vale of Glamorgan 58% 119% 58% 62% 121% 4% 67% 107% 68% 86% 107% 18% 2% 58.09% 2% 2% 80% 0.00%
Torfaen 45% 92% 51% 49% 96% -2% 58% 93% 64% 80% 100% 16% 14 pups 12 pups 3% 120%
Wrexham 44% 90% 50% 42% 83% -8% 62% 100% 70% 80% 100% 10% 41 pups 37 pups 3% 137%
Average 49% 51% 62% 80% 3.44% 2.51%
% Improvement 5% 28%
27.11%
Cll
2.14
The percentage of attendance, those present or on 
approved educational activities, in secondary 
schools.
3aseline %WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Av
Baseline
Av
Actual
Blaenau Gwent 88% 97% 91% 90% 99% -1% 77% 87%
Bridqend 90% 100% 91% 92% 101% 0% 94% 97%
Caerphillv 89% 98% 90% 89% 99% -1% 88% 93%
Cardiff 88% 97% 90% 89% 98% -1% 95% 99%
Carmarthenshire 91% 101% 91% 91% 100% 0% 104% 102%
Cerediqion 91% 101% 94% 91% 101% -3% 114% 111%
Conwv 90% 100% 92% 91% 100% -1% 108% 102%
Denbiqhshire 91% 101% 92% 90% 99% -2% 97% 95%
Flintshire 91% 101% 91% 91% 101% 0% 102% 103%
Gwvnedd 92% 102% 92% 92% 101% 0% 107% 109%
Isle of Anqlesev 91% 101% 92% 90% 100% -2% 101% 102%
Merthvr Tvdfil 90% 99% 91% 90% 99% -1% 92% 89%
Monmouthshire 91% 101% 93% 91% 101% -1% 111% 104%
Neath Port Talbot 90% 100% 91% 92% 101% 1% 101% 100%
Newport 90% 99% 90% 90% 99% -1% 92% 95%
Pembrokeshire 92% 102% 93% 91% 101% -1% 107% 102%
Powvs *0.4% 0% 92% 102% 109% 114%
RCT 89% 99% 91% 90% 99% -1% 95% 95%
Swansea A1.9% 2% 89% 98% 104% 99%
Vale of Glamoroan 90% 100% 92% 92% 101% 0% 113% 114%
Torfaen 91% 101% 94% 90% 99% -4% 93% 98%
Wrexham 90% 100% 91% 91% 101% 0% 95% 91%
Averaqe 90% 91%
% Improvement 1%
cm
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inuing ca
Deople in 
Dare plan 
re
care on 
and/ or
their
pathway
The percentage of first placements (for looked after 
children) beginning with a care plan in place.
The rate of older people (aged 65 or over) helped to 
live at home per 1,000 population aged 65 or over.
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
90% 110% 100% 91% 99% -9% 72% 128% 95% 61% 76% -34% 109.00 120% 109.00 113.31 102% 4.31 Blaenau Gwent
85% 103% 95% 94% 102% -1% 67% 118% 95% 76% 96% -19 % J 90.59j 99% 87.50 127.71 115% 40.21 Bridgend
91% 111% 100% 100% 109% 0% 7% 12% 95% 60% 75% -35% 102.70 113% 107.00 85.35 77% -21.65 Caerphilly
76% 93% 100% 95% 104% -5% 20% 35% 100% 74% 93% -26% 73.60 81% 75.90 95.64 86% 19.74 Cardiff
100% 122% 100% 100% 109% 0% 31% 55% 98% 100% 126% 2% 175.00 192% 135.00 94.17 85% -40.83 Carmarthenshire
78% 95% 100% 50% 55% -50% 43% 76% 98% 100% 126% 3% 82.77 91% 86.50 123.20 111% 36.70 Ceredigion
100% 122% 100% 100% 109% 0% 50% 89% 95% 48% 60% -47% 54.37 60% 112.50 89.88 81% -22.62 Conwy
63% 76% 100% 30% 33% -70% 85% 151% 95% 58% 73% -37% 90.00 99% 98.00 122.35 110% 24.35 Denbighshire
100% 122% 100% 100% 109% 0% 83% 147% 100% 58% 72% -42% 47.90 53% 47.90 79.22 71% 31.32 Flintshire
60% 73% 100% 88% 96% -12% 34% 60% 95% 77% 96% -19% 73.541 81% 75.69 58.20 52% -17.49 Gwynedd
58% 71% 100% 100% 109% 0% 78% 138% 95% 73% 92% -22% 90.00 99% 111.00 154.47 139% 43.47 Isle of Anglesey
55% 67% 95% 100% 109% 5% 0% 0% 95% 100% 126% 5% 117.54 129% 123.00 137.03 124% 14.03 Merthyr Tydfil
90% 110% 95% 100% 109% 5% 90% 160% 95% 94% 118% -1% 113.90 125% 114.20 149.11 134% 34.91 Monmouthshire
93% 114% 100% 100% 109% 0% 55% 98% 95% 99% 125% 4% 119.72 131% 122.00 153.06 138% 31.06 Neath Port Talbot
71% 87% 98% 100% 109% 3% 88% 156% 95% 100% 126% 5% 48.77 53% 52.50 123.45 111% 70.95 Newport
100% 122% 100% 100% 109% 0% 50% 89% 100% 98% 123% -2% 87.90 96% 100.00 106.54 96% 6.54 Pembrokeshire
25% 31% 100% 86% 94% -14% 92% 163% 92% 51% 64% -41% 98.93 108% 99.50 72.35 65% -27.15 Powys
100% 122% 100% 90% 98% -10% 34% 60% 95% 71% 89% -24% 96.58 106% 101.00 122.50 110% 21.50 Rhondda Cynon 
Taff
67% 82% 100% 100% 109% 0% 37% 66% 95% 69% 86% -27% 109.60 120% 112.40 169.14 153% 56.74 Swansea
100% 122% 100% 100% 109% 0% 97% 172% 98% 100% 126% 2% 41.00 45% 43.00 77.86 70% 34.86 Vale of Glamorgan
100% 122% 100% 94% 102% -6% 100% 177% 100% 88% 111% -12% 47.00 52% 65.00 117.44 106% 52.44 Torfaen
100% 122% 100% 100% 109% 0% 28% 50% 95% 97% 122% 2% 136.00 149% 112.50 67.20 61% -45.30 Wrexham
82% 92% 56% 80% 91.20 110.87 Average
12% 41% 22% % Improvement
CIV
3.8 3.9 3.13 I
The rate of delayed transfer of care for social care 
reasons per 1,000 population aged 75 or over.
The percentage of adult clients receiving a written 
statement of their needs and how they will be met.
The number of people aged 65 or over whom the 
authority supports in residential care homes or 
nursing homes per 1,000 population aged 65 or 
over
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
74.00 423% 62.00 67.93 406% 5.93 81% 97% 92% 84% 92% -8% 37.21 131% 30.25 39.18 134% 8.93 Blaenau Gwent
? 13.00 3.73 22% -9.27 90% 107% 95% 88% 97% -7% 27.00 95% 27.00 31.02 106% 4.02 Bridgend
1.24 7% 1.24 47.54 284% 46.30 100% 119% 100% 93% 102% -7% 24.00 84% 24.00 26.89 92% 2.89 Caerphilly
17.40 99% 11.50 13.84 83% 2.34 59% 70% 95% 87% 96% -8% 27.00 95% 27.00 27.23 93% 0.23 Cardiff
39.10 223% 20.00 38.00 227% 18.00 79% 94% 100% 78% 86% -22% 30.76 108% 26.00 28.08 96% 2.08 Carmarthenshire
26.14 149% 17.00 13.00 78% -4.00 50% 60% 100% 100% 110% 0% 28.23 99% 28.50 26.28 90% -2.22 Ceredigion
14.00 80% 14.00 0.16 1% -13.84 100% 119% 100% 87% 96% -13% 29.10 102% 27.00 30.91 106% 3.91 Conwy
2.53 14% 2.53 1.34 8% -1.19 85% 101% 100% 100% 110% 0% 24.00 84% 22.00 32.93 112% 10.93 Denbighshire
12.50 71% 12.50 3.60 22% -8.90 81% 97% 98% 96% 106% -2% 27.80 98% 27.80 31.28 107% 3.48 Flintshire
22.22 127% 15.00 2.61 16% -12.39 94% 112% 97% 99% 109% 2% 40.01 141% 39.57 35.81 122% -3.76 Gwynedd
15.00 86% 10.00 2.00 12% -8.00 88% 105% 98% 98% 108% 0% 33.06 116% 27.75 31.62 108% 3.87 Isle of Anglesey
3.10 18% 1.10 1.68 10% 0.58 88% 104% 100% 100% 110% 0% 34.94 123% 27.50 31.60 108% 4.10 Merthyr Tydfil
18.92 108% 12.50 10.71 64% -1.79 100% 119% 100% 67% 74% -33% 19.50 69% 19.20 20.47 70% 1.27 Monmouthshire
19.50 111% 15.00 8.33 50% -6.67 60% 72% 100% 90% 99% -10% 30.48 107% 28.90 28.86 99% -0.04 Neath Port Talbot
5.00 29% 5.00 31.50 188% 26.50 100% 119% 100% 100% 110% 0% 29.39 103% 27.00 29.92 102% 2.92 Newport
18.80 107% 15.00 10.49 63% -4.51 100% 119% 100% 100% 110% 0% 24.48 86% 24.00 24.06 82% 0.06 Pembrokeshire
24.00 137% ? 16.68 100% 100% 119% 100% 100% 110% 0% 19.48 69% 20.00 22.69 77% 2.69 Powys
33.96 194% 14.00 6.35 38% -7.65 60% 72% 95% 79% 87% -16% 32.14 113% 32.00 31.21 107% -0.79 Rhondda Cynon 
Taff
20.20 115% 15.00 16.35 98% 1.35 78% 93% 100% 85% 94% -15% 28.60 101% 26.60 32.10 110% 5.50 Swansea
3.50 20% 1.29 6.26 37% 4.97 90% 107% 100% 95% 105% -5% 25.00 88% 27.00 28.20 96% 1.20 Vale of Glamorgan
37.00 211% 30.00 53.51 320% 23.51 80% 96% 100% 82% 90% -18% 25.00 88% 22.00 27.29 93% 5.29 Torfaen
16.00 91% 12.50 12.50 75% 0.00 81% 97% 100% 92% 101% -8% 27.90 98% 28.00 26.84 92% -1.16 Wrexham
17.51 16.73 84% 91% 28.41 29.29
-4% 9% 3%
cv
3.14(a) 3.14 (b) | 3.14 (c)
The number of ph 
aged under 65 wf 
home per 1,000 a
ysical or sensory disabled adults 
10m the authority helps to live at 
dults under 65.
The number of learning disabled adults aged under 
65 whom the authority helps to live at home per 
1,000 adults under 65.
The number of adults with mental health problems 
aged under 65 whom the authority helps to live at 
home per 1,000 adults under 65.
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
8.23 223% 3.39 8.73 137% 5.34 4.98 152% 4.98 5.83 138% 0.85 3.15 125% 3.15 4.27 103% 1.12 Blaenau Gwent
3.88 105% 3.70 9.85 155% 6.15 4.53 138% 4.70 5.09 120% 0.39 2.40 95% 2.70 3.42 83% 0.72 Bridgend
5.20 141% 5.46 2.90 46% -2.56 1.50 46% 1.86 3.48 82% 1.62 0.80 32% 0.84 1.43 35% 0.59 Caerphilly
3.92 106% 4.04 5.66 89% 1.62 1.91 58% 1.96 3.05 72% 1.09 0.49 19% 0.50 1.50 36% 1.00 Cardiff
9.06 246% 9.00 3.55 56% -5.45 2.86 87% 3.50 3.26 77% -0.24 0.97 38%j 3.00 2.35 57% -0.65 Carmarthenshire
1.41 38% 3.00 8.51 134% 5.51 2.80 86% 3.20 3.57 84% 0.37 4.70 186% 5.20 3.12 75% -2.08 Ceredigion
2.47 67% 2.50 6.51 102% 4.01 2.98 91% 3.00 5.15 122% 2.15 1.46 58% 3.00 4.15 100% 1.15 Conwy
3.46 94% 3.46 5.34 84% 1.88 2.22 68% 5.00 3.59 85% -1.41 5.25 208% 5.25 4.75 115% -0.50 Denbighshire
1.79 49% 1.79 4.72 74% 2.93 3.89 119% 3.89 3.16 75% -0.73 2.62 104% 2.62 4.41 107% 1.79 Flintshire
2.72 74% 2.77 3.18 50% 0.41 4.02 123% 4.69 3.78 89% -0.91 2.72 108% 2.91 2.25 54% -0.66 Gwynedd
2.28 62% 4.18 26.32 414% 22.14 3.44 105% 3.97 9.50 224% 5.53 4.52 179% 4.52 20.84 504% 16.32 Isle of Anglesey
7.86 213% 9.00 9.80 154% 0.80 3.37 103% 3.50 3.47 82% -0.03 5.11 202% 6.00 4.78 116% -1.22 Merthyr Tydfil
3.66 99% 4.00 3.74 59% -0.26 3.50 107% 3.61 6.85 162% 3.24 2.90 115% 3.20 4.70 114% 1.50 Monmouthshire
4.18 113% 4.70 5.43 85% 0.73 3.97 121% 4.00 3.99 94% -0.01 3.25 129% 3.60 4.35 105% 0.75 Neath Port Talbot
1.75 47% 1.90 6.67 105% 4.77 2.13 65% 2.30 4.21 99% 1.91 0.99 39% 1.10 2.19 53% 1.09 Newport
1.26 34% 2.00 3.15 50% 1.15 3.56 109% 3.80 3.62 85% -0.18 1.86 74% 2.50 1.41 34% -1.09 Pembrokeshire
1.66 45% 1.75 2.78 44% 1.03 5.07 155% 5.05 4.16 98% -0.89 0.95 38% 0.95 1.86 45% 0.91 Powys
1.33 36% 3.00 6.80 107% 3.80 3.38 103% 3.38 4.48 106% 1.10 2.41 95% 2.50 3.27 79% 0.77 Rhondda Cynon 
Taff
3.70 100% 4.00 5.30 83% 1.30 3.40 104% 3.70 3.19 75% -0.51 2.20 87% 3.00 5.67 137% 2.67 Swansea
2.80 76% 3.20 5.10 80% 1.90 2.50 76% 3.50 2.73 64% -0.77 3.00 119% 3.40 2.39 58% -1.01 Vale of Glamorgan
3.09 84% 3.50 2.34 37% -1.16 2.85 87% 2.90 3.29 78% 0.39 1.21 48% 1.27 2.61 63% 1.34 Torfaen
5.37 146% 4.00 3.59 56% -0.41 3.10 95% 4.25 3.80 90% -0.45 2.68 106% 4.25 5.25 127% 1.00 Wrexham
3.69 6.36 3.27 4.24 2.53 4.14
73% 30% 63%
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The percentage of cases 
with an allocated social wc 
service appropriate to the 
those children in group (a)
Df children looked after 
)rker who is providing a 
child's need (exclude 
above)
Av
Base
Child
Av
Actual
Child
Av
Base
Adults
Av
Actual
Adults
Av
Base
Older
People
Av
Actual
Older
People
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Base
line
%WA
Bline
Target Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
100% 107% 100% 90% 91% -0.11 45% 47% 100% 82% 84% -18% 119% 88% 167% 126% 125% 118% Blaenau Gwent
100% 107% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 99% 104% 100% 99% 100% -1% 111% 99% 113% 119% 97% 111% Bridgend
100% 107% 100% 99% 101% -0.01 97% 102% 100% 100% 102% 0% 62% 92% 73% 54% 99% 84% Caerphilly
100% 107% 100% 85% 87% -0.15 100% 105% 100% 98% 99% -2% 64% 98% 61% 66% 88% 90% Cardiff
100% 107% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 100% 105% 100% 100% 102% 0% 89% 117% 124% 63% 150% 90% Carmarthenshire
95% 102% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 92% 97% 100% 100% 102% 0% 86% 90% 103% 98% 95% 100% Cerediqion
100% 107% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 100% 105% 100% 100% 102% 0% 105% 85% 72% 108% 81% 93% Conwy
98% 100% 100% 105% 100% 92% 94% -8% 114% 53% 123% 95% 92% 111% Denbighshire
75% 80% 95% 100% 102% 0.05 100% 105% 100% 100% 102% 0% 135% 91% 90% 85% 75% 89% Flintshire
100% 107% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 93% 98% 100% 100% 102% 0% 67% 96% 101% 65% 111% 87% Gwynedd
100% 107% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 100% 105% 100% 100% 102% 0% 105% 101% 115% 381% 108% 124% Isle of Anglesey
100% 102% 100% 105% 100% 100% 102% 0% 34% 117% 173% 117% 126% 116% Merthyr Tydfil
100% 107% 100%j 100% 102% 0.00 100% 105% 100% 100% 102% 0% 135% 114% 107% 111% 97% 102% Monmouthshire
94% 101% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 97% 102% 100% 100% 102% 0% 106% 117% 121% 95% 119% 118% Neath Port Talbot
97% 104% 98% 100% 102% 0.03 97% 102% 97% 100% 102% 3% 122% 117% 51% 86% 78% 107% Newport
90% 96% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 90% 95% 100% 100% 102% 0% 105% 116% 72% 56% 91% 89% Pembrokeshire
98% 100% 100% 105% 100% 99% 101% -1% 97% 79% 79% 62% 89% 71% Powys
100% 107% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 95% 100% 100% 98% 99% -2% 91% 93% 78% 97% 110% 109% Rhondda Cynon 
Taff
99% 101% 100% 105% 100% 99% 100% -1% 74% 98% 97% 99% 110% 131% Swansea
80% 86% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 80% 84% 100% 97% 99% -3% 147% 117% 90% 67% 66% 83% Vale of Glamorgan
100% 107% 100% 100% 102% 0.00 100% 105% 100% 100% 102% 0% 150% 107% 73% 59% 70% 100% Torfaen
100% 107% 100% 83% 85% -0.17 100% 105% 100% 100% 102% 0% 86% 115% 115% 91% 124% 76% Wrexham
93% 98% 95% 98%
5% 4%
CVII
>.1 (a) i and (b)
Total tonnage of municipal waste arisings: 
percentage recycled, reused or composted
EBaseline %WA ‘ 
Bline
rarget Actual %WA
Actual
+/-
Target
Blaenau Gwent 4.71% 69% 15.00% 14.18% 86% -0.82%
Bridgend 6.26% 92% 22.00% 15.32% 93% -6.68%
Caerphilly 5.00% 73% 15.00% 19.27% 117% 4.27%
Cardiff 4.80% 70% 13.00% 14.20% 86% 1.20%
Carmarthenshire 5.50% 81% 20.00% 13.63% 83% -6.37%
Ceredigion 12.18% 178% 15.00% 26.45% 161% 11.45%
Conwy 13.00% 190% 15.00% 17.91% 109% 2.91%
Denbighshire 4.20% 62% 15.00% 13.11% 80% -1.89%
Flintshire 7.00% 103% 14.00% 16.00% 97% 2.00%
Gwynedd 5.70% 83% 12.00% 17.15% 104% 5.15%
Isle of Anglesey 2.70% 40% 15.00% 12.91% 78% -2.09%
Merthyr Tydfil 3.49% 51% 15.00% 13.60% 83% -1.40%
Monmouthshire 9.00% 132% 18.00% 15.87% 96% -2.13%
Neath Port Talbot 6.30% 92% 22.00% 10.00% 61% -12.00%
Newport 6.48% 95% 12.00% 19.63% 119% 7.63%
Pembrokeshire 11.51% 169% 15.00% 15.50% 94% 0.50%
Powys 9.00% 132% 25.00% 27.97% 170% 2.97%
Rhondda Cynon 
Taff
6.00% 88% 15.00% 10.85% 66% -4.15%
Swansea 7.20% 105% 15.00% 19.76% 120% 4.76%
The Vale of 
Glamorgan
12.00% 176% 15.00% 21.14% 129% 6.14%
Torfaen 5.20% 76% 15.00% 15.60% 95% 0.60%
Wrexham 3.00% 44% 10.00% 11.84% 72% 1.84%
Average 6.83% 16.45%
% Improvement 141%
CVIII
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